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Summary of Thesis
This dissertation seeks to contribute to the development of the comparative study of 
international commercial arbitration by focusing on the Middle Eastern experience in 
commercial dispute resolution. Theoretical and practical criticism is offered and 
suggestions for an improved regional legislative framework are made.
With the ever-increasing importance of international trade to Middle Eastern 
countries, research upon the effective dispute resolution mechanisms of commercial 
arbitration has become imperative. The process of harmonisation of commercial 
arbitration has become the subject of wider international and regional research 
studies, and the aim of this work is to contribute to the field in the context of the 
Middle Eastern region. This thesis examines “regionalism” and the process of 
harmonisation in international commercial arbitration. Within the philosophical 
framework of international commercial arbitration, international contract principles 
and dispute resolution mechanisms, the objective is to analyse existing cultural 
deviations and boundaries, and ascertain how these have prevented effective law 
reform within the region itself, obstructing the harmonisation process.
Despite regional variations, in practice the process, of harmonisation is essential if the 
Middle East is to benefit from and participate in the phenomenon of globalisation. 
Whilst regional culture has become increasingly significant, harmonisation of 
commercial arbitration has become more urgent.
The thesis argues that harmonisation with the international commercial arbitration 
Model Law can be achieved when the concept of regionalism is taken into 
consideration. Different aspects manifested within regionalism regarded as legal 
cultural deviation can be accommodated, making for an efficient arbitration law 
reform in accordance with the international accepted substantive and procedural 
principles of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
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Maliki: One of the four Sunni schools of law, founded by Mali Ibn Anas.
Manhaj: Pathway: set of general rules that are followed by researchers.
Masalah: Interest.
Madhhab: Rite.
Mazalim: Plural of Mazalama, a grievance or injustice. Refers to a special legal 
procedure invoking the direct authority of the sovereign to review all judgements and 
right all wrongs without being bound by Shar’ia rules of procedure or evidence. 
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Min Muqtadayat Al-‘aqd: The contract purpose.
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MuPam lil-‘aqd: Appropriate to the contract.
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Musalaha: Reconciliation.
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important source of Islamic Jurisprudence.
Rabia’ al Awwal: Islamic Calendar month usually between (April and May)
Riba: Interest.
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adopted his school of though.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
“The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration was adopted 
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on 21
thJune 1985, at the close of the Commission’s 18 annual session. The General 
Assembly, in its resolution 40/72 of 11 December 1985, recommended “that all States 
give due consideration to the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, in 
view of the desirability of uniformity of the law of arbitral procedures and the specific 
needs of international commercial arbitration practice.”1
The Model Law constitutes a sound and promising basis for the desired harmonisation 
and improvement of national laws. It covers all stages of the arbitral process from the 
arbitration agreement to the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award and 
reflects a worldwide consensus on the principles and important issues of international 
arbitration practice. It is acceptable to states of all regions and different legal or 
economic systems of the world.
The form of a Model Law was chosen as the vehicle for harmonisation and 
improvement in view of the flexibility it gives to States in preparing new arbitration 
laws. It is advisable to follow the model as closely as possible since that would be the 
best contribution to desired harmonisation and be in the best interests of the users of 
international arbitration, who are primarily foreign parties and their lawyers.
This thesis is about harmonisation of international commercial arbitration laws with 
reference to the Middle East region. The legitimacy of this research is based on the 
fact that the importance of international commercial arbitration is being increasingly 
recognised in today’s global economy. In the mid-Nineteenth Century in Europe and 
US, arbitration was regarded as a “bastard remedy” and arbitrators as “caricatures of 
their judicial sibling.”4 However, with the increased boost of international business
1 Explanatory note (1) by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration.
2 Explanatory note (2) by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration.
3 Explanatory note (3) by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration.
4 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of due Process in American Law, 70 Tul. 
L. Rev. 1945, 1947 (1996). The precise reasons for the common law hostility towards arbitration are 
unknown, but some scholars surmise that they trace back to English judges’ almost complete reliance 
on fees from cases for their income, which meant that arbitrators were unwelcome competitors. See 
John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreement and Antitrust Claims: the Need for Enhanced Accommodations 
of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C.L. Rev. 219 224 (1986). A second possible reason is the
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across national boundaries whether in areas of international trade and investment, 
international arbitration as the global preferred method for resolving international 
commercial disputes cannot be overemphasised:
“Today, the scene has changed; almost all international agreements 
contain arbitration clauses. International arbitration holds an exalted 
status and is commonly revered as vital to world trade. The trends of 
the world economy and the potential of international business are 
matters of concern for eveiy national country”.5
Not surprisingly, tremendous efforts have been made to ensure that national 
legislations fit within the accepted global standard system as provided by the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. Therefore, any nation interested in the global economy 
should adjust its law to accommodate the demand of international arbitration. Thus, 
“International arbitration has transformed itself from a ‘bastard remedy’ to ‘crown 
prince’ of international dispute resolution”.6 The main concern remains to establish 
universal acceptance of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
1.2 Analytical Framework
Epistemology about harmonisation of international law - in general - has emphasised 
the great influence of “differences of legal culture” on the harmonisation process of 
international law. T.O. Elias, President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 1981 
to 1985, has explored how “differences in legal culture” might affect the behaviour of 
international entities in any attempt to harmonise international law.
To analyse the impact of different legal cultures between the Developed and 
Developing Countries, Elias investigated how the relationship between North and 
South countries in its political, economic and social aspects can influence attitudes 
towards various rules of international law. He explored the impact of implementing
n
GATT rules and regulations in respect of the exercise of sovereign rights of states.
centuries-long struggle by the early courts for jurisdiction and their consequent unwillingness to 
surrender it. See Catherine A. Rogers, (2002). Fit and function in Legal ethics: Developing a code of 
conduct for international arbitration. Michigan Journal of International Law p. 4
5 (Rogers, C.2002).
6 (Rogers, C.2002).
7 See T.O. Elias, (1992). New Horizons in International Law. Matrinus Nijhoff, London, pp. 212-216.
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He concluded that: “ it is important, however to distinguish conflicts of interest from 
conflicts of values, and conflicts of power, a distinction not often made in discussing 
problems of international trade and disposal of natural wealth and resources. A 
conflict of values produces a stalemate but conflicts of interest and power are subject 
to certain dynamic political and social forces, which today are overwhelming agents 
of process and evolution”. Therefore, Elias sought to answer his research question by 
examining the macro aspects of different societies, indicating how they give meaning 
and influence the different legal attitudes, and finally highlighting the social forces 
behind legal behaviour.
Bedjaoui, another former president of the (ICJ) has analysed the historical experiences 
of both parties to international contracts, and how different legal cultures have led to 
very different interpretations of international rules and available remedies.
He critically analysed the 1970s campaign within the UN for achieving what became 
known as the New International Economic Order (NIEO). In his analysis he showed 
how economic and political aspects influenced the attitude of countries of the South to 
achieve certain rules of international law regarding natural resources and economic 
affairs.9 He explored how legal culture affects an understanding of the international 
law-making process, highlighting how the argument of Western origin of international 
law has been used for the suggestion of further development of international law.
An analysis of “differences in legal culture” helped these two influential international 
law scholars to establish an analytical framework which enabled them to gain in-depth 
understanding, and to show how shared social values affect attitudes towards 
international law in general.
Based on the aforementioned epistemological studies, this research will be conducted 
employing the comparative law approach and examining cultural values and their 
interaction with the legal system. This analytical framework is intended to examine, 
discuss, and analyse pre-existing international arbitration law to determine, 
understand and interpret social forces behind the attitudes and behaviours towards 
harmonisation of international commercial arbitration. This interpretation will be 
based on social and political dimensions. The best rationale for this analytical 
framework is provided by Kurt Sontheimer:
8 Ibid.
9 See Bedjaoui Mohammad, (1979). Towards a New International Economic Order. New York, Holmes 
& Meier, pp. 167- 187.
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“Every political culture is connected to a certain part of a tradition which 
came into being in history and has sustained its existence till the current 
time. A political culture in a particular society rooted in the sustainability 
of historic, political consciousness and behaviour manners, which has a 
part to play, more or less, in history and moment. Our interest in history 
firstly arises from our wish to know what has been extended from the past 
till the current time and to what degree we can realise reasons in history for 
contemporary phenomena.”10
1.3 Research Statement (Problems, Aims, Purposes and Challenges)
In an era of globalisation, Middle Eastern countries are obliged to establish efficient 
and promising economic policies in order to meet the needs of their citizenry. They 
must ensure that such policy is well developed to fit within the international system. 
The aim should be to engage effectively in international trade and to promote foreign 
direct investment. Otherwise, the legal framework will lag behind the expectation at 
the domestic and international level. In this context, an international commercial 
dispute resolution mechanism is considered an area of high concern for national 
corporations as well as multinationals and transnational corporations.
Despite the Middle East’s importance in terms of economic trade and the uniqueness 
of its legal system based on Islamic Law and other multilayered legal systems in an 
era of globalisation, a review of the literature reveals scant attention paid to this 
region. Existing studies have focused mainly on differences in legal culture between 
common law family in the UK and US and civil law family in Continental Europe, 
and other regions, for example, Latin America, East Asia and Africa.
Research studies in regard to harmonisation of international commercial arbitration 
law in the Middle East region have not previously been carried out. There are 
knowledge gaps; therefore, the research aim is to add the Middle East perspectives to 
the extant literature. Moreover, the research will emphasise the significance of 
examining the impact of legal cultures on attempts to harmonise international 
commercial law.
10 See Mi Jian, (2002). Chinese Legal Culture: In a Western Scholar’s Eyes. Journal o f the History of 
International Law vol. 4 pp. 167-168. Kluwer Law International.
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The research aims to examine the impact of regionalism on establishing a harmonised 
international commercial arbitration law in the Middle East. In so doing, the work 
seeks to examine and evaluate the regulation environment in the Middle East in the 
context of certain legal, historical, social, political and economic factors which 
influence law reform.
The study also aims to contribute to the general understanding of the social and legal 
theory of commercial arbitration which exists in the Middle East and explore how it 
interacts with the international standard of commercial arbitration in attempts to 
enhance the harmonisation process of international commercial arbitration.
Thus, the work aims to provide policy makers with a comprehensive understanding of 
what arbitration law reform is required. Further, it aims to provide a comprehensive 
paradigm for international commercial arbitration law reform in the Middle East and 
to offer a practical mechanism to establish such reform.
Several challenges faced the researcher in his endeavour to achieve comprehensive 
research. First, after the tragic events of September 11, calls for critique, evaluation 
and reform in the Middle East were viewed with suspicion and became highly 
sensitive political issues. Calls for reform aroused hostility from among those 
fervently committed to Islamic factions and their supporters. Reform and legislative 
environment was and is viewed less sympathetically if it is related to Western models. 
Second, the Middle East region is not a coherent whole. It has inconsistent 
multilayered legislations, different jurisprudences, historical backgrounds and 
political systems which made this research particularly challenging.
At the outset, there was a choice of two possible research approaches to examine 
international commercial law reform. The first was to compare the existing 
commercial arbitration laws in the Middle East to the UNCITRAL Model Law as a 
tool for reform. The second was to compare and scrutinise every detail of 
jurisdictional differences separating the Middle East and the West. Taking into 
consideration that their two legal systems are shaped differently as a result of different 
customs and attitudes, the latter option was chosen.
This choice allows for more comprehensive presentation and understanding of 
commercial law reform in its legal, social, economic and political contexts. For this 
reason, John Austin’s legal philosophy of positivism will be used.
5
Because the Middle East is facing waves of different political and religious factions, 
countries in the region are in process of social, political and economic transition. 
Those fervently committed to Islamic factions are seeking to advocate Islam not only 
as a religion but also as the primary influential element in every aspect of life. Such 
intention inevitably makes Islamic Law a major focus of attention of this research for 
critique and analysis.
Another area of concern is that public policy and legislative process is invariably 
politically influenced, and critique might be viewed as antagonistic to the state or 
government concerned. Accordingly, the research is required to address several main 
areas, namely, culture, Islamic Law, and public policy issues. Any evaluation might 
be viewed as politically motivated.
It is therefore not surprising that in-depth studies in the research field are relatively 
rare, and, where they do exist, deal with the study topic at the national country level 
and descriptive rather than evaluative. For these reasons, understandably, research in 
the present study area is inadequate and insufficient.
1.4 Scope Of The Thesis And Its Hypothesis
The Middle East region usually refers to Arab and non-Arab states (mainly Turkey, 
Iran and Israel). It is important to emphasise that the scope of the research will cover 
only the Arab Middle Eastern states. The reason for this limitation is that these states 
share the same historical, cultural, economic as well as geographical factors.
Turkey for example, has deep historical connections with Europe, principally because 
it was the heart of the Byzantine Empire. Turkey has been a long-time member of 
NATO and also sees itself as a prospective candidate for European Union 
membership. Furthermore, Turkey has adopted the secular traits in government that 
predominate in Europe and the West in general.11
Because its relationship with the Arab Middle Eastern states is based upon religion 
and geographic proximity, Iran is sometimes included in the Middle East region. 
However, Iran differs in terms of its Islamic Madhhab from the rest of the Arab 
Middle Eastern states as Iran follows mainly the Shi’ite doctrine.
11 See www. W ikipedia.net
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Due to geographic reality Israel is sometimes considered a Middle Eastern state, but 
does not share similarities with the other Arab Middle Eastern states in terms of 
history, religion, or economy.
Finally, the scope of the research will focus upon those Arab states which are 
members of the Arab League, this being the principal Middle East regional 
organisation.
The analytical framework and research statement help to define the scope of the 
research and its hypothesis. This study will seek to examine the hypothesis that 
regionalism can affect the success or otherwise of the establishment of a framework 
for harmonisation of international commercial arbitration, and influence the process 
of harmonisation. The study attempts to answer three main research questions: First, 
to what extent does the Middle East region have different concepts of international 
commercial arbitration? Second, what is the legislative environment in regard to 
conducting law reform? Finally, does, and if so how, this region comply with 
international commercial arbitration concepts different from its own?
In so doing, this thesis seeks to identify the underlying factors that influence the 
attitude of Middle East countries towards commercial arbitration law reform as well 
as certain peculiar problems or limitations of these countries that prevent them from 
participating in the reform to harmonise international commercial arbitration law.
The scope of the research can be justified on the basis that the goal of comparative 
law research is not to make uniform legal systems. Comparative law works not only 
for intellectual gains, but also as a catalyst for developing ideas and solutions.12 It is 
an inspiring mechanism for legal thinking especially if there is concern to avoid direct 
transplantation of foreign legal concepts into the host body of the national-regional 
legal system by taking the regulatory environment into consideration.
This mechanism has to consider the socio-economic, political-cultural, and systematic 
differences of the respective jurisdictions. Through comparison, we can learn and 
sharpen our judgement, but we should avoid imitating blindly.13 
A cross-cultural inquiry that combines philosophical discussion of controversial 
international commercial arbitration law issues with a detailed history of the evolution 
of commercial arbitration discourse in the West as well as in Middle East over the last
12 See Hoecake Mark Van (2004). Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law. Hart 
Publishing. Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology and Comparative Law: Contribution from the Sciences 
and Social Sciences. He discusses the importance of comparative law. on pp. 38-42.
13 Ibid.
7
hundred years will be conducted. The research scope will consider what modifications 
may be necessary to achieve the goal of harmonisation of international commercial 
arbitration law. Such approach may help to minimise and avoid problematic aspects 
of the transplantation of the UNCITRAL Model Law into the Middle East.
l.S Methodology
The methodology for this thesis is characterised largely by its deductive premise, that 
is, that regionalism in terms of the regulatory environment is inadequate to effect and 
promote law reform. This premise refutes the implicit and explicit assumptions made 
by policymakers that the law is, in fact, up to the task.
Consequently, this thesis starts from the position that the surrounding regulatory 
environment is inadequate. The task of this thesis is to identify whether this is so, and 
to explore the nature of those deficiencies. Evidence will be gathered to prove or 
disprove the premise. This research findings and conclusions are derived largely from 
library-based documentation, systematic search of the legal literature and case law in 
relation to the main research questions formulated for examination, critique and 
analysis.
Further references, namely, books and other legal periodicals have been obtained 
from other libraries, mainly from the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, London 
School of Oriental and African Studies and British Library. Secondly, the use has 
been made of electronic sources, which are more-up-to-date.
Particular emphasis is given to gathering Middle East countries’ statutes and 
legislations. Direct contact was made with embassies, law firms and officials to obtain 
details of existing commercial arbitration laws in the region. The aim is to review 
international commercial arbitration in the Middle East in light of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law to show the effectiveness, deficiencies and limitations of legal reform. 
During such contacts, a number of informal interviews were carried out to focus on a 
number of issues of concern and to obtain a clear understanding and better 
appreciation of current issues related to the research hypothesis and questions. Due to 
the requirement of confidentiality, some of the information obtained and names and 
sources are not quoted.
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1.6 Cartography Of The Thesis
The study will be divided into three parts. The first part will deal with the questions: 
in what ways has international commercial arbitration law been developed in its social 
context and how have the two jurisdictions of the West and Middle East region 
interpreted it in light of their different socio-legal cultures?
The key issue is to examine whether the Middle East region has different concepts of 
international commercial arbitration. A general analysis of the doctrine of 
harmonisation of international commercial arbitration and regionalism will be 
undertaken. Chapter Two will outline attempts to harmonise international commercial 
arbitration law taking into account the impact of domestic and regional legal cultures 
in these attempts, tracing how far this concept has been developed at the international 
level. Examples of other regions will be given, e.g. (Europe, Latin America, East Asia 
and Africa).
For the reason explained earlier, Chapter Three will apply John Austin’s legal 
philosophy of positivism to discuss and analyse the three main aspects of this legal 
philosophy (normative, institutional and coercive) in relation to the development of 
international commercial arbitration law in the West in order to explore how Western 
regional values have influenced its nature and character, and additionally, how it has 
facilitated the establishment of the UNCITRAL Model Law as a modem harmonised 
international code of practice.
The same legal philosophy will be applied to the Middle East region in Chapter Four 
in attempts to compare and explore the main features, characteristics and social forces 
that have influenced the legal aspects of the dispute resolution mechanisms with 
regard to international commercial arbitration.
Part Two of the thesis will deal with international commercial arbitration contract 
principles. Chapter Five will examine and investigate the controversy surrounding 
commercial arbitration contractual principles. It will explore the concepts of the legal 
theories applicable to international contracts, mainly to the state contract and its 
agencies, as well as private persons in attempts to explore how Western regional legal 
concepts have influenced the principles and clauses of the Model Law.
Chapter Six will continue the analytical discussion of the international commercial 
arbitration contract in the Middle East region, identifying regional perceptions of 
international contract principles. This chapter will examine the role of the ethics and 
tradition in developing commercial contract principles in the Middle East. Particular
9
emphasis will be paid to Islamic Law and an examination of its underlying principles 
and implications for the international commercial arbitration contract will be 
undertaken.
Part Three will focus on the modernisation and reform of commercial arbitration and 
dispute resolution in the Middle East. Chapter Seven will examine the impact of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on the Middle East Region. First, it will examine the impact 
of the historical legacy on the development of commercial arbitration law, and then 
identify what limitations prevent application of the UNCITRAL Model Law in the 
region. In this respect, the chapter will explore why and how these limitations have 
been expressed by Middle East countries and the position that has been taken in law 
and in practice towards international commercial arbitration.
Chapter Eight will examine the experience of four Middle East jurisdictions (Egypt, 
Oman, Tunisia and Jordan) towards introducing the UNCITRAL Model Law into 
their legislation. The chapter will analyse the extent to which these countries comply 
with the principles of the Model Law. Further, it will compare and evaluate reform 
legislation in the aforementioned four countries relating to the UNCITRAL Model 
Law in attempts to determine areas of modifications, why and their effectiveness. 
Chapter Nine will identify areas for future reform of international commercial 
arbitration law. First, it will reflect on legal, cultural, socio-economic core arguments 
which act as obstacles to reform. Finally, the chapter will assess whether reform is 
essential, and whether the UNCITRAL Model Law can be accommodated within 
regional values.
Chapter Ten will assess the hypothesis and the research questions in light of the main 
findings. The research contribution will be summarised, research implications and 
future research proposed.
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CHAPTER TWO 
Harmonisation and Regionalism: General Concept
2.1 General Concept
International trade is currently subject to numerous domestic legal systems that differ 
radically in their jurisprudential heritage and their political and cultural context.1 The 
possibility of mutual misunderstanding, confusion, and cultural clashes is significant, 
especially where the lawyers for one or both parties are not experienced in 
international commercial arbitration. A cultural clash between practitioners from the 
common law and civil law traditions, unfortunately, sometimes leads to delays and 
increased tension during the arbitration process and in extreme cases, even a loss of 
faith in the tribunal process.2 Therefore, trade disputes require a highly developed
■3
understanding of cultural factors.
Cross-cultural awareness requires an understanding that we inevitably see the world 
around us through spectacles fashioned by our own experience. This involves a web 
of predispositions, assumptions, and behavioural patterns.4
Professor Speiser makes a persuasive case for finding the origins of many of our legal 
concepts in ancient Mesopotamia from the middle of the third to the end of the first 
millennium B.C., where he finds that:
“The legal tradition concerned is closely integrated in spite of the 
underlying differences in date, geography, political background and the 
language.” Inter alia, he reminds us of Mesopotamian legal precepts that 
laws reflect truths which are timeless and impersonal; that the 
interpretation of laws must be entrusted to professional judges and that 
these judges must look to precedents. In this law, the written document 
found its high place and this was but one of the legal concepts passing on
1 See Amy H. Kastely, Reflection on the International Unification of Sales Law: Unification and 
Community, NW. J. Int’L. &BUS. 574. p.l 1.
2 See Bernardo M. Cremades, Managing Discovery in International arbitration. Dispute Resolution J. 
Nov.2002/Jan.2003.p.73.
3
See Martin Hunter, International Commercial Dispute Resolution: The Challenge of the Twenty-first 
Century. Arbitration International, Vol. 16, No.4, LCIA, 2000. p.388.
4Ibid.
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with trade and the shifts in political influence through the Phoenicians, 
the Hittites, the Egyptians and so on into Greece and Rome.”5
Having established the need for cross-cultural awareness in international arbitration 
throughout the many years of work on the unification of international trade law, 
participants in the debate have engaged in an ongoing discussion of the goals and 
methods of the project. Recurrent in the conversation has been the idea that 
unification both requires and facilitates the formation of an international community 
with common practices through the use of a common legal language. The dual goals 
of facilitating international commerce and promoting international harmony are often 
articulated.6 Unification of trade law inevitably entails changes in the legal outlook 
of courts, scholars, practitioners, and traders throughout the world.7 
At this point, it is important to draw attention to the influence of “regionalism”8 on 
the ultimate goal of harmonisation in international arbitration. From a common 
interest in geographical, cultural, economic, agricultural, or mineralogical issues, 
states have organised themselves from time to time on the basis of common 
economic-interests, by negotiation, for example, regional trade agreements, 
delimitation in river routes or shared seabeds, transportation on great European river 
systems, and shared interest in the production and consumption of commodities such 
as wheat, sugar, coffee, and tin.9
5 Speiser, “Cuneiform Law and the History of Civilisation,” 107 Proceedings, Am. Philosophical Soc. 
536-541 (1963) and references in his footnotes. Prof. Ada B. Bozeman’s skilful tapestry of politics and 
culture in International History (1960), carries the thread of law as one essential part of the pattern 
from the time and regions with which Prof. Speiser deals up to the present era. Supra 30. In Amy H. 
Kastely. p.351
6 Supra 4. p.3
7 Supra 4.p. 11
8 Regionalism is a term in international relation that refers to the expression of a common sense of 
identity and purpose combined with the creation and implementation of institutions that express that 
particular identity and shape collective action within a geographical region. This is in contrast with 
regionalisation, which is the expression of increased commercial and human transactions in a defined 
geographical region. Behind the process of regionalisation lies the concept of regionalism. This can be 
seen as the normative aspects, or values, that underlie regionalisation, e.g. the (contested) European 
identity. However, it is also a theoretical tool for analysis of international relations. For example, the 
concept of security regime in regional security would not be possible without the analytical tool of 
'regionalism'.
9
See Philip C. Jessup, a judge, International Court of Justice, in Diversity and Uniformity in the Law 
of Nation. American J. of Int’l Law. p.356.
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Under this phenomenon of “Regionalism”, the interest of each geographical-cultural 
grouping is in making its own jurisdiction an attractive venue for commercial 
arbitration. The common approach is a continuation of reform of arbitration laws and 
institutions in the region on the one hand, and the endorsement of cultural values in 
the version of these local legal frameworks on the other.
In this way, harmonisation can come about more rapidly in one region of the world 
than in other regions where arbitration practice and the relationship between 
arbitration and the courts is the outcome of history and precedent.10 If progress in 
harmonisation in the wider international community is slower than in the European 
context, for example, this is because, as Professor Eric Stein states:
“Even within a nation-state, a legal norm is the ultimate expression of the 
will and values of the society; only after the conflicting economic and 
social forces have been composed may the resulting consensus crystallise 
into a general norm.”11
England in the Middle Ages affords an example of changing social values and 
‘modernisation’ of commercial practice within a nation state. From this time through 
to the early modem period, the process of “loveday” arbitration came under 
increasing pressure. An increasingly litigious society was reshaping arbitration -  a
conciliatory process - to suit its needs. Potential abuses of the process and changing
• 10notions of community undermined the legitimacy of the loveday arbitration, which
eventually fell by the wayside as a historical anachronism.
Douglas has observed: “from the Dark Ages through to the end of the Middle Ages, 
arbitration was a conciliatory process exhibiting most of the characteristics of 
conciliatory processes. Its function to reconcile rather than to judge was embodied in 
the medieval institution of the “loveday”. Loveday arbitrations were tme alternatives 
to litigation (lawdays); the process and function were as different from those in 
litigation as their function. From the late Middle Ages through to the early modem 
period, the conciliatory process came under increase pressure. An increasingly
10 See W. Laurence Craig, (1995). Some Trends and Development in the Laws and Practice of 
International Commercial Arbitration. Tex. Int’l L.J. 1995. p.34.
11 Stein, (1964). “Assimilation of National Laws as a Function of European Integration,” 58 
A.J.I.L. vol. 1 No.2 p.350.
12 See Douglas Hurt Yam, (1995). Commercial Arbitration in Old England (602-1698). Dispute 
Resolution Journal, p.68.
13
adjudicative society was reshaping arbitration - a conciliatory process - to suit its 
needs. Potential abuse of the process and changing notions of community,
* • 13competition and individualism undermined the legitimacy of loveday arbitration.” 
Thus, merchant communities were able to change the character of arbitration from the 
“loveday” arbitrations which were a form of mediation to “lawday” arbitrations which 
were true processes of litigation.
By the end of the Seventeenth Century, the term “loveday” and the institution it 
described had fallen completely out of use. The last reference to lovedays in the legal 
literature is in 1694 and is significant because it clearly links modem arbitration with 
the medieval loveday. The author of Arbitrium Redivivium notes that:
“Something in the Saxon or Old English, [arbitrement] was called a Love- 
Day, because of the Quiet and Tranquillity that should follow the ending 
of the controversie.’T Conciliatory arbitration was losing its institutional 
support, being over shadowed by the legal process, and failing to meet 
the needs of its potentially greatest user, the commercial community.14
Thus, the significant role of merchants was one which the first arbitration act dated 
from 1698 reinforced as a consequence of the inefficiency of common law courts in 
applying mercantile law. Regarding the growing dominance of the commercial 
community in the development of arbitration, Blackstone observed:
“Experience having shown the great use of these peaceable and domestic 
tribunals, especially settling matters of account, and other mercantile 
transactions, which are difficult and almost impossible to be adjusted on 
a trial at law, the legislature has now established the use of them.”15
13 See Douglas H. Y., Commercial Arbitration in Old England (602-1698), p. 68. Dispute Resolution 
Journal. 1995.
14 op.cit. 1, p. 72. Arbitrium Redivivum: or the law of Arbitration; collected from the Law-Book both 
Ancient and Modem, and deduced to these times: Wherein the whole Learning of Awards or 
Arbitrements is methodically treated with Several Forms of Submissions by way of Covenants and 
Bond: As also several Forms of Arbitrements or Awards [by the author of Regula Placitandi] (London, 
1694) p.2
15 See supra note 38. 3 BI. Comm. 17 p. 72.
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The Industrial Revolution and increasing economic specialisation led to the 
development of trade and industry associations whose rules provided for and 
encouraged the use of arbitration by its members.16
The same could be said about differences in social values between different regions. 
In some cultures, for example, the context of the former Soviet Bloc countries, more 
attention is given to the unique circumstances of the commercial relationship. Thus, a 
Romanian might view a British approach as inflexible and disrespectful to the 
personal ties involved; whereas the Briton might view the Romanian approach as 
creating an unjustified exception in favour of a friend, and even nepotism in the Arab 
Middle East where emotional and family ties play an important part in problem­
solving. Recognising and responding appropriately to these cultural differences is an
17important element in commercial arbitration.
The implicit rule to be emphasised here is that “Regionalism” will influence the 
doctrine of harmonisation of international commercial arbitration rules; each region 
differs in its cultural, social, and legal background, but each one should be sensitive to 
these differences prevailing in others.
2.2 Harmonisation Regimes
The overwhelming majority of nations agree on certain universal harmonisation 
regimes that govern international commercial arbitration. For our purposes, these 
universal regimes can be distilled down to the Lex Mercatoria and the UNCITRAL 
Model Law.
While most legal systems appear committed to these regimes, it will be demonstrated 
that this consensus at the core exists only in abstract generalities, an embracing of 
‘themes’ rather than specifics.
2.2.1 UNCITRAL Model Law 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985) Law 
was developed within the framework of the United Nations and was drafted by 
international experts whose extensive travaux preparatories are readily available.18 
The UNCITRAL remains a model law rather than a convention or a uniform law 
because it was known that obtaining multilateral agreement on a precise text would be
16 See supra note 43.
17 Trompenaars and Hampden-Tumer, (1997, 2nd Edn). Riding the Waves o f Culture: Understanding 
cultural Diversity in Business pp. 39-40. See supra note 18 in Martine Hunter of International 
Commercial Dispute Resolution, 2000. p.389.
18 Supra, 12, p.21.
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difficult, due to wide variations between existing regional national laws. The hope 
was to encourage progress towards a recognised norm rather than to insist on 
uniformity.19
“It was never expected that the Model Law would be enacted in all the principal 
arbitration centres in the world. These states have long-established arbitration laws 
and practices; the tendency has been to modify those laws while remaining within the
0C\original statutory frameworks.” In the same respect, Redfem (1995) has suggested 
that, “it is unrealistic to expect that such interim measures can be taken only by courts 
at the seat of arbitration. But if the right of courts to grant interim measures in 
connection with arbitration is generally recognised, the conditions under which such 
measures may be granted are not currently uniform, and neither the Model Law nor 
the relevant conventions provide standardised limitations on the scope of interim and
91provisional measures, or other means of avoiding conflict.”
One of the primary developments towards recognising differences among national 
states towards the Model Law22 is the Commission’s welcoming of the opportunity to 
discuss the desirability and feasibility of further development of the law of 
international commercial arbitration. “It was generally considered that the time had 
arrived to assess the extensive and favourable experience with national enactments of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985) as well 
as the use of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Conciliation 
Rules, and to evaluate in the Commission the acceptability of ideas and proposals for 
improvement of arbitration laws, rules and practices.”23
Thus, in reports presented at that commemorative conference, various suggestions 
were made regarding some of the problems identified in practice so as to enable the 
Commission to consider the future direction of work by the UNCITRAL in the field 
of disputes settlement.24
19 Supra, 12, p. 16.
20 Supra, 12, p. 16.
21 D. Alan Redfem, Arbitration and Courts: Interim Measures of Protection—Is the Tide About To 
Turn? Texas International Law Journal p. 71.
22 Supra, 4, p .ll.
23 See Renaud Sorieul, Update on Recent Developments and future Work by UNCITRAL in the field 
of International Commercial Arbitration. Journal o f International Arbitration 17(3): 163-184, 2000. 
Kluwer Law International, p. 164.
24 Ibid. p. 163.
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2.2.2 Lex Mercatoria
The second key attribute of harmonisation of commercial arbitration is the popular 
use of the “lex mercatoria”.25 This unwritten law of merchants was developed as a 
means to permit arbitrators to tailor decisions to accommodate customary trade
96practice and the principles that guided international trade law. Lex mercatoria was
97developed during the primacy of Western European-dominated international trade. 
And it is also true that many Non-Western legal systems have been heavily influenced 
by Anglo-American or Western European jurisprudence. But is the lex mercatoria 
universal?
Although the lex mercatoria is conceived as a universal and pervasive underlying 
arbitral decision in international commerce, the majority of jurists now believe that
9 0
the lex mercatoria has not attained such universality. As arbitrators come from 
diverse legal backgrounds, such as common law, civil law, socialist law, and Islamic 
law, their interpretations of the same customs and usages of international commerce 
are unlikely to be consistent. Regionalism has also impeded the development of a 
consistent body of rules of the lex mercatoria because of its tendency towards 
divergence.
25 According to Goldman (1983), the “Lex mercatoria” is not new. He has noted that it has its 
precursor in the Roman ius gentium, the body of law that regulated the economic relations between 
foreigners and Roman citizens. Other authors, Schmittoff, C. Chia-jui (ed.) (1988) go further back in 
time and trace the origins of the Lex Mercatoria in the Ancient Egyptian or in the Greek and 
Phoenician sea trade of the Old ages. In any case, it is the law merchant of the Middle ages where the 
historical roots of the Lex Mercatoria can truly be found. The flourishing of international economic 
relations in Western Europe at the beginning of the eleventh century caused the formation of the law 
merchant, a cosmopolitan mercantile law based upon customs and applied to cross- border disputes by 
the market tribunals of the various European trade centres. This law resulted from the effort of the 
medieval trade community to overcome the fragmentary and obsolete rules of feudal and Roman law 
which could not respond to the needs of the new interlocal and international commerce. Merchants 
created a superior law, which constituted a solid legal basis for the great expansion of commerce in the 
Middle Ages. For almost eight hundred years uniform rules of law, those of the merchants, were 
applied throughout Western Europe among traders. For further discussion see Ana Mercedes (2002) lex 
mercatoria, Rettid pp.46-56
26 Dezalay & Garth, supra note 36, at 295.
27 The substantial difference between the Sales convention and the uniform law among several socialist 
states is discussed in comment, the Convention on Contract for the International Sale of Goods and the 
General Condition for Sale of Goods. Amy H. Kastely, Supra note 149.p.l3.
28 Ibid.
29 Mustill, supra note 149, at 40.Abul F.M.Maniruzzaman. The Lex Mercatoria and International
Contracts: A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration. 1999. Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 657pp. 11 
20 Ibid, p .ll.
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2.3 Arbitration Law Reform And The Impact of Regionalism
With the dramatic increase in international arbitration and a related recognition that
- j i
international arbitration provides the only viable means of resolving trade disputes, 
the issue of harmonisation of commercial arbitration laws has become increasingly 
important. The arbitration caseload has more than doubled during the last five years, 
from 320 cases in 1997 to 672 in 2002, according to the American Arbitration 
Association. The Paris-based International chamber of commerce (ICC), which has 
led the world in international arbitration, confirmed this dramatic growth. A record 
number of 593 cases came before the ICC, and in 2002 the International Court of 
Arbitration (ICA) registered more than 80 new cases for a single month.32 
Although the Model Law is meant to provide common standards for arbitration law, 
the issue of accommodating regional identity has also become increasingly 
significant.
Cross-cultural clash and the impact of regionalism upon dispute settlement procedures 
may be illustrated by the incompatibilities or divergences of approach between 
regions.
In Europe, for example, the two major law families exhibit different characteristics. 
The “civil law” family based on Roman law, has produced legal systems characterised 
by a primary law-making approach of comprehensive codifications, while the 
common law family is an organically grown body of case law supplemented by 
relative unextensive statutes with a narrower scope.34
Harmonisation of international commercial arbitration has emerged as the pre- 
eminent means for resolving disputes that arise between different legal cultures
31 “[P]rivate dispute resolution among commercial men is as old as commerce itself.” W. Lawrence 
Craig, Some Trends and Development in the Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration, 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. 1,5 (1995) for a more detailed description of the ancient history of 
arbitration, see Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damage in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. 
Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. Rev.954, 954 n.3 (1986) (citing Frances Kellor, American Arbitration 3 
(1948)) (dating commercial arbitration back to the time when “Phoenician and Greek traders roamed 
the ancient world” and to “the desert caravans of Marco Polo”); Will Durant, The Story of Civilisation: 
our Common Heritage 127, 361 (1935) (“ The ancient Sumerians, Persians, Egyptians, Greeks, and 
Romans all had a tradition of arbitration.” The development of a formal system of private dispute 
resolution is attributable to the medieval English courts of fairs and boroughs, which could adjudicate 
disputes between merchants and traders at markets and fairs. For an expanded history of international 
arbitration, see Craig, supra, at 2-11 (tracing the important milestones in the development of modem 
international arbitration) See Catherine A. Rogers. Supra note 27. Fit and function in Legal Ethics.p.4.
32 See Sue Reisinger, (2003). Arbitration increases overseas a means of avoiding court in international 
trade, www.iudicialaccountabilitv
33 Supra, l.p.3.
34 Ibid.
35 Supra, 23 pp. 17-18
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including the aforementioned two legal families. Therefore, international arbitral 
procedure and practice has evolved by adopting and harmonising elements of 
common law and civil law traditions. The wide difference between common law and 
civil law approaches provides an excellent illustration of “cultural clash” impeding 
harmonisation of international commercial arbitration.
In the United Kingdom, for example, reform was prompted by widespread 
dissatisfaction among foreign parties with the “case stated” method of judicial review. 
This method permitted parties to appeal on questions of English law and have them 
decided by British courts, either during the arbitral process or after an award. 
Parliament eliminated this substantially unrestricted right of appeal on questions of 
law with the Arbitration Act of 1979. Even though, in 1989, the Department Advisory 
Committee recommended against the adoption of the Model Law, noting that the 
Model Law was influenced by civil law concepts, and that historically there had been 
a closer relationship between the arbitral process and the court in common law 
jurisdictions, the British Arbitration Act 1996 codified statutory and case law 
principles in a form and language which is intended borrowed from the Model Law in 
style if not is substance.
With respect to the UK Arbitration Act 1996, parties giving “reasonable opportunity” 
rather than “full opportunity” (UNCITRAL Model Law), would be sufficient, 
considering an appropriate balance between the parties’ autonomy and efficiency. 
The parties are free to agree the seat of the arbitration in their arbitration agreement 
(article 3). If the parties fail to agree the seat of the arbitration, an arbitral (or any 
other) institution or person vested by the parties with powers to do so may designate 
the seat (article 3(b)). Where no arbitral seat has been designated or determined, and 
there is a connection with England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the court may still 
exercise its powers under the 1996 Act for the purpose of supporting the arbitral 
process (article 2(4).
The parties are free to agree how their disputes are to be resolved, subject only to 
those safeguards necessary to protect the public interest. By virtue of article 33(1 )(a)
36 English Draft Arbitration Bill, in U.K. Dept, of Trade & Industry, Consultation Document on 
Proposed Clauses and Schedules for an Arbitration Bill, reprinted in 10 Arb. Int’l. 189 (1994) Supra 
157. see supra 12 p. 18.
37 JCA newsletter No. 9. January 2001. Japan commercial Arbitration Association.
38 See Wilmer Hale, Wendy Miles and Giorgio Mandell, (2006). International Arbitration: England and 
Wales, www.iclg.co.uk
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of the 1996 Act the tribunal is required to adopt procedures suitable to the 
circumstances of a particular case (article 33(i)(b)) and must comply with that general 
duty in conducting the arbitral proceedings and in making all decisions relating to 
matters of procedures and evidence (article 33(2)).39
In principle, intervention by national courts in the arbitral process should be minimal. 
Nevertheless, the national courts have jurisdiction to act in support of arbitral 
proceeding and, in particular, may deal with procedural issues in relation to: the 
enforcement of peremptory orders of the tribunal (article 42); securing attendance of 
witnesses (article 43); the taking and preservation of evidence, making orders relating 
to property, sale of goods, granting of interim injunctions or the appointment of a 
receiver (article 44); and the determination of a preliminary point of law (article 45). 
It is worth noting that the parties may agree to exclude a large part of the national 
courts’ powers.40
France’s legislative approach to the reform of arbitration law is arguably totally 
different from that of the United Kingdom. The new provisions give the parties almost 
unlimited freedom to provide for their own arbitration procedure, either by specific 
agreement or by incorporating a set of rules, without requiring them to refer to a 
national law of procedure. Where they have not done so, such power is given to the 
arbitrator. NCPC article 1494 provides:41
“The arbitration agreement may, directly or by reference to a set of 
arbitration rules, define the procedure to be followed in the arbitral 
proceedings; it may also subject them to a given procedural law.”
Other European countries, including Belgium, Italy, Austria, and the Netherlands, 
have followed this modernisation trend to varying degrees.42
In America, the NAFTA dispute settlement procedure has been characterised as 
primarily “facilitative,” ultimately leaving control over dispute resolution with the 
parties. Representative of this facilitative approach, the dispute settlement aspects of 
the NAFTA are a mish-mash of procedures negotiated to allow the redress of separate
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid. p. 18.
42 See Supra, 176,177,178, 179 op.cit. supra, 12 p.20.
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disputes differently.43 Chapter 20 of the NAFTA sets out the general rules for 
resolving disputes concerning the rights and obligations that arise out of the NAFTA 
by creating a three stage procedure involving (a)consultation between the parties; (b) 
utilisation of the good offices, conciliation and mediation provided by the Free Trade 
Commission; and (c) nonbinding arbitration.44
In contrast to the general facilitative approach of the NAFTA, the MERCOSUR 
utilises dispute settlement procedures that lead to binding arbitral results.45 
Remarkably, the MERCOSUR dispute settlement in practice relies much more on 
diplomatic negotiations than the rules-based approach to settling conflict, as countries 
have generally opted not to utilise the binding system.
In the rest of South and Central America and Mexico, regionalism concepts can be 
found in the contexts of the power of arbitrators. Arbitrators are very much like 
judges in State Court proceedings. The arbitrator-judge identity finds its most striking 
example in Colombia and Ecuador, where the arbitrator is vested with some sort of 
imperium. Indeed, in both these countries, an arbitral tribunal may actually take and 
execute certain provisional measures without judicial assistance and may even 
directly call on the police force for assistance in enforcement.46 
One of the most important characteristics of the new legal developments in arbitration 
in the region is that laws have been carefully drafted in order to reduce the 
intervention of the judge.47 In this respect, while most of the laws have been inspired 
by the New York Convention and UNCITRAL Model Law, Latin America countries 
have made enormous effort and have accomplished great progress in ADR during the 
last five years under the influence of the region as legal culture.
In Asia, by contrast to the Model Law concept, legal reform has been influenced by 
the regional dispute settlement culture which more frequently seeks a “harmonious” 
solution, one which tends to preserve the relationship, rather than one which, while
43 See generally, Gary N. Horlick & Amanda DeBusk, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Building on 
the U.S.-Canada FTA, GATT and ICSID, 27 J.W.T. 21 (1993) (providing a general negotiating history 
and overview of the NAFTA dispute settlement procedures). See supra note, 52 J. Michael Taylor 
Dispute Settlement under FTAA an Apparent Melding of WTO, NAFTA and MERCOSUR 
Approaches, Journal o f Int’l Arbitration 19(5) 393-422,202. Kluwer Law International, p.400.
“ Ibid. p.401.
45Ibid,
46 See, Art. 32 of Colombian Decree 2279 of 1989 and Art. 9 of Ecuador Law of 4 September 1997. 
The Arbitrators have the same power in the case of the enforcement of orders relating to evidence. 
op.cit. p. 141.
47bid. pp. 141-142.
48 Ibid. p. 142.
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arguably factually and legally “correct,” may severely damage the relationship of the 
parties involved.49 Thus, going back thousands of years, in China, for example, there 
is a concept known as li, which concerns the social norms of behaviour within the five 
natural status relationships: emperor and subject, father and son, husband and wife, 
brother and brother, or friend and friend.
Li is intended to be persuasive, not compulsive and legalistic, a concept which 
governs good conduct and is above legal concepts in societal importance. The 
governing legal concept, fa, is compulsive and punitive. While having the advantage 
of legal enforceability, fa  is traditionally below li in importance.
The Chinese have always considered the resort to litigation as the last step, since it 
suggests that the relationship between the disputing parties can no longer be 
harmonised. Resort to litigation results in loss of face, and discussion and compromise 
are always to be preferred. Over time, the concepts of fa  and li have become fused, 
and the concept of maintaining the relationship and, therefore, face, has become part 
of the Chinese legal system. The same can be said for other Asian legal systems. A 
noted commentator has described the Korean method of dispute resolution thusly:
“Dispute settlement, after all, does not occur in a social vacuum. The 
settlement defines, or redefines, status, rights and obligations, both for 
the disputants themselves and for some other people. Status expectation 
may be reaffirmed, weakened, strengthened, or altered, and all this has 
some effect on subsequent relationships and social action”50
Finally, despite the arguments of the legal comparison difficulties with African law, it 
has been said that the dispute resolution process has an underlying logic that makes it 
comparable to Euro-American legal thought and procedure despite regional 
variations.51
49 For a more general discussion of this area, see M. S. Donahey, “Mediation and Conciliation in the 
Asia/Pacific Region: Sites, Centers and Practice,” Doyle’s Dispute Resolution Practice, Asia-Pacific, 
Para. 85-000. CCH International (1992) Supra 2, M. Scott Donahey, Seeking Harmony: Is the Asian 
concept of conciliator/ arbitrator applicable in the West? Dispute Resolution Journal. April 1995. p.74
50 Ibid. pp.74-75.
51 Herskovits insisted that, the evidence shows that; throughout the East African area, despite tribal 
variations, the dispute-settling process has a logic that makes it “as a whole comparable, in terms of 
ethical assumption and procedural regularity, to Euro-American legal thought and procedure, however 
different the forms in which they are cast may be.”
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CHAPTER THREE 
Philosophical Basis of Legal Theory Underlying 
Modern International Commercial Arbitration Law
3.1 Positivism Legal Theory and Modern Arbitration Law
Given the concept of the doctrine of harmonisation of international commercial law, 
this part will address the question of how modem commercial arbitration law has 
evolved. The question will be answered by analysing the legal philosophy which 
underlies this modem law. For this purpose, legal positivism theory will be used. 
While it is tme that legal positivism can be distinguished from its rival, natural law 
(non-posited), it cannot easily be distinguished from its other rival, legal realism.1 
Labelling cultural traditions is always a difficult task, and even more so in the case of 
a comprehensive theoretical approach, therefore, legal positivism will be used as an 
analytical tool. According to Sadowski (2004),2 this conceptual philosophy allows for 
the separation of the law as an object of study to convey the social manifestations of 
the law and obedience to it. Natural law theory is based on the belief in the existence 
of universal objective values that can be apprehended by human reason, while legal 
positivism assumes moral values to be rooted in specific cultural and social contexts. 
Considering how broad the definition of “legal positivism” has become, and given the 
large varieties of historical and cultural contexts in which it has flourished, it is 
possible to say that legal positivism is an “essential contested concept”. It is a notion 
that is likely to be interpreted in quite different ways, even if it has a conceptual core 
which is commonly agreed upon. The primary difference between positivism and 
realism legal theory is that the latter manifests the judicial will and not the 
legislative4: it maintains that the law is a system of commands, rules, norms, 
emanating from the sovereign as legislator.5
1 See Keekok Lee, The Positivism Science of Law. 1989. Gower Publishing Company, p. ix.
2 See Mark Zirk-Sadowski, (2004). Legal Epistemology and transformation of legal cultures. Hart 
Publishing. Oxford and Portland Oregon, p. 21.
3 See Giorgio Pino, (1999). The Place of legal positivism in contemporary constitutional states. Law 
and philosophy. Vol. 18. Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 515.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. p. 191.
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Thus, positivism has been defined and understood in many ways.6 “It has been argued 
that the history of positivism coincides more or less with the history of modem 
science. It is essentially a philosophical response to the new science. Common to its 
various conceptions is the underlying theme of generating order in the universe not by 
means of theology or metaphysics, but by the application of scientific method to the 
study of natural/social phenomena as well as moral and legal ones.”7 For example, 
positivism legal theory had a role in the reform and regeneration of post-revolutionary 
French society. To quote Kolakowski:
“Comte’s whole doctrine, including the theory of knowledge, becomes 
intelligible only when grasped as a grandiose project for universal reform 
encompassing not only the sciences but all spheres of human life. 
Reflection on the France of his day led him to the conviction that the 
organisation of society needed overhauling from top to bottom, and that 
one prerequisite was reform of the sciences and of methods of thought 
generally. Reform of the sciences, he believed, would make it possible to 
create an as yet non-existent science of society, without which social life 
could not be reconstructed on rational foundations. Uniform organisation 
of the totality of human knowledge was indispensable to pave the way for a 
fully-fledged science to be known as ‘sociology’, which alone would make 
it possible to transform collective life.”8
Above all else, positivism is a search for order through science, and when that method 
is applied to the study of social/ normative phenomena, the knowledge that it yields 
can be used to reform society, so that there can be progress without disorder and order 
without stagnation.9
6“Positivism is a theory of history in which improvement in knowledge is both the motor of progress 
and the source of social stability (Comte). Positivism is a theory of knowledge according to which the 
only kind of sound knowledge available to humankind is that of science grounded in observation 
(Comte). Positivism is a unity of sciences thesis according to which all sciences can be integrated into a 
single natural system (Comte). Positivism is a theory of history in which the motor of progress that 
guarantees the emergence of superior forms of society is competition between increasingly 
differentiated individuals (Spencer). Positivism is a theory of meaning, combining the phenomenalism 
and legalistic method, and captured by the principle of verifiability, according to which the meaning of 
a proposition consists in its method of verification (Logical Positivism). Positivism is a theory of 
knowledge according to which science consists of a corpus of interrelated, true, simple, precise and 
wide-ranging universal laws that are central to explanation and prediction... (Hempel).” p. 63.
7 Ibid. p. 164.
8 Ibid. p.63.
9 Ibid. p.52.
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According to legal positivists, mainly influenced by John Austin10, there are primarily 
three general and important features of the law -  namely, normative, institutionalised, 
and coercive. The normative dimension serves as a guide for human behaviour. It is 
institutionalised in that its formulation, application, and modification are, to a large 
extent, performed or regulated by institutions. It is coercive in that obedience to it, 
and its application, is internally11 guaranteed, ultimately, by the use of force. Thus, if 
a body of rules or norms is claimed as a legal system in the positivistic sense, it must
19satisfy all these characteristics.
Therefore, legal positivism as a general philosophy will be used as an analytical tool 
in order to identify the general trends from Western and Middle East cultural 
perspectives that relate to international commercial arbitration.
The weakness of using this legal philosophy is related to the criticism of legal 
positivism that, in one way or another, it fails to give morality its due. A theory that 
insists on the facticity o f law (the social facts defining the “free choice” within which 
the individual may determine his actions) seems to contribute little to our 
understanding that law has important functions in making human life go well, that the 
rule of law is a prized ideal, and that the language and practice of law is highly
19moralised. Accordingly, positivism's critics maintain that the most important 
features of law are not to be found in its source-based character, but in the capacity of 
law to advance the common good, to secure human rights, or to govern with 
integrity.14
At the centre of positivist legal theory, Modem International Arbitration Law has 
tempered most of the concepts and characteristics of Western commercial practice. It 
will be shown in the next chapter that positive theory, applied with such success in the 
context of western European commercial law, is inappropriate in the Middle East
10 The first stage of the development of positivism which-for this reason- called original positivism was 
the positivism of John Austin. This framework of legal positivism has never, in fact, been challenged, 
although it has been significantly modified by analytical philosophy. The refined version of legal 
positivism primarily represented by Hart.
11 According to MacCormick, on the internal aspect of norms’ in legal reasoning and legal theory, one 
should distinguish the cognitive and the violation aspects. The cognitive internal point of view is 
characteristic of those who, being members of a group, do not regard a rule as their own.
12 Joseph Raz, (1980). The Concept of a Legal System (2d ed. 1980). Supra note 179. See Abul F.M. 
Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and International Contract: A Challenge for International 
Commercial Arbitration. Am. U. Inf 1L. Rev. 657, 1999. ppl4
13 See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.plato.standford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/
14 Ibid.
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where different cultural norms make its wholesale and unqualified transferability 
problematic, notwithstanding its acceptance in highly generalised terms.
First, regarding the “normative” dimension of the theory, the analysis will reflect 
upon competition, individualism, and the role of the merchant. Second, regarding the 
“institutionalised” aspect of the theory, Anti-Statism will be discussed. Finally, the 
analysis will discuss the approach to contracts, and judicial characteristics of 
arbitration in the “coercive” dimension of the theory.
3.2 Normative Aspect of Modern Commercial Arbitration Law 
This part will examine the attitude in the West toward international commercial 
arbitration, and the impact of this behaviour upon the development of the modem 
commercial arbitration law.
3.2.1 The Concept of “Competition”
The various “merchant communities” of international trade comprise a worldwide 
society whose needs and customary mles are determined by the economic character of 
the relationships that are created within it.15 Competition between these interest 
groups could be considered the main focus of commercial arbitration. The starting 
point, therefore, is to consider the competition between the different courts in old 
Europe16, with particular relevance to the United Kingdom 
Interjursdictional Competition in United Kingdom
This part will highlight the concept of competition in the United Kingdom, mainly
1 *7between monarchical law and merchant law. The Church was a major trader and
1 £merchants could and did take some types of dispute to ecclesiastical courts . In 
addition, many of the major fairs were held at important priories and abbeys, so it was 
clearly in the interest of the church’s leaders to remain on good terms with the 
merchant community by offering them a source of dispute resolution that would
15 See generally Berthold Goldman, Lex Mercatoria, Forum International No. 3, Nov. 1983, at 1, 1-24., 
see Ibid. p. 13.
16 The discussion is about the time between (602 and 1698).
17 See Bowes, W. A. (1923). The Romance of the Law Merchant: Being an Introduction to the Study of 
International and Commercial Law with Some Account of the Commerce and Fairs of the Middle 
Ages, pp.9. See Bruce L. Benson, To Arbitrate or To Litigate: That Is the Question, p. 121. European 
Journal of Law and Economics, 8: 91-151 (1999). Kluwer Academic Publishers.
18 In England, the collective classification of particular courts that exercised jurisdiction primarily over 
spiritual matters. A system of courts, held by authority granted by the sovereign, that assumed 
jurisdiction over matters concerning the ritual and religion of the established church, and over the 
rights, obligations, and discipline of the clergy.
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recognise their customs and practice, at least when they did not conflict with canon
law.19 Therefore, around the twelfth century, some European kings20 began
91systematically collecting and codifying the customary rules of the Law Merchant, 
and asserting claims to legal authority in competition with other claimants such as the 
Roman Church (canon law), and powerful aristocracy (manor law). They clearly 
wanted to claim authority over commercial matters as well. After all, commerce was 
an increasingly important source of wealth creation, and control of its rules might
99allow kings to capture part of that wealth.
In the United Kingdom, merchants were given a right of Royal appeal. The appeal 
could be taken to the Chancellor and the King’s Council, and in this way the 
appearance of Royal backing of the Law Merchants was created, while 
simultaneously a roll for the Royal Courts in enforcement of commercial law was 
established. Importantly, by creating the possibility of appeal, the Law Merchant was
9^
made to appear to be less decisive law.
The early notion of “forum shopping” and venue for arbitration was established. For 
example, if a forum was expected to favour one party, and the other could demand the 
use of or appeal to an alternative, the parties would tend to compromise on the forum 
that would be least biased and therefore most fair.24
Rowley (1989, at p.371) explains, “The competitive nature of early common law 
evolution provided a powerful impulse for the law to reflect the interest of litigants 
and, in this sense, to be efficient... the royal courts succeeded by providing the best 
available justice, reflecting not least the preference of merchants and money lenders 
attracted to England by the development of foreign trade”.
Such competition between the common law courts probably also reduced the impact 
of subjugation to the Law Merchant somewhat, even after most of the prerogative 
courts and other alternatives were eliminated as effective competition. Common law 
judges refused to recognise the Law Merchant as a distinct branch of law, however, in
19 Ibid.
20 Kings; Henry VIII and later by Elizabeth’s reign.
21 See Berman, H. J. (1983). Law and Revolution: The Formation of Western Legal Tradition, p.341. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. See Supra 10, p. 121.
22 Ibid. p. 120.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
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contrast to other European counties, and they rejected some of its important 
principles.25
Later in the Sixteenth century, Parliament aligned with the common-law courts 
against the Royal Courts. Such alignment took the position of Parliament asserting the 
Common-Law Courts, claim as the supreme source of the law, by attacking all other 
sources of law. For instance, the great common law jurist and parliamentarian, Sir 
Edward Coke, who was intimately involved in the struggle between parliamentary and 
Royal authority, ruled that the decisions of merchant courts could be reversed by 
common law judges, claiming that the merchant courts’ purpose was to find a suitable 
compromise while judges ruled on the legal merits of the case (Vynior’s Case [1609] 
4 Eng Rep302).26 Commons (1924, p.303) suggests, “The capitalist system has been 
built up, as we have seen, on the enforcement and negotiability of contracts, [but it 
was] ...difficult...for the lawyers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries to 
authorise the custom of merchants in enforcing promises and buying and selling 
them.”27
More generally, demands for a unified court system increased in England, particularly 
during the Nineteenth Century, and ultimately (ini 875) the three common law courts 
were merged under a single Supreme Court. However, competition from 
commercial arbitration intensified in England during the same period that saw 
mounting pressure to centralise and create one court of the common law (Benson 
1989,1998f).
Thus, early codifications and interjurisdictional competition meant that the customary 
laws of the Law Merchant provided the foundation upon which the state enforced
9 0commercial law. However, in some jurisdictions - consider England - the Law 
Merchant was ultimately altered and at least partially absorbed.30 
Interjurisdictional Competition in the USA
Commercial arbitration was in widespread use in each of the British Colonies almost 
three centuries before modem arbitration statutes were passed, and after the 
revolution, arbitration remained in use in all of the states.31 The use of commercial
25 Ibid. p. 124.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. p. 124.
28 Ibid. p. 126.
29 See supra note 10.
30 Ibid. p. 121.
31 Ibid. p.128, for more details see, Benson (1995,1998) for evidence and references.
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arbitration developed during the colonial and post-revolutionary periods in spite of 
judicial hostility. Later in the Nineteenth Century, hostility lessened in several state 
courts (MacNeil 1992; Benson 1995a, 1998f), but arbitration continued to evolve both 
in states where the courts were relatively receptive and states where they were not 
(Benson 1995a, 1998f).32
As legal diversity33 continued to prevail among states of the United States in many 
respects, particularly in commercial and financial matters, it became evident that 
diversity in legal rules was distinctly disadvantageous, and measures to secure 
uniformity were adopted. When the American Bar Association was founded in 1878 it 
dedicated itself in part to securing “uniformity of legislation throughout the nation.” 
Twelve years later, the Association appointed a Special Committee on Uniform States 
Laws, and in 1892 was held the first National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, in which all States of the Union now participate. Over one 
hundred of the uniform laws which the conference drafted and approved are still 
current, although the number of States which have enacted them varies from one 
subject to another.34
A principal outcome of the NCCUSL has been efficient uniformity. A research found 
that, whatever the motivation of the NCCUSL and state legislatures, factors such as 
jurisdictional competition and competition between interest groups have led state 
legislatures to enact efficient laws in uniformity.
In fact, competition has several dimensions; the first is interstate competition. One 
important implication to be emphasised here is that interstate competition has ended 
state legislators’ monopoly over special charters and liberalised the law on other 
matters, including commercial arbitration. Further, the NCCUSL has never clearly 
articulated the appropriate scope of uniformity.
32 Ibid.
33 Prior to passage by New York (1920), New Jersey (1923), the federal government (1925), Oregon 
(1925), Massachusetts (1925), Pennsylvania (1927) and California (1927), of statutes commanding 
their law courts to enforce arbitration agreements and rulings, agreements to arbitrate were generally 
not considered binding under US common law, and at least for a portion of US history prior to the 
1920s, hostile judges felt free to overturn arbitration decisions if one of the parties chose to litigate.
34 See Philip C. Jessup, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of Nations. P.354, The Am. J. Int’l. L. 
Vol.58
35 See Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi. An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 
p. 132. J. of Legal Studies, Vol. XXV, Jan. 1996. University of Chicago.
36 Ibid. p. 135.
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Another area of competition is the influence of interest groups. Interest groups - 
mainly business oriented - support inefficient uniformity, since they have little 
incentive to seek uniform adoption of a law that can be easily avoided by contract. 
Usually such interest groups may participate in drafting and lobbying for NCCUSL 
proposals that both are appropriately uniform and serve the groups’ interest by 
maximising their power.
Such competition amongst interest groups leads to another type of competition: that 
is, the Federal versus State law competition. Some of the NCCUSL’s proposals are 
consistent with the public interest theory of uniformity but nevertheless may not be 
widely adopted because of opposition by powerful interest groups. In respect to 
competition between the Federal and State law, “proponents of uniform state laws see 
them as a solution to the problem of inconsistent and hard-to-find state laws that avoid 
the need for a federal solution that would shrink state autonomy. Although federal 
legislation can achieve these goals as well as or better than state uniform laws, since 
complete state uniformity is rare, proponents of uniformity have long rejected a 
federal solution.”40 Indeed, some advocates of uniform state laws view uniform laws 
as a way of averting the greater evil of Federal Law.41
Although business-oriented interest groups may have a smaller advantage at the 
federal level than they do in the uniform lawmaking process, it does not follow that 
any particular group can dominate state legislatures to achieve a uniform state law.42 
One feasible improvement that is consistent with the NCCUSL’s goals is to focus its 
work on procedural, commercial, and probate statutes instead of attempting to 
promote uniformity wherever there is inconsistency,43 because in the long run it has 
been emphasised that the best solution to the problem of inefficient and inconsistent 
state laws may be more competition among the states rather than more uniform laws, 
and the most important lesson is that one should be sceptical about the production of 
law by any rule making elite.
Market Competition
Because merchants and consumers can choose to buy from someone else,44 the 
competitive market concept in international commercial arbitration will be discussed 
as primarily concerned with the Western idea of maintaining a reputation for fairness 
in arbitration institutions and procedures. The dual objectives to be mentioned here 
are the influence of the perception amongst Western jurists on how the idea of 
competition in international commercial arbitration helps to develop the arbitration 
procedural law on the one hand, and how it helps to develop international arbitration 
in other parts of the world on the other hand.
In oil arbitration cases involving oil rich countries such as Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Iran, 
and Libya, where Western interests are at stake,45 arbitrators have broken away from 
the traditional positivist rules, as they have not been found suitable46 for international 
transactions in the ever-growing circumstance of interdependence of the international 
community. The efforts of western jurists are aimed at securing their multinational 
corporations’ foreign investment in the developing world and the preservation of the 
political and economic power of the western world.47 As two authors48 recently 
observed:
“The law and legal practice directed to the north-south disputes, for example, 
developed to reflect the interests of Western business in avoiding national 
courts and laws. And merchants found the services useful and valuable also 
because the perceived autonomy and universality of the lex mercatoria 
enable the Western merchants to ensure - at least statistically - their 
domination and their profits in their business relations with ex-colonial 
governments. Stated simply, autonomy and universality are not only 
consistent, but also closely related to the subordination of law to economic 
and political power.”49
44 See supra note 10, p. 124.
45 For more details, see Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. V. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 I. L. 
R. 144 (1951) (per Lord Asquith). Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co., Ltd., 20 I. L. R. 534 
(1953) (per Alfred Buknill). Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. V. National Iranian Oil Co. (1963), 
35 I. L. R. 136 (1963) (per Cavin). See supra note 8, p.20.
46 Arbitrators interpreted the common choice-of-law provision in the Libyan cases for example, in three 
different ways. No doubt, different arbitrators with different philosophies in the three different cases 
were likely to reach different conclusions on the same issues.
47 Ibid. p.20.
48 Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, (1996). Dealing in virtue: international commercial arbitration 
and construction of a transnational legal order. Texas international Law journal, pp. 397-407.
49 op.cit.
31
Another Western scholar has also noted that “the so-called lex mercatoria is largely an 
effort to legitimise as “law” the economic interests of Western corporations.” Thus, if 
arbitrators are perceived as the instrumentality of Western economic and political 
power, arbitration as an institution will not prosper globally. Hence, it proves to be a 
challenge for arbitrators to develop a balanced arbitral jurisprudence that will be 
acceptable universally.50
As mentioned above, the concept of competition helped to develop international 
commercial arbitration in other parts of the world, but other factors usually influenced 
the choice of arbitration sites. European sites for example, were generally considered 
acceptable not only in disputes with European parties, but also with parties from 
Africa or the Middle East, in part because many African and Middle Eastern legal 
systems were derived from European civil codes.51
In addition to the preferred sites for ICC arbitration, other neutral forums gained 
popularity based on political and geographical preference. Indeed, between 1980 and
c'y
1988, the ICC supervised arbitrations in sixty- three countries around the world. For 
instance, the Vienna International Arbitration Centre (VIAC) was created in 1975 and 
has developed into a well known international arbitration institution, frequently called
c i
upon by parties from all over the world. Vienna has since become an important 
centre for East-West arbitrations because of its proximity to Eastern European 
countries and its acceptability to COCOM members.54
Based upon the same geographical convenience or political acceptability, parties have 
become attracted to the site of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce, which has since become an important centre for international arbitrations 
involving Russia and states of the former Soviet Union, and China as well.55 Finally, 
Kuala Lumpur is the home of the regional Centre for Arbitration, set up by the Asian-
50 op.cit. pp.20. See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial 
Arbitration and Construction of a Transnational Legal Order 98 (1996); see also Frank E. Nattier, 
International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America: Enforcement of Arbitral Agreements and 
Awards, 21 Tex. Int’l L. J. 397, 407 (1986).
51 See W. Laurence Craig, Some trends and developments in the laws and practice of International 
Commercial Arbitration, pp. 8. Tex. Int’l. L. J. 1995.
52 Ibid. p. 10.
53 As of September 2001, the Vienna International Arbitral Centre administered 70 cases. See Andreas 
Reiner. The 2001 Version of the Vienna Rules p. 661. J. Int’l. Arb. 18 (6): 661-668, 2001. Kluwer Law 
International.
54 See supra note 43, p.9.
55 Ibid.
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African Consultative Committee with the cooperation of the Malaysian government, 
which provides for administration of international arbitration under the UNCITRAL 
Rules.56
The growth of arbitration will be fuelled, as always, by the needs of international 
business, but the direction it will take, and particularly the choice of arbitration sites, 
will also be a function of geography.57 In short, there are more players, more rules and 
more referees in the game, but the character of the game is unchanged: the strongest 
players will still make most of the rules, supply most of the referees, and win most of 
the time.58
3.2.2 The Concept of “Individualism”
The second element of the normative concept of positivism legal theory of 
international commercial arbitration modem law is the concept of “individualism”. 
Ideology of Individualism in International Commercial Law 
Traditionally in Continental Europe the concept of the state has been very important, 
and there is a greater sense of people ‘belonging’ to the state. This ‘belonging’ carries 
with it expectations about responsibilities that the state owes to its people and is 
expected to fulfil. Examples of these responsibilities are providing centralised police 
forces, stronger central bureaucracies, and less concern for the ideologies of 
individualism.59 Modem Western ideology of international commercial law has been 
characterised by individualism.60 The Franciscan monk, William of Ockham (1285- 
1349?), translated then developing “individualism”61 into philosophical and legal 
thought.
56 Ibid. p.33.
57 Ibid.
58 See John W. Head, Supranational Law: How The Move Towards Multilateral Solutions is changing 
the character of “International” Law. p. 20. Kan L. Rev. 605 1994.
59 See George P. Gilligan. The Origins of UK Financial Services Regulation. P. 4. Complaw. 1997, 18 
(6) Sweet & Maxwell Limited.
60 See Andreas Buss. The Evolution of Western Individualism, p. 20. Religion (2000) 30, 1-25. 
Academic Press.
61Individualism is a moral, political, and social philosophy, which emphasises individual liberty belief 
in the primary importance of the individual, and in the "virtues of self-reliance" and "personal 
independence". "Individualism" embraces opposition to authority, and to all manner of controls over 
the individual, especially when exercised by the political state or "society". It is thus, directly-opposed 
to collectivism. It is often confused with "egoism". Societies and groups can differ, in the extent to 
which they are based upon predominantly "self-regarding" (individualistic, and arguably self- 
interested) rather than "other-regarding" (group-oriented, and group, or society-minded) behaviour. 
There is also a distinction, relevant in this context, between "guilt" societies (e.g. medieval Europe), 
("internal reference standard"), and "shame" societies (e.g. Japan, "bringing shame upon one's
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“Law is the expression of the will and power of individual legislators; the 
term is used to designate the social recognition of the power of the 
individual, and no natural or social order exists beyond that upon which 
the individuals decide. Power has become the functional equivalent of 
order and hierarchy. The modem conception of the individual as a value 
comes to mind here.” 62
Indeed, the principal function of the social order was to protect individual rights. In 
the following centuries to Axial Age civilisations and early Christianity, the idea of 
natural law dominated social thinking and contributed to the development of inward 
individualism. Natural Law theories are sometimes divided into classical and modem. 
In the classical version man is a social being63 and the basis of law is the social and 
political order in conforming to the order of nature. Modem natural law theory thus 
does not involve social beings but instead self-sufficient individuals.64 The socialist 
objectives of the post-Revolutionary East European government militated against 
individualism to an extent, but ultimately its pursuit of social justice and the 
coincident influence of natural law principles fostered a predominantly individualist 
conception.
Individualism was not the sole watchword of the revolutions which ushered in and 
characterised Western national legal systems, rather it extended to characterise the 
international law.65 “Western Europe constituted ‘the original international 
community within which international law grew up gradually through custom and 
treaty. The community which arises within such conventional treatments is a
ancestors") with an "external reference standard", where people look to their peers for feedback, as to 
whether an action is "acceptable" or not (also known as "group-think").The extent to which society, or 
groups are "individualistic" can vary from time to time, and from country to country. For example, 
Japanese society is more group-oriented (e.g. decisions tend to be taken by consensus among groups, 
rather than by individuals), and it has been argued that "personalities are less developed" (than is usual 
in the West). The USA is usually thought of as being at the individualistic (its detractors would say 
"atomistic") "end of the spectrum", whereas European societies are more inclined to believe in "public­
spiritedness", state "socialistic" spending, and in "public" initiatives.
62 Ibid. p. 13.
63 Such a relation between people is a social power relation, as distinct from a productive power 
relation. The will of one human is subordinated to the other’s will, which thus has power of command. 
The execution of commands by a subordinate is a change brought about in the subordinate’s actions 
and is thus a manifestation of power emanating from the superior. The great question and dilemma of 
the social being is how individual human freedom can be reconciled at all with social power relations.
64 Ibid. p. 16.
65 See Francesca Klug. Values for a Godless Age: The Story of the United Kingdom’s New Bill of 
Rights. Pp.2-3, E. H. R. L. R. 2001,2,241-243. Sweet and Maxwell Limited.
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community of sovereign states ... the process is thereby begun of determining 
whether such a community knows of values other than the sovereign identities of its 
individual members - whether the ‘community’ becomes more than the mere 
collection of its parts, or to use Franck’s word, ‘the system’s values, aims, and effects’ 
and the extent to which (if at all) the community’ is prepared to admit other than 
states within its following.”66 Thus, one can find that international law has recognised 
each of the actors within the international system for what they are- whether they be
f\1states, international institutions, individuals or corporations. Such a definition has 
been influenced by the concept of personal liberty and protection of human rights in 
the international economy.
Roughly speaking, liberalism traditionally suffers from two important problems in 
connection with relations between groups, individuals and states. One problem is that, 
keen as it is to place the individuals in the spotlight, liberalism has difficulty in 
coming to terms with groups, be they tribes, or minorities, or indigenous people. Yet 
if only out of strategic concerns, the liberal will also have an intuitive affinity with 
such groups, precisely because they help form an alliance against the overzealous 
ambitions of the state. Therefore, some communitarians stress that liberalism is 
based on the false premise that the individual is largely responsible for his own 
identity; while other say individuals are always part of larger social groups, from 
family to neighbourhood to tribe to, eventually, nations or states; thus individuality is, 
at least in part, a product of community.69 Having described how the concepts of 
individualism and liberalism are deeply rooted in Western culture, their impact cannot 
be appealed on the process of the development of harmonised arbitration rules as they 
expand to include economic activities.
Hayek and other defenders of liberty rights, for example, believe that human rights 
and market freedoms are, in effect, one and the same thing. They understand the
66 See Sir R. Jennings and Sir A. Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law: Peace, vol. I (9th edn, 1992), 
at 87. Also see the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua: 
Nicaragua v. United States of America, ICJ Reports (1986) 14, at 133 (paragraph 263). See, further, N. 
Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society (2000), at 28 
(Describing the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention’ as ‘the constitutive rules of international 
society’) supra notes 23 & 24 in Dino Kritsiotis. Imagining The International community, p. 4. 
European Journal of Int’l. L. 2002 13 (961).
67 op.cit. p. 15.
68 See L. Henkin, ‘International Law: politics, values and functions’, See Th. M. Franck, The 
Empowered Self: Law and Society in the Age of Individualism, p. 418. Oxford University Press. 
International J. on Minority and Group Rights 7: 411-420, 2000. Kluwer L. International.
69 o.p.cit. p.416.
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human rights functions of international economic law not only in terms of promoting 
the availability and accessibility of traded goods, traded services and open markets 
that are essential for the fulfilment of many social human rights, but also in 
guaranteeing freedom, non-discrimination, rule of law and social justice (e.g. in the 
Bretton Wood and WTO agreements) in a coherent manner that empowers citizens,
• mcontains state power and reinforces individual rights.
Furthermore, they believe that individuals can be empowered through decentralised
and more complex market governance mechanisms which treat citizens as legal
11subjects rather than mere objects. It has been argued that, given the everyday 
experience of a billion people who can survive only by trading the fruits of their 
labour in exchange for goods and services indispensable for their personal self­
development, this should be recognised as a human rights problem rather than merely
79as a legislative or administrative task to be left to ‘benevolent governments’. Teson 
has emphasised another dimension of the individualism paradigm in international law, 
where he confronts the traditional foundation of international law through a moral 
critique:
“Traditional foundations are illiberal and authoritarian because they unduly 
exalt state power. All exercise of power must be morally legitimate.
Roughly, an exercise of power is morally legitimate when it is the result 
of political consent and respect the basic rights of the individuals subject 
to that power. If international law is to be morally legitimate, therefore, it 
must mandate that states respects human rights as a precondition for 
joining the international community. Immanuel Kant was the first to 
defend this thesis, and for that reason I will call it the Kantian theory of 
international law.”73
It has been argued that Teson has been too modest in his view regarding the extent to 
which the ideas of “normative individualism”74 now inform law and practice at the
70 See Emst-Ulrich Petersmann. Taking Human Dignity, Poverty and Empowerment of Individuals 
more Seriously. P. 2. European J. of Int’l. L. 2002.13 (845).
71 Ibid. p.4.
72 Ibid. p.2.
73 See Teson, Fernando R. (1998), A Philosophy of International Law. pp. 1-2 (Boulder: Westview 
Press); see in Christopher Harding, Statist assumption, normative individualism and new forms of 
personality: evolving a philosophy of international law for the twenty first century, p. 108. Non-State 
Actors and International Law 1: 107-125, 2001. Kluwer Law International.
74 Kagitcibasi (1997) distinguished normative individualism, with its emphasis on individual rights and 
avoidance of the oppression of the in-group, from relational individualism, with its emphasis on the 
distance between self and in-group. We do not have, as yet, specific measures of each of these aspects, 
or many variables, in addition to the vertical and horizontal dimensions, that may define different kinds
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international level. While there is clearly much that is in an abstract sense ethically 
persuasive in his argument, it also possesses in a more empirical sense a very 
significant resonance in a good deal of political and normative practice at the 
international level over the last fifty years or so.75 This is most evident in the 
emergent body of humanitarian norms which seeks in various ways to provide an 
international guarantee of individual rights and interests. But it is also possible to go a 
stage further and identify a significant normative dynamic - especially in the 
European-international context - which is driving the development of a detailed and
76effective body of rules which are manifestly indicative of ‘normative individualism’. 
Frank (1999),77exposes another puzzle for international lawyers - how to reconcile the 
state’s role as the protector of individual rights with the reality that the power may be 
abused or ignored, that what is intended to improve the lot of individuals turns out to
7 0
make their condition worse.
Self Regulation
The concept of ‘individualism’ in international commercial arbitration law can be 
more effectively reinforced if understood as a process of self regulation. It has been 
said that, conferring equal individual rights enables a higher degree of legal 
autonomy, empowerment and responsibility of individuals, and a more decentralised 
‘self-enforcing constitution’, than does a paternalistic reliance on authoritarian
70
regulation of personal freedom. Two examples of the self-regulatory process are 
helpful in this regard; the first will be London’s financial markets, and the second is 
the development of the lex mercatoria.
First, all English markets (e.g. metal exchange, grain, and other trading activities) and 
not just London’s financial markets have long-held traditions of self-regulation. They 
are legally grounded in the law merchant and common law, and have at their heart the 
belief that commerce is a domain of private transactions. The private regulatory 
structures of the City’s markets therefore reflect national characteristics and are
of individualism and collectivism (Triands 1994). Specially, we need to examine differences between 
the relationship of self to close in-group, distance in-group (e.g., state), neutral out-group (e.g., 
strangers) and hostile out-group (e.g., people with whom one has a zero-sum relationship), in private 
and public settings, that are characterised by differing levels of tightness. See Harry C. Triandis (2001). 
Individualism-Collectivism and Personality. Journal of Personality. P. 920.
75 op.cit. p. 108.
76 Ibid.
77In his latest book, the Empowered Self: Law and Society in the Age of individualism (1999), Frank 
discussed the role of the state to protect human rights.
78 See Colin Warbrick, Introduction to the Symposium. p2. EJIL 2002 13 (902).
79 See Supra note 60. p.4.
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OA
partially explained by the relative weakness of the central state, or alternatively by 
its unwillingness to intervene, guided by laissez faire notions.
Moreover, the essentially private character of the Bank of England and the Stock 
Exchange has moulded the self-regulatory system of the UK financial-services 
sector.81 By the end of the nineteenth century the importance of London’s financial 
markets to the UK economy was manifested in the fact that one-fifth of the nation’s
OA
wealth was invested in company shares.
Evidence shows that any significant regulatory developments have been largely 
influenced by constituent interest groups. These groups have achieved their regulatory 
autonomy through their reflexive interaction with external economic and political 
structures.83 It has also been observed groups consistently defeat or deflect external 
attempts at regulatory intervention, and routinely consolidate their own regulatory 
authority and system of self-regulation. To maintain their regulatory authority and to 
preserve their self regulatory traditions, they utilise their shared social and political 
connections, their lobbying power, and the financial services industry’s strategic 
importance.
Secondly, the basic concepts of modem Western mercantile law - lex mercatoria “the 
law merchant” were formed by the concept of self regulation, and, even more 
importantly, it was then that mercantile law in the West first came to be viewed as an 
integrated, developing system, a body of law” (Berman 1983, p.333). In fact, the 
commercial revolution could not have occurred without the rapid development of this 
system of law (Berman 1983, p.336). This legal system evolved spontaneously within 
the decentralised merchant community, rather than being produced by centralised
85state government.
80 See supra note 51, p. 4.
81 Only in recent times has the stock Exchange become more open and more publicly accountable. The 
Bank of England was nationalised by the Bank of England Act 1946, but the process of choosing the 
governor has remained unchanged and nationalisation has had virtually no effect on the bank’s 
methods of operation. See generally R Eatwell, The 1945-1951 Labour Governments (London: 
Batsford Academic, 1979) see supra note 51. pp.6
82 See G.Robb, White-Collar Crime in Modem England, Financial Fraud and Business Morality, 1845- 
1929 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 See supra note 10.
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Party Autonomy
Party autonomy,86 the freedom of individuals or self determination of legal relations 
by individuals according to their respective will - and the limits of party autonomy- 
comprises one of the fundamental issues of national contract and private law, perhaps
0 7
the most fundamental.
In the United Kingdom, following Holt and Mansfield88, British courts were 
increasingly willing to enforce contracts as businessmen wanted them to be enforced. 
However, in light of competition and applying customary law merchants, things 
begans to change, English courts began pulling back from the doctrine of revocability 
in Scott v. Avery (5H.L. Cas.811 (1855)), holding that contracts to arbitrate specific 
future disputes were binding, although contracts to arbitrate “any disagreement arising 
under the term of the contract” were revocable. In Scotland, the doctrine was 
explicitly rejected in Drew v. Drew (2 Macqueen’s Cases on Appeal (1855)), as it was 
recognised to be in direct conflict with the general common law doctrine of binding
89contracts.
As to the impact of individualism, in Europe, the fundamental freedom of individuals 
is manifested as the basic goal of the EC Treaty and designed to extend party 
autonomy across borders. The contract is the instrument of party autonomy. In the 
internal market place, party autonomy means not only orthodox contractual freedom, 
but also and more importantly, the freedom to choose the law applicable and thereby 
also has to do with domestic mandatory law.90
86 International arbitration is a consensual, contractual process. At its heart is the cardinal principle of 
party autonomy, according to which parties enjoy wide latitude in structuring their arbitration 
arrangements so as to suit their particular needs. Implicit in this scheme of flexible arbitral self- 
government is an understanding that the rules stipulated by the parties as governing their arbitration 
will bind the arbitrators and administering institutions in performance of their respective functions. See 
Hoellering, Michael F.(1998). International Arbitration agreements: a look behind the scenes. Dispute 
Resolution Journal.
87 See Stefan Grundmann, Information, Party autonomy and Economic Agents in European Contract 
Law. p.269. Common Market Law Review 39: 269-293, 2002. Kluwer Law International.
88 The late seventeenth century, particularly with Sir John Holt, and the eighteenth century with Lord 
Mansfield, saw common law decisions once again explicitly drawing upon customs and usages of 
English merchants as a source of changes in English common law. Mansfield even instituted the use of 
merchant juries to consider commercial disputes. While Mansfield’s role in reviving customary sources 
of legal changes in common law was particularly important (there were political motivations behind 
Mansfield’s efforts), another significant impetus appears to be the fact that as international trade 
became relatively more important, common law courts were forced to compete with foreign courts and 
legal systems to regulate international commerce. Benson (1999) pp. 125-126.
89 See supra note 10 p. 126.
90 See supra note 74 p. 270.
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In the United States, cases have reflected that the American’s legal system has 
defended party autonomy according to arbitration contract law. In the Mitsubishi case 
(1985)91, a case with international dimensions, the US Supreme court rejected the 
considerations and concluded:
“that concern o f international comity, respect for the capacities o f  
foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need o f  the 
international commercial system for predictability in the resolution o f 
disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming 
that a contrary result will be forthcoming in a domestic context.”93
91 This landmark case of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., raised and decided 
the question of the arbitrability of antitrust claims. In the judgment by five to three votes, 
anticompetitive conduct is subject to arbitration'. See Robert B. Von Mehren (2003) The Eco-Swiss 
Case and International Arbitration. Arbitration International, Vol. 19, No. 4. p. 465.
92 The Court rebutted the argument that the public interest involved in the private enforcement of the 
antitrust laws militated against a tolerance for arbitration of these claims by rejecting the fundamental 
premise of the argument, especially as presented by the United States. The Court simply noted that the 
private damage remedy - by which is presumably meant the treble damage remedy - can be sought 
outside American courts. The Court reasoned that a tribunal appointed to decide claims arising under 
American law should be bound to decide the claims in accord with the law of the country giving rise to 
the claim that, therefore, the Sherman Act should continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent 
function. Ibid
93 The issue of whether domestic antitrust claims are arbitrable has yet to reach the US Supreme Court. 
Lower courts, however, have already answered this question in the affirmative. Kotman Elecs. V. JBL 
Consumer Prods. Inc., 93 F. 3d 724 (11th Cir. 1996), cert, denied, 117 S. Ct. 946 (1997); Coors 
Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries, 51 F. 3d 1551 (10th Cir. 1995); GKG Caribe, Inc. v. Nokia-Mobira, 
Inc., 725 F. Supp. 109 (D. Puerto Rico 1989); Cindy’s Candle Co., Inc. v. WNS, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 973 
(N. D. III. 1989).
With regard to the general significance of Mitsubishi for antitrust litigation we should bear in mind 
Andreas F. Lowenfeld’s remark, that antitrust claims submitted to arbitration almost exclusively arise 
in the context of counterclaims among parties to an agreement once the contractual relationship has 
become invalid. Companies squeezed out of the market by rivals or seeking to prevent a merger among 
competitors do not resort to arbitration because they have no contractual relationship with the persons 
or entities against which they seek relief: Andreas F. Lowenfeld, ‘The Mitsubishi Case: Another View’ 
in (1986) 2 Arbitration International 178 at p. 180. See Patrick M. Baron and Stefan Liniger, A Second 
Look at Arbitrability Approach to Arbitration in the United States, Switzerland and Germany, p.30 
Arb. Int’l. vol. 19, No. 1, LCIA 2003.
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In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon (1987)94 similar to Mitsubishi case, 
the US Supreme Court held that a party who agrees to arbitrate a statutory claim 
cannot forego the substantive protection afforded by the statute. Rather, it trades the 
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, 
informality, and expedition of arbitration. Furthermore, as in Mitsubishi, the US 
Supreme Court emphasised that the potential complexity of certain matters is in itself 
not sufficient to ward off arbitration.95
Finally, in Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, SA v. M/V Sky Reefer et al. (1995)96, the 
issue at stake was whether a foreign arbitration clause in a bill of lading would be 
invalid under [COGSA §3(8)] because the selection of a foreign forum in conjunction 
with the choice of foreign law might lessen the liability of a carrier in a sense 
prohibited by the provisions of COGSA. Based upon the notion that the “United 
States should be a trusted partner in international trade, along with the idea that US 
courts ‘will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the
94 Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon decided on June 8th, 1987. Respondents were 
customers of petitioner Shearson/American Express Inc. (Shearson), a brokerage firm registered with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), under customer agreements providing for arbitration 
of any controversy relating to their accounts. Respondents filed a suit in the Federal District Court 
against Shearson and its representative (also a petitioner here) who handled their accounts, alleging 
violations of the antifraud provisions in 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) 
and SEC Rule 1 Ob-5, and of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act (RICO). 
Petitioners moved to compel arbitration of the claims pursuant to 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 
which requires a court to stay its proceedings if it is satisfied that an issue before it is arbitrable under 
an arbitration agreement. The District Court held that respondents' Exchange Act claims were 
arbitrable, but that their RICO claim was not. The Court of Appeals affirmed as to the RICO claim, but 
reversed as to the Exchange Act claims.
95 Ibid. p. 31. See also, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., supra n. 12 at 638.
96 The contract at issue in this case was a standard form bill of lading to evidence the purchase of a 
shipload of Moroccan oranges and lemons. The purchaser was Bacchus Associates (Bacchus), a New 
York partnership that distribute fruit at wholesale throughout the Northeastern United States. Bacchus 
dealt with Galaxie Negoce, S. A. (Galaxie), a Moroccan fruit supplier. Bacchus contracted with 
Galaxie to purchase the shipload of fruit and chartered a ship to transport it from Morocco to 
Massachusetts. The ship was the M/V Sky Reefer, a refrigerated cargo ship owned by M. H. Maritima, 
S. A., a Panamanian company, and time chartered to Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., a Japanese 
company. Stevedores hired by Galaxie loaded and stowed the cargo. As is customary in these types of 
transactions, when it received the cargo from Galaxie, Nichiro as carrier issued a form bill of lading to 
Galaxie as shipper and consignee. Once the ship set sail from Morocco, Galaxie tendered the bill of 
lading to Bacchus according to the terms of a letter of credit posted in Galaxie's favour. The US 
Supreme Court concluded that “Because we hold that foreign arbitration clauses in bills of lading are 
not invalid under COGSA in all circumstances, both the FAA and COGSA may be given full effect. 
The judgement of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.” See US Supreme Court collection No. 94-623.
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legitimate interest in the enforcement of the... Laws has been addressed, the US
07Supreme Court affirmed the arbitrability of the matter.”
Another necessary aspect of party autonomy is the role of arbitrators. Since 
arbitration itself is based on party autonomy, modem arbitration law emphasises that 
it must be respected in the context of arbitration.
The arbitrator’s revision of the parties’ contract by substituting the applicable law, 
however equitable, should be prohibited in principle for the sake of the sanctity of the 
contract.98 Thus, one may argue that if an arbitrator applies any law other than the 
parties’ chosen one, the parties’ expectations will be frustrated.99 Professor Riesman 
has observed; “it is unfair to the parties and dangerous for the future of arbitration if 
arbitrators can arrogate to themselves a change of the mles once parties have selected 
a set of them to govern their transactions.”100
On a final point, the concept of party autonomy in arbitration predicates that the 
binding authority of an award derives solely from the agreement of the parties, and 
not from national law.101
3.2.3 The Concept of The “Role of Merchants”
3.2.3.1 In the Development of the Law
In the arena of commercial arbitration law, modem international commercial 
arbitration laws have been developed within the constant interaction between state 
and private individuals (merchants). One of the most noticeable Western 
characteristics is that commercial arbitration law is not a static phenomenon, but 
rather a process of continuing political adaptation within a regulatory setting, in which
• •  109actors can erode existing law and lobby for change.
97 op.cit 19, p. 32. See, Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S. A. v. M/V Sky Reefer et al.,
98 op.cit. 8, p.8. See Henri Mazeaud et al., Traite Theorique et Patrique de la Responsabilite Civile 
Delictuelle et Contractuelle sec. 1, at 735 (6th ed. 1965); George Ripert, 81 La Regie Morale dans les 
Obligations Civiles; see also UNCITRAL Draft Model Law for International Commercial Arbitration, 
art. 34 (2), in 24 I.L.M. 1302, 1314 (1985); 585 Abs 2 Allgemeines B < umu> regerliches Gesetzbuch 
[ABGB] (Aus.), reprinted in 1 International Handbook of Commercial Arbitration (Pieter Sanders ed., 
1998); Belgium Judicial Code art. 1074, reprinted in 1 International Handbook of Commercial 
Arbitration (Pieter Sanders ed., 1998); The Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 1065 (1), 
reprinted in 12 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 370 (1987); United States Arbitration Act, February 12, 1925, sec. 
10, reprinted in 1 International Handbook of Commercial Arbitration (Pieter Sanders ed., 1998).99
See supra note 8.
100 W. Michael Reisman, System of Control in International Adjudication and Arbitration: Breakdown 
and Repair 95 (1992) op. cit. supra note. 8 p .8
101 See Roy Goode, The Role of Lex Loci Arbitri in International Commercial Arbitration, p.24 Arb. 
Int’l. vol. 17 No. 1. LCIA, 2001.
102 See George P. Gilligan, The Potential of Socio-Legal Approaches in the Development of Company 
Law. p. 127. Comp. Law. 2000, 21(4), 127-128.
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Socio-legal approaches are useful in demonstrating that commercial arbitration law is 
a social and political process, not a value-neutral and automatic system. It is not a 
“given”, but is more often a basis for negotiation for major players. Power bases in 
the production of law and regulation can include: professional groups; established 
institutional and social structures; interdependent relationships between different
imarkets; and national political priorities. Certainly these forces have been present 
in the regulatory changes that have accompanied the development of the law from a 
very early time to the most recent trends in the era of globalisation. Unsurprisingly, 
they are present also in the current policy reform processes in the West and other 
regional blocs.
As merchants began to transact business across political, cultural and geographic 
boundaries they came into contact with foreign trade practices. Many trade practices 
in different localities were found to have much in common, but where conflicts arose 
or where innovative trade practices were developed, those practices which proved to 
be most effective at facilitating commercial interaction tended to supplant those that 
were less effective.
By the end of the Twelfth Century many important principles of commercial law were 
international in character.104 Mitchell (1904) states: “From these foundations and 
most particularly in Europe, the continued evolution of rules and legal institutions in 
European commercial society was spontaneous and undersigned. This “customary 
nature of the Law Merchant was by far the most decisive factor in its development: it 
made the law eminently a practical law adapted to the requirements of commerce; and 
as trade expanded and new forms of commercial activity arose - negotiable paper, 
insurance, etc.-custom everywhere fashioned and framed the broad general principles 
of the new law”. 105
More importantly, the development of private dispute resolution systems can be 
traced back to medieval Europe, when merchants and traders from different regions 
would assemble at markets and fairs to do business; this led to the development of
,03lbid.
104 See supra note 10. p. 118
105Mitchell 1904, pp.7-9; Bewes 1923, p. 138; Berman 1983, pp. 350-355), as in Bruce L. Benson, to 
arbitrate or to litigate : that is the question, p.l 18. Also for more details, see Mitchell, W. (1904).p.l2. 
An Essay on the Early History of the Law Merchant, pp.7-9.
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both the special procedures for dealing with mercantile matters and a substantive law 
of merchants, the “lex mercatoria” .m
These socio-legal approaches to the merchants’ activities influenced the development 
of commercial arbitration laws at the domestic and international levels. First at the 
domestic level by providing foreign merchants with substantial protection against 
potential discrimination under local laws, including local customs. Accordingly, by 
the early Thirteenth Century various communities of traders could turn to the Law 
Merchant as an integrated system of principles, concepts, rules and procedures. The 
rapid evolution of the Law Merchant continued through the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
and Fifteenth Centuries so that as commercial opportunities expanded, commercial 
law became even more objective, precise, uniform and integrated, and its dispute 
resolution procedures became more formalised. Merchants established their own 
participatory courts for several reasons; for one thing, merchants needed their own
107courts so they could be sure that their own rules would be enforced.
3.2.3.2 The Establishment of “Merchants Courts” and “Courts-Sponsored Arbitration”
The previous part examined how the merchant community played a major role in the 
outcome of commercial arbitration rules taking advantage of individualism, conflict 
and competition. This part will examine the role of merchants in establishing their 
courts (the merchants’ courts) and significance in the development of commercial 
arbitration law.
Merchants naturally used the urban courts which evolved from the earlier market 
courts, and which they, the merchants, continued to dominate. The availability of 
numerous alternative disputes resolution forums, including the merchant courts of the 
fairs and markets, meant that the Law Merchant remained a source of protection 
against the growing centralised power of the king. Indeed, as Hayek explains:
“The growth o f  the purpose-independent rules o f  conduct which can 
produce a spontaneous order w ill... often have taken place in conflict 
with the aims o f  the rulers who tended to try to turn their domain into an 
organisation proper. It is in the ius gentium , the law merchant, and the
106 op.cit. 43, p. 3 For a discussion of international enforceability of obligatory awards, see Rene David, 
Arbitration in International Trade 366-72 (1985).
107 op.cit. 10, For more details, see Berman, H. J. (1983). Law and Revolution: The Formation of 
Western Legal Tradition pp. 350. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. See also, Trakman, L. E. 
(1983). The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial Law, pp. 15. Littleton, Co: Fred B. Rothman 
and Co.
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practices o f  the ports and fairs that we must chiefly seek the steps in the 
evolution o f  law which ultimately made an open society possible.” 108
These commercial courts were constituted by merchants (commercants) either 
individually or through participation in companies.109 Merchant court judges were 
merchants chosen from the relevant merchant community (fair or market), and when 
technical issues were involved, merchants experts in the relevant area of commerce 
could be chosen as judges.110
Perhaps the most widely cited characteristics of the merchant courts were their speed 
and informality. This characteristic was in response to the needs of merchants, and 
another reason for participatory merchants courts. Merchants of the time had to 
complete their transactions in one market or fair and quickly move to the next, so a 
dispute had to be settled quickly to minimise disruption of business affairs.111 
In further developments, powerful members of England’s merchant community saw 
advantages in having royal and later parliamentary authority established over
t 10commercial matters. In this context, one early development in the gradual process
of absorption of the Law Merchant was cooperation by royal authorities in applying it.
Merchants clearly found it beneficial to shift the burden of enforcement. The growing
political power of domestic merchants was a significant factor leading towards more
royal and then parliamentary influence over commercial matters. In the later stage, as
a result of the growing political power of domestic merchants, they exercised more
significant influence over commercial matters, as they influenced state courts to
sponsor arbitration, arguing lawyers and state judges often had no knowledge of
commercial issues. The growing demands of the commercial community upon the
courts probably encouraged court-sponsored arbitration since this met many of its
1
dispute processing needs. These court-sponsored arbitrations were meant to provide 
a method of expediting the resolution of cases whenever judicial resources were 
scarce, disputants too powerful, or issues too sensitive, or when the subject matter was
108 opcit 10. p.121 Hayek, F. A. (1973). Law, Legislation, and Liberty, pp.81-81. vol. 1, University of 
Chicago Press.
109 opcit.43. p.4.
110op.cit. lO.p. 119.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid. p. 123, see Olilvie, M. H. (1984). “Review of Leon Trakman’s The Law Merchant: The 
Evolution of Commercial Law.”, p. 115. Canadian Bar Review. 62, 113-116. Also see Benson, B. L. 
(1989). “The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law.” Southern Economical Journal. 55, 644-661.
113 op cit. supra note 89. pp.70-71.
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unsuitable for jury determination or required specialist knowledge or expertise.114 
Under such pressure, courts began granting requests to make out-of-court submissions 
subjects of rules of court. According to Kyd,
“This practice does not appear to have begun before the reign o f  Charles 
II [late 17th century] for the reports o f that period show that it was not 
before the latter end o f that reign that the courts granted their interference 
without reluctance.”115
Nevertheless, each case meant the payment of fees from which the justices derived 
much of their living. Competition between the courts for legal business became very 
bitter with the result that the boundaries of jurisdictions became much less definite or 
precise. The judges resorted to any subterfuge to attract cases into their courts.116 
Thus, early judicial defenders of the revocability doctrine spoke of the courts’ interest, 
suggesting that the common law judges of England saw arbitration as an undesirable 
threat to their control of dispute resolution. Still, arbitration remained an option if
117merchants were willing and able to apply reputation sanctions .
The late Seventeenth Century, particularly with Sir John Holt, and the eighteenth 
century with Lord Mansfield, saw court decisions once again explicitly drawing upon 
customs and usage of English merchants as a source of change in English common 
law.118
International Arbitration Agreements
In England as elsewhere, pressures from the commercial community were not to be 
denied. Fierce judicial opposition to arbitration gradually gave way to a wary 
acceptance of it but under the closest judicial scrutiny, and it was only in the latter 
half of the twentieth century (and in England, only in the past two decades) that courts 
finally came to terms with the fact that parties to arbitration agreements want privacy, 
confidentiality and finality in the settlement of their disputes, and view judicial 
intervention in the arbitral process or in the review of awards as a measure to be taken 
only in exceptional circumstances.119
114 Ibid. p.69.
115 S. Kyd, A Treatise on the Law of Awards (London 1791) pp. 10-11.
116 See supra note 10.
117 Reputation sanctions as merchants could operate on their political-economic leverage.
118 See supra note 95.
119 See supra note 84.
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In summary, because of powerful merchants’ role, arbitration is no longer perceived 
as a tolerated encroachment upon the State’s monopoly over justice, but as the 
ordinary means of resolving international commercial disputes. For parties to an 
international transaction, arbitration usually affords legal protection and security equal
190to, if not greater than, that offered by state courts.
3.3 Institutional Aspects of Modern Commercial Arbitration Law
Considering the second aspect of John Austin’s concepts of positivism legal theory, 
this part of the chapter will examine the concept of Anti-Statism as the most 
institutionalised framework for developing modem international commercial 
arbitration law in the context of Western legal culture.
3.3.1 The Concept of “Anti-Statism”
It has been shown in the previous part of this chapter how factors within the 
normative aspect framework of legal positivism in Western legal culture have 
influenced the development of commercial arbitration law. In this section of the 
chapter, it is important to examine how Western society came to adopt and 
institutionalise the new concepts of modem commercial arbitration law. What were 
the broader cultural consequences of this?
At this point it is important to emphasise that the dispute resolution procedures found 
in any culture reflect and express its metaphysics and its values. Further, the dispute 
procedures, because they are so public, dramatic, and repetitive, are in turn one of the
191processes by which social values and understanding are communicated.
The relationship between Western society’s culture and its socially-approved means 
of dealing with disputes has intrigued procedural comparatists and social theorists for 
decades. Notwithstanding wide acceptance that there is such a relationship, its 
relevance to pragmatic work of procedural reform remains controversial. The 
importance of the issues has grown as the globalisation of business and personal 
activity has created incentives to transplant or harmonise procedures across 
borders.122
120 Homayoon Arfazadeh, Arbitrability under the New York Convention: the Lex Fori Revisited, p.78. 
Arb. Int’l. vol. 17. No. 1, LCIA, 200.
121 See Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, p. 2. Am. J. Comp. 
L. 2002.
122 op.cit. 109, pp. 5. For a thorough and insightful discussion of examples and relevant developments, 
see Gerhard Walter & Fridolin M.R. Walter, International Litigation: Past Experience and Future 
Perspective (2000). See also Taruffo, supra n. 1, at 14-18 (describes efforts to harmonise procedures).
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3.3.2 Western Concept of “Anti-Statism”
The concept of “Anti-Statism” can take several forms. Some versions of anti-statism 
stress the idea of sovereignty, noting that this can be located in groups other than the 
state. These versions fit well with the way, for example, Indian tribes, religious 
groups, and similar organisations function, evidencing unofficial but state-like 
authority and law.123 In these versions of anti-statism, an individual belongs to two 
sovereign groups: state and church or state and tribe. Another version of anti-statism 
views the individual as belonging to many different kinds of groups, some voluntary 
and others not, only some of which can comfortably be called sovereign.
Dama Hac Ska (1986)124, offers an alternative to the adversarial/inquisitorial 
categorisation of procedural systems. He posits two dimensions along which types of 
government can be plotted. The first is concerned with the “structure of government,” 
i.e., its “character” of authority. The second is concerned with the “legitimate function 
of the government”, more specifically, views on the purpose to be served by the
19Sadministration of justice.
He argues that “a nation’s procedures will reflect these fundamental attitudes about 
government and that this dynamic is observable, albeit imperfectly, in the real world.” 
Although he does not undertake a country-by-country comparison of procedures, he 
often distinguishes between continental and Anglo-American systems. He shows how 
a particular process flows from basic predilections about the form of governmental 
organisations, and that these vary with historical experiences of particular places. 
Dama Hac Ska thus shares the view that the cultural grounding of modem disputing 
institutions is very deep. It is for this reason that, as he notes, “what appears normal in
19 f \one system can seem grotesque in another.”
To describe the character of procedural authority, Dama Hac Ska’s distinguishes the 
hierarchical ideal from the coordinate ideal: the structure of the authority (hierarchical 
or coordinate) informs the process used by that authority. “The hierarchical ideal
123 For an exercise in formal pluralist analysis along these lines, see Carol Weisbrod, Family, Church 
and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26 J. FAM. L. (1987-88) (analysing 
the relations between church and state in the United States and using religion as an example of non­
state authority). See Carol Weisbord, Emblems of Federalism p. 2 U. Mich. J. L. 1992.
124For more details see Mirjan R. Dama Hac Ska, (1986) In The Face of Justice and State Authority: 
Comparative Approach to the Legal Process. New Haven, London, Yale University press.
125 Dama Ska does not claim that political organisations and goals are the only determinants of legal 
processes. Significantly, he acknowledges the limits imposed by “existing inventories of moral and 
cultural experience, the fabric of inherited, beliefs, and similar considerations.
126 Faces of justice, p. 66.
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essentially corresponds to conceptions of classical bureaucracy. It is characterised by 
a professional corps of officials, organised into a hierarchy which makes decisions
197according to technical standards”.
The coordinate ideal is “defined by a body of non-professional decision makers, 
organised into a single level of authority which makes decisions by applying
19 o
undifferentiated standards.”
The second determinant of the process is the “disposition” of the government to be 
either a “reactive” or “activist” state. The former simply provides a framework within 
which citizens pursue their own goals. The administration of justice is typically 
engaged in conflict-solving. Not so the activist state. It embraces a particular model of 
the good life and strives to achieve it. Justice can be characterised as engaged in 
implementing policy. “The legal process of a truly activist state is a process organised 
around the central idea of an official inquiry and is devoted to the implementation of 
state policy.129
Dama Hac Ska’s achievement was to create “a framework to examine the legal 
process as it is rooted in attitudes towards state authority and influenced by the
ichanging role of government.” While insisting that political factors “play a central
role in accounting for the grand contours of procedural systems,” he adds that a
government’s choice of procedural arrangements is limited by “existing inventories of
moral and cultural experience, the fabric of inherited beliefs and similar 
1^1considerations.”
Here, Dama Hac Ska’s approach is to explore two different sets of antipodes of state 
authority character: hierarchical versus coordinate authority and the reactive state 
versus the activist state. These will be discussed in following sections to show that the 
harmonisation process of commercial arbitration law has been positively influenced 
by the Western anti-statism type of state authority (as hierarchical ideal and reactive). 
In contrast, the Middle Eastern statism type of state authority (as coordinate ideal and 
activist) negatively affects the harmonisation process as will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
127 Faces of justice, pp. 17
128 Ibid, pp.38.
129 Ibid, 147
130 Ibid, pp. 240
131 Ibid pp. 241
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Reactive Disposition of the State
The early arguments for stringent national control of arbitral proceedings (a system of 
privatised justice) were based primarily upon state concerns with justice. It is argued 
that, “it is the highest interest of the state to maintain the principle of judicial review 
of arbitration, not only to develop the law, but also to ensure the administration of 
justice and thus to avoid the risk of arbitrariness.”132
Western culture found itself facing tension caused by the inherited autonomy of 
systems of commercial arbitration as privatised judicial systems and the apparent need 
for these systems to be controlled by, and accountable to, public systems of justice. 
Western culture was thus obliged to choose between the following two arguments; the 
public policy argument and the delocalisation argument. The public policy argument 
contended that the state should have jurisdiction over commercial arbitration given 
the issue of conflict of laws and national courts’ readiness in appropriate cases to 
apply a foreign law to a dispute and recognise and enforce judgements of foreign 
courts. The state’s jurisdiction over commercial arbitration would protect the 
legitimate expectations the first was the public policy argument and the second was 
the de-localisation argument of parties to the dispute who would suffer injustice if 
their reasonable reliance on the applicability of the law having closest connection to 
the matters at issue were to be frustrated.
In contrast to such arguments, delocalisation theory134 supported international 
commercial arbitration founded upon party autonomy. In general, it is argued that 
rather than concerning themselves with abstract notions of justice in dispute
132 F. A. Mann, Private Arbitration and Public Policy, 4 CIV. Just. Q. 257, 267 (1985). See 
Theofrastous, Theodore C., International Commercial Arbitration in Europe: Subsidiarity and 
Supremacy in Light of the De-Localisation. Western Reserve J. of Int’l. L. 1999, vol. 31, 2/3 p.3.
133 op.cit 84, pp. 31-32. See Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (2000, 13th ed.), para. 1-006.
134 This theory is well established and has influenced the wording of international conventions from the 
Geneva Protocol of 1923 to the New York Convention of 1958. The Geneva Protocol states “The 
arbitral procedure, including the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, shall be governed by the will of 
the parties and by the law of the country in whose territory the arbitration takes place”. This is an 
example of the of dualism concept in international commercial arbitration practice. On the one hand, 
the parties have a considerable degree of autonomy in respect of the way in which the arbitration is 
conducted, with the parties being free to decide on the procedural rules they wish to adopt, expressed 
by their will. On the other hand, the law of the country in the territory where the arbitration takes place, 
the lex arbitri, possesses the powers to support the arbitral process and intervene where required. See 
William Langton, (2006). Is Delocalised Arbitration a viable option in international commercial 
arbitration? www.Williamlangton.blogspot.com.
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resolution, parties seek complete autonomy, or certainly very high levels of it, in the
* • 135arbitration process as the most efficient means of settling disputes.
The delocalisation theory has, however, been criticised for in fact undermining the 
concept of party autonomy. If, following annulment of the award, the parties engage 
in fresh arbitration, appointing the same or a new panel of arbitrators, and pursue the 
proceedings to a second award, why should not the consensual basis of the new 
arbitration proceedings, and implicit acceptance of the nullity of the original award, 
be respected? Why should the will of the parties be disregarded? And if it is conceded 
that it should not be disregarded, we are left with the position of two separate, and 
possibly conflicting, awards covering the same dispute, both of them having to be 
treated as valid under the theory of delocalisation.
Conflict between the parties’ objective to have a private legal system in which their 
autonomy is respected and the state’s concerns to maintain its national courts’ 
jurisdiction over the arbitration procedures on the one hand and gain the benefit of 
international trade on the other, demonstrates clearly the reactive disposition of the 
state in Western culture. The following part will discuss some features of anti-statism 
in Western culture.
3.3.3 Some Features of Anti-Statism in Western Legal Culture 
Over the past several decades, the concept of de-localisation has had a dramatic 
impact on the international accords which govern arbitral proceedings and awards. 
Though early conventions clearly favour state control, later conventions and 
declarations demonstrate a willingness to balance individual objectives against those 
of the state. The desire to fix proceedings to the state is evidenced by the language of 
the Geneva Protocol of 1923, whereby “the arbitral procedure and constitution of the 
arbitration were governed by similar language found in the Geneva Convention for 
the Execution of foreign arbitral awards of September 26, 1927, which had the effect 
of mandating that the constitution of the tribunal and the arbitral procedures be in 
conformity with the law of the place of arbitration and be governed by the lex loci 
arbitri of the situs.”137
135 op.cit. 123, p. 4 See e.g. Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, The Role of Party Autonomy in International 
Arbitration, 52 Disp. Resol. J. 24, 25 (1997) (equating party autonomy to the commercial freedom to 
contract).
136 op.cit. supra note 84 p.33.
137 op.cit. 123. See LDIP art. 190(2) (Switz.), translated in Switzerland’s Private Law, supra note 154.
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A response to what some felt to be the unworkable nature of these agreements came 
in the form of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Arbitral awards. The enactment of this convention marked a turn towards 
increasingly de-localised international commercial arbitration. The most significant 
step towards de-localisation at the national level has come from the Model Law 
developed by the UNCITRAL and adopted in 1985. Unlike the New York or Geneva 
Conventions, the Model Law was intended as a lex loci arbitri for any state which 
decided to adopt it.139
Furthermore, international arbitration with participants from each side of the common 
law-civil law divide has traditionally required arbitrators to follow the practice of one 
party or the other at each stage of the arbitration. In recent years, however, converging 
practices have emerged that embrace elements of both systems.
These converging practices are rapidly gaining acceptance in international arbitration 
as a middle ground acceptable to parties from both sides of the divide.140 It is 
unlikely that the common law and civil law approaches to advocacy and proof will 
ever fuse into a single set of procedures for international arbitration; nor is it desirable 
that they should.141 In the following part, the concept of anti-statism in Europe and the 
USA will be discussed to see to focus how it improves the harmonisation process of 
international commercial arbitration.
Anti-Statism in Europe
The localisation tradition was the English requirement of the “special case” or “case 
stated” procedure in arbitration. This procedure, dropped by the Arbitration Act of 
1979, not only provided for the English High Court to hear challenges to any award 
granted in England, but also provided for the uniquely English concept that the 
arbitral proceedings could be challenged before the arbitral forum had reached a 
conclusion termed the “consultative case”.142
138 A Latin term for “law of the place where arbitration is to take place” in the conflict of laws. See 
Gary L. Benton, (1997). The Arbitration of International Technology Disputes under the English 
Arbitration Act 1996. Arbitration International, vol. 13, No. 4. LCIA. p. 361
139 Ibid. p. 5. See also, Martin Hunter et al. The Freshfield’s Guide to Arbitration and ADR. 32 (Kluwer 
1993). Although, in the case of Europe, it would seem that the Model Law has been more inspirational 
than legally effective. As of this point, only Scottish and British arbitration laws have been largely 
based on the Model Law.
140 See Siegfried H. Elsing and John M. Townsend, Bridging the Common Law-Civil Law Divide in 
Arbitration. Arb. Int’l. vol. 18, No. 1, LCIA, 2002. p. 59.
141 Ibid. p.65.
142 op.cit. 123, p. 3. See Relaxation of Inarbitrability and Public Policy checks on U.S. and Foreign 
Arbitration: Arbitration out of Control. Although some questions of fairness may be couched in terms
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In the 1960s and 1970s there was considerable debate about which European country 
provided the best legislative conditions for international commercial arbitration.143 
European nations that have recently or are in the process of adopting arbitration laws 
have tended to favour a de-localised, pro-autonomy approach to the law. This means 
that the sites of arbitral proceedings matter less, and maximum party autonomy is 
generally found in any of the nations which have updated their arbitral laws in the last 
two decades.144
As a result, the law governing international commercial arbitration in European 
nations has become increasingly de-localised in recent years, and this trend is 
spreading.145 A considerable number of European countries having recently revised 
laws to accommodate the demands of international arbitration (including France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and recent modification 
in Italy and Germany). Generally, these laws have demonstrated preference for de- 
localised arbitral proceedings.146 However, all European nations have not subscribed 
to complete delocalisation.147
For example, French law does not provide any special procedures for international 
arbitration, but where the parties have not expressly chosen to be governed by French 
procedural law, the arbitrators are free to apply the arbitration procedures agreed to by 
the parties, including foreign arbitration law procedures if the parties so agree.
Under the Swiss regime, a state, a state-held enterprise or a state-owned organisation, 
as a party to an agreement, can neither rely on its own law for the purpose of 
challenging its own capacity nor can it invoke its own laws to contest the arbitrability 
of the dispute at hand. Thus, a state cannot frustrate arbitration by denying its capacity 
to enter into an agreement providing for the arbitration of disputes by arguing, for 
example, that the arbitration clause had not been approved by a specific council.
of control and comfort with the arbitral process on the part of the judiciary. Also see Carig et al. 
International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (2nd edn. 1990) (discussion of traditional constraints 
on the choice of Arbitration Law (lex arbitri)
143 op.cit. 43, p. 8. See Michael J. Mustill, Arbitration: History and Background, J. Int’l. Arb. June 
1989, at 43.
144 See supra note 123, p. 11.
145 Ibid. p.9.
146 Ibid. p.6.
147 Ibid. p.3.
148 op.cit. 43. p. 9. The Judgement of July 5, 1995 (Monier v. Scali Freres), Cour d’appeal de Paris, 
reprinted in 1956 Revue De L’arbitrage [Rev. Arb.] 48. A dispute regarding the quality of sale of goods 
arose under a contract providing for arbitration in Paris which was “to follow English jurisdiction 
exclusively.” The court found that the parties had waived any right to appeal under French law as they 
had agreed that the arbitration was to be governed by English procedural law which the court found 
(perhaps erroneously) did not provide for appeal in the circumstances.
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Similarly, a state cannot deny the objective arbitrability of a dispute by employing the 
argument that the controversy involves a matter which is not arbitrable under its own 
laws.149 In Fincantieri-Canrtieri Navali Italiani SpA v. Oto Melara of June 1992, the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal (Bundesgericht) held that the issue of arbitrability has to be 
determined irrespective of the validity of the contractual obligations under the Lex 
clause. As a result, foreign (as well as Swiss domestic) mandatory rules of law do not 
function as barriers to arbitrability. The Fincantieri case not only underlines the 
existence of an arbitration-friendly environment in Switzerland, but also illustrates the 
Swiss tendency to lessen statutory or other limitations and to reduce the impact of 
public policy concerns with regard to arbitrability. Swiss courts expect arbitrators to 
apply public policy rules with all other rules of law in settling disputes that have been 
put forward to them.150
Anti-Statism in the United States of America 
Historical Position of Courts
Prior to the passage by New York (1920), New Jersey (1923), the Federal 
Government (1925), Oregon (1925), Massachusetts (1925), Pennsylvania (1927) and 
California (1927), of statutes commanding their common law courts to enforce 
arbitration agreements and rulings, agreements to arbitrate were generally not 
considered binding under US Common Law, and at least for a portion of US history
149 Article 177(2) of Swiss Private International Law Act (PIL) has been a legislative milestone in 
international commercial arbitration: Switzerland was the first country to explicitly restrict the 
objections of states and state-controlled organisations disputing arbitrability by invoking their own 
national law. The PIL incorporated ‘those fundamental ideas which are embodied in a whole series of 
important arbitral awards’: see Marc Blessing, Introduction ideas to Arbitration: Swiss and 
International Perspectives (2000), p. 183. For a sample list of such awards see Blessing, supra n. 31 at 
pp. 9,27-28.
150 op.cit 78, pp. 35. Seminal in this respect is case law developed in the area of competition law. Many 
contracts with perceived adverse effects on competition provide not only for arbitration in Switzerland 
but also for the application of Swiss law. Because of the validity of such contractual arrangements, one 
might be inclined to think that Switzerland provides a ‘safe haven’ as far as potential violations of 
(usually mandatory) competition laws are concerned, for example, contravention of European antitrust 
laws, as such laws could potentially be evaded by employing a contractual regime that explicitly 
excludes the application of European competition law. This, however, is by no means so: in Ampaglas 
v. Sofia (Chambre de Recours du Tribunal Cantonal du Canton de Vaud, De’cision du 28 Octobre 
1975, commentated in (1981) III Journal des Tribunauz71), the Chamber de Recours of the Canton of 
Vaud held obiter dictum that an arbitrator is entitled to scrutinise a contract under the notion of arts 85 
st seq. of the EC Treaty, irrespective of contractual provisions seeking to limit such a standard of 
review. The holding of Ampaglas was confirmed by the Bundesgericht in G. SA v. V. Spa in 1992 
(BGE 118 II 193), where the court held that arbitral tribunal sittings in Switzerland not only have 
authority, but are obliged to scrutinise a contract as to whether it is in compliance with EC competition 
laws.
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prior to the 1920s, hostile judges felt free to overturn arbitration decisions if one of 
the parties chose to litigate.
How the Position Has Changed
In the United States, the development of a concept regarding arbitrability is 
predominantly a matter of case law. The courts, over time, have set forth limitations 
to the parties’ freedom to arbitrate disputes in specific areas of law, namely, with 
respect to controversies arising in connection with such areas of law that were 
traditionally considered to be within the exclusive domain of state and federal 
courts.151 As a result, certain types of cases, in particular those involving strong public 
interest, were considered as being non-arbitrable. Over the last couple of decades, 
however, US courts have more and more taken an arbitration-friendly view. As a 
consequence, the effects of public policy considerations limiting the arbitrability of
• • 152certain types of controversies have been reduced as will be discussed in cases.
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. (1974), marks the beginning of a more liberal approach 
of the US Supreme Court towards arbitration. The case involved the questioning of 
the arbitrability of claims under the Securities Exchanges Act of 1934.153 Some 20 
years prior to this decision, in Wilko v. Swan (1953), the US Supreme court had held 
that disputes under the Securities Act of 1933 were not arbitral. It reasoned that the 
right of an individual to select a judicial forum could not be waived under the 
Securities Act of 1933. The US Supreme Court also voiced concerns with respect to 
the review of an arbitrator’s decision on securities law matters by the courts, and it 
finally concluded that the effectiveness of the remedies available under the Securities 
Act of 1933 would be lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings.154 
In such cases, the need for international commerce to enforce arbitration procedures 
would prevail over other public policy considerations.155
151 See supra note 78, pp.28-29.
152 See Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A.v. M/V Sky Reefer et al., 515 U.S. 528 (1995); Gilmer v. 
Interstate/ Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) Shearson/ American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
428 op.cit.78. p. 29. U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Pritzker v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F. 3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993); Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press 
Inc., 816 F. 2nd 1191 (7th Cir. 1987); Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684 F. 2nd 228 
(2d Cir. 1982); Acquaire v. Canada Dry Bottling, 906 F. Supp. 819 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver.
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“The invalidation o f such an agreement [to arbitrate] ... would reflect 
parochial concepts that all disputes must be resolved under laws and in 
our courts... We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and 
international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our law, and 
resolved in our courted.”
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. (1985), the US Supreme 
Court expanded the general guidelines established in Scherk to antitrust disputes, 
which until that time had been deemed to be non-arbitrable. Prior to Mitsubishi, the 
opinion prevailed that the state and its courts have the duty and responsibility to 
promote national interests by enforcing antitrust law. Arbitration, with its confidential 
and private character, was perceived as not suited for the resolution of antitrust 
matters. It was feared that public interests might be unjustifiably excluded ‘behind the 
closed doors’ of an arbitral proceeding. The US Supreme Court concluded:
“That concerns o f international comity, respect for the capacities o f  
foreign and transnational tribunals and sensitivity to the need o f the 
international commercial system for predictability in the resolution o f  
disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming 
that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.” 156
In Shearson/American Express v. McMahon (1987), the court expanded Mitsubishi to 
allow arbitration of claims arising under Racketeer Influenced and Corruption 
Organisations Act (RICO) 1964 and the Securities Exchange Act of (1934) because 
the arbitration clause in question covered such claims. The McMahon court relied on 
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 1954 to allow arbitration of the claims under the 
1934 Act even though section 29(a) voids a waiver of any provision of the Act. The 
court stated that this language only applies to the substantive, as opposed to 
procedural, provisions of the 1934 Act. The McMahon court also stated affirmatively 
that the burden of proof was on the party opposing arbitration of claims arising under 
the statute.157
156 Ibid. p.30.
157 Shearon/ American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 228 (1987) (stating that, by its terms, 
§ 29 (a) only forbids waiver of substantive obligations under the ’34 Act). (Requiring claimants to 
demonstrate congressional intent to expect a ststutory claim from FAA coverage to avoid arbitration). 
See Brian K. Van Engen, Post-Gilmer Developments in Mandatory Arbitration: The Expansion of
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In Rodriguez de Ouijas v. Sherason /American Express, Inc.{1989), the court held that 
an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims, including those brought under the 1933 
Act, was enforceable. In reaching this holding, the court found it necessary to overrule 
Wilko v. Swan, which had previously held that the 1933 Act prohibited waiver of a 
judicial forum. The Gardner-Denver Court had relied on Wilko to some extent, but the 
Rodriguez Court made no mention of the effect of this ruling on the Gardner-Denver 
line of cases.
This shows how the concept of anti-statism has developed over time within US 
courts’ decisions that a dispute is arbitrable (subject to arbitration) if it involves any 
sort of economic interest, regardless of whether the underlying transaction is 
commercial or private in nature, and whether the respective controversy involves 
civil, administrative or public law, or international public law.
In summary, the change in the reviewed position in Europe and the United States 
illustrates a steady trend towards a more liberal approach regarding acceptance of 
arbitration in disputes that involve a great degree of public interest. This shows the 
shift of the focus of state control over arbitration procedures to a different stage, yet 
international arbitration as an “institution” has taken a significant step forward since it 
is positively advocated for the harmonisation process of commercial arbitration.
3.4 Coercive Aspect of Modern Commercial Arbitration Law
This part of the chapter will focus on the third aspect of John Austin’s legal 
positivism theory, which is the “coercive” concept, in an attempt to examine the 
process of acceptance of international commercial arbitration in the West. At the 
centre of the controversy is the need to explain the basis on which such a parallel and 
private method of dispute settlement gained acceptance and obedience. The point here 
is to focus on two views to explain the legal character of obedience concepts; first is 
the “contract nature” of modem commercial arbitration law, and second is the 
“judicial character” of the modem law.
Mandatory Arbitration for Statutory Claims and the Congressional Effort to Reverse the Trend, p. 400. 
J. of Corporation Law. 1996.
158 Ibid. p. 34. See also, Marc Blessing, ‘The New International Arbitration Law in Switzerland, A 
Significant Step Towards Liberalism’ in (1988) 5 Journal of International Arbitration 9 at p. 24; see 
also Frank Vischer, ‘Artikel 177’ in Anton Heini et al. (eds, IPRG-Kommentar (1993), p. 1500; 
Bucher, supra n. 30 at p. 41; Ruede and international en Suisse (1989), p. 305: Walter, Bosch and 
Bronimann. Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbar-Keit in der Schweiz (1991), p. 58; Briner, supra n. 30 at 
p. 317.
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3.4.1 The “Contract Nature” of the Modern Arbitration Law
In Western legal cultures, the contract tends to constitute a complete definition of the 
relationship between the parties. Arbitration as a contract is built on a number of 
factors, all pointing to the control which the parties themselves, more than the courts 
or the legislator, have over the process. To begin with, in a normal commercial 
transaction the parties are not compelled to enter arbitration. They will initially have 
voluntarily entered into this particular method of settlement. It is also the fact that the 
parties have agreed to be bound by the award of the tribunal even if enforceable 
against them. However, if the parties choose to treat the award as not binding it will 
lose its effect, in which case it may be regarded as a mere attempt at friendly 
settlement.159
These rules came to dominate the Law Merchant “commanding merchants to do that 
which they themselves had promised to do”. The agreement was the overriding factor 
in regulating business conduct. Thus, many rules developed about and through 
contracting, and much of the merchant courts’ business was focused on contract 
issues.160 Not surprisingly, such a rule was behind the success of arbitration in Old 
England, in Liverpool, which led to its adoption by other trade groups (firstly by large 
commodity dealers e.g., com, oil seed, cotton and coffee followed by stock dealers 
and produce merchants) in other locations, including London, within a short period of 
time.
Then professional associations of architects, engineers, estate agents and auctioneers 
took up the practice, regularly putting arbitration clauses in all contracts to guarantee 
that disputes over transactions would not go into government courts. “By 1883 a 
correspondent of the London Times could write that ‘whole trades and professional 
have virtually turned their back on the courts’...Once ‘private courts’ were tried their 
advantages quickly became apparent”. 161
159 See George Elombi, Arbitration of International Commercial and Investment disputes: Are the 
Misgivings of Developing States justified? p. 44, 1996. Un-published thesis.
160 op.cit. 10, p. 119 See Trakman, L. E. (1983). The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial 
Law, Littleton, CO: Fred B. Rothman and Co. pp. 18, 10.
161 Ibid. p. 127. Wooldridge, W. C. (1970). Uncle Sam, The Monopoly Man, New Rochelle, NY: 
Arlington House, p. 99.
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Intention of the Parties
Regardless of the different views as to whether the contract is made at the moment
* 162when a letter of acceptance is posted or the moment when the letter is received, the 
contract’s conclusion by “offer” and “acceptance” is a common principle. It is said 
that arbitration is based on a contract by two or more persons in dispute to have their 
differences settled by a neutral third party.
The contract therefore arises from the parties’ desire to see the dispute resolved in a 
manner and following the rules determined by them or their appointees on their 
behalf. In that sense, the process is entirely theirs as created and controlled by them. It 
is the parties’ intention that appoints the arbitrators, determines the issues to be 
resolved and sets out the procedure for the arbitrators. Even though the convention’s 
formation provisions use the terms “offer” and “acceptance”, it would be a mistake to 
assume that these words carry the detailed meanings given to them in Anglo- 
American or Western European law.163 In general, the contract is based on and 
regarded as the expression of the parties’ will, provided that in doing so they stay 
within the limits of the law.164
Alan Redfem and Martine Hunter (1991)165 consider the agreement between the 
parties to an arbitration as “the foundation stone of modem international commercial 
arbitration”, as no arbitration will take place without the consent of the parties 
involved in the dispute.
Redfem highlights the overriding importance of consent in arbitration proceedings by 
reference to well known cases, in which the Court of Appeal of Paris, and later the 
French Supreme Court,166 reversed an ICC award on the grounds that the government
1 fn
of Egypt was not bound by the arbitration clause to which it was not a party. Unlike 
litigation, therefore, one party cannot by unilaterally initiating the process compel the 
other disputant to a settlement by arbitration. The entire institution is thus based on
162 See Philip C. Jessup, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of Nations, p. 353. Am. J. Int’l. L. 1964 
vol. 58.
163 See Amy H. Kastely, (1988). Reflections on the International Unification of Sales Law: Unification 
and Community: A Rhetorical analysis of the United Nations Sales Convention, p. 14. NW. J. Int’l. L. 
& Bus. 574.
164 See supra note 157.
165 See Alan Redfem and Martin Hunter. Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration. 
Second edition 1991. Sweet and Maxwell, p. 74.
166 op.cit. 157, p. 52. Decision of 6 January 1987 [1988] 13 Yearbook Comm. Arb’n.
167 op.cit 157, pp. 52, See also ICSID awards on jurisdiction of 27 November 1985 and 14 April 1988, 
including the annulment award on jurisdiction of 14 December 1989 [1991] 16 Yearbook Comm. 
Arb’n., pp. 19, 28 and 40 respectively, where an ICSID tribunal accepted jurisdiction. The award on 
the merits of 20 May 1992 is reported in [1993] 8 ICSID Rev., -FILJ., 328
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the principle that the process is consensual in nature and that, in the absence of that 
consensus, it will not come into existence.
The same could be said about the common law system. In the United States in 1925, 
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act 1954 (FAA) which was intended to 
place arbitration agreements on an equal grounding with other, more accepted 
contractual arrangements. More importantly, it was made mandatory for the courts to 
stay court proceedings pending arbitration in accordance with the agreement. 
According to the Supreme Court, the FAA:
“Establishes that, as a matter o f federal law, any doubts concerning the scope 
o f arbitrable issues should be resolved in favour o f arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction o f  the contract language itself or an
168allegation o f waiver, delay, or a like defence to arbitrability.”
In addition, Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act FAA, provides that, “[i]f any suit 
or proceeding is brought ... upon any issue referable to arbitration under an 
agreement..., the court... shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the 
action until such arbitration has been had ...” This provision demands that, should a 
court determine that an issue is covered by a written agreement that provides for 
arbitration, the court must stay proceedings and allow arbitration of the covered issue 
or issues. The Supreme Court maintains that this provision “leaves no place for the 
exercise of discretion by a district court in the matter. This basically means that once a 
court finds an issue is within the scope of an arbitration agreement, it has no 
jurisdiction over the issue. However, a court must stay proceedings under these 
circumstances only if the FAA applies to the agreement containing the arbitration 
clause.169 Further, under Section 4, an aggrieved party can apply to the competent 
court for an order directing that the arbitration proceed as provided for the contract, 
thus ensuring specific performance of the agreement.170
168 op.cit. 152, p. 393. See Also, Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24- 
25 (1983) (discussing the presumption of arbitrability created by congressional enactment of the FAA).
169 Ibid. pp. 393-394. See also the discussion the purpose and function of the FAA, the rejection of 
arbitration for statutory claims under Gardner-Denver, and the allowance of arbitration of statutory 
claims under the Mitsubishi trilogy. Also see 9 U.S. C. §§ 1-2 (1988) (providing the exceptions to the 
FAA and naming the types of agreements covered by the FAA).
170 For an overview of the specific enforceability of an arbitration agreement in the United State see 
Bom, Gary B., International commercial Arbitration in the United States. Commentary and Materials, 
Kluwer, Deventer, 1994, pp. 183-191.
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While this ruling occurred before the common law doctrine of binding contracts was 
fully formed, as common law began enforcing all contracts to which parties intended 
to bind themselves,171 courts in Common Law countries typically would not order 
such a contract variation in litigation because they felt they lacked authority to write 
or rewrite the contract for the parties. We find German law and the laws of some other 
civil law continental European countries confer somewhat wider power to judges for 
variation of contracts in order to adapt them to a fundamental change of
1 70circumstances. The question underlying the issue of forum-specific arbitration law 
is whether, in the name of party autonomy and seeking higher levels of certainty, 
parties should be completely free to choose the forum, procedure, and substantive
17^rules of an arbitral proceeding, without limitation by national legislation.
Binding Authority
As per Roman law, Western culture provided arbitrators as private judges with 
binding authority over contractual matters.174 Therefore, the parties had little control 
over the process. The cause remained pending within the jurisdiction of the court; 
once they submitted, parties could not revoke the arbitrator’s authority without the 
court’s consent, nor wilfully hinder the arbitral proceedings, nor refuse to abide by the 
award without exposing themselves to penalties for contempt just as if they had 
impeded the judicial process or ignored court judgement.175 The idea that arbitration 
has its origin and exists only by virtue of the agreement of the parties concerned is not 
merely an abstract principle of Western arbitration theory.176 In Holford v. Lawrence
op.cit. supra note 10, p. 123.
172 op.cit. 123, p. 2. For a brief comparative analysis, see Adaptation and Renegotiation of Contracts in 
International Trade and Finance (ed.) Horn (1985). See Norbert Horn, (2000) The Development of 
Arbitration in International Financial Transactions, pp. 283, Arb. Int’l. vol.16, No. 3, LCIA, 2000
173 Becoming in effect, an “a-national Arbitration.” see Hans Smit, A-National Arbitration. 63 Tul. L. 
Rev. 629, 631 (1989).
174 op.cit. 43, p. 3. The difference between the award of the arbiter, which did not have any effect in 
law, and that of the arbitrator, which created a contractual obligation (although without executory 
force), was destined to have an influence on the concept of arbitration as spelled out in modem civil 
codes, and the issue of whether arbitration is a matter of contract or of procedure. Professor David’s 
magisterial study of arbitration from a comparative law point of view is a unique resource. For an 
overview, see Rene David, Arbitration in International Trade: A Book Review, in The Art of 
Arbitration 89 (Jan C. Schultsz & Albert J. van den Berg eds., 1982). For a view of arbitration from 
earlier times based on classical sources, see Douglas M. Macdowell, The Law in Classical Athens 203- 
11 (1978).
175 op.cit. 89, p. 71. It was not until about 1670 that courts became more willing to use attachment as 
the penalty just as in contempt.
176 See supra note 157, p. 52.
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(1695), the court upheld the power of the judge to compel the parties to abide by the
177award.
As a consequence, it has been said that parties should avoid any ill-considered 
compromise in their arbitration clause, where the cardinal sin of drafting an 
arbitration clause is ambiguity.178 Too often parties agree to arbitration as the form of 
dispute resolution, but give little attention to the form the arbitration should take. It 
can be a very expensive mistake to treat the drafting of an arbitration clause lightly. 
The choice of the arbitration institution, the arbitration rules that are to apply, the 
number of arbitrators, the place of the arbitration, and the applicable substantive law 
should all be carefully considered.179
If the undertaking is honoured and the parties cooperate in the arbitration in important
respects, the law does not interfere with their freedom to direct the conduct of the
process and its outcome. They define the issues to be resolved, they appoint the
members constituting the tribunal, they determine the scope of the tribunal’s
jurisdiction (which they may further limit or terminate altogether), and they set out the
procedure and decide what material to accept or exclude in evidence. In general,
however, the trend is to confer the tribunal with wide powers to decide on all or most
of these issues. For that reason the award itself has sometimes been regarded as an act
1 80of the parties themselves, brought about through the agency of the tribunal. Further, 
the parties can vary the award if they choose to do so.
Thus, the parties retain control at all three stages of the process: they bring it into 
existence; they determine the procedural and substantive issues and, eventually, the 
outcome of the arbitration. It is particularly this capacity to exercise overall control of 
the process and the fact that it is the agreement of the parties which makes this 
possible, including an agreement to be bound (or what the law regards as such), that 
strengthens the contractual nature of the process.181
177 op.cit. 89, p. 72. As shown by the case of Hide v. Petit (1670) 1 Ch. Cas. 185, 22 E. R. 754 (Ch.), 
(1695) 88 E. R. 1182 (K.B.)
178 In the content and drafting of the arbitration agreement see generally W. L. Craig, W. Park & J. 
Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd edn. Oceana Publications, 2000), chs. 
6-9. See Bernardo M. Cremades (Nov. 2002/ Jan. 2003). Managing Discovery in International 
Arbitration, p. 76. Dispute Resolution Journal, Nov. 2000/ Jan.2003.
179 Ibid.
180 See supra note 157, p. 46.
181 Ibid.
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3.4.2 The Judicial Character of Modern Arbitration Law
The “Judicial Character” of modem arbitration law will be examined as the second 
aspect of obedience to commercial arbitration law in Western legal culture. Reference 
will be made to similarity with the practice of ordinary courts of law in civil and 
judicial matters in support of the judicial character of arbitration. It is treated as 
judicial in that it is essentially a “method”, i.e. a procedural means of settling a 
dispute.
Judicial Characteristics of Arbitration
The traditional Western view is that the conciliation process should be separate from
the arbitration process and that the same person who acts as conciliator should not act
as arbitrator in the same dispute. It is thought that offers to compromise and
disclosures of confidential information made during the conciliation process might
182affect the ability of the conciliator to act as an arbitrator in the same dispute.
Further, the Western view of the role of arbitrator is as unbiased seeker of the “truth”, 
who then strictly applies the law to the tmth which has been discovered and renders a 
decision based solely on such application without regard to its effect upon the parties’ 
relationship. An example of the prohibition of the combined roles is the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law is (UNCITRAL) Rules of 
Conciliation which do not permit a conciliator to act as an arbitrator in the same 
dispute. Often Western statutes and mles (e.g. the California Code of Civil Procedure) 
merely express a disposition against such a combined role.
Pierre Lalive (1984) has emphasised that a neutral arbitration site has three 
characteristics: equal treatment of the parties (concrete neutrality); non-allegiance to 
any relevant political “bloc” (political neutrality); and an appropriate legal
1 S ienvironment (judicial neutrality).
The concept of the judicial character of arbitration brings into focus debate about the 
cultural deviation between the common law and civil law arbitration procedures. In 
one aspect of arbitration procedure - disclosure of information - the philosophy of 
common law discovery is that “prior to trial every party to a civil action is entitled to
182 See M. Scott Donahey, (1995). Seeking Harmony: Is the Asian concept of the conciliator/ arbitrator 
applicable in the West? p. 76. Dispute Resolution Journal, April 1995.
183 Ibid. p.78. See also, Optional Conciliation Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, art. 10; 
California Code of Civil. Procedure. Section 1297. 393
184 op.cit. 43, p. 7. See also Pierre Lalive, on the Neutrality of the Arbitrator and of the Place of 
Arbitration, in Swiss Essays on International Arbitration 23 (Claude Reymond & Eugene Bucher eds., 
1984).
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the disclosure of all relevant information in the possession of any person, unless the 
information is privileged. The seminal US Supreme Court decision Hickman v. Taylor 
(1947) described the discovery process in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as 
having a “vital role in the preparation for trial ... as a device ... to narrow and clarify 
the basic issues between the parties, and ... for ascertaining the facts or information as 
to the existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues....”. The Court said, 
“The way is now clear, consistent with recognised privileges, for the parties to obtain
1 Of
the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial....”.
In contrast, the civil law systems of Europe emphasise the principles that each party 
has the burden of providing its own case, and that the opposing party should not be 
forced to incriminate itself, or assist in the case against it. As a leading Swiss lawyer 
has explained, “We feel that the principle onus probandi incumbat alleganti (The 
Burden of proof rest upon he who alleges) excludes the possibility of obtaining the
1 fiAhelp of the court to extract evidence from the other side.”
As a result, it is not uncommon that judges, particularly in civil law countries, put 
some pressure on the parties to reach a settlement. In common law countries, with 
their more adversarial procedures, the role of the judge is historically more limited 
and the parties become the driving forces behind the proceedings. Keeping this in 
mind, arbitrators with parties from a common law background are often very careful 
to avoid taking an active role in promoting a settlement. Blatant pressure from the 
arbitrator and even unsolicited proposals are often seen as possible reasons to 
challenge the impartiality of an arbitrator. Therefore, direct settlement proposals are 
usually only given if the parties explicitly require the tribunal to do so.187 
Here, the converging practice tends to be accommodation of both traditions. 
Arbitrators will generally accept written legal arguments in whatever format the 
parties prefer them, whether as briefs or as pleading notes, and will generally listen to 
whatever style of oral argument the lawyers wish to present. Most international 
lawyers now expect code provisions, commentary, and case law to be advanced as 
persuasive, with the relative weights assigned to each influenced by the substantive 
law that applies to the dispute.188
185 op.cit. 175, p. 74. C. A. Wright, Law of Federal courts (4th edn. West Publishing, 1983) at 500.
186 Ibid. p. 74.
187 See supra note 169, p. 294.
188 See supra note 133, p. 65.
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International arbitrators now expect to hear experts presented by the parties, either by 
reading their reports or by hearing their oral testimony, or both.189 Most arbitral 
tribunals now allow counsel for the parties to question witnesses first before they ask 
their questions, if only for the sake of projecting an impression of even-handedness. 
That impression is generally well served by allowing the parties to ask the difficult 
questions, and for the tribunal to do so only if the questions asked by the parties fail to 
bring out the points in which the tribunal is interested.190 At best, the judicial 
procedure characteristics have been maintained.
Another aspect of the judicial character of arbitration procedure is the scope of the 
arbitral tribunal. In this sense, the tribunal is strictly limited to the specific question 
placed before it by the parties and it has to deal with the matter in equity, law and fact. 
Such an issue raises the question of tribunal authority. It has been said by George 
Ridgeway (1923) that a judge in a domestic court is invested with the power of the 
state and can ultimately enforce his or her will on the parties, using the power of the 
state to punish, if necessary. Arbitral tribunals derive their authority from the consent 
of the parties and, although they might ultimately have considerable power over 
recalcitrant parties, in practice, tribunals prefer to encourage voluntary compliance 
and avoid testing the limits of their authority.191
1 QOThis idea is clear in the ICC Arbitration Rules of 1923 which provides only that the 
parties are “honour bound” to carry out the award of the arbitrators. It is expected that
moral norms and “the force that businessmen of a country can bring to bear upon a
• 1recalcitrant neighbour” will be sufficient to ensure respect of arbitral awards.
The court retains an inherent jurisdiction over the process and, therefore, can exercise 
its discretion when converting the award into a judgement and can intervene in the
189 Ibid. p. 64.
190 Ibid. p. 63.
191op.cit. See supra note 175, p. 77.
192 The most important and oldest institution in the field of arbitration is the International Chamber of 
Commerce, Paris. The International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce 
(the "ICC") is the arbitration body of the ICC. The Court does not itself settle disputes. The function of 
the Court is to provide necessary facilities for the settlement by arbitration of business disputes of an 
international character in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the ICC if so empowered by an 
arbitration agreement between the parties.
193 op.cit. 43, p. 4. See George Ridgeway, Merchants of Peace 322 (1938), quoted in W. Laurence 
Craig, William W. Park & Jan Paulsson, An International Chamber Of Commerce Arbitration xxi (2d 
ed. 1990).
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event of arbitrator error or misconduct. Therefore, arbitration takes place directly 
under the court’s supervision and has to conform to judicial standards. The award has 
to be one which the court will enter as a judgement, and because the arbitrators can 
impose their award through the court, they can issue unicentric (conclusively deemed 
acceptance of the award), non-conciliatory awards conforming to the style of the 
judicial award.194
Arguably, the problem of balance begs the question of control. When enforcement 
depends on the goodwill and cooperation of the participants, the parties are allowed 
complete control over the process without court intervention. If courts are to be used 
to enforce the process, to what extent should they be allowed to control the process? 
The answer evolved over the next two centuries.195 Overall, the establishment of an 
effective adjudicative use of arbitration increased the possible level of coercion in out- 
of-court references.
194
195
o^p.cit. See supra note 89, p. 71. 
1 Ibid. p. 72.
66
CHAPTER FOUR 
Philosophical Basis of the Legal Theory Underlying International 
Commercial Arbitration in the Middle East Region
The previous chapter considered the philosophical legal theory underlying modem 
international commercial law by applying John Austin’s concept to modem 
international commercial arbitration to explain how this law has been developed and 
to highlight its main characteristics. It shows that modem international arbitration law 
has been created and developed in ways which predominantly reflects Western legal 
culture and legal philosophy.
This chapter will now examine in a similar light the philosophical legal concept of 
international commercial arbitration as understood in the Middle East region. The 
chapter will analyse significance differences of legal thought between the two 
regional perceptions as a direct product of regionalism. The purpose is not to examine 
in general these differences, or the legal cultural deviation, since this in itself is not 
the aim of this research, rather, the objective is to show later how these differences -  
regional legal, culture - influenced attempts to harmonise the modem arbitration law 
in the Middle East region.
4.1 Normative Aspect of Commercial Arbitration in the Middle East Region
Chapter Three critically analysed the normative concept of Modem commercial 
arbitration law constrained by social norms. We saw it broken down into main 
characteristics, in which “competition”, whether inter or intrajurisdiction, enhanced its 
continuous reform and development. The analysis also showed how one of the most 
important characteristics of the Western philosophical phenomenon of 
“individualism” emerged in ideological legal thinking and was reflected in the “party 
autonomy” and “self-regulation” of commercial law. it also showed how the 
normative concept of “merchants’ behaviour” in the West was an essential factor in 
development of the modem law, whether at the national level by merchants 
establishing their own courts, or at the international level as shown in the 
development of international arbitration agreements.
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In the Middle East region, the scheme is reversed. The emphasis shifts from the 
individual to the general. The collective interest is paramount and individualism 
submerged. The existence of the collectivism concept is rooted very deeply in the 
Middle East region and dominates the culture in general and legal thinking in 
particular. This domination is a consequence of socio-economic, customary and 
religious factors.
4.1.1 Middle East Collectivism 
It has been already shown how the concept of individualism dominates the culture of 
legal thinking in modem commercial arbitration law. It also has been said that this 
concept “favours tasks over relationships, individual reward over group reward, 
competition over cooperation and individual accountability over group 
responsibilities”.1 Overall, it is difficult to argue that this concept has not left the 
modem international commercial arbitration law without its fingerprint.
In the first place, individualism was partly the product of industrialisation. Liberalism 
in social, political and economic thought, and particularly the role of the individual in 
society, was also in part the product of the new means of production and 
accumulation of wealth. Private arrangements were regarded as the best means of 
producing goods and securing progress. The intervention of the state, if at all, on 
behalf of the rest of the community was to be minimal. Private arrangements and 
private interests should in all circumstances be upheld, unless the public interest was 
affected in a material way, and there were compelling reasons why they should not be 
given effect to. The interest of the general public became of secondary importance 
and, in any case, its depended on the extent to which individuals were free to pursue 
private goals. It was the belief that it would not be in the interest of the public if the 
state, acting for the community, were to interfere excessively in privately arranged 
deals. What was just and fair for individuals was, through them, also fair and useful to
'j
the rest of the society.
This concept was emphasised by the work of Thomas Hobbes; he treated the 
individual, instead of the group, as the ultimate and basic unit of society. All human 
activity was considered as the product of the individual’s will. This view is found not
1 See Parkes, et al., 2001. See David Pitts and Yuseok Moon, Individualism, Collectivism & 
Transformation Mediation. Pp. 4. Annual Conference of the International Association for Conflict 
Management. Salt Lake City, Utah.
2 See George Elombi, Arbitration of International Commercial and Investment Disputes: Are the 
Misgivings of Developing States Justified? Unpublished PhD thesis, p.86. Centre for Commercial Law 
Studies. Queen Mary & Westfield College, University of London.
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only in Hobbes, but also in Kant, according to whom the free will constitutes the only 
source of legal obligations and justice. Although Jean Jacques Rousseau emphasised 
the “social contract”, he spoke of it not as overriding the social order but as the 
outcome of the manifestation of the will of individual members of society to ensure 
that the property and liberty of each were protected. The social order would therefore 
be nothing other than the aggregate of the individual will of the members who 
constitute it.
Nature of Collectivism
In 1700s there was limited private ownership -  in terms of type of investment -  so 
that the elements of individualism were absent. There was no mass industrial 
production and no dependence on it, on trade or on accumulated wealth, moreover, 
members of the society depended economically and socially on each other.
This interdependence was bound to give rise to a collective perspective of life which 
in part explains the above difference in the relationship between the position of the 
individual and that of the group in the West and in the Middle East region.
In Middle East communities, the existence of society is not accounted for on the basis 
of a contract, be it a “social contract”. Society, it has been argued, is the product of 
nature and not of man’s free will. The society is viewed not as an aggregate of 
individuals, each with his own personal rights and liberties, all grouped together in a 
“contract” but rather in terms of groups, with the family, instead of Hobbes’ and 
Rousseaus’ individuals, viewed as the basic social unit. The village, the clan and the 
tribe are treated as the larger groups.
Today, that unit would be extended to include the modem state. The units are all part 
of one social organism and held together not by any contract but, initially, by nature 
through the bond of kinship (for the family) and subsequently through the influence of 
other social and natural factors (in the case of the village, the clan, the tribe and the 
state). Whereas Rousseau and Hobbes viewed society as an aggregate of individuals,4 
Middle East communities see and treat the society itself as the basic unit.
The society is an aggregate of itself. The separate identity of its individual members 
disappears or is simply regarded as never having existed, in preference for the 
collective identity of the society, against which every individual action is subject.5
Tbid.
4 Ibid., p. 88.
5Ibid.
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Group interest takes precedence over private interests and justice is regarded from the 
point of view of what is primarily in the public interest. In the Middle East region the 
“social contract”, if such a thing is recognised, exceeds the private contract if not in 
time, certainly in importance. The validity of any private arrangement (contractual or 
not) is measured by reference to its public utility. This is so because in the main the 
needs of the individual are seen as part of the needs of the wider community to which 
s(he) belongs.6
With the aforementioned in mind, it becomes necessary to ask how this philosophical 
divergence affects commercial arbitration agreements. Not surprisingly, any private 
arrangements are subject to the interest of the rest of the community, which is 
considered paramount. It is the community interest which validates or invalidates all 
private arrangements. It provides the standard by which private bargains are tested 
and upheld or rejected. The freedom of the individual does not arise independently but 
is acquired from the society which confers it.
Once the contract is validated in terms of the society any breaking of a contract is
regarded not only as a wrong done to the other contracting party, but primarily as a
disruption of an existing social order. The imbalance thus created has to be restored
by a process which emphasises the greater need for harmony in the society than
upholding the private rights of the particular individual on whose side the law might
appear to be. There should be no individual winner or loser. There remains only the
group as winner. However, if the harmonising process beaks down, there will also be
only one loser, personified in the group.7 In view of customs and traditions in the
Middle East, as in other Eastern societies, close personal relations have a pervasive
influence in almost all kinds of human transactions. An individual is viewed in the
total context, that is, as a son, as a nephew, or the like. This is in contrast to the
detached and impersonal relations that characterise Western industrialised societies
£
where functional relationships usually prevail.
6 Ibid., p. 86.
7 Ibid., p. 90.
8 See J. A. R. Nafziger and R. Jiafang, “Chinese Methods of Resolving International Trade, Investment, 
and Maritime Dispute,” 23 Willamette L. Rev. 619, 621 (1987). See M. Scott Donahey. Seeking 
Harmony: Is the Asian concept of the conciliator/arbitrator applicable in the West. p. 75. Dispute 
Resolution Journal. April 1995.
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Collectivistic culture focuses on relationship development at the expense of task 
completion, satisfying friends and associates at the potential expense of one’s self, 
and social motivation instead of competition.9
Finally, this concept also finds its accommodation from a religious point of view; 
social justice in Islam is a central value. Some even contend that this value is 
uncompromising:
“The Islamic perception of the socio-economic process is dynamic 
and its insistence on social justice is uncompromising. This is 
because injustice disrupts social harmony and, for that very reason, 
is unethical.”10
Collectivism and Counter Arguments to the Criticism
Historically, the debate over the plausibility of group rights has focused on whether 
groups can have morally significant interest. Authors like Michael McDonald 
(1991)11 allege there is nothing awkward about collective rights because groups have 
all the necessary features of a right-holder. McDonald writes:
“Individuals are regarded as valuable because they are choosers and have 
interests. But so also do communities make choices and have values. Why 
not then treat communities as fundamental units of value as well? 12
Others balk at the proposal to regard groups as intrinsically valuable. Michael Hartney 
argues:
“... people generally believe that communities are important because of their 
contribution to the well-being of individuals. Such a view is a part of what
9 op.cit. See supra note 15, p.4.
10 See (Quoting Boisard Marcel, Humanism in Islam 110 (English translation, American Trust 
Publications 1987) (“If for example, [in Islam] private property and individual initiatives are 
recognised as opposed to collective communism, they are strictly limited, which is contrary to Western 
liberalism.”)) See Amir H. Khoury. Ancient and Islamic sources of intellectual property protection in 
the Middle East: A focus on trademarks.p.18. The Journal o f Law and Technology (2003)
11 Michael McDonald, “Should Communities Have Rights? Reflection on Liberal Individualism,” The 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 4 p. 237. In, Christopher Heath Wellman, (1999). 
Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Group Rights. Law and philosophy 18: 13-40, p. 15.
12 Michael McDonald, “Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on Liberal Individualism, The 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 4 (1991):p. 237. As quoted by Christopher Heath 
Wellman. Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Group Rights p. 15. Law and Philosophyl8:13-40 
(1999) Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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might be called value-individualism: only the lives of individual human 
beings have ultimate value, and collective entities derive their value from 
their contribution to the lives of individual human beings. The opposite 
view we might call ‘value collectivism’: the view that a collective entity 
can have value independently of its contribution to the well-being of 
individual human beings. Such a position is counter-intuitive, and the 
burden of proof rests on anyone who wishes to defend it.”13
The Liberals14 are concerned to protect the individual’s sphere of dominion. Since 
each individual may order his own affairs as he sees fit, however, it seems liberals 
cannot object if everyone unanimously agrees to waive their individual autonomy in 
favour of the group’s dominion. However, even this unanimously accepted move is 
worrisome to liberals, since it precludes individuals from rationally revising choices 
in areas where the group now has dominion.15 As Allen Buchanan (1975)16 explained, 
this is an important reason to protect future choices, even when the particular liberty 
presently strikes one as unimportant. Secondly, as Terry Price has pointed out, 
nothing near unanimity can be reached among groups most urgently in need of 
collective rights.
“Groups imperilled because of dwindling numbers and splintering values 
are often most in need of special group rights, but they also experience 
dissension which prevents any general agreement (let alone unanimity) 
about collective control and finally, even if all the adults in a group are 
willing to waive their individual rights, a liberal state might block such a 
measure on behalf of the group’s minors. Given its aversion to
13 Michael Hartney, “Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights,” The Canadian Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence 4 (1991): p.297. As quoted by Christopher Heath Wellman, Liberalism, 
Communitarianism, and Group Rights p. 15. Law and Philosophyl8:13-40 (1999) Kluwer Academic 
Publishers.
14 Liberals refer to those who believe in liberalism. Liberalism, the philosophy or movement has as its 
aim the development of individual freedom. Because the concepts of liberty or freedom change in 
different historical periods, the specific programmes of liberalism also change. The final aim of 
liberalism, however, remains fixed, as does its characteristic belief not only in essential goodness but 
also in human rationality. Liberalism assumes that people, having a rational intellect, have the ability to 
recognise problems and solve them and thus can achieve systematic improvement in the human 
condition. Often opposed to liberalism is the doctrine of conservatism, which, simply stated, supports 
the maintenance of the status quo. Liberalism, which seeks what it considers to be improvement or 
progress, necessarily desires to change the existing order. A. Arblaster, (1986). The Rise and Decline 
of Western Liberalism.
15 Ibid., p. 28.
16 In his essay, “Revisability and Rational Choice,” Canadian Journal o f Philosophy 5 (157); 396-408
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paternalism, liberalism is opposed to restricting an adult’s sovereignty in 
the interest of that individual’s well-being. Liberals need have no 
qualms, however, about interfering on behalf of a minor or someone 
otherwise without full autonomy. The state’s prohibition of a group’s 
legal right would be justified on these grounds.17
Kymlicka (1989)18 argues for group rights by emphasising the good of cultural 
membership as an important ingredient for meaningful choice and self-respect, and 
then urging that this good is maximally secured by extending special collective rights 
to cultural groups. Kymlicka begins by affirming liberalism’s insistence upon equality 
of opportunity for resources, well-being, and self-respect. What liberals have failed to 
appreciate, Kymlicka emphasises, is that the good of cultural membership is often an 
important ingredient of one’s well-being and self respect.19 
Kymlicka utilises the communitarian observation that:
“Humans are not isolated “atoms” who find and assess value 
independently of others, but instead are responsive to cultural and other 
groups which help limit and define the valuable life. The choice as to 
what type of life is most meaningful is ultimately made by the individual, 
but the range of options one finds promising is defended and shaped by 
the cultural membership with which s(he) identifies. Choosing and living 
a life one finds meaningful is a challenge for each of us, but doing so 
without identifying with a particular culture or by aligning oneself with 
an imperilled culture is a much more daunting task.”20
What Kymlicka emphasises, then, is that one’s culture is actually a vital resource, and 
because of liberalism’s egalitarianism, the liberal state must thus ensure each person’s 
culture is healthy and capable of fostering meaningful lives.
The second step in Kymlicka’s argument is that often cultures can be fortified only if 
they are given rights as a group. The idea here is that persons often act individually in 
a manner that weakens the culture, so the only way to secure a culture is to extend the
17 Ibid.
18 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1989, 
Chapters 7&8.
19 Ibid., p. 29. For expansion and commentary upon this argument, see Allen Buchanan’s discussion in 
Secession, pp.52-64.
20 Ibid., p. 30.
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group’s collective control over certain areas. For instance, imagine that a given
culture is being weakened by the influx of “outsiders.” To combat this, the imperilled
culture could be strengthened with either property or language laws. Property laws
might prohibit individuals from selling their property to persons of whom the group as
a whole does not approve, and language laws could prohibit people from publicly
speaking or displaying written signs in a language other than that favoured by the 
0 1imperilled culture.
Liberals are hostile towards group rights because the latter occupy a domain that 
might otherwise be allotted to individual control. One might argue that the liberal 
focus upon the individual leaves no room for group control because individual rights 
“rule out” collective dominion. An objector to this approach insists that the nature of 
rights allows them to protect the individual from the concerns of the collective; a right 
is valuable because it is a “trump” that fortifies an individual’s position against the 
weighty balance of public interests. To be a liberal, according to this theory, is to 
understand that individual liberty can never be outweighed by group concerns because 
the moral rules from which individual rights are deduced are immune to the 
competing interests served by group rights. According to this argument, an 
individual’s moral rights exist only because of moral rules, and the latter rule out the 
possibility of group rights.22
Therefore, liberalism cannot rule out group rights because moral reasoning does not 
take the form necessary antecedently to rule out this (or any) option, and because 
there are moral reasons the liberal must respect in favour of some collective rights.23
4.1.2 The “Given Law” Concept 
One of the main differences in respect of the normative aspect of the legal philosophy 
of modem international commercial arbitration law and its perception in the Middle 
East is that, in the West, the concept of “competition” and the “role of the merchants” 
played a significant role in law making and its development, while the concept of 
“Given Law” dominated the normative legal thinking in the Middle East region.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 35.
23 Ibid., p. 36.
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The Concept of Islamic Law
The concept of law in Islam is different from that under the Romano-Germanic and 
Common law families of law. Three key aspects are particularly important to 
understand how it differs.24
The first is the role of the divine in law. St Augustine and Thomas Aquinas advocated 
a Christian version of the natural law doctrine.25 They made a distinction between 
man made law (positive law) and divine law. Divine law constitutes natural law. Any 
positive law contrary to divine law is not law. In the West, the natural law doctrine 
eventually gave way to positivism, where law properly speaking is man-made and 
determined by the legislature.
Islamic law is the epitome of the expression of the natural law doctrine. However, 
unlike the Christian or European version of natural law, divine law from the Islamic 
point of view is not bereft of content. It is expressed in the Islamic law.
The second is the comprehensive nature of law. “Under Islamic law, all human 
actions have legal significance. Actions fall into one of these categories: al-Wajib 
(obligatory act), al-Mannduh (recommended act), al-Haram (prohibited act), al- 
Makruh (distasteful act) and al-Mubah (a legally indifferent act).”26 Schacht (1964)27 
correctly described Islamic law as ‘the epitome of Islamic thought, the most typical 
manifestation of the Islamic way of life, the core and kernel of Islam itself.”
The third is the duty of Muslims to live according to Islamic law. The divine nature of 
law, its comprehensiveness and its being obligatory make Muslims consider law as 
part of religion. To them, religious ethics and morality form an integral part of the 
same normative process. It is obligatory for Muslims to regulate their lives according 
to Islamic law. A Muslim cannot ‘opt out’ of Islamic law completely or partially in 
any transaction, based on the concept that God, “Allah”, the creator of man is the 
lawgiver and lawmaker. To impose on a Muslim any man-made law that contradicts 
divine law is not government but an oppression. The Muslim is not bound to obey 
such oppressive government, and the perverted laws emanating therefrom.
24 See AA Oba, Islamic Law As Customary Law: the Changing Perspective in Nigeria. P.821. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 15: pp. 817-850.
25 See Dennis Lloyd, Hie Idea of Law (Harmondsworth: Penguin Book, 1981), 78-81.
26 See A. A Oba, Islamic Law As Customary Law: the Changing Perspective in Nigeria. International 
and comparative Law Quarterly 15: p. 821.
27 See J. Schacht, (1964). Introduction to Islamic Law. Oxford University Press.
28 op.cit. 35, p. 822.There is no obedience to human being ordering disobedience to Allah; nor obey any 
whose heart We have permitted to neglect the remembrance of Us, one who follows his desires, whose 
case has gone beyond all bounds’: Surat al-Kahi 18:28; and ‘And follow not the binding of those who
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The Importance of Addressing Islamic Law.
Addressing questions of international commercial arbitration in the Middle East 
region, while ignoring the relevant historical, moral, conceptual, and legal background 
of Islam, will only afford a distorted view. This holds true even if the “past” does not 
provide a “codified” legal system or reveal (formal) roots of the current commercial 
arbitration regimes in this region.29 For the purpose of the remainder of this chapter 
the following assumptions will be made.
• 30(i) Generally, Islam has a substantial influence on most countries in the region.
(ii) Islam provides Muslims with a comprehensive way of life. Its teachings touch
31upon all aspects of life, including civil and commercial matters.
(iii)Today, we are witnessing a reassertion of Islam in the Middle East and around the 
world. Therefore, recognition of its presence and effects is warranted. One 
commentator recently pointed out, “Islamic law is relevant to modern-day business 
throughout the Middle East, and its importance is increasing.32
(iv) Islamic law provides a comprehensive legal and political system. Consequently, 
Islamic law does not accept rules that negate its principles. Therein lies an additional 
danger of continued tension between conflicting concepts of modem international
33commercial arbitration in the region.
(v) In order to critically examine the present commercial arbitration legal system in 
the Middle East region, it is important to have a clear understanding of basic 
principles in Islamic law pertaining to commercial arbitration. This understanding 
may also assist in providing a viable solution or improvements to the current legal 
system of the region.
(vi) If the basic principles of the competing legal systems (in the area) emerge as 
compatible, then this compatibility may further assist in the stability of the 
commercial arbitration regime in the region.34
are extravagant - who make mischief in the land, and mend not their ways’: Surat Shu’raa, 26:151-2. 
The Prophet is also quoted as having said: ‘there is no obedience due to any creature (no matter who 
they are) if they order to sin against Allah)’ and ‘He who commands you to sin has no authority over 
you’, both quoted in Abdul Rahman I Doi, Shari’ah: The Islamic Law.
29 op.cit Supra note 25 p.5.
30 Azmi et al., (referring to Al-Shaykh Allmam Ibn Taymiyyah, Public duties in Islam: The Institution 
of Hisba (Muhtar Holland Trans. The Islamic Foundation 1982) op.cit. see Supra note 25, p. 4.
31 See Supra note, 25 p. 5.
32 op.cit. 25, p. 5. See also, Howard L. Stovall, Arab Commercial Laws-Into Future, (1999).
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
76
General overview of the structure and hierarchy within Islamic law 
Codified Law 
The Qur’an:
The Qur ’an is Islamic Holy Scripture and the most authoritative source of Islamic 
law. Indeed, it is the most central and highest source of Islamic law. It is regarded as 
being of divine origin and as containing God’s (.Allah’s) revelations to the Prophet 
Mohammad. Much has been written regarding the divinity of the Qur’an and its 
overwhelming impact and influence on the life of Muslims. Such analysis would fill 
volumes and is outside the scope of this research.
The Sunnah:
The Sunnah is the collection of recorded sayings (“Hadiths ”) and deeds of the 
Prophet Mohammad. The Sunnah constitutes the accepted holy tradition as dictated 
by the Prophet Mohammad. Consequently, the Sunnah is intended to serve as a model 
of conduct for all Muslims. In addition to this function, the Sunnah also complements 
the Qur ’an by setting rules for matters that the Qur ’an is silent on.
Idjma:
The Idjma is the “collective” consensus on a point of law by religious scholars 
authorised to interpret the Qur ’an and Hadith of the Sunnah.
Non-Codified Law 
Qiyas:
The Qiyas “is a strict legal-reasoning method of analogy, which is referred to only 
when there is “nothing directly on a point in the foregoing sources of Islamic law.” 
The Qiyas is referred to only where a point of departure is clearly established from the 
Qur ’an, Sunnah, or Idjma. In addition, the Qiyas does not form a precedent since its 
rules are applied to the facts in a narrow fashion. In this regard, unlike common law 
systems, Islamic law does not have binding precedents.”
The revelations compiled in the Qur ’an and in the Hadith, together with the Ijma and 
Qyias, constitute the Shar ’ia—the Divine Islamic Law (literally “the path to water”). 
The Shar ’ia was developed and formulated during the first three centuries after the 
Prophet Mohammad’s death and attempts to address all aspects of life.36
35 See Amir H. Khoury, (2003). Ancient and Islamic sources of Intellectual Property Protection in the 
Middle East: a focus on trademarks. Journal of Law and Technology, p. 5.
36 Ibid., p. 6. See Also, Steven D. Jamar, The Protection of Intellectual Property Under Islamic Law, 21 
Cap. U.L. Rev. 1079, 1081-82 (1993). For a discussion on how various human actions are classified by
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Ijtihad:
The term “Ijtihad' in Arabic means, “The struggle for understanding.” Ijtihad is 
employed by Islamic scholars and judges in order to resolve a problem that has not 
been dealt with previously by any of the above sources of Islamic law.
The popular view in Islam is that only select religious scholars who are perceived to 
posses integrity and intellect should attempt to interpret the Qur ’an and the Hadith 
Non-Shar’ia law
Non-Shar’ia sources of law are intended to compensate for a “lacunae”. These 
sources deal with aspects and issues on which all sources of the Sharia law are 
collectively silent. The underlying principle is that non-Sharia norms must not 
conflict with the Shar ’ia law. Hence, compliance with the principles of the Shar ’ia 
law is a pre-condition to the validity of any legal norms formulated within a non- 
Sharia context.
Inter-Religious Divisions
In addition to this hierarchy within Islamic law, various divisions are found in Islam 
itself. The most substantial division is between the Shi ’ites and the Sunnis. Both of 
these groups consist of several different religious schools of thought (“Madhhab ” or 
“rites”). Each rite bears the name of its founder. Within two centuries of Islam, four 
major schools of religious thought and interpretation developed within the Sunni 
group:
Hanafi: (also known as the “Kufa” or “Iraqi” school). Hanafi is the oldest of the four 
schools. Its followers are mainly located in Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. 
Maliki: (also known as “Medina”). This school’s influence is largely in North Africa. 
Shaft’i: This school enjoys control in South India, Southern Asia, and East Africa, as 
well as the Arabian coastline.
Hanbali: This school is the most traditional of the four, and its followers are primarily 
located in Saudi Arabia.
Some contend that these divisions make Islamic law far less “monolithic”. Others 
disagree with this view and contend that these schools of thought are more closely 
related to each other than the various Christian religions are.
the Shar’ia, see Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East43-90 (6th edn. 
,Westview Press 1999). Goldschmidt notes that:
The sharia’ah tries to describe all possible human acts, classifying them as obligatory, recommended, 
neutral, objectionable or forbidden by God, the supreme legislator. In addition to some commercial and 
criminal laws, the Shar’ia covers rules about marriage, divorce, child rearing, other interpersonal 
relationships, property, food and clothing, hygiene and manifold aspects of worship.
78
Manifestations of International Commercial Arbitration in Islam
What we know of classical commercial law allows a provisional synthesis of a long 
history of Islamic law into certain characteristics which afford a perspective on the 
present-day relationship between Islam and business.
The relevance of the common law of Islam can be approached through the historical 
framework that Fernand Braudel (1972)37 introduced in his study of trade patterns in 
the Mediterranean world. This French historian calls the long wave or the long 
structure lonue dur 'ee (Macrohistory), and is helpful in understanding how fourteen 
centuries have come to bear on the world of business in Islam. For this purpose, the 
Islamic law of trade is a useful indicator.
Islam encourages trade: a long list of specifications is found in the Qur'an - with 
regard to contracts, the necessity of certainty, the central importance of ethics, the 
strict requirements of honouring one’s obligations, of putting them in writing, the 
permissibility of trade and its importance, and the famous sentence in the second sura 
(chapter) about how trade has been allowed by God.39 In fact, the Qur ’an contains a 
number of verses that specifically recognise trade and compel fair dealing therein. 
Among the most notable verses in this regard are the following:
“God has allowed commerce and prohibited Riba (interest).” (Qur'an 2:275). 
“Believers Honour your contracts.” (Qur’an 5:1).
“Woe to the fraudsters.” (Qur’an 9: 29).
These verses form some of the basis of how trade should be conducted according to 
Islam. Clearly, these verses emphasise not only the central importance of trade but 
also equally the ethics of trade. The first element is the centrality of trade, the 
universal respect it carries in Muslim civilisation, and the importance of commerce as 
the nerve of the city and of regional exchange. The free movement of goods is a key 
element in the structure of original Islam through to the present period. The fact that 
the Prophet Muhammad started his career as a caravan merchant is unique to the 
Islamic Prophecy.40 The original textual tradition of Islam and Islamic law 
acknowledges the importance of commerce, including the securing of long-distance 
trade, market sanctity and security, both at the ethical and the practical levels.
37 See, Fernand Braudel (1972). The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the age of Philip II 
Vol. 1 London: Fontana.
38 See Hilary Lewis Ruttley and Chibli Mallat, (1996). Commercial Law in the Middle East. P. 19. 
Graham & Trotman.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
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Whatever the reality of trade in the early Islamic hijaz, the tradition of an Islamic 
Prophet-merchant is firmly established and developed across the centuries. In addition 
to the already mentioned centrality of trade terms in the Qur’an, it has extols the
thvirtues of commerce in detailed and supportive argument as did Dimashqi (11 
century CE) in his Mahasin al-tijara.41
Other manifestations advocate the concept of commerce much like capitalism; Islam 
recognises “accumulation, in the form of commodities that can be exchanged (rather 
than its use-value), as part and parcel of the overall dynamics of economic advance. 
However, the ethical and norms perceptions of the two systems lead to varying results 
with respect to this “accumulation.”42 While capitalism in the West as we have 
already seen insists on exclusive individualism and self-interest as a propelling engine 
of economy, Islam sees the need to contain individualism and “self-interest” within 
the limits of its principles, since “all wealth belongs to God, who desires that it be 
owned equitably by all mankind.” In this respect, it has been observed that “Islamic 
economics is based neither on the unlimited freedom of unbridled capitalism nor on 
public ownership that results in total denial of individual ownership and freedom.”43 
Fairness and good faith in commercial dealings and incorruptibility in the 
administration of justice are considered to be comer stones of the Sharia. It has 
therefore been concluded that unfair competition is regarded as illegal and “damaging 
conduct.” Hence, the perpetrator of an act that is found to be unfair competition is 
required to make up for the damage.44
In sum, Islam guarantees personal freedoms so long as these do not injure the freedom 
of others or negate the ethical norms of conduct generally accepted by Muslim 
society; “thus contemporary Islam can sympathise with the basic capitalist principle
41 op.cit.47. p.20. It was Published in Cairo 1318 AH, and discussed at length in S.D. Goitein, A 
Mediterranean Society, Vol. 1, Berkeley.
42 See supra note 47. Hilary Lewis Ruttley and Chibli Mallat, (1996). Commercial Law in the Middle 
East. P.7 Graham & Trotman.
43 Ibid, p.7. “Quoting Ayatullah Sayyid Mahmud Taleghani, Society and Economic in Islam (R. 
Campbell, trans., Mizan Press 1982).
44 op.cit. 25, p. 12 See also, Ida Madieha Azmi, Spyros M. maniatis &Bankole Sodipo, Distinctive 
signs and Early Markets: Europe, Africa, and Islam, in persp. On intell. Prop.: The Prehistory and Dev. 
Of Intell. Prop. Sys. Vol. 1, 123, 132 (Alison Firth, ed., Sweet & Maxwell 1997); see Sidney A. 
Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 Trademark Rptr. 265, 266-67 (1975); 
William Henry Brone, A Treatise on the Law of Trademarks and Analogous Subjects 5 (2edn., Little, 
Brown & Co. 1898) (submitting that the word “brand” derives from the Anglo-Saxon Verb Meaning 
“to bum”).
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of private ownership of wealth-producing assets and against the extremes of personal 
wealth possible under laissez faire capitalism.”45
The Impact of Islamic Law and Rules of Conduct in the Middle East Region
Apart from Lebanon, in all other Arab countries it has been said that Islam is widely 
perceived by both religious and legal scholars to constitute “a complete way of life”. 
The laws of these countries are influenced to some degree by the Shar ’ia.46 Coleman 
(2001)47 asserts that the law is a normative social practice that purports to govern 
behaviour. But how can the rules of law secure their claims to govern our behaviour? 
The answer is that they are all rules that acquire the claim to govern because they are 
authorised by a more fundamental rule called the rule of recognition. The rule of 
recognition, according to Coleman, is the fundamental rule of a legal system. In 
general, the idea seems to be that norms are subordinate to the rule of recognition. 
Islam As a Rule of Recognition
Based on Coleman’s concept of recognition, religious scholars recognise that “Islam 
is a religion, an ethic, and a legal system all in one.”49 Another source explains that 
the Islamic religion is not limited to the spiritual fulfilment or enlightenment of the 
individual, but rather extends to all matters pertaining to a way of life. According to 
that source, “Dm” -  the Arabic word for religion -  “encompasses theology, scripture, 
politics, morality, law, justice and all other aspects of life relating to the thoughts or 
actions of men.”50
In this regard, the difference between Islamic law and civil and/or common law 
systems is twofold:
(a) Where the latter is secular human law subject to change by legislators, the 
former is regarded fundamentally as a divine law -  and, as such, basically 
immutable.
(b) While Western law tends to address what may be adjudicated in courts, 
Islamic law takes the whole of human conduct for its field.
45 Ibid., p. 17. See John Cumming, Hossein Askani & Ahmad Mustafa, Islam and Modem Economic 
Change, See Also, (John L. Esposito, ed., Syracuse U. Press 1980).
46 Ibid, p. 22. Qur’an, Surah Al-Furq’an Makki, 25:67.
47 Jules L. Coleman, (2001).The Practice of Principle. Oxford University Press.
48 See Supra note 3 pp. 493-494.
49See Hilary Lewis Ruttley and Chibli Mallat, (1996). Commercial Law in the Middle East, p.22, 
Graham & Trotman.
50 Ibid., p. 22. See also Roberts, who adds, “It is not that religion dominates the life of a faithful 
Moslem, but religion, in this comprehensive sense, is his life.”
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It appears that Islamic law covers all aspects of a Muslim’s life and is considered to 
be a divine law that commands all and draws a line between good and evil. Islamic 
law does not seem to fall within any of the various schools of jurisprudence, including 
the historical, Realist, or even the Natural law schools.
It is widely accepted that the Qur ’an contains “principles of religious belief, moral 
virtues, and a general legal system governing aspects of human behaviour.”51 Hence 
economic thought and practice in Islam functions within ethical principles, and the 
comprehensive purpose of Islam extends to all spheres of life, including civil and 
commercial issues. For example the Qur’an urges fair trading and outlaws every form 
of fraud, false measures, lying and cheating.
Another important feature of Islam is that it focuses on the individual and his duties to 
God and to his fellow men. Consequentially, Islamic law is perceived to be a 
“Doctrine of Duties.”
The influence of the religion is all the more important for having made itself felt in 
the regulation of every material or spiritual action of individuals.
We can understand therefore why the “fiqh ” goes beyond the limits assigned to law in 
contemporary juridical systems, and more particularly in the Western system. This is 
why many questions relating purely to morality or to religion in Western law come 
within the competence of the Muslim jurist, who has to make judgements of 
importance on moral, religious, social or merely human actions in commercial 
activities which are of no concern to the Western jurist. The Muslim is under an 
obligation to conform to certain imperative injunctions which come from revelations 
of his religion, ones whose basis is fundamentally moral. Among the principles 
related to commercial dispute we may cite:
The principle of equity: “God doth command you to render back your trust to those to 
whom they are due; and when ye judge between man and man that ye judge with 
justice. ” (Qur’an 4: 58)
The principle of equality: “But i f  ye turn back, ye shall have capital sums; deal not 
unjustly, and ye shall not be dealt with unjustly. ” (Qur’an 2:279)
51 The value of Qur’an in the Eyes of Muslims. See www.balagh.net/English/Qur’an.
52 See Nayla Commair-Obeid. The Law of Business contracts in the Arab Middle East, a theoretical 
and practical comparative analysis (with particular reference to modem legislation), p. 11. Arab and 
Islamic Law Series, 2002. Kluwer Law International.
82
4.2 Institutional Aspects of Commercial Arbitration in the Middle East
4.2.1 The Concept of “Statism”
The previous chapter discussed how the concept of “anti-statism” was rooted deeply 
in modem international commercial arbitration. Historical evidence of state reaction 
towards the demands for change has been given to highlight how this concept has 
influenced the development of commercial arbitration. Moreover, it has been shown 
how de-localisation of international commercial arbitration evolved in favour of party 
anatomy, and how judicial interference with party anatomy was viewed as depriving 
parties to arbitration of predictability, finality and confidentiality. A national, 
stateless, delocalised system where there is no connection to any national legal system 
is the common trend of modem international commercial arbitration. It has been 
called the private legal system. The fixed arbitration procedure found in the New 
York Convention (1958) is a good example. Further, the UNCITRAL Model law is 
considered the most significant step towards de-localisation.
Contrary to Western legal culture, “Statism” is the dominant concept related to 
institutionalised international commercial arbitration in the Middle East region.
Before addressing institutional concepts of “Statism” in the Middle East, it is 
important to show how this concept fits within the institutional theory of law. 
McCormick and Weinberger have endeavoured to bridge the gap between legal theory 
and the sociology of law. In their view, “an important question for legal and social 
theory is what role legal mles and regulations should play as factors guiding human 
conduct, both with respect to individual conduct and social relations. Weinberger 
advocates that ‘our grasp of the legal norms must include insights into their functions 
- the jurist must always ask: How does the legal institution function as an institution? 
What is the effect on society of the regulation under consideration? McCormick and 
Weinberger claim that the institutional theory of law provides a conceptual 
framework for analysing of legal phenomena from a socio-legal point of view.”53 
Weinberger nevertheless characterises institutions as “ framew or k-sy stems o f human 
action [which] have a core o f practical information, pointing to the fact that an 
institution is a condition for the determination of actions but that it is, usually, not
53 See Massimo La Torre, (2005) Institutionalist theories of law. Jurisprudence, legal theory and 
philosophy of law. See also, Weinberger, O., Law, Institution and Legal Politics'. Fundamental 
Problems of Legal Theory and Social Philosophy (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1991). p.24. See Muriel De Groot and Mir Jan Oude Vrielink. Legal theory and Sociological 
Fact, pp.251-252. Law and Philosophy 17:251-270, 1998. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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sufficient on its own to determine the action and to provide the basis for a mode of 
action.”54
Therefore, the analysis of the institutional concept of commercial arbitration in the 
Middle East will focus on the statism framework in this region.
4.2.2 Evidence of Statism in the Middle East 
The meaning of Statism can be defined as centralised bureaucratic governance55 in 
controlling international commercial arbitration. This part of the chapter will highlight 
some fundamental problems related to this concept with regard to commercial 
disputes and commercial arbitration.
Statism in Ancient Islam
State control over commercial activity in the Middle East region is not a recent trend, 
it is ancient and modem. Hisbah was an Islamic legal and commercial institution that 
was entmsted with the task of supervising and enforcing fairness in the exchange of
goods. This duty was further reinforced with the legal duty to amend any unjust
enrichment in commercial transactions.
The importance of Hisbah, namely, to “command what is good and to forbid what is 
evil,” has led some to classify Hisbah as a religious institution. This reflects the high 
regard given by Islamic law to fair dealing in trade. Some scholars even consider this 
Islamic institution with its far reaching authorities as the most important institution of 
the Islamic State.56
The function of Hisbah expanded in scope to the function of market inspection as the 
Islamic empire grew. Thus, during the Abbasid era, the new office of “Mohtaseb” 
(head of Hisbah) was formally created. The Mohtaseb carried out the duty of quality 
control over host traders, crafts and professions, including doctors, millers, bankers 
blacksmiths, bookbinders, booksellers, butchers, slaughterers, fryers, sausage makers, 
perfumeries, tailors, educators, grain sellers, confectioners, silk manufacturers, 
apothecaries. In view of the many types of professions that the Mohtaseb oversaw, his 
duties extended well beyond the mere inspection of weights and measures. Indeed, the
54 Ibid., at 256.
55 See Hirst, Paul. From Statism to Pluralism UCL Press 1997. p. 503.
56 Amin Haji, Institutions of Justice in Fatimid Egypt (358-567 H/ 9691171 AD), in Islamic Law: 
Social and Historical Context 198,207 (Aziz Al-Azmeh, Routledge, 1988); See supra note, 25. p. 13.
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detailed manuals of Hisbah reveal that the Mohtaseb carried out numerous different 
functions.57
Additional Legal and Administrative Bodies
In terms of authority and duties, the Mohtaseb intermediated between religious judges 
(“Qadi ”) and the “Mazalim” tribunals. In terms of enforcement, Mazalim tribunals 
assisted the Mohtaseb. These tribunals were essentially a forum for complaints of 
injustice perpetrated by the strong against the weak. Even where no formal complaints 
were lodged, the Mohtaseb was still entitled to investigate occurrences and issues,
58since he had a mandate to investigate compliance with any of the state’s regulations. 
Common Recent Trends
Statism continues to dominate legal thought in Middle East. The attitude of the Arab 
world towards this concept is the same regardless of changes in international 
economic and legal theories in an era of globalisation. Middle Eastern countries still 
use the concept as a tool for governing and managing almost all commercial 
transactions in their societies. In many of these countries, since the famous Aramco 
award, which pitted the government of Saudi Arabia against the American oil 
company, a lesson has been learnt by the wealthiest government in the Arab world: 
any administrative contract, that is a contract involving the state or one of its 
branches, will not, by law, include an arbitration clause without express permission 
from the Council of Ministers. In one way or another, this is the case in most Middle 
East Arab countries, an arbitration agreement cannot be effective if rejected openly 
by legislation or hampered by administrative means.59
4.2.3 Why Statism in the Middle East?
As mentioned above, it is important to understand the concept of statism in the 
Middle East in its general framework-system of human action. In other words, it is 
important to analyse what is the basis for this mode of action. In this respect, two 
main aspects may be mentioned as to why Middle East countries have not engaged in 
the harmonisation process of modem International Commercial Law and why they
57 Some sources such as Nihayat al-Ratabah, report 40 separate duties assigned to the Mohtaseb. Other 
sources such as Ibn-Ukhuwwah report 70 different functions. For an illustration of the scope of duties 
and powers of the Mohtaseb, see Serjeant, R.B., A Zaidi Manual of Hisbah of the Third Century (H) 
(1952) vol.27, Revista Degli Studi Orientali 1 See supra note, 25 pp. 14
58 Commenting that the “ambit of hisbah comprises three main categories of action” what concerns 
God and religion (e.g. neglect of Friday prayer) what concerns man (e.g. failure of water supply) and 
issues that involve both (e.g. enforcing parental duties)). See supra note, 25 p. 14.
59 See Chibli Mallat, A comparative critique of the arbitration process in the Arab world, p. 7. Lebanese 
Review of Arab Arbitration. 1996. vol. 1 issue 3.
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have been very keen to defend their concept of statism. Firstly, the socio-legal base 
and then the spiritual and religious bases will be discussed.
Socio-Legal Base
Regarding the socio-legal aspect, statism was based on the concept that modernisation 
and reform in Middle East counties require centralised governments. In pre-modem 
systems like Middle East countries where “traditional social forces, interests, customs 
and institutions are strongly entrenched”,60 a central and strong state having the power 
and authority to mould/persuade/force/ push/ urge social agents along a given
/ • i  £ * \
developmental path is required. Such contention supports Huntington’s (1968) 
insistence on the need for a strong state in modernising transitional societies. He 
stated:
“To cope successfully with modernisation, a political system must be able, 
first, to innovate policy, that is, to promote social and economic reform 
by state action...these [modernising] societies differ from the United 
States in the number and strength o f the sources o f  opposition to 
modernising reform. The change or destruction o f these traditional forces 
requires the concentration o f power in the agents o f modernisation... it 
thus seems reasonable to conclude that in a modernising society, policy
innovation will vary more or less directly with the concentration o f
63power in its political system.”
In Huntington’s view, democracy can come about only gradually, and in a phased and 
planned manner. Most of the process of modernisation, importantly, requires 
concentrations of power. Such a view is expressed in ongoing arguments in the 
Middle East defending statism and rejecting reform.
Statism is also required in reaction to modem Western commercial arbitration as a 
foreign product. Arbitration of commercial disputes has been emphasised in the legal 
thinking of the Third World in general and the Middle East in particular as a tool
60 Ibid., at 1093.
61 Ibid., at 1094.
62 Quotation from "Huntington's 1968 classic, "Political Order in Changing Societies," which has for 
many years been a textbook for developing world authoritarian leaders. Another of his books, "The 
Soldier and the State" was and still is required reading in national security theory for numerous military 
leaders, including those of the Salvadoran military. P. 1093. Third World Quarterly, 1999. vol. 20 No. 6 
1089-1107.
63 Ibid., p. 1089-1107.
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which strongly reflects the unique genius of the Western mind. The criticism remains 
the same: that the environment of international commercial arbitration in all respects 
and at all stages of the process is heavily weighted in favour of Western countries.64 
Afro-Asian jurists took the following view in the 1970s in Kuala Lumpur, Baghdad 
and Doha with regard to the already established arbitration institutions, which:
“had their own rules for conduct of arbitrations which did not work out 
particularly favourably for the developing countries, particularly in the 
matter of venue, choice of arbitrators, and also fees and charges liveable 
by the institutions concerned. Since most of these institutions functioned 
under the auspices of chambers of commerce and other associations of 
trade, it was difficult to visualise the manner or the means by which 
practical steps could be taken to effect modification of the rules of such 
institutions to bring them in conformity with the interest of the 
developing countries.”65
For Samir Saleh66, “international or foreign arbitration is generally held on foreign 
territory according to foreign rules of procedure and substantive laws and before a 
majority of foreign arbitrators”.67 Gerold Herrmann also notes that “in the Arab
s o
countries, the attitude is one of hostility, disillusion or distrust” The suggestion is 
that international arbitration in commercial matters is necessarily “foreign” to the 
Arab party.
The Spiritual and Religious Bases
According to the statism concept, many believe that “the state, not the individual, is 
now the spiritual centre of society.”69 Government assumes a moral importance that
64 Tibor Varady, (2002). International commercial arbitration: a transnational perspective. Kluwer Law 
International. In Transnational Arbitration and state contract, Hague Academy of International Law, 
Centre for studies and research in International Law and International Relations, 1988, pp. 83. see 
supra note 16, p. 19.
65 Ibid., at 20. See supra note 14, Asian -African Consultative Committee, Report of the Seventeenth, 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Sessions held in Kuala Lumpur (1976), Baghdad (1977) and Doha (1978), 
Secretariat of the Committee, New Delhi, p. 136, cited by Somarajah, M.Inffa, note 29 p.8.
66 See Sarnie Saleh, Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East: Shar’ia, Syria, Lebanon, and 
Egypt. Hart publication.
67 Ibid., at 20. See supra note 16 The Settlement of Dispute in the Arab World: Arbitration and other 
Methods-Trends in Legislation and Case Law” (1986) 1 Arab L.Q., 198, p. 199.
68 Ibid., at 21. See Supra note 21, 22. Asante, Samuel K.B. “The Perspectives of African Countries on 
International Commercial Arbitration” (1993) 6 Leiden Journal of International Law, 331.
69 See George R. Delaume, (1987). Transnational Arbitration and the State Contract. See supra note 
24, at p. 617.
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outweighs individuals’ claims. Statism does not speak of government as a collection 
of bureaucrats, agencies, and limited constitutional powers but as the embodiment of 
the collective good, a community itself. Statists believe government should make 
decisions for individuals. Since individuals usually prefer to make their own 
decisions, coercion and compulsion become necessary correctives. Accordingly, to
70some, ‘statism teaches that we are the children, and government is the parent.”
In fact, statists are looking for far more than a material embrace in the arms of big 
government. The French economist Frederic Bastiat commented as follows:
“The state is that great fictitious entity by which everyone seeks to live at
the expense of everyone else.” In statist terms, this is what is called
“community,” and anyone who questions this equation is accused of 
opposing “shared values” and the common good.71
Walzer observed that “the sovereign rights of state are no longer based on individual 
rights to life and liberty but rather on “the rights of contemporary men and women to 
live as members of a historic community and to express their inherited culture through 
political forms worked out among themselves.”72 For him, the “state should respect 
the individual’s rights if and only if “there exists a “fit” between the community and 
its government”. Such a “fit” exists in every state in which a people [is] governed in 
accordance with its own traditions,” in which its form of regime reflects “a widely 
shared view or way of life”.73
Accordingly, it has been said that “there are clear variations as to the nature of the ties 
between the state and Islam, and varying degrees concerning the position of Islam
rules as the state’s valid law. In these cases, each state decides or formulates the
extent and scope of the Sharia’s application within its legal system.74 In order to 
understand the legitimacy of the injunctions, one must see them in the general 
framework of the Islamic system.” 75
70 Ibid., at 618.
71 Ibid.
72 “The Moral Standing of States,” Michael Walzer, Philosophy & Public Affairs 9, no. 3 (spring 
1980). See Gerald Doppelt. Statism without Foundations, p.398. Philosophy and Public affairs, vol.9, 
No.4 (summer, 1980), 398-403.
73 Ibid., at 399.
74 See John Cummings, Hossein Askani & Ahmad Mustafa, Islam and Modem Economic Change, 25, 
36 (John L. Esposito, ed., Syracuse U. Press 1980).See supra note 25 p23.
75 Ibid., at 24.
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Muslims see in Islam a religion which provides a set of fundamental principles upon 
which the state should be established and administered which, taken to its absolute 
form, results in the creation of a theocracy. Consequently, it has instituted a system of 
duties which must necessarily be imposed on the believers as ritual, moral and legal 
obligations which are on the same level and which submit to the authority of the same 
religious imperative.76
Contrary to the Anti-statism concept which influenced the development of modem 
commercial arbitration, and for the sake of the concept of statism, we can see 
nowadays the attitude of those in the Middle East who are committed Islamists and 
like-minded government officials who defend statism and want religion to play a 
bigger role in everyday life, and want to make the rituals of the Islamic faith legally 
enforceable for Muslims.
They are striving to establish religious credentials and seeking the creation of an 
Islamic state and pushing for a bigger role for Islamic law.77 Some have described the 
defenders of statism as ‘normgivers’, either seen as being rational and deliberating 
persons who base their decisions on moral considerations, religious beliefs or 
empirical interests, or as irrational and emotionally driven people, who are governed 
by passions and ideologies. Such differing views are seen in most countries in the 
Middle East.
The significant difference between modem international commercial arbitration law 
and the statism concept in the Middle East is that if the concept of the individual is 
undermined, the community’s perception of justice is also bound to change. The 
nature of arbitral justice is also bound to reflect the conceptual background in the 
Middle East in that, in the relationship between group and private interests, the group 
stands out victorious. Whenever they are in conflict with the general interest, 
individual rights and freedoms, no matter how fundamental they may be, are bound to
70be compromised. This has led to a growing number of moderate Muslims becoming 
concerned about the implications of enforcing statism for a country’s economic and 
social aspects.80
76 See supra note 58, p.3 quoted; Schacht, op.cit.. p.20 et seq.
77 See John, McBeth. The case of Islamic Law, p.3. Far Eastern Economic Review. 2002: 165, 33.
78See Michael Baurmann. Legal Authority as a Social Fact. P.294. Law and Philosophy 19:247-262, 
2002, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
79 See supra note 16, p.89.
80 op.cit. supra note 84, p.2.
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4.3 Coercive Aspects of Commercial Arbitration in the Middle East
The previous chapter addressed the ‘coercive’ concept of obedience in modem 
international commercial arbitration using John Austin’s positivism legal theory. It 
showed that “arbitration as a contract was based on the doctrine of freedom of the
th thcontract, which arose out of the political and economic thought of the 18 and 19
R1centuries in Europe and in the West in general.”
The analysis highlighted two main concepts how international commercial arbitration 
as private method of dispute settlement gained acceptance and obedience, firstly, by 
analysis the “contract nature”, secondly, through an analysis of the “judicial 
character” of the process. In accordance to these two characters, the main argument 
focused on the characteristics that modem international arbitration agreement is 
“irrevocable” as a “contract” or as “process”. The following section will consider the 
coercive nature of arbitration and obedience to the international commercial 
arbitration contract in Middle East region and how they differ from the Western legal 
characteristics.
At first sight, the coercive nature of arbitration in Middle East can be explained on 
grounds of contract in Islamic law, which comprises two categories: “the first consists 
of ritual regulations ( ‘Ibadat) set down for religious and spiritual purposes. The 
second category, (Mu’amalat), is comprised of the rules required to administer and 
organise the community. This category also provides social rules to guide the 
relationship between individuals and their communities. Islamic law regulates 
everything from ritual obligation to property rights, giving unity to an Islamic society 
and organising all of its activities into a meaningful whole. Commercial arbitration 
contracts fall within the second category.”82
In Middle East countries and according to Islamic law, arbitration is classified as a 
contract. To a large extent, it remains a contract of an unusual character since it is still 
not recognised as binding as all other contracts. The process can be brought to an end 
either by agreement of both contracting parties (since it is consensual) or, by a 
unilateral act of either of them.83
81 op.cit. See supra note 16, p. 87.
82 op.cit. See supra note 16, p.82.
83 op.cit. See supra note 16, p. 95.
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4.3.1 The Contract Nature of Arbitration in the Middle East
The contract regime in the Islamic system can be seen almost exclusively in the work 
of the fuqaha\ followed somewhat later by the practitioners, who tried to soften the 
principles established by the “exegetes ”.84 The Islamic contractual system is above 
all empirical, and has been constituted as a result of the questions put to the 
practitioners and the solutions given by them to the litigation they had been called on 
to arbitrate.85
According to El-Ahdab, “a view attributed to the Imam Shaft ’i holds that “awards are 
only enforceable if the parties agree and thus arbitration will not have a binding 
character but be closer to conciliation.” There is no theory of contract in classical 
Islamic law, nor is there any general theory of obligation such as one finds in Roman 
or French law. So only certain specified contracts in Islamic law are binding and 
arbitration does not fall into any of the specified categories.”
El-Ahdab states “that under the Medjella (the first civil codification of Muslim law 
under Ottoman rule) the appointment of arbitrators could be revoked at any time 
unless the court had authorised or approved their appointment. In this case, arbitrators
87became delegates of the judge and their appointment could no longer be revoked.”
To Samir Saleh and Sayed Hassan Amin, “arbitration in Islamic law is said to be of 
the nature of a contract of agency, from which a party can withdraw unless it has been 
made for the benefit of a third party or confirmed by a judge. This view, which is 
shared by all the Islamic schools of jurisprudence, except the Malikis, stem from the 
fact that the authority of the arbitrator, unless confirmed by a judge, is revocable by
QQ
any of the parties at any time before the award is made.”
Saleh notes that “arbitration clauses (as distinguished from a submission) are not even 
referred to in Sharia jurisprudence. As in the old Belgian and French civil codes,
84 Exegetes, pi. exegetai Lit. “interpreter.” A group of officials who expound the proper procedure in
situations which raise unusual questions of religious law. Their activity is attested in several cases, all of
them homicides; and in each case they are responding to an inquiry by an individual rather than as expert 
witnesses before a court. In one case they also offer advice to a litigant, implying that this was something 
more than their regular function of interpreting the law. See S.C. Todd, selections by Michael de Brauw, 
edition of March 16, 2003 page 34 of 50.
85 op.cit. See supra note 58, p. 4.
86 op.cit. See supra note 16, p. 95.
87 See Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, (1999). Arbitration with the Arab countries, 2nd edition. Kluwer Law 
International.
88 See Samir Saleh (2005). Commercial arbitration in the Arab Middle East. Hart Publishing, p.76 
Also, see Amin Sayed Hassan, (1991). Legal System of Kuwait. Rayston. p. 54.
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arbitration is only referred to as a submission of an existing dispute to a settlement by 
a neutral third party. [In the circumstances, undertaking to submit to arbitration before 
the existence of a dispute would be void in Islamic law, not only because it is not 
recognised by the Shar’ia Law], but also on account of its not being capable of 
compliance with the conditions prescribed for the validity of a reference after the
QQ
dispute has arisen.”
The requirements as stated by Saleh are: “(a) that there should be a dispute in 
existence; (b) that the parties should give their consent to the reference of the dispute 
to arbitration; (c) an acceptance of the designated arbitrator(s) to enter the reference, 
and (d) that the dispute should be determined in accordance with the principles of 
Islamic law. It is important to be concerned with the first three requirements since the 
fourth does not arise until after the dispute has been decided by the arbitrator. Since 
an arbitration clause cannot meet the first requirement it cannot be enforced.”90 
Saleh seems at first to suggest that the clause may be treated in the same way as an 
ordinary term of the contract and upheld as such. However, the same author 
immediately dismisses the suggestion on the grounds that by providing for an 
arbitration clause the parties will be relying on a future and unknown event as a 
condition upon which operation of that clause depends. Such a condition will be 
regarded as void since Islamic contract law frowns upon uncertainties. Saleh points 
out that:
“[i]f, as it is believed, the settlement o f a dispute is considered the main 
object o f  an arbitration agreement, in inserting an arbitration clause the 
parties would be agreeing on the intervention o f a future and unknown event.
This uncertainty, save for a few exceptions in future sales restrictively 
recognised by the Hanafis, would be a grounds for the annulment o f  the 
arbitration clause, and it would be considered “batil” (null and void). I f  the 
existence o f a dispute is considered a non fundamental element o f arbitration, 
a mere suspensive condition on the occurrence o f which the arbitration clause 
- valid ab initio - would become enforceable, the arbitration clause can be 
challenged on another ground: arbitration contracts are among the contracts 
which cannot be conditional according to the Hanafi and Shaft’i schools.
89 Ibid., p. 136.
90 Ibid, p.84.
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Furthermore, the very concept of the suspensive condition does not exist in 
the Maliki and Hanbali schools.”91
Amin states that “in the Shaft ’i school, the authority of the arbitrator is, at the will of 
any of the parties to the proceedings, revocable at any time, even after it has been 
confirmed by a judge. This seems unique to the Shafi’i school. In the other schools, in 
the absence of the continuing consent of both parties, the authority of the arbitrator to 
proceed with his function ceases unless prior to entering the submission he had 
previously been confirmed in that role by a judge of a regular Islamic court, 
whereupon his authority to proceed on the reference becomes a delegation of the
• Q2powers of a judge and irrevocable by the parties.”
4.3.2 Judicial Character of Arbitration in the Middle East
Islamic law gives the main stages of the arbitration process separate treatment. 
Whereas the arbitration agreement itself is not regarded as binding; the award, on the 
other hand, is binding. This is so because the system treats the award as comparable to 
a judgement, thus rendering it final, binding and enforceable against the parties. For 
Saleh, the implication is that although one party can withdraw from the process at any 
time by revoking the authority of the arbitrator, he forfeits that opportunity once the 
award is made. So, although Islamic arbitration may start in law as a non-binding 
arrangement, it assumes considerable significance after the award is made. As far as 
the arbitration agreement itself is concerned, the legal effect of not treating it as 
binding in Islamic law is that it is probably not a contract in the modem sense.
The fact that arbitration is in the said region’s system not regarded as founded on a 
contract has many consequences which reflect on the differences between the concept 
as understood in the practice of modem international commercial arbitration and in 
many Middle Eastern countries. One of the effects is that both the agreement and the 
process itself are revocable. One of the parties can revoke the agreement or withdraw 
from the process without being in breach of contract. In many of the systems, this 
right exists at any time before the award is issued.94
The difference between arbitration as understood in the West and arbitration in many 
Middle Eastern countries lies in the character of arbitration and particularly in the
91 Samir Saleh (2005). Commercial arbitration in the Arab Middle East. Hart Publishing, p. 173.
92 Amin Sayed Hassan, (1991). Legal System of Kuwait. Rayston. p. 62.
93 op.cit. 91.
94 op.cit. See supra note 16, p. 99.
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overall attitude to the function of adjudication generally. Both have implications for 
arbitration as an alternative form of dispute settlement. One implication is concerned 
with the acceptance of arbitration in its present form in these countries.95 
Another implication arises in relation to the contribution of Middle Eastern countries 
to the evolution of the concept and the practice of arbitration itself in international 
trade. Both implications are related in their bearing on the general attitude to the role 
of adjudication. It would appear that the neglect or ignorance of the perception in 
many developing countries, including Arab Middle Eastern countries, of the function 
of adjudication accounts to a significant extent for the attitude of Third World parties 
to arbitration in matters of international trade.96
95 Ibid., at 108.
96 Ibid, at 109.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
International Arbitration Contract Principles: Analysis of Modern 
Arbitration Law and Western Perceptions.
5.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to examine precisely how the contract doctrine devotes its 
energies to describing and policing the divide between the different perceptions of the 
international arbitration contract between the West and Middle East. It will argue that 
the most elemental need for contracting across the jurisdictional boundaries of 
different legal regimes is not for a uniformity of laws but for pre-contracting certainty 
regarding which jurisdiction’s laws will be applicable to the contract and which 
jurisdiction’s adjudicatory system will assume effective responsibility for dispute 
resolution with regard to the contract. Also of importance is the enforceability of an 
arbitral award issued by the effective commercial dispute resolution tribunal. 
Therefore, harmonisation of international commercial arbitration, and not only the 
law applicable to international contracts, must be universally applicable, and also 
should be uniformly interpreted and applied to ensure the real meaning and efficacy 
of such law does not vary according to jurisdictions. Comparing the different 
perceptions of international contract principles between the West and Middle East 
thus becomes essential.
This chapter will start by considering the need for harmonised international contract 
principles in the area of international business. Then it will refer to some of the 
harmonisation trends in the West to overcome difficulties in applying a national 
contract law in respect of an international business contract. Since Western countries 
have different perceptions of contract principles, this chapter will examine and 
investigate the controversy and competing legal theories surrounding international 
contract principles.
Finally, in an attempt to explore the harmonisation process of international 
commercial arbitration contracts, the chapter will examine which of the Western legal 
theories of international contract principles has been introduced at the international 
level and in particular to the language of the harmonised UNCITRAL Model law. 
How significantly this Western perception of international contract principles as 
merged in the clauses of the UNCITRAL Model Law differs from the perception of
international contract principles in the Middle East will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
International Business Contract
International business contracts involve parties from different countries and their 
contractual obligations usually have to be performed in more than one country. As a 
consequence and because of the very nature of the international business contract, 
special contractual law cannot be purely national since this would lead to different 
contract laws being applied to the same contract.1
Accordingly, it is very difficult for parties entering into international contracts in 
which a choice of law governing the contract or a choice of adjudicating forum so 
resolve contractual disputes has been made in the contract not to overlook the 
necessity of first examining the practical consequences of these choices. If any 
applicable jurisdiction were to reject such choices of law and forum, whether outright 
or through an application of its conflict of laws rules, then the parties need to 
understand the consequences of such rejection and the effective nullification of their 
contractual provisions, and to take measures accordingly. In any case, where no 
choice of law or forum has been made in a contract, the parties should also be equally 
interested in determining what laws will be applicable to the contract and what forum
' j
will adjudicate contract disputes under the applicable conflict of laws rules.
This situation leads us to consider the need for harmonised international contract law 
principles. At this introductory stage it is worth mentioning some of the significant 
steps taken in Western legal culture in this regard.
5.2 Harmonisation of International Contract Principles
5.2.1 UNCITRAL Rules 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL” or 
“Commission”) developed the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (“Rules”)3 to arbitrate 
international trade disputes between countries with different legal, social, and 
economic systems. Currently, many international privatisation contracts provide that 
future disputes will be resolved through binding arbitration under the “Rules”.4
1 See European Principles of Contract Law, The Need for International Contract Law Principles. 
International Contract Adviser. Winter 1998. Vol. IV, No. 1 p. 15.
2 See National and State Private International Law Statutes. International Contract Adviser. Winter 
1998 Vol. IV, No. lp.54.
3 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) Adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1976).
4 One example is a privatisation contract for the sale of a Czech enterprise by the Czech Republic 
(selling country) to a German Corporation (private foreign investor). The contract provides for all
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5.2.2 UNIDROIT Rules
Reference to this example is made to emphasise that harmonisation according to “a 
model framework” is better achieved than “a convention - base framework”.
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) is an 
independent international organisation whose purpose is to examine ways of 
harmonising and co-ordinating the private law and to prepare gradually for the 
adoption by states of uniform rules of private law. The eligibility of a subject for 
unification will to a large extent be conditional on the perception of a state’s 
willingness to accept changes to its municipal law rules in favour of a new 
international solution on that subject.5
The uniform rules drawn up by the UNIDROIT have traditionally tended to take the 
form of international conventions designed to apply automatically in preference to a 
state’s municipal law upon completion of all the formal requirements of the state’s 
domestic law for their entry into force. However, the low priority which tends to be 
accorded by governments to the implementation of such conventions and the time it 
tends to take for them to enter into force have led to the increasing popularity of 
alternative forms of unification in areas where a binding instrument is not felt to be 
essential. Such alternatives include model laws which states may take into 
consideration when drafting domestic legislation.6 Considering the importance of the 
above, this makes the harmonisation of international contract principles of 
commercial arbitration within a model framework like the UNCITRAL Model Law 
most significant as will be discussed later in the coming chapters eight and nine.
5.2.3 The Brussels Convention
The Brussels Convention is another example of a solution developed by the West to 
overcome and to avoid the greatest legal difficulty facing international business 
contracts, that is, application of conflict of laws. The key point the Convention 
addressed is that, contract disputes may be litigated in the jurisdiction of the “place” 
of the performances of the contractual obligation as determined by the controlling law
disputes to be resolved through binding arbitration under Rules. See John D. Franchini, 1994. 
International Arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Contractual Provision for 
Improvement. Fordham Law Review. See supra 4, p.l.
5 See Unidroit and International Contracts. International Contract Adviser. Vol. VI, No. 4. Autumn 
2000. p.47.
6 Ibid., p.48.
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for the contract, nor where a tort is involved, litigation may take place where the 
allegedly tortuous event or damage occurred.7
Thus, recognition and enforcement of subsequent civil and commercial judgements in 
the EU is nearly automatic under the Brussels Convention. There are six grounds 
under Article 27 and 28 for refusing recognition and enforcement of judgements. 
These are: the public policy, protection of defendants’ right, irreconcilable conflict 
with an existing judgement in the enforcing state, and a conflict between the
• Qjudgement court and the enforcing court on the preliminary question.
5.2.4 The Rome Convention
A significant example to show difference between the perception of the West and the 
Middle East on international contract principles is the principle of contractual choice 
of law. The Rome Convention principally deals with contractual choice of law. It 
provides both for the selection by contractual parties of a designated choice of law 
and the procedural designation of an applicable law of contract by the courts when the 
parties have made no effective contractual choice of law. It affirms the right of parties 
to commercial contracts to designate the law which will govern their contracts. 
Member states, courts are bound by law to honour such choice of law. Where no 
designations have been made, the law of the country most closely connected with the 
contract will apply. In practice, the national law with the closest connection with the 
contract will normally be that in which the party which is to affect the “characteristic 
performance” resides.9 How such principles differ according to the Middle East 
perception will be discussed in the next chapter.
5.2.5 Functions of Aforementioned Conventions
Having mentioned the above examples as tools developed by the Western legal 
culture the question remains, do these tools give the expected outcomes to cover the 
problems associated with international business contracts? The UNIDROIT Principle 
of International Commercial Contracts, for example, and the other Conventions are 
more than multilateral efforts to establish the law governing international commercial 
contracts. Such efforts reflect the desire of the international business community to be
7 See the Rome Convention on the Law of Contractual Obligation/ Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement of Judgements. International Contract Adviser Winter 1998. vol. IV, No. 1. p.50.
8 Ibid., p.51.
9 Ibid., p.48.
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able to rely upon a universally-accepted body of legal principles applicable to each 
and all of their international commercial agreements.10
5.2.6 Regionalism and Harmonisation of International Contract Principles
Given the above given examples, does regionalism have any effect on the 
harmonisation of international contract principles? This section will examine how 
regionalism is a core factor behind the establishment of The European Principles of 
international contract and how the latter were intended to be principles and rules 
reflecting common solutions to problems of contract law within Europe as a region. 
This is of particular importance because of the need to find some way to bridge the 
fundamental gap between the civil law and the common law of contract for use within 
the Single Market of the EU. Creating such common rules for European contracts 
requires the reconciliation of a number of quite different European assumptions and 
practices regarding international contracts. As the result, the Commission on 
European Contract Law issued the first component of European Principles in 1995.11 
The key element to be mentioned here is regionalism’s influence on the process of 
harmonising international contract principles in Europe. When the drafting of the 
European Principles began, there was serious doubt as to whether the UNIDROIT 
Principles could be successfully devised or would be accepted by the international 
legal and business community. Consequently, the European Principles were drafted to 
fulfil European requirements when or if the UNIDROIT Principles failed to
i ^
materialise or proved to be inadequate. In other words, the European Principles are 
designed to operate within a single economic market. The EU Single Market blurs any 
distinction between intra-EU “international” contracts and domestic contracts and 
provides a high degree of harmonisation of the EU legal regimes for consumers and 
other commercial contract transactions. In contrast, the UNIDROIT Principles are 
intended to operate globally, but not domestically, and to function within markets 
with widely disparate legal and economic regimes.13
It has been argued that if the European Principles are used to form the basis for the 
Common European Code of Private Law (as contemplated by EU Parliament 
resolutions of 26 May, 1989, and 6 May, 1994), this would move them out of the
10 Q&A: What Is “The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts? 
International Contract Adviser. Autumn 1997, Vol.III, No. 4, p. 37.
11 op.cit. Supra note 2, p. 16.
12 Ibid., p.25.
13 tu;^ i
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category of a competing set of non binding principles applicable to international 
contracts and into the realm of mandatory statutory law applicable to specific 
transactions. In addition, because of the greater degree of shared principles and 
conditions of EU member states when compared with the general global community 
of nations, it was possible to formulate the European Principles with greater breath, 
detail, and precision than was or could ever be possible with the UNIDROIT 
Principles, which sought to reconcile essentially dissimilar and ultimately 
irreconcilable legal, economic, cultural, and political positions from around the world. 
This makes the European Principles more complete as a body of rules governing 
contracts and, therefore, more useful for those in agreement with the underlying legal 
principles from which they were drawn.14 This clearly shows the strong influence of 
regionalism in any attempts to harmonise international contract principles.
5.3 International Contract Principles: Harmony and Diversity 
After discussing the impact of business contracts upon the emerging need to 
harmonise the principles of international contracts and the attempts taken by the West 
to achieve this goal on the one hand and the effects of regionalism on these attempts 
on the other, this part of the chapter will describe some of the competing international 
contract principles. The aim is to show the areas of diversity and competing claims 
among these principles. Such diversity among international contract principles will be 
critically examined to find which of these Western principles has been introduced into 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. As mentioned 
earlier it is extremely important to compare and show how these principles differ, 
from the Middle East perception, if harmonisation of international commercial 
arbitration is to give the expected outcome and be universally accepted, implemented 
and interpreted.
5.3.1 Sanctity versus Flexibility of International Contract Principles
The sanctity and flexibility of international contracts are the most significant 
competing principles in respect to international business contracts in general and 
international commercial arbitration in particular. In the following part, each principle 
will be discussed, and later which of these Western principles has been adopted and 
introduced within the harmonised UNCITRAL Model Law clauses will be examined.
14 Ibid.
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5.3.1.1 Sanctity Contract Principle “pacta sunt servanda”
In the West, the fundamental right of conclusion of contract is protected by two 
important principles; ‘the contract is the law of the parties’, and ‘pacta sunt 
servanda’} 5 agreements are to be observed at all costs. These two general principles 
are applicable to agreement between states as well as between private persons. In 
other words, they are recognised as rules of the private law of the contract governing 
the agreements entered into between private parties and are also recognised as rules of 
the law of treaties governing the agreements between states.16
In the following commercial arbitration cases, apart from the legal arguments raised 
in them, the aim of the discussion is to show the supremacy of the sanctity principle 
of the commercial arbitration contract over the flexibility principle within Western 
legal culture.
In the Sapphire award (1967)17, it was held that “it is a fundamental principle of law
which is constantly being proclaimed by international courts, that contractual
obligation undertaken must be respected. The rule ‘pacta sunt servanda ’ is the basis
• 18of every contractual relationship”.
15 Pacta sunt servanda (Latin for “the pact must be respected”) is a Brocard, a basic principle of civil 
law and of international law. In its most common sense, it refers to private contracts, stressing that 
contained pacta and clauses are laws between the parties, and implies that the non-fulfilment of 
respective obligation is breach of the pact. The general principle of the correct behaviour in 
commercial praxis, that also implies the bona fide, is a requirement for the efficacy of the whole 
system, so the eventual disorder is sometimes punished by the law of some systems even without a 
direct damage suffered by any of the parties. The rule of pacta sunt servanada is based on good faith; 
this entitles states to require that obligation be respected and to rely upon the obligation being 
respected. This good faith basis of treaties implies that a party to a treaty cannot invoke provisions of 
its domestic law as justification for a failure to perform. From Wikipedia legal dictionary.
16 See Hamid Reza Nikbakht Fini, 1990. Unpublished thesis. State Contract and Arbitration, p.26. See 
Supra 14, (The Principle pacta sunt servanda is recognised by the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. Article 26 of the Convention provides that: “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties 
to it and must be performed by them in good faith”)
17 In Sapphire Int’l Petroleums Ltd. V. National Iranian Oil Co., the arbitrators were influenced by 
certain considerations and in particular:
(1) the fact that “the arbitration should be governed by a law procedure, and that it should be 
subject to the supervision of a State authority, such as the judicial sovereignty of a state”
(2) the need to facilitate the enforcement of the award: by providing for arbitration as an exclusive 
mechanism for resolving contractual disputes, the parties to an agreement, even if one of them 
is a state, must, however, be presumed to have intended to create an effective remedy. The 
effectiveness of an arbitral award that lacks nationality—which it may if the law of the 
arbitrator is international law—generally is smaller than of an award founded on the 
procedural law of a specific legal system and partaking of its nationality. See George R. 
Delaume, (1981). State Contract and Transnational arbitration. The American Journal of 
International Law. vol. 75. p. 11 Supra note 35.
18 Ibid.
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In the case of Topco/Calasiatic (1981)19 the sole arbitrator by referring to two awards 
of Aramco (1958)20 and Sapphire (1963) said: “no international jurisdiction 
whatsoever has ever had the least doubt as to the existence, in international law, of the 
rule ‘pacta sunt servanda’... the maxim pacta sunt servanda should be viewed as a 
fundamental principle of international law”.21 This principle was also upheld by the 
sole arbitrator in the Liamco(1979) case22. The Tribunal held that “it is widely 
accepted in international law and practice that an arbitration clause survives the 
unilateral termination by the state of the contract in which it is inserted and continues 
in force even after the termination.”
Thus, the sanctity of commercial arbitration contract principles has been determined. 
The question remains why this contract’s principles have such effects in Western legal 
culture and what are their scope? It has been argued that the ‘pacta sunt servanda ’ 
principle has a moral basis as one of the fundamental principles of international law, 
and it constitutes part of the Hus cogens’24. The scope of the ‘pacta sunt servanda’ 
principle is designed as a rule applicable to agreement between two equal parties, i.e., 
two sovereign states or two private parties. But most legal writers and jurists have
19 The view prevailed in the Aramco and the TOPCO/Calasiatic Award, the arbitrator held that the 
arbitration was directly governed by international law on the following grounds:
(i) “The jurisdiction immunity of states (the principle par in parem non habet jurisdictionem) 
excludes the possibility, for the judicial authorities of the country of the seat, of 
exercising their right of supervision and interference in the arbitral proceedings which 
they have in certain cases.”
(ii) “Considering the jurisdictional immunity of foreign states, recognised by international 
law in a spirit of respect for the essential dignity of sovereign power, the Tribunal is 
unable to hold that arbitral proceedings to which an interference by the latter state would 
constitute an infringement of the prerogatives of the state which is a Party to the 
arbitration. This would render illusory the award given in such circumstances. For these 
reasons, the Tribunal finds that the law of Geneva [i.e. the law of the seat of the Tribunal) 
cannot be applied to the present arbitration.
“it follows that the arbitration, as such, can only be governed by international law, since 
the parties have clearly expressed their common intention that it should not be governed 
by the law of Saudi Arabia, and since there is no grounds for the application of the 
American law of the other party. This is not only because the seat of the Tribunal is not in 
the United States, but also because of the principles of complete equality of the parties in 
the proceedings before the arbitrators,” See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, (1988). The Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Programme of the United States. Cornell International Law Journal. 
vol. 21, pp.202 supra note 37.
20 See, Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), 27 I.L.R. 117,168 (1958).
21 See George R. Delaume, (1981). State Contract and Transnational arbitration. The American Journal 
of International Law. vol. 75. p. 11 Supra note, 37.
22 Libyan American Oil company (LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic.
23 See R Doak Bishop, (2000).Intemational arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: the development of a 
‘Lex Petrolea’. Cepmlp Journal, p.4.
24 A norm of general international law is accepted and recognised as something to be respected, and not 
to be deviated from. Easily accepted by the Natural Law School, but there is no agreement on its 
substance. An example is the prohibition on the use of force to settle conflicts. See Howard Fienberg, 
International Law definitions.
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extended this principle to the contract entered into between states and private 
persons.25
Application of the principle of sanctity of contract extends to international
commercial arbitration contracts. Thus, these contracts are binding on the parties and
26neither of them is entitled, unilaterally, to modify or abrogate the contract.
In regard to its scope, it is worth mentioning that sanctity of contract is so significant 
in Western culture, even if one of the international contract parties is a state where it 
cannot exercise its sovereign power in legislation to alter or modify the contract. This 
point is much disputed when examining the Middle Eastern perception of 
international contracts as will be emphasised later.
In the West, some jurists reason that “a state cannot by exercising its legislative 
sovereignty, take measures to alter or discharge its contractual obligation or nullify 
the contract. In these circumstances, the contract may be brought to an end by the 
mutual agreement of the parties or by the decision of an impartial tribunal, i.e., any 
action, such as abrogation or modification, affecting the continued validity of the 
agreement should be taken by the consent of the parties or should be referred to a 
dispute settling body. Thus, it is not only admitted that the contracting state is not
only a party to the contract, but a sovereign legislator that does not have the right to
11alter or modify the contract unilaterally.”
Therefore, unsurprisingly, various state contracts commonly contain a clause designed 
to stabilise or freeze essential terms of the contract against non-commercial risk. In 
other words, the stability clause provides for stability of rights of the parties to the 
state contract and prohibits the state recourse to its legislative or administrative power 
to modify or nullify the contractual rights or connected commercial benefits of the
• ORprivate contracting party without his consent.
25 Wehberg, H.: “Pacta sunt Servanda”, American Journal of International Law, 1959, p.775; Lalive, J. 
F. : “Contracts Between a State or a State agency and a Foreign company”, 13 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 1964, p.987 Oxford Journal vol. 13 No. 3.
26 Ibid.
27 (it is said that if the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is to apply to international contracts it would be 
more limited than its application in the international law of treaties to which the principle is applicable 
in a very limited extent) See Von Mehren, R.B. and P. N. Kourides: “International Arbitrations 
Between States and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalisation Cases”. American Journal of 
International Law, 1981 vol. 75, pp.530-532.
28 For an early illustration see, e.g. Article 21 of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company agreement of 1933 
which provided that “...The company formally undertakes to have regard at all times and in all places 
to the rights, privileges and interests of the Government and shall abstain from any action or omission 
which might be prejudicial to them. ... This concession shall not be annulled by the Government and 
the terms there-in contained shall not be altered either by general or especial legislation in the future or
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5.3.1.2 The Flexible Contract Principle
Having discussed the sanctity of contract in Western legal culture, it has to be 
mentioned that scholars counter the absolute sanctity of the contract and stress the 
need for flexibility in the performance and legal effect of international commercial 
contracts. They generally point to the nature of such contracts which affect the scope 
of governmental functions, and the national economic development, and are often 
related to natural resources or public utilities.
In reference to classic forms of Middle East contracts with principally West European 
and North American companies, they are most often in the field of natural resources. 
They mostly have to be concluded over a long period, 20, 40, or even 60 years, and 
are usually connected with ownership, control agreements and complex fiscal 
regimes. For these reason, implementation of the flexibility principle in international 
contracts has been argued since there very nature is likely to require the necessity of 
alteration, modification and readjustment from time to time or even sometimes 
abrogation.
Regarding the flexible contract principle in international commercial arbitration, the 
following section will examined some of the most common arguments raised in its 
defence and discuss some relevant Western -  Middle Eastern cases.
The Public Interests Argument
Referring to natural resources type of international commercial contract between the 
West and Middle East, defenders of the flexibility contract principle argue that, these 
kinds of international business contracts are basic instruments of public policy and 
closely connected with the interests of the host-Middle Eastern-country to promote 
and direct its economic development. Thus, they cannot be separated from changes in 
political and economic conditions of a country.
Accordingly, since these countries are concerned with the economic welfare of their 
citizens, these cannot bind themselves to relationships with individuals that might in 
time derogate from that welfare. On the other hand, the party who voluntarily 
contracts with a foreign state, takes into account the probabilities of performance by 
the state and subjects himself to the law of that state. The consequences of this 
reasoning is that, contracts cannot be situated in the province of private contracts and
by administrative measures or any other acts whatever of the executive authorities”, - see J.C. 
Hurewitz: II “Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record 1914-56, 322(1956). 
Similar stipulations have been provided for in most of the recent oil concession agreements, such as 
Kuwait-Shell and NIOC-Pan American Agreements. See supra note 16, pp.40 supra note 63.
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private law, which are devised to apply to transactions of movable goods in a market 
regime, but are public character contracts and lie more in the domain of public law, 
under which contractual provisions on the grounds of public policy, unfairness or
90inequity can be modified or transmitted.
Geiger (1974)30, in his comparative survey came to the conclusion that, “economic 
development agreements are binding on both parties. They are, however, subject to 
the government’s prerogative of unilateral modification in the public interest. Such 
modification may be brought either by general legislation or administrative action
91directly interfering with the agreement”
Denial of International Status Argument
Another argument used to defend the flexibility principle is that, international 
contracts should be governed by the law of the host state and that public international 
law is not applicable to them. The denial of international status to commercial 
contracts is mainly because individuals are not subjects of international law.
Such argument was raised by The Permanent Court of International Justice in the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (1952) case concerning a dispute over an agreement of 
1933 between the Iranian Government and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. It held 
that “The new concessionary contract did not regulate any public matters directly 
concerning the two Governments. It could not possibly be considered to lay down the
*39law between the two states”
In the Aramco (1958) arbitration, the tribunal rejected a contention made on behalf of 
the company that “an oil concession should be assimilated to an international treaty 
governed by the law of Nations, and also held that as the agreement was between a 
state and private corporation, not between states, it was not governed by public
33international law”. Accordingly, this decision has two consequences: first, any 
change to the law of the state party which changes the agreement partly or wholly will
29 See B. Sen (1988) Diplomat’s Handbook of International Law and Practice, third revised edition. 
Nijhoff Publisher.
30 See Geiger R. (1974). The Unilateral changes of Economic Development agreement. International 
and comparative Law Quarterly. Vol. 23, p. 87.
31 Ibid, p. 102.
32 See Bing B. Tia, (1998). The regime of straits in international law. Oxford University Press, p. 180, 
191.
33 See M. Al-Saeed, (2002). Legal protection of economic developments. Arab law Quarterly, vol. 17, 
No. 2. p. 21.
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not be considered as breach of contract; and secondly, given a breach of contract, it 
will not per se be a breach of international law.34
F.A. Mann (1983), countered the view that the modification or abrogation of state 
contracts involves a breach of international law and stated that the doctrine “stems 
from a fundamental error which would not have arisen if public international lawyers 
had due regard to the character and teachings of private international law: in the type 
of case where there is room for the problem at all under customary public 
international law, no breach of contract in fact occurs and , consequently, the principle 
of pacta sunt servada is not infringed. Contracts are governed by the law determined 
by the private international law of the forum. That law “not merely sustains but,
'X <because it sustains, may also modify or dissolve the contractual bond”.
Crawford J. (1997)36 quoting Foighel, (1982)37 stated that “the fact that 
nationalisation is not a breach of international law cannot be altered by the fact that 
nationalisation destroys contract rights, for example, a concession which the 
nationalising state granted to a foreign company. There is no rule in international law 
that gives greater degree of protection to rights secured by contract than to other rights 
of property.”38
The Changed Circumstances Argument
Another argument for defending flexibility in international contract principles is 
changed circumstances. It has been argued that if the principles of public 
international law such as pacta sunt servanda do apply to international contracts, 
there are other international legal principles, such as changed circumstances {clausal 
rebus sic stantibus), which constitute expectations to that principle. Article 62 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which determines the scope of the clausal 
rebus sic stantibus shows that even in the field of inter-state agreements the principle 
of sanctity of contract is not absolute. It provides that:
34 Ibid.
35 See F. A. Mann, (1983). England Rejects Delocalised Contract and Arbitration. International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 33. p. 194-195.
36 See James Crawford, (1997). State Practice and International Law in Relation to Unilateral 
Secession. Paper, University of Cambridge.
37 Isi Foighl, (1982). Nationalisation: A Study in the Protection of Alien Property in International Law. 
Greenwood Publishing Group. Oxford.
38 Ibid.
39 See Geiger, R. “The Unilateral Changes of Economic Development Agreements” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly. 1974, p. 100. Geiger suggests that sanctity of contract has never been 
treated as an absolute and unqualified principle neither by public international law governing the 
relations between states nor by general principles of law recognised by any of the major legal systems.
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“A fundamental change of circumstance which has occurred with respect to 
those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not 
foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or 
withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence of these 
circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to 
be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is radically to 
transform the scope of obligation still to be performed under the treaty”.40
Some international jurists hold the view that the maxim of clausal rebus sics stantibus 
(the changed circumstances) is a reservation and an exception in international law to 
the principle pacta sunt servanda; and this concept is now generally accepted. The 
doctrine was considered in the Tunnel Indemnity (1986)41 case wherein the tribunal
He maintains that state contracts are not treaties; even so, he argues that in the field of treaty relations 
the clauaula rebus sic stantibus in a very restrictive sense constitutes an exception to the doctrine of 
pacta sunt servanda.
40 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in Brownlie: “Basic Documents in International Law”, 
3rd Edn., 1983 Oxford.
41 Contract between the Secretary of State for Transport and Channel Tunnel Group Limited Clause 24 
referred to the: Exceptional Circumstances and Force Majeure
24.1 None of the parties to this Agreement shall be liable for any failure or delay in complying with 
any obligation under this Agreement to the extent that such failure or delay has been caused 
directly by Exceptional Circumstances or by any other event or circumstance presenting the 
characteristics of force majeure such as:
war (whether declared or undeclared); 
invasion, armed conflict or act of foreign enemy;
riot, insurrection, act of terrorism, sabotage, criminal damage or the threat of such 
acts;
nuclear explosion, radioactive or chemical contamination or ionising radiation; 
any effect of the natural elements including geological conditions which it was not 
possible to foresee and to resist; 
strike of an exceptional importance;
behaviour of one party causing serious and certain damage to another party; 
to the intent that in particular, but without limitation, the time allowed for the performance of 
the obligations referred to in Clause 10 shall be extended accordingly.
24.2 Any party claiming that it has been prevented from fulfilling any of its obligations under this 
Agreement by reason of an Exceptional Circumstance or any other event or circumstance 
referred to in Clause 24.1 will notify all other parties immediately in writing, stating the basis 
of the claim.
24.3 Any party wishing to dispute the validity of a claim which has been notified under this Clause 
will give written notice of dispute to the party making the claim within 28 days of the date of 
the notice of claim stating the grounds on which such claim is disputed.
24.4 If neither the notice of claim nor the notice of dispute has been withdrawn within 28 days of 
the date of the notice of the dispute, the matter shall be submitted to arbitration in accordance 
with the provisions of Clause 40.
24.5 If the notice of claim is not contested or if the notice of dispute is withdrawn within 28 days, 
all parties shall be deemed to have accepted the validity of the claim.
24.6 A party shall not be entitled to rely upon Clause 24.1 where that party by act or omission has 
seriously aggravated the relevant Exceptional Circumstances or other event or circumstances 
referred to in Clause 24.1.
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mentioned the possible application of the doctrine where unforeseen circumstances 
had destroyed the economic basis of the concession and made performance by the 
concessionaire impossible. In this case, application of the doctrine was considered a 
measure which could help the concessionaire receive an equitable return on its 
investment agreement.42 Such changing circumstances and force majeure clauses are 
commonly used the Middle Eastern international contracts.
In the case of Questech Inc. v. Ministry o f National Defence o f the Islamic Republic o f 
Iran (1985)43, chamber one of the Tribunal (Bockstiegel, Chairman) applying the 
principle of clausal rebus sic stantibus observed that “changes which are inherent 
parts and consequences of the Iranian Revolution must be taken into account. The 
chamber continued: the fundamental changes in the political conditions as a 
consequence of the revolution in Iran, the different attitude of the new Government 
and the new foreign policy especially towards the US which had considerable support 
in large sections of the people, the drastically changed significance of highly 
sensitive military contracts especially those to which US companies were parties, are 
all factors that brought such a change of circumstances as to give the respondent a 
right to terminate the contract”. 44 
Administrative Contract Argument
The final argument worth mentioning is the administrative contract legal argument to 
defend the flexibility of international contracts. This argument relies very strongly on
24.7 The giving of notice invoking Clause 24.1 shall not release the party giving the notice from 
the requirement to take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences of the relevant 
Exceptional Circumstances or other event or circumstance referred to in Clause 24.1.
24.8 Except as specifically provided to the contrary, no party shall be relieved of its obligations 
under this Agreement by reason of impossibility of performance or any circumstances 
whatsoever outside its control.
42 See Robert Knutson, (2004). Common law development of the doctrine of impossibility of 
performance and frustration of contract and their use and application in long-term concession contracts. 
LCIA. Kluwer Law International
43 The claim in this case arose out of a contract that was part of a project to modernise and expand 
Iran's electronic intelligence gathering system. The project, known as "IBEX", was also involved in the 
Tribunal's Award No. 180-64-1 of 27 June 1985 in Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. The 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The contract in this case provided for the Claimant, 
Questech, Inc. ("Questech"), to evaluate the planning and implementation of a training programme 
conducted by the Claimant in the Sylvania case, and to certify student achievement in the programme. 
Questech alleged that the Respondent, the Ministry of National Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
("the Ministry of Defence") breached the contract in 1979. The Ministry of Defence alleged that the 
Claimant breached the contract, and it interposes a counterclaim. An Interim Award was issued in this 
case requesting the Government of Iran to move for a stay of proceedings before the Public Court of 
Tehran with respect to claims brought by the Ministry of Defence that were identical to its 
counterclaims before the Tribunal (Interim Award No. ITM 15-59-1 of I March 1983).
44 See Loukas Mistelis, (2001) Is Harmonisation a Necessary Evil? The Future of Harmonisation and 
New Sources of International Trade Law. Sweet & Maxwell. Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports 9 
(1985-110), p. 107 (AWD, 191-59-1,sep. 20, 1985).
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administrative law theory which a considerable number of Middle Eastern countries 
adopts in their legislation as will be discussed in the next chapter.
The administrative contract argument refers to the municipal practice of states 
regarding their contracts with private persons as public contracts, which even though 
they are binding on both parties and the maxim pacta sunt servanda is still applicable, 
are limited by the inherent overriding power of the state. In addition it is contended 
that none of the major legal systems recognise a rigid meaning for the pacta sunt 
servanda principle, but that it is subject to consideration of good faith and equity.45 
Contracts between states and private enterprises for the purpose of economic 
development can be found in virtually every legal system. In France as in other legal 
systems, the public law concept is based upon the fundamental difference between the 
sovereign state and private persons. The German doctrine regards this inequity as the 
main feature of administrative law. Another criterion of public law which is specially 
emphasised by French legal theory is its close relationship to needs and interests of 
the public service.46
They are closely related to the interests of the host country to promote and direct its 
economic development. According to the argument of the administrative contract, 
economic development agreements are not treaties. They are characterised by the 
fundamental inequality between the contracting parties, sovereign states on one side 
and private persons on the other. Consequently, even though state contracts are 
binding on both parties, they are, however, subject to the government’s prerogative of 
unilateral modification in the public interest. Such modification may be brought either 
by general legislation or administrative action directly interfering with the 
agreement47
5.3.2 Monism versus Dualism in the Context of the International Contract 
Principles
In attempts to harmonise international business contracts, the previous section of this 
chapter discussed the competing legal arguments of sanctity versus flexibility of 
international contract principles within Western legal culture. This part will discuss 
other competing arguments concerning the harmonisation of international contract
45 See: “Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law”. Working paper on 
international investment number 3/2004. OECD.
46 Ibid.
47 For further evaluation see infra, Chapter Five: “Concluding Remarks and Evaluation”. See supra note 
113. op.cit 16, p.54.
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principles, that is, monism48 and dualism49 principles. The aim of such comparison is 
to highlight some of the differences between Western legal culture and Middle East 
countries in respect to law applicable to international commercial arbitration 
contracts. Generally speaking in the West, in contrast to Middle East, the monism 
contract principle rather than the dualism principle is the notion applied to 
international contracts as will be discussed later.
In respect of what sort of law is applicable to international contracts, the 
internationalisation of international contract theory has been developed.50 It has been 
said that, “the theory of internationalisation of international contracts poses some of 
the hardest questions that relate to both public and private international law. The 
theory suggest that, no matter what law the parties to such contract choose as the 
proper law of the contract, international law superimposes their choice and is applied 
automatically as the overriding governing law. Thus, where the law of the host state 
applies as the sole applicable law, either by virtue of the parties’ express choice or by 
the conflict laws rule of closest connection in the absence of such choice, the theory 
of internationalisation triggers off not only the theoretical controversies of monism 
versus dualism of public international law but also the issues of party autonomy and 
the doctrine of the proper law of the contract in private international law.” 51
48 Monism: This theory characterises international and municipal law as a single legal system with 
municipal law subordinate to international law. Hence, in the Netherlands, all treaties and the orders of 
international organisations are effective without any action being required to convert international into 
municipal law. This has an interesting consequence because treaties that limit or extend the powers of 
the Dutch government are automatically considered a part of their constitutional law, e.g. the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights. In states adopting this theory, the local courts automatically 
accept jurisdiction to adjudicate on lawsuits relying on international law principles. See American 
hearing dictionary.
49This theory regards international and municipal law as separate systems so that the municipal courts 
can only apply international law either when it has been incorporated into municipal law or when the 
courts incorporate international law on their own motion. In the United Kingdom, for example, a treaty 
is not effective until it has been incorporated, at which time it becomes enforceable in the courts by any 
private citizen, where appropriate, even against the UK Government. Otherwise the courts have a 
discretion to apply international law where it does not conflict with statute or the common law. The 
constitutional principle of parliamentary supremacy permits the legislature to enact any law 
inconsistent with any international treaty obligations, even though the government is a signatory to 
those treaties. See American hearing dictionary.
50 See M. Somarajah, (2004). International Contract Law on Foreign Investment. Cambridge University 
Press, p. 423.
51 See A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, 2001. State Contracts in Contemporary International Law: Monist versus 
Dualist Controversies. EJIL, Vol. 12, No. 2, 309-328. p. 309
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There seems to be a trend towards the law of the host state being viewed as the law 
applicable in international contracts. According to this trend, Middle Eastern 
countries’ laws will be applied when contracts are made with foreign investors. For 
example, in the contract between the Arabian American Oil Company and Saudi 
Arabia the Islamic Shar’ia law was the applicable law.
However, many Western developed countries are also often found to insist on the 
application of their own national law to natural resources international contracts. 
From their point of view, the performance of such international contracts takes place 
in the territory of the host state, which considers itself well placed to insist that the 
application of its own law is desirable and practical in day-to-day operations. The law 
of a state may sometimes mandate this to contract by reference to its own national 
law.53
At this point, the issue under consideration is, in the context of harmonisation of 
international contract principles, whether or to what extent harmonised international 
commercial arbitration law has any role to play in the situation where the proper law 
of the contract is some municipal law, and the contract has its being in that law as the 
proper law of the contract.
This issue will be examined based on some arguments presented in the debate on the 
relationship between international law and municipal law, and reference will be made 
to some international commercial arbitration cases.
5.3.2.1 Arguments for application of the Monist Contract Principle 
As mentioned above, monist principles in Western legal culture give little weight to 
the proper law or applicable law notion based on the doctrine of the autonomy of the 
will of the parties, especially if the parties’ choice is the law of the host state in the 
context of an international business contract. This is principally because of the 
supremacy of international law they maintain over municipal law. This has created a 
tension in private international law relates to the choice-of-law issue in the context of 
international contracts.
“Some jurists who support the automatic internationalisation of international contract 
from the monist point of view justify their stance to superimpose international law on
52 See Somarajah, (1997). Power and Justice in Foreign Investment Arbitration, Journal of 
International Arbitration. See Pogany (1992), Economic Development Agreements. 7 ICSID Rev- 
FILJ. The author of the Article affirmed the trend towards the localisation of state contracts in the 
petroleum sector, as confirmed in a number of interviews he conducted with oil industry executives, 
p. 103.
53 See A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, (2001) p.310.
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such contracts by subjective and objective considerations. Thus, internationalisation 
theory turns out to be a ‘cocktail theory’ that serves both international law theories 
(monists) and practitioners (internationalists) equally.”54
In commercial arbitration cases involving some Middle Eastern countries and Western 
party, the monist principle has been raised. In the Pyramids case (the SPP 1988 
case)55 for example, the ICC tribunal accepted that Egyptian law was the proper law 
of the contract. But the tribunal took the view that international law could be deemed 
as part of Egyptian law and therefore concluded:
“We find that reference to Egyptian law must be constructed so as to include 
such principles of international law as may be applicable and that national laws 
of Egypt can be relied upon only in as much as they do not contravene said 
principles.”56
The arbitral tribunal’s conclusion that “the principle of international law overrides 
internal legislation in the event of inconsistency attributes supremacy to international 
law over municipal law, and is generally an expression of the monist doctrine. 
Moreover, party autonomy would be disregarded when it designates a particular 
municipal law and such designated law would be disregarded when it designates a 
particular municipal law.”
co
This principle was followed by an ad hoc tribunal in the Aminoil case (1982) . The 
tribunal applied primarily the law of Kuwait which had, in the tribunal’s view, 
international law as an integral part of it. However, the tribunal was not faced with a
54 Ibid., p.311.
55 Middle East Ltd. And Southern Pacific Project v. Egypt and EGOTH (988). In this case, the 
Egyptian General Organisation for Tourism and Hotels (EGOTH) and Southern Pacific Properties 
(SPP) entered into an agreement to the construct of two tourist centres, one of which would be located 
near the Giza pyramids. Due to a worldwide campaign against the agreement, the Egyptian government 
cancelled the project, and declared the area around the pyramids public property. A French appellate 
court reviewing the decision of the arbitration panel, the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), held that the counter-signature of the agreement by the Minister of 
Tourism, preceded by the words “approved, agreed and ratified,” did not bind Egypt as a party. The 
Egyptian law governing EGOTH explicitly gave it a separate legal personality regarding commercial 
transactions. EGOTH also possessed an independent organisation, budget, and was subject to the same 
tax laws as governed private companies. Thus, where a state enterprise has a separate legal identity that 
may allow it to declare force majeure in light of actions by the state, the corporate veil may not be 
pierced simply because the state approved the contract. Therefore, for the state enterprise to be able to 
declare force majeure regarding an action of the state, it must first have a separate legal identity. That 
is, it must have the ability to unilaterally enter into binding contracts in commercial transactions. See 
Christopher Scott Maravilla, (2002). The Ability of a State-Owned Enterprise to declare Force Majeure 
Based upon Action of State. Journal of International and Comparative Law at Chicago-Kent. vol. 2, 
p.5.
56 Ibid.
57 See Maniruzzaman, (2001) supra note 55.p. 318.
58 American Independent Oil Company v. Kuwait (1982) in 66 ILR 519, 21 ILM 976.
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conflict between a principle of international law which it considered applicable and a 
rule of Kuwait law. The tribunal has said: “the different legal elements do not always 
and everywhere blend as successfully as in the present case. Since no conflict arose 
between the two laws, the issue of the primacy of the one over the other did not need 
to be dealt with in practice. Had there been any conflict as such, it might be that the 
tribunal would have attached supremacy to international law.”59 
Such a view, also held by the ICC tribunal in the Pyramids case (1988), may perhaps 
be an assertion that international law leaves the matters concerned entirely within the 
reserved domain of municipal law and when the former becomes an integral part of 
the latter by way of incorporation or transformation it stands as a higher norm.60 
The position did not differ in the Norwegian Loans case (1957)67. Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht observed:
“It may be admitted... that an ‘international’ contract must be subject to some 
national law; this was the view o f the Permanent Court o f International Justice 
in the case o f  the Serbian and Brazilian loans. However, this does not mean 
that national law is a matter which is wholly outside the orbit o f  international 
law. National legislation ... may be contrary, in its intention or efforts, to the 
international obligation o f the State. The question o f conformity o f national 
legislation with international law is a matter o f international law. The notion 
that if a matter is governed by national law is for that reason at the same time 
outside the sphere o f  international law is both novel and, if  accepted subversive 
o f international law. It is not enough for a State to bring a matter under the 
protective umbrella o f its legislation, possibly o f a predatory character, in order 
to shelter it effectively from any control by international law.”63
59 Ibid., See Brownlie, supra note 18, at 32.
60 Ibid., See Jennings and Watts, supra note 24, at 82.
61 The Proceedings in this case of certain Norwegian loans, between France and Norway, had been 
instituted by an Application of the French Government which requested the Court to adjudge that 
certain loans issued on the French market and on other foreign markets by the Kingdom of Norway, the 
Mortgage Bank of the Kingdom of Norway and the Smallholding and Workers' Housing Bank, 
stipulated in gold the amount of the borrower's obligation and that the borrower could only discharge 
the substance of his debt by the payment of the gold value of the coupons and of the redeemed bonds. 
The Application expressly referred to Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court and to the Declarations 
of Acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction made by France and by Norway. For its part, the 
Norwegian Government raised certain Preliminary Objections which, at the request of the French 
Government, which the Norwegian Government did not oppose, the Court joined to the merits. See 
ICJ, case summaries
62 Vice President of the International Court of Justice in the Norwegian Loans Case, 6 July 1957.
63 See the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, ICJ Reports (1957) vol. 9. p. 312.
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Regarding the same case, Brownlie (1998) noted: “‘in his [Lauterpacht’s] work, 
monism takes the form of an assertion of the supremacy of international law even 
within the municipal sphere, coupled with well-developed views on the individual as 
a subject of international law.” 64 He also observes that “such a doctrine is antipathetic 
to the legal corollaries of the existence of sovereign States, and reduces municipal law 
to the status of pensioner of international law.”65 Those jurists who agree with the 
monist-naturalists that a state contract will always be subject to international law 
despite any municipal law being chosen by contracting parties as the sole proper law 
of the contract.”66
Thus, Judge Lauterpacht’s opinion in the Norwegian Loans case “ cannot be the 
authority for internationalisation of a state contract since such a contract on its own 
does not create an international obligation, even though international law is 
designated by the contracting parties to be the governing law of the contract. This is 
especially true in the context of any international commercial arbitration which is
fnparticularly of private character or rather ‘quasi-international.”
Further, “Professor Jennings (1965)’ view is based upon the unitary concept of law 
comprising both the branches of law, municipal and international. In his monist 
approach, international law assumes primacy over municipal law. Such primacy is 
supposed to prevail in both international and municipal spheres. In fact, in fashioning 
his arguments Jennings is verging on the possibility of an international law of 
contract.”68
Moreover, he seems to have elevated the individual on the level of international law 
as its subject. It thus appears clear from Jennings’ view that, whether the contract is 
governed by municipal or international law, any simple breach of contract would be a
64 See Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th edn., 1998) 32.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., p.313, See Schwebel, International Arbitration: Three Salient Problems (1987) 108-115 and 
125-143; and Schwebel, Justice in International Law (1994) 425-435. See generally Philip Allott, 
Eunomia - New Order for a New World (1990); and Allott, ‘The Concept of International Law’, 10 
EJIL (1999) 31-50.
67 Ibid., See generally F. Lalive, ‘Contracts Between a State or a State Agency and a Foreign Company, 
Theory and Practice: Choice of Law in a New Arbitration Case’, 13 ICLQ (1964) 987, at 997; 
Bourquin, ‘Arbitration and Economic Development Agreements’, in Selected Readings on Protection 
by law of Private Foreign Investments (1964) 99, at 111 and 113; van Houtte, ‘International Arbitration 
and National Adjudication’, in C.C.A. Voskuil and J.A. Wade (eds), Hague-Zagreb Essays 4 on the 
Law of International Trade (1983) 312, at 322-327.
68 See R.Y. Jennings, (1965). Rules Governing Contract between States and Foreign Nationals, at Sir 
H. Lauterpacht, ICJ Reports (1962). Quoted by A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, (2001).
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breach of international law and would thereby engage state responsibility vis-a-vis the 
alien.”69
5.3.2.2 Arguments for the application of the Dualist Contract
Principle
The dualists’ argue that municipal law will be applicable to international contracts 
because it will be valid and operative in the municipal sphere. Accordingly, the 
municipal law has primacy over the international law. In the case of inconsistency 
between international law and the municipal law, the domestic court will usually give 
the priority to the municipal law.
The supremacy of international law over municipal law has been denied by many 
writers when municipal law is the exclusive choice of law. Thus, in the words of Dr 
Mann70:
“As a matter of public international law no State can rely on its own legislation 
to limit the scope of its international obligations. But this rule contemplates 
obligations governed by public international law and has no bearing upon the 
scope of obligations which are subject to a system of municipal law, such as 
the law of the Debtor State. If under the latter system of law no breach of 
contract occurs, it is not open to public international law to assert the 
contrary. Where the Debtor State does wrong to its alien creditor, public 
international law may impose a delictual liability. The existence of a tort 
towards the creditor’s State is independent of any question of breach of 
contract.”71
This view has attracted vigorous support in recent legal literature on the subject. Dr 
Mann has defended his view as follows: “To hold the parties to their own choice of a 
legal system as the proper law of their contract and to judge the existence or non­
existence of a ‘breach’ by the law so chosen is imperatively demanded by any legal 
order which cherishes certainty, equitable treatment, and sound results. So there can 
be no “breach” of contract unless there is a breach in the proper law, and no law other 
than the proper law of contract, and unless the contract is changed according to that
69 Jennings, Supra note 8, at 177-178.
70 F.A. Mann. (1959). The Proper Law of Contract Concluded by International Persons. British 
Yearbook of International Law (vol. XXXV), p. 34.
71 Ibid., See Mann, supra note 24, at 315; S.K.B. Asante, ‘Stability of Contract Relations in the 
Transnational Investment Process’, 28 ICLQ (1979) 401, at 406. See also the Serbian Loans case, 1929 
PCIJ Series A, No. 20, at 20; and the Norwegian Loans case, ICJ Reports (1957) 31.
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law or by virtue of that law, there cannot be any breach of contract in international 
law.” 72
It seems that “Dr Mann would not object to the interaction of municipal and 
international laws when both laws are jointly the designated proper law of contract. 
Thus, for him, it is the proper law that matters, and not the interaction itself between 
the two if it is permitted in the choice-of-law provision. For justification of his thesis, 
he resorted to the private international law of the forum of arbitration, the lex fori 
theory. He suggested that “we must still start from private international law to subject 
the contract to international law”.
It thus appears from Dr Mann’s standpoint of the jurisdictional theory of arbitration 
that an international arbitral tribunal is the bound forum (used of the law of the 
country in which an action is) or the seat of the arbitral tribunal, i.e. the lex fori. This 
is perhaps to affirm the supremacy of municipal law over international law from the 
standpoint of municipal courts. As alluded to earlier, in state practice there seems to 
be a tendency for municipal courts to apply municipal law when it is inconsistent with 
international law, unless the former has made a provision for the application of the 
latter.74
Nevertheless, another line of the argument that, “it cannot be denied that one of the 
parties to a state contract, i.e. the state, is a subject of international law, and that that 
law governs its conduct by providing certain international minimum standards with 
respect to the treatment of aliens or foreign counterparties. And no matter what the 
choice of law of the contract is, whether municipal or otherwise, since one of the 
parties to such a contract is a sovereign state the international minimum standards of
7 c
state conduct must apply to that effect.”
From this perspective, international law is to that extent supreme over municipal law 
as an objective standard. Most legal systems do in fact conform to such international 
law requirements in requiring lawful exercise of a state’s prerogative rights vis-a-vis 
aliens or foreign counterparties. Professor Bowett has observed:
72 Ibid. See Mann; supra note 24, at 315.
73 See A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, p. 318.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid, p. 323, See Jennings, supra note 8, at 181-182; see also Bowett, supra note 24, at 936-937; and 
Olmstead, ‘Economic Development Agreements Between States and Aliens: Choice o f Law and 
Remedy’, 48 California Law Review (1960) 424.
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“The argument that the State’s conduct is governed by international law adds 
very little to the substantive requirements, except in the extreme situation of a 
State claiming, by virtue of its own municipal law, prerogatives not generally 
recognised to the State under most systems of law, such as the right to 
discriminate against aliens or the right to refuse all compensation.”76
By saying that the specific municipal law as the sole proper law of the contract must 
conform to the requirements laid down by international law governing the conduct of 
states is not to suggest that international law supplants the proper law as the system in 
which the contract has its base, or origin.77
Looked at from the standpoint of private international law, the freedom of choice 
(autonomy of will) of the parties should, in principle, be respected, which is also a 
rule of international law. Professor Bowett thus comments regarding the Pyramids 
case:
“Whenever there is a contractual choice of specific municipal legal system as the 
proper law, the choice is to that legal system per se. There is no renvoi to 
international law, and thereby to other municipal systems generally, vis the 
concept of ‘general principles of law’ as a part of international law”.78
5.3.3 Contractual Freedom versus National Public law
Another area of competing arguments in respect to harmonising international 
contracts is the conflict between the choice of contracting parties and the public law 
notion. It has been mentioned earlier in this study that the legal philosophy of modem 
international commercial arbitration has created a doctrine of contract in which the 
concept of parties will seem perfectly acceptable.
As the UNCITRAL Model Law spreads throughout the world, the issue remains 
whether it is possible to have a coherent legal doctrine in the field of international 
commercial contracts. This part of the chapter will show how the private choice and 
public law concepts appear most clearly when harmonisation of international 
arbitration contract principles has to be considered.
76 Ibid. See Bowett, supra note 24, at 937.
77 Ibid., See Jennings, supra note 8, at 181.
78 Ibid., p.324, See Bowett, supra note 24, at 932, n.12.
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Arguments for the application of the Contractual Freedom Principle
In the West, courts traditionally have refused to enforce private contractual choice of 
law clauses if enforcement would result in the displacement of the forum’s applicable 
public law. Professor Henri Battifol (1982) explained, “It is [only] natural that the 
public law of the forum should prevail over private choice. Consequently, the same is 
true of choice of forum clauses - if the contractually designated forum would fail to 
apply the applicable public law of the forum before which the dispute has been 
brought, the latter forum will simply ignore the clause.”79 Such position is in conflict 
with the fundamental right of individuals to enter into a contract, simply as an act of 
will and as exercise of a moral virtue.80
In an attempt to explain the relationship between arbitrability and public law, 
Professor Thomas Carbonneau (1986) comments as follows: “Arbitrability serves as 
[the] instrument by which to exempt matters of vital national importance from the 
reach of private adjudication.”81
Further, the assumed of the inarbitrability of public law claims was so pervasive at the 
time of the drafting of the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (The New York Convention), that the Swiss 
delegate to the Convention proposed changing the reference to “Foreign Arbitral 
Awards” in the Convention’s title to “Arbitral Awards in Private Law.”
Nevertheless, this position has changed in the West and the principle of arbitrability 
is widely recognised as the autonomy of parties to international contracts to designate 
the law that applies to their transactions and the forum in which they will resolve their 
disputes. Within this context, parties to international contracts are free to designate the 
law or principles that will govern their transaction to the exclusion of all otherwise
79 See Henri Battifol, (1982). Public Policy and Autonomy of the Parties: Interrelations Between 
Imperative Legislation and the Doctrine of Party Autonomy, quoted by Philip J. McConnaughay, 2001. 
The Scope of Autonomy in International Contract and Its Relation to Economic Regulation and 
Development. Columbia J. Transnational Law. pp.4-5
80 Ibid., p8.
81 Thomas E. Carbonneau, (1986) The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism: Assessing the 
Folly of Mitsubishi. J. TransnatT L. 265, 295 (1986). Quoted by Philip J. McConnaughay, 2001. The 
Scope of Autonomy in International Contract and Its Relation to Economic Regulation and 
Development. Columbia J. Transnational Law.
82 Ibid., See also U.N. Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, Summary Record of the 
Twenty-Third Meeting, June 9, 1958, E/Conf.26/SR. 23 12 September 1958, reprinted in III 
International Commercial Arbitration, C. 203 (Ggaja ed. 1979).
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applicable law. They are free to arbitrate privately any disputes that might arise
• 01among them to the exclusion of otherwise compulsory public court litigation.
In the context of international commercial arbitration, the New York Convention, 
modem national arbitration laws, and national judicial deference have combined to 
enable parties to international transactions to elect a virtually complete divorce 
between their private commercial arbitration procedures and awards on the one hand, 
and any significant national “control mechanisms” or judicial review, on the other. 
Moreover, when contractual choice of law is exercised in the context of international
o acommercial arbitration, the scope of autonomy becomes even greater.
The main reason for such change in Western legal culture is the nature of commercial 
contracts in that unlike in most national courts, applicable law in arbitration may 
include the lex mercatoria (Law of Merchant), amiable composition (arbitrators are 
not bound by any procedure and settlement of dispute through mutual concession), ex 
aequo et bono (according to what is right and good), or even rules or principles of the
Of
parties’ own making.
Consequently, within the realm of matters otherwise governed by private law, it is fair 
to say that Western nations have largely ceded to parties to international commercial 
transactions virtually complete freedom and control over the law, rules or principles 
that will govern their relationship, and over the procedures and outcomes that will 
govern the resolution of their disputes.
The same is true of contractual promises to privately arbitrated international 
commercial disputes and of the final awards that emanate from arbitrations. The value 
of autonomy lies in its universality, of which the New York Convention is a principal 
guarantor. By virtue of their accession to that Convention, nations, to-date, have 
agreed to honour written agreements to privately arbitrate international commercial 
disputes to the exclusion of national court jurisdiction and to enforce the awards that 
result from these arbitrations to the exclusion of national judicial review. Moreover, 
the judiciaries of these nations, by and large, have reinforced autonomy in the context 
of private law by acknowledging explicitly what is only implicit in the New York 
Convention - the complete freedom to designate applicable law, to the exclusion of 
otherwise applicable law, in the context of private arbitration. Thus, it is the virtually
83 Ibid., p.l.
84 Ibid., at supra notes 30 and 33.
85 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
86 Ibid., p. 6.
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almost universal recognition of contractual autonomy in international transactions that 
enables commercial parties to reliably select an applicable law and arbitral forum to 
the exclusion of all non-selected alternatives.
It has been argued that autonomy in international contracts offers indispensable 
benefit for international commerce -  and the opportunity to create new principles and 
procedures for governance and dispute resolution in West/non-West commercial 
relationships, where fundamentally different understandings often exist with respect 
to the role of law and contracts in the structure and governance of commercial 
relationships. This opportunity, which is increasingly important for international 
commerce in light of the burgeoning trade between West/non-West, exists because 
contractual autonomy in international transactions enables commercial parties to 
select a virtually complete divorce between their private arbitral procedures, choice of 
applicable law, and final arbitral awards on the one hand, and any significant national
oo
control mechanisms or judicial review, on the other.
Similarly, it has been argued that a significant virtue of autonomy in international 
contracts is a capacity to accommodate the emergence of new principles and 
procedures for dispute resolution in West/non-West commercial relationships in light 
of the fundamentally different understandings that often exist in such relationships
on
with respect to the role of law and contracts in the resolution of disputes. To this 
extent, the arbitrability of international commercial contract with public law claims 
represents a significant difference and debate in respect to the contractual freedom 
principle.
5.3.4 Legal Nature of International Contracts
5.3.4.1 International Treaties versus Administrative Contracts
After discussing competing claims surrounding international contract principles, this 
part will discuss the diversity of its legal nature. Such arguments in respect to the 
legal nature of international contract will be obvious with the stand position taken by 
the Middle East and its effects on harmonisation of international commercial 
arbitration as one form of international contract.
87 Ibid.
88 Many leading commentators consider the absence of national judicial “control mechanisms” on 
international arbitration to be a source of major problems for international transactions. See Supra note 
No. 89 at p.6.
89 Ibid.
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Binding and the legal value of contracts cannot be determined unless the applicable 
law of these contracts is recognised, thus, attention will be given to the main legal 
principles which have constituted the proper law of international contract, and 
particular reference will be made to contracts between states and foreign investors 
because they are the most common type of international contract in the Middle East 
and usually natural development contracts.
Despite the shared general characteristics of international state contracts, diversity of 
interpretation of the legal nature of these contracts influences the dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Lord McNair (1986)90 cites the following general characteristics and 
legal features pertinent to such contracts:
(i) They are made between a government on the one side, and on the other, a 
foreign individual or corporation owing its legal existence to the laws of a foreign 
state;
(ii) They are commonly contracts for some long-term exploitation of natural 
resources involving the expenditure of capital in setting up permanent installations for 
the duration of the agreement;
(iii) The rights created are not purely contractual but are more assimilated to 
rights of property;
(iv) They confer extensive incentives to foreign investors, such as complete 
freedom from export and import duties, exemption from taxation and, in some cases, 
special facilities with regard to foreign exchanges and exemption or reduction in rates;
(v) Many of these agreements are governed partly by public law and partly by 
private law;
(vi) There need not be any close connection between the host state and that of the 
investor;
(vii) They usually make provision for arbitration in the event of dispute.
The legal nature of international state contracts is uncertain and controversial. Their 
character and legal nature have never been manifestly determined. The basic 
consideration underlying the ongoing controversy in this respect is whether there are 
inherent, in the relationship between the contracting public entity and the private 
foreign party, certain non-negotiable aspects of power and duty of the state concerned
90 Lord McNair, (1986). The Law of Treaties. Oxford University Press, p. 153.
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to serve the social and economic welfare of its people by the exercise of its sovereign 
legislative and administrative powers.91 In the following part, the two common 
arguments used by the West will be discussed.
5.3.4.2 International State Contracts are not International Treaties 
It has been argued that international state contracts are not in fact treaties, since one of 
the parties is a private individual or corporation. Superficially, they look very similar 
to treaties, both in their negotiation and drafting. However, they cannot be regarded as 
treaties since they are not between the subjects of international law. This view was 
stated by the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Iranian case, when rejecting 
the British contention that the 1933 Concession agreement between the Persian 
Government and the Anglo Persian Oil Company had a double character - both as a 
concession agreement and a treaty between the two governments. The Court said that 
the agreement:
“.... was nothing more than a concession agreement between a government 
and a foreign corporation. The United Kingdom Government is not a party to 
the contract: there is no privity of contract between the Government of Iran 
and the Government of the United Kingdom. Under the Contract the Iranian 
Government cannot claim from the United Kingdom any rights which it may 
claim from the company nor can it be called upon to perform towards the 
United Kingdom Government any obligations which it is bound to perform 
towards the Company. The document bearing the signature of the Iranian 
Government and Company has a single purpose; the purpose of regulating the 
relations between the Government and the Company in regard to the 
concession. It does not regulate in any way the relations between the two 
governments.
§.3.4.3 International State Contracts are not Administrative Contracts
The determination of whether international state contracts include administrative 
contract or not is important. In the sense that droit administratif is understood in 
French law and in countries which adhere to this concept, administrative law is 
understood as a separate and autonomous branch of law which covers a wide field that
91 Ibid., p. 154.
92 Anglo - Iranian Oil Co. case (United Kingdom v. Iran), International Court of Justice, Reports, 1952, 
p.ll2.See supra note 19. op.cit 110. p. 154.
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includes administrative contracts, acts and powers, administrative courts and state 
liability.93
Administrative contracts (contracts administratifs) are contracts concluded by the 
state or public authorities which are governed in countries that apply the droit 
administratifby legal rules and principles which, in some respects, substantially differ 
from the rules and principles applicable to ordinary civil contracts. The fundamental 
principle of contract administratif is recognition of the unilateral powers of the public 
powers of a public authority to control or modify the execution of the contract in the 
public interest. However, the exercise of this power is subject to the payment of 
adequate compensation for any losses resulting from the modification of the 
contractual provisions of the contract. The proper use of such power in the public 
interest is supervised by the administrative courts.94
Thus, the legal nature of the contracts concluded between a state and foreign private 
person stems from the legal rules governing the contract. But it should be stated that 
there are no well-settled and world - wide accepted international legal rules regarding 
the legal position of such contracts.
Not only writers and scholars but also judges and states have different views on the 
extent of the legality of state contracts. The source of controversy is the validity of 
state contracts and the extent to which the state may assert, by virtue of its sovereignty 
that it is not obliged to perform the stated terms of a contract. In fact, in some aspects, 
there is a clash of interests between the two parties, the foreign private party insists on 
immunisation and rigidity of contract and tries to restrain the government from 
freedom of action and obtain a maximum return. This is the position usually taken by 
Western investors doing business in the Middle East. The state party, on the other 
hand, demands more flexible contractual advantages, or imposes additional duties or 
takes some measures, unilaterally, to alter or nullify the contract using administrative 
contract arguments.95
5.4 Modern Arbitration Law: The Proper International Contract Principle
Having discussed the most common competing claims surrounding international 
contract principles in the West, it is the Western regional perception of international 
contract principles with which the chapter is most concerned, since it is the most
93 Wikipedia, legal dictionary.
94 Ibid.
95 op.cit. supra note 16. pp. 24-25.
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significant determining which of the Western principles has been adopted in the 
harmonised UNCITRAL Model Law.
In this context, it has been emphasised that the Western understanding of sanctity 
rather than flexibility, monism rather than dualism and respected contractual choice 
rather than public law contract principles has dominated the legal thinking in respect 
to international commercial arbitration contracts. Such understanding has been 
introduced to the language of the harmonised Model Law of international commercial 
arbitration.
Sanctity of the contract and an arbitrators’ power to ‘fill the gaps’ are presented as 
example to show how sanctity of the contract principle and respected contractual 
choice of the parties have been introduced to the harmonised international commercial 
arbitration Model Law. These examples will be analysed from the contractual, 
procedural and the state immunity perspectives.
5.4.1 The Contractual Perspective
It has been said that “the contractual perspective relates to the natural weakness of 
complex long-term ‘relational’ contracts. Time factors make these contracts 
vulnerable to the changes of technological, political or economic circumstances or the 
omission of certain contractual provisions. Given the significance of long-term 
contracts, these problems are ‘a fact of life’ and arbitrators as the natural judges of 
international trade and commerce should be able to cope with them. However, their 
resolution requires a balancing of two antagonistic classical principles of contract law. 
The principle pecta sunt servanda stands for the sacrosanct character of the parties’ 
initial agreement. The notion of clausula rebus sic stantibus reflects the idea of 
creating a certain flexibility of the initial party agreement over the duration of the 
contract in order to maintain the initial economic equilibrium. On this contractual 
plane, a decision in favour of or against an arbitrator’s power to fill gaps or revise 
contracts depends on how the ‘eternal dilemma between the ideal of sanctity of 
contracts and the need for commercial flexibility is resolved.”96
5.4.2 The Procedural Perspective
The procedural perspective relates to the traditional view of arbitration as it is 
reflected in Article 7 (1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration and provisions of other domestic arbitration laws. These provisions are
96 See Klaus Peter Berger, 2001. Power of Arbitration to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to Make 
Sense. Arbitration International, vol. 17, No. 1 p.l.
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said to reflect a concept of arbitration that is limited to traditional legal ‘disputes’, 
requiring from the arbitrator a ‘yes or no’ decision with respect to a party’s non­
performance or violation of contractual duties.97 It is argued that this procedural 
notion of arbitration is incompatible with the creative character of decisions required 
in cases of adaptation and gap-filling which involve the evaluation of economic issues 
and rewriting of the parties’ contract.98 From this perspective, gap-filling and contract 
adaptation are not arbitrable, unless the arbitrator is freed from the constraints of 
substantive law and is authorised by the parties to act as ‘amiable compositeur’.99 
During drafting of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the question was discussed whether a 
provision dealing with the problem of contract revision and gap-filling should be 
included. Discussions in the Working Group revealed one decisive classification that 
could and should be made here, a distinction relating to the prior authorisation by the 
parties. The same differentiation has been made in many arbitral proceedings such as 
the AMINOIL arbitration.100
If the parties have authorised the arbitrators to adapt or supplement the contract, in 
these cases, “the principle of pacta sunt servanda does not speak against but in favour 
of the arbitrators’ competence to reshape the contract. They are called upon to 
implement the agreement of the parties on gap-filling or contract adaptation. Such an 
authorisation may be included in the standard arbitration agreement. Thus, in ICC 
Arbitration No. 7544, “the parties had authorised the tribunal to decide on all disputes 
arising out of the contract including changes of the contract itself. By including such a 
clause in the contract, the parties made it clear beyond doubt that they considered the 
fair distribution of mutual profile and gains over the duration of the contract more 
important than legal certainty.”101
97 Ibid., See the statement of the German delegation during the drafting of the model Law in UN Doc. 
A/CN.9/263, para. 15: ‘the activity of the arbitral tribunal is concentrated on the interpretation and 
application of contractual agreements and legal provision’.
98 Ibid., See also supra note 8. Vagts, in International Investments Disputes: Avoidance and Settlement 
(ed. Rubin and Nelson), (1985) at pp. 29, 36 et seq.)
99 Ibid., See also supra note 9. Fouchard, Gaillard, On International Commercial Arbitration (1999) 
No. 37.
100 Kuwait v. The American Independent Oil Company (AMINOIL), ILM 1982, 976, 1015: ‘there can 
be no doubt that ... a tribunal cannot substitute itself for the parties in order to make good a missing 
segment of their contractual relations -  or to modify a contract - unless that right is conferred upon it 
by law, or by express consent of the parties’; see Mann, supra n. 18
101 Baur, in Festschrift Steindorff (1985) at pp. 511- 512. In Klaus Peter Berger, (2001). Power of 
Arbitrators to fill Gaps and Revise Contracts Make Sense. Arbitration International Journal.
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Thus, the primacy of party autonomy in international commercial arbitration may 
have a decisive influence on the determination of an arbitrator’s power to adapt 
contracts or fill gaps.
If no express or implied authorisation can be found in the contract, the arbitrators are 
left with a difficult task. They have to look for legal authority to intervene in the 
parties’ contract without their consent. Such an authorisation can be found in the 
applicable law, i.e. the arbitration law or the law applicable to the substance of the 
dispute. This search for authority is made difficult mainly for two reasons. First, the 
absence of a provision in the contract allowing adaptation or gap-filling necessarily 
emphasises the principle of sanctity of contracts. Second, even if the arbitrators 
conclude that adaptation or gap-filling is just and fair in a given case, the complex 
interaction between procedural law and contract law often stands in the way of such a 
modification or supplementation of the parties’ rights under the contract. Therefore,
sanctity of the contract is the dominant principle of modem international commercial 
contract, in which the arbitration contract is the basic source of the arbitrator’s 
powers.
As Norbert Horn has stated: “No court or arbitrator in the world, at least in 
international business transactions, can render an award that could serve as the legal 
basis for a complex future cooperation against the will of one of the parties.”
Finally, the sanctity principle of international contracts does not mean there is no 
place for adjusting the terms of contract for gap-filling according to the good faith 
doctrine.
In his Report to the Tenth International Congress on Comparative Law as well as in 
his magnus opus on Arbitration in International Trade, Rene David pursued the idea 
of a uniform concept of arbitration comprising traditional dispute settlement as well as 
contract adaptation and gap-filling. In his view, the strict distinction between the two 
kinds of decision-making should be given up as a relic from the nineteenth century: 
“The arbitrators may be given by the parties the task of solving a legal dispute 
or of intervening in the regulation of the contractual relationship. In both 
cases the situation is, in essence, the same... it is artificial and in many 
respects deplorable that a distinction should be drawn between the two 
varieties of arbitration: the one aiming at the settlement of a legal dispute, the
102 Ibid., pp.5-6.
103 Ibid., p. 13.
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other at the regulation of a contractual relationship. In both cases, the same 
technique is resorted to, the same result is aimed at, and the application of the 
same rules is desirable.104
5.4.3 State Immunity Perspective 
A key question in international commercial arbitration is whether sanctity of contract 
applied to state sovereignty in which a government or its instrumentality has 
voluntarily committed itself to arbitration.105
It has been said that governments, when they enter the marketplace, continue to be 
very different from other entities.106 There are reasons for this. In free-market 
countries, government officials and commercial sectors have found an 
accommodation for their various common and cross-purposes in the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity when they are hailed into foreign courts. To be sure, the doctrine
♦ i  r\n
of absolute immunity could sometimes causes grief to private individuals.
The last century witnessed a struggle in courts, legislatures, arbitration tribunals and
diplomatic conferences, to fashion a new legal order that could accommodate, on the
one hand, the claims of governments for an immunity sufficient to permit them to
conduct their activities with a degree of autonomy consistent with their sovereignty
under international law, and, ,on the other, the claims of private participants in the
international economy who insisted that all actors in the international system must
operate under some rule of law because law is an indispensable part of the
environment of productive economic activities. The political and legal struggle
produced a new accommodation, based on a restricted sovereign immunity in foreign
courts: immunity from judicial jurisdiction for public or political acts, but not for
commercial acts. Even public acts could lose their immunity if there were waivers,
1 0 8which could, in some jurisdictions, be expressed by consent to arbitration.
In the landmark Socobelge case, an international commercial arbitration tribunal was 
asked by the Greek Government not to apply a contract which the Greek Government 
had breached, because Greece was involved in a complex and tenuous international 
debt workout, nominally under the aegis of the League of Nations. The arbitral
104 David R. (1985), Arbitration in International Trade. No. 425; see also David, supra n. 2, at 285; 
Sanders, supra n. 12, at p. 142. op.cit 103.
105 W. Michael Reisman, 2002. International Arbitration and Sovereignty. Arbitration International, 
vol. 18, No. 3. LCIA. p.236.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid., p.231.
108 Ibid., p. 232.
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tribunal rejected the claim and issued an award in favour of the private company. 
Years later, when the Permanent Court of International Justice was asked by the 
Greek Government to review and set aside that award on these very political grounds, 
the Court held in favour of the arbitration award. Subsequent tribunals have not 
always had as clear a vision as the Permanent Court but have usually reached the right 
conclusion.109
109 Ibid., p.238.
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CHAPTER SIX
International Arbitration Contract Principles: Analysis of Middle
East Perceptions
6.1 Introduction
Despite the diversity of international contract principles, the previous chapter 
critically examined how the sanctity of the contract is rooted deeply in Western legal 
culture. In the process of harmonising of international contracts, chapter Five showed 
that sanctity of contract is the most dominant contract principle in Modem Arbitration 
Law, and how an understanding of regionalism positively affects and facilitates the 
harmonisation process when it takes regional understanding into consideration.
This chapter will examine contract principles found in the Middle East, how 
international principles of contract are perceived in the region, and whether there are 
any dominant contract principles. As the international community during the decades 
following World War II stmggled to provide a transnational regulatory and 
adjudicatory infrastructure for international commerce so, developing nations, 
including Middle Eastern countries, are today struggling to devise legal institutions 
that
(i) transcend methods of interaction within known communities and facilitate 
economic exchange among strangers,
(ii) accommodate in some culturally neutral way transactions including parties 
from completely different legal systems or traditions,
(iii) operate independently of government, and if possible, with the government’s 
promise not to interfere with the operations and decisions of these institutions,
(iv) require little public investment, but are somehow capable of providing in the 
near term some of the functions of a public legal infrastructure that typically 
take decades to fully mature, and that
(v) despite all these features, somehow leave each nation’s sovereignty intact. 
They are trying to solve this dilemma by turning to the principle institutions 
of autonomy in international contracts: private arbitration and contractual 
choice of applicable law.1
1 Philip J. McConnaughay, 2001. The Scope of Autonomy in International Contracts and Its Relation to 
Economic Regulation and Development. Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law. p.4.
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The first part of the chapter will examine the role of ethics and tradition in 
understanding Middle Eastern contract principles. The second part will examine the 
impact of Islamic Law on commercial contract principles. The third section will 
analyse the regional perception of international contract principles. Finally, the 
chapter will address some contemporary issues of International Contracts in the 
Middle East.
6.2 The Role of Tradition and Ethics in Middle Eastern Commercial Contracts
Like other Asian countries, the Middle Eastern traditional supposition is that the 
written contract is tentative rather than final, unfolding rather than static, a source of 
guidance rather than determinative, and subordinate to other values - such as 
preserving the relationship, avoiding disputes, and reciprocating accommodation - 
that may control far more than the written contract itself and how a commercial 
relationship adjusts to future contingencies.2 In the following part, how the Middle 
Eastern tradition of commercial contracts differs from the West will be examined.
6.2.1 The Role of Tradition in Forming International Contract Principles
6.2.1.1 “Friendly Negotiations” Clause
A core term in many Middle Eastern commercial contracts is the “friendly 
negotiations” or “confer in good faith” clause. It captures the essence of contractual 
obligation in Middle Eastern as well as Asian tradition. Such clauses typically recite 
that, if differences or disputes arise during the course of the contractual relationship, 
the parties will discuss and resolve the matter amicably. The Western view of such 
clauses is that they impose no real obligation at all; at most, they represent a 
mechanism for making unenforceable requests for novation, or perhaps an initial 
formality in a multiple-step dispute resolution process culminating eventually in 
compulsory adjudication intended to enforce precise contractual terms. But these 
views presuppose a Western understanding of the contract itself, which is not shared 
in the Middle East. From a traditional Middle Eastern perspective, a “confer in good 
faith” or “friendly negotiation” clause represents an executory contractual promise no 
less substantive in content than a price, payment, or delivery term. Characterising a 
“confer in good faith” or “friendly negotiation” clause as a “dispute resolution” clause 
tempts a misapprehension of its essential nature, for no “dispute exists if all of the
2 Philip J. McConnaughay, 2001. Rethinking the role of Law and Contracts in East-West Commercial 
Relationships. Virginia Journal of the International Law Association, p.7.
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parties to the contract share such understanding of its evolving and responsive 
(through good faith conference and friendly negotiations) nature.3 
This understanding of the “friendly negotiation” and “confer in good faith” clause, 
however, does not mean that real disputes do not arise in Middle Eastern commercial 
relationships. Just as the written contract defines the parameters of reasonable 
behaviour in a Western commercial relationship, so too does the contract, together 
with the other traditional values to be discussed, define the boundaries of reasonable 
commercial behaviour in Middle Eastern commercial relationships. The non­
performance of obligations, or performance outside of these values, or refusal to 
adjust to reasonable demands due to changing circumstances, or unreasonable 
demands for adjustment, can all give rise to disputes in Middle Eastern commercial 
relationships no less serious and potentially destructive of the mutual enterprise than 
those that arise in the West. Both the process by which the dispute is resolved, and the 
values that inform its resolution, however, once again fundamentally differ in Middle 
Eastern traditions from those that we know in the West. Just as contracts are relational 
in Middle Eastern traditions, so too is commercial justice.4
6.2.1.2 The Importance of Relations 
The second traditional aspect of commercial contracts in the Middle Eastern region is 
relational values. The primacy of relational values in the Middle East has contributed 
traditionally to a significant aversion to seeking outside assistance for the resolution 
of private disputes. Great shame accompanied resort to third-party adjudication, and 
the source of the shame was twofold. First, the pursuit of compulsory adjudication 
involved an unseemly emphasis on private interests in societies where individual 
interests always were subordinate to those of the group; it was as if participating in 
adjudication involved a public display of selfishness. Second, the resort to 
adjudication was humiliating and involved a significant “loss of face,” for it was 
attended by an implicit admission that an opponent lacked respect to “yield” or “give 
way” and settle the dispute privately. Even if the parties to a dispute overcame their 
aversion to outside assistance, relational values still defined both the substantive
3 See also Gidon Gottlieb, supra note 81, at 568 (“[The character] of juridical activities in relational 
societies” includes “the negotiation and renegotiation of juridical instruments accepted [in the West] as 
binding.”); Macneil, supra note 77, at 396 (“The Chinese see the institution of contract, resolution of 
contractual disputes, and contract law as different parts of one integrated whole... . This has not been 
the case in the United States.”). As in supra note 2. pp7. See supra note 92 p.27.
4 See Henderson, supra note 12, at 174 (noting that in Confucian philosophy, “justice [is] relational”), 
op.cit supra note 2. p.7. See supra note 93 p.27.
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justice they sought to achieve, and the dispute resolution techniques and procedures 
used to deliver that particular conception of justice.5
6.2.1.3 Subordination of Written Contract
Consistent with the subordination of written law and contracts in the ordering of 
commercial affairs, and with the commensurate elevation of relational considerations 
such as status, harmony, reciprocal adjustment, and actual circumstances, the 
objective of dispute resolution in the traditional Middle East was not the 
ascertainment of legal rights and allocation of blame and entitlement, as it is in the 
West, it was a peaceful resolution, reconciliation, whatever the result. The merits of 
the outcome were not irrelevant, but in the Middle Eastern tradition had far more to 
do with relative status, actual circumstances, reciprocal adjustment, and maintaining 
the relationship than with the terms of any contract or law antecedent to the dispute. 
One might describe the parallel between Western and Middle Eastern and other Asian 
commercial dispute resolutions as the objective of each to achieve the “expectation 
interests” of the parties, but the comparison would convey falsehood if the completely 
different contents of the expectations were not noted as well. Middle Eastern 
commerce is as dependent as Western commerce on the “predictable” resolution of 
disputes; but “predictability” in the Middle Eastern tradition drives not from “legal 
predictability”, as conceived in the West, but from the fact that there will be a 
conclusion to the dispute, and in most cases, the conclusion will provide a basis on 
which the commercial relationship may continue.6
6.2.1.4 Commercial Justice
This version of commercial justice requires dispute resolution techniques and 
procedures different from those best suited to yield the “legally correct” outcomes 
favoured by the Western legal tradition. Mediation and conciliation, for example, 
traditionally have been strongly preferred over arbitration or other compulsory 
adjudications for the resolution of commercial disputes precisely because they are 
more likely, if successful, to provide a basis on which to continue the commercial
5 See Philip M. Chen, Law and Justice: The Legal System in China 2400 B.C. to 1960 A. D., at 4 
(1973) (“If you are aggrieved, going to court is an admission that the other person does not have 
sufficient respect for you to settle properly outside of court. It is, therefore, an admission of lost face.”); 
Cohen, supra note 87, at 1208 (“A lawsuit caused one to lose “face’since it implied either some falling 
from virtue on one’s own part ... or, what was also embarrassing, the failure to elicit an appropriate 
concession from another as a matter of respect for one’s own “face.”) See infra note 115 for citations to 
scholars whose work suggests that traditional aversions to public litigation may have resulted more 
from structural than cultural factors, op.cit 3. p. 7. See also supra note 96, p. 28.
6 Ibid., p.8.
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relationship. Even judges and arbitrators charged with the adjudication of disputes in 
the Middle East routinely make intermittent efforts to mediate the disputes, meeting 
privately with each party and engaging in ex parte (on behalf of only one party, 
without notice to any other party) communications, and they see no particular 
problem with resuming their adjudicative role - and perhaps even imposing an 
outcome based on information they have learned during mediation -  if their efforts to 
mediate fail. This conduct, of course, is alien to conventional Western notions of 
judicial impartiality, but perfectly consistent with Middle Eastern notions of the 
values and objectives that should govern the resolution of commercial disputes.7 
Relational considerations also make privacy an essential aspect of Middle Eastern 
commercial dispute resolution traditions, at least in a judicial context. Privacy is an 
aspect of international commercial arbitration in the Western tradition as well, but it 
clearly is valued more highly in the Middle East. For example, the privacy of 
commercial arbitration offers a reduction in the humiliation and loss of face 
traditionally associated with seeking outside assistance for the resolution of disputes. 
Privacy also promotes intermittent mediation and conciliation, the preferred 
mechanisms of dispute resolution in Middle Eastern and other Asian countries. And 
whether in the context of mediation and conciliation or arbitral adjudication, private 
proceedings are far more conducive than public proceedings to all sorts of wide- 
ranging and often proprietary discussions that might lead to the preservation of an 
imperilled commercial relationship. Similar considerations also explain the 
importance in Middle Eastern dispute resolution traditions of arbitral discretion not to 
issue written opinions explaining decisions and awards; explanatory attributions of 
blame and blamelessness more appropriately attend “legally correct” outcomes, not
O
relational ones, and the failure of commercial relationships, not their resurrection.
In sum, traditional Middle Eastern beliefs and practices with respect to the role of law 
and contracts in the ordering of the governance of private commercial affairs are 
fundamentally different from those of the Western legal tradition. The primacy of law
7 Ibid., p.8.
8 Philip J. McConnaughay emphasised in his supra note 107, at p.29 that: “He do not intend his 
depiction of this contrast to suggest a preference for Asian over Western outcomes, for without the 
“equalising” effects of law, relational outcomes clearly will tend to preserve, rather than address, any 
social and /or economic inequities that might be present in any given relationship. However, such 
outcome determinative disparities are less likely to occur in the world of cross-border commerce, and 
the deep Asian preference for relational justice and dispute resolution mechanisms exists in that context 
as well.”
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and its moral force in the “deal closing” written contract terms in the West becomes 
seemingly elastic, “relationship beginning” predictions in the East. The procedural 
regularity and judicial impartiality essential to legally correct commercial justice in 
the West become the procedural irregularity and ex parte mediation essential to 
relational commercial justice in the East.9
6.2.2 The Role of Islamic Law in the International Commercial Contract 
Until the second half of the Nineteenth Century, Islamic law applied in nearly all 
Muslim countries with regard to the law of obligations and contracts. Islamic law 
must in this context be understood to comprise the law that is revealed, the teachings 
of the different schools and sects, customary practice, as well as an inevitable measure 
of foreign influence and alterations impelled by performance and passage of time. In 
practice, Islamic law is instanced by old decisions of Cairo Shari ’a courts (Chehata 
1969, 55-56), by official registers and private appearances in places like Riyadh, 
Jeddah, Oman, the Yemen, Damascus and Baghdad, and by the much heralded 
manuscripts of the Cairo Geniza (Goitein 1964, 314-357 and Udovitch 1970, 289- 
303).'°
From the second half of the Nineteenth Century onwards, the Islamic law of contracts 
was affected by Western law, as a result, a composite legal system emerged which 
was not always systematic, and still in the process of adaptation. Until the nineteenth 
century, there is little doubt that Islamic ethics, directives and prohibitions pervaded 
the field of contracts and obligations. However, according to life’s exigencies and 
contact with other cultures, countries in the Middle East have rapidly created a more 
lenient legal system parallel to the theoretical legal structure. The Shari’a is never 
purely idealistic and speculative, but in the mean time, there are no other coherent 
systems of law which can compete with its position in Islamic countries.11 
It also has been mentioned, that since the Nineteenth Century, the Shari’a has lost its 
exclusivity to govern financial transactions in Middle Eastern countries to a 
combination of sacred and secular laws. In countries such as Saudi Arabia, Oman or 
Yemen, where Islamic law remains dominant, a substantial number of mundane 
statutes curtail the Shari’a ’s ascendancy significantly. Conversely, where in other
9 Ibid.
10 Nabil A. Saleh, Financial Transactions and The Islamic Theory of Obligations and Contracts. In 
Chibli Mallat, 1988. Islamic Law and Finance. Graham & Trotman. London, pp.13-14.
11 Ibid., p. 14.
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countries secular laws seem to take precedence, the Shari ’a has not been completely 
supplanted. Government stances can be divided into several categories:
• Those that have transformed their entire internal commercial and mainly,
financial systems to an Islamic form, for example, Sudan
• Those that embrace Islamic Law as a national policy while supporting dual 
commercial tracks (Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar);
• Those that neither support nor oppose Islamic law within their jurisdictions 
(Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq and North African countries); and
• Those that actively discourage a separate Islamic Law presence (Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen and Oman).12
The legal currents which exist side by side, the Shari ’a and secular statutes or their 
combination, have ill-defined and ever shifting spheres of application. Practice, which 
also includes rulers’ unpredictable dictates, adds another uncertainty to the principles 
of international commercial contract by creating or superseding the law as a matter of 
fact. To identify the legal rules governing a given problem is therefore an arduous
i  <3
task. The difficulties are compounded by the actual interpretation and practical 
implementation of the rule as will be discussed in section IV below.
6.2.3 Principles of Islamic Contract Law
6.2.3.1 Non-Binding (Ja’iz) versus Binding (Lazim) Contract Principles
All of the nominate contracts are either Ja ’iz, meaning non-binding or revocable at 
will, or lazim, meaning binding and irrevocable. A contract may be J a ’iz to one or 
both of the parties. If a contract is J a ’iz to a party, that party may terminate the 
contract prospectively at any time, even if the contract declares it irrevocable or fixes 
its duration. Termination does not affect acts already taken under the aegis of the 
contract. Indeed, a J a ’iz contract is so by its very nature (i.e., this trait is an “essential 
term” or muqtada). Examples of the J a ’iz contract are agency and partnership 
contracts. The lazim contract, on the other hand, binds a party both retrospectively and 
prospectively.
The paired concepts of Ja ’iz and lazim afford another way to organise the nominate 
contracts. Contracts that are J a ’iz to both parties include partnership (all forms), 
agency, deposit, loan ( ‘ariya), and reward. Others are J a ’iz for both parties until
12 Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L. Hayes, III, 1998. Islamic Law and Finance, Religion, Risk, and 
Return. Kluwer law International, p. 10.
13 Ibid., p. 15.
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delivery, including gift, loan (qard), and pledge. Still others can be terminated by one 
of the parties, such as pledge by the pledgee (after delivery), or guarantee by the 
obligee. Lazim contracts include sale, lease, compromise, assignment, and 
rescission.14
That so many basic contracts are treated as J a ’iz, and that this trait in a contract 
cannot be amended, shows once again how in Islamic law the parties consent is the 
basic for legitimacy. J a ’iz contracts require more than agreement at the moment of 
contracting; they demand the parties’ continued satisfaction. Otherwise, the scholars 
tell us these contracts will be void, usually for reasons of gharar,15 
What aspects of the above analysis affect modem international arbitration contracts? 
First, generically defined goods are vastly more common in modem commercial 
societies than they were in Medieval times. Outside of real estate and sales between 
private individuals, few items sold are unique. Most goods are to some degree 
standardised and fungible (meaning goods of which any unit is, by nature or usage of 
trade, the equivalent of any other like unit) and are purchased by description, not 
identification. This means that Islamic law’s degree of tolerance for delay, largely 
confined to sales of ‘ayn, may prove inadequate in today’s society.16 
Second, the bilateral execution of the contract is fundamental to the operation of 
modem economics. Through contracts, parties expect to be able to gain security for a 
future performance without paying fully for that performance in advance. Even with 
no advance payment or performance, modem laws build a reciprocally secure 
arrangement; the parties mutually undertake either to perform or to respond in 
damages for all attendant losses. Modem law would see an advance payment 
requirement as unfair in denying the paying party the ability to refuse performance if 
the other party should default. But Islamic law, as summed up in the al-kali ’ maxim
• • 17(forbidding sale of “delay for delay”), systematically opposes this logic.
6.2.3.2 Contract on Future Things
Reference to contract on future things (in which the Islamic law literatures usually 
gives an example of a sales contract as selling fruit before being well grown) is made 
because contracting on the dispute resolutions mechanism in international commercial 
contracts falls within this category.
14 Ibid., See chapter 5 (Islamic Law of Contract.) p. 111.
15 Ibid., p. 112.
16 Ibid., p. 121.
17 Ibid., p. 122.
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In reality not all Muslim scholars have been unappreciative of practical pressures and 
practical needs; thus the teaching of the Maliki author Ibn Rushd, who said that in 
case of necessity (darura) and when the future inception of the subject-matter is 
certain, such as when during one harvest fruits are produced in connected succession, 
a sale contract of the whole harvest would be valid (Ibn Rushd 1981, Vol. 2, 156).18 
Although many other authors have shared Ibn Rushd’s views, Ibn Qayyim al- 
Jawziyya especially addressed the problem. Ibn Qayyim denounced the confusion 
between a non-existent subject-matter and uncertainties which cast doubt on the 
future existence of the subject-matter. What the Shari’a condemns, he concludes, is 
not non-existence but uncertainty (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 1970, vol. 1, 357-361).19 
Contemporary Arab authors and legislators have been only too happy to rely on this 
approach. They have focused their attention on gharar and disregarded the question 
of the thing’s non-existence. And it is most probably in the wake of Ibn Qayyim’s 
precedent that the provisions of article 129.1 are to be found in Iraq’s Civil Code of 
1951. These provisions read in translation: “The subject-matter of an obligation may 
be non-existent at the time of contracting, provided its future existence is possible and 
provided it is determined in a way which dispels want of knowledge (jahl) and risk 
(gharar)’. Qatar followed suit (see Article 33 of the 1971 civil and commercial 
Law).20
Even the more traditionalist Jordan’s Civil Code of 1976 contains provisions to the 
effect that ‘the subject-matter of a contract may be a thing in future provided risk 
(gharar) is averted’ (article. 160.1). In the following Articlel61, risk (gharar) is 
equated to an exorbitant want of knowledge. The Explanatory Memorandum of the 
Jordanian Civil Code (p. 155) tells us that the Hanafi School of law deems as a 
requisite that the subject-matter of a contract be in existence at the time the contract is 
concluded. But it considers that it may not be necessary in contracts such as hire 
(ijara), Salam (a sale with an advance payment for future delivery) and manufacture 
(istisna’).21
Kuwait’s modem legislators share that view. Not only does Article 168 of the 1980 
Civil Code stipulate that ‘the subject-matter of a contract may be a thing in the future 
unless its existence is dependent upon pure chance’, but also the accompanying
18 Ibn Rushd 1981, Bidayat al-mujtahid wa-nihayat al-muqtasid. Dar al-ma’rif, Beirut.
19 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 1970,1’lam al-muwaqqi’in, Dar al-Jeel, Beirut, op. cit supra note 10. p. 20.
20 Ibid.
21
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Explanatory Memorandum (p. 13 8) emphasises that exceptions and qualification to the 
Shari’a principle (i.e. no thing in the future can be the subject-matter of a contract) 
are so numerous that it can be said that the principle does not receive application 
except when material (gharar) cannot be averted.22
Consequently, it can be said that in contemporary Arab codification, averting material 
(gharar) has replaced the Shari’a requisite for the existence of the subject-matter at 
the time the contract is concluded. Material (gharar- uncertainty) and not the absence 
of the subject-matter cause voidance of contracts in the eyes of Arab legislators.
In practical terms, after Ibn Qayyim, Sanhuri and other scholars in the Arab world, 
contracts on future things are deemed valid provided they do not include a material 
element of uncertainty, risk or speculation.23
6.2.3.3 Choice of Special Condition 
Arbitration clauses fall within this definition. Choice of special condition (shurt) is 
restricted under the Shari’a but not under contemporary statutes. As Professor 
Coulson has posed the question of ‘special condition’ (shurt) as follows: ‘[In Islamic 
Law] each nominate contract is strictly, and usually simply, defined in terms of its 
purposes and effect, and the question is how far, if at all, may the parties vary this 
rigid scheme by introducing agreed special terms and appendages to the particular 
contract they are purporting to conclude’ (Coulson 1984, 51).24 
The answer offered by the different schools of law is that a special condition can be 
added to the pre-fixed terms and conditions of a nominated contract only if some 
specific requirements are met. These requirements vary from one school to the other. 
Hanafi teaching as an example, provides that a special condition is readily and validly 
accepted as an appendage to a contract if it is necessary to the contract (min 
muqtadayat al- ‘aqd), for example, the vendor retaining possession of the object of a 
sale until the time he receives payment; or if it is appropriate to the contract (mula’m 
lil- ‘aqd), such as the vendor asking for a pledge to secure payment of a sale price; or 
if the condition is customary to the inhabitants of the place where the contract is 
concluded. 25
The remaining schools have adopted different criteria. The Hanbali School is 
considered the most lenient of those schools with regard to the problem. Under its
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p.23.
25 Ibid.
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teaching the validation of a special condition is the rule unless it falls within one of 
the two following categories:
(a) If it conflicts with the objective or the essence of the transaction, such as when 
the vendor requires that the buyer shall not sell or otherwise dispose of what 
he has acquired.
(b) If the special condition is contrary to a specific prohibition in the Shari ’a, such 
as when the Prophet Muhammad disallowed the presence of two conditions in 
one contract.
The two conditions which are proscribed, according to the Hanbali interpretation, are 
those which bring an advantage to one of the contracting parties without being 
necessitated by or appropriate to the contract itself.26 The classic example of the 
combination of two such conditions in one contract is when the buyer of grain 
requires that the vendor mills it and carries it to him. But when the conditions, 
whether two or more, are necessary or appropriate to the contract itself, such as a sale 
made contingent upon the presentation of a pledge together with another security,
77then the conditions are valid.
The Impact of Choice of Condition on Region Legislation 
Divergences in the Region
Contemporary Civil Codes in the region evidence two contradictory positions. 
Kuwait’s Civil Code, for example, has not adopted any of the fiqh teachings with 
regard to special conditions, which in the circumstances would have been MalikV 
teaching; what has been chosen is not too different from what is expected to be seen 
in any Western-inspired secular statute, namely, that ‘a contract may contain any 
condition agreed by the contracting parties provided it is not prohibited by law, Public 
Policy or good morals’ (Para. 1 of Art. 175).28
By contrast, para.l of article 164 of Jordan’s Civil Code (which is identical to article 
34 of Qatar’s Civil and Commercial Law) sums up Hanafl teaching with respect to 
special conditions. It states in translation: ‘A contract may contain a condition which 
confirms its content or is appropriate to the content or is found in customs and habits’. 
On the other hand, para.2 of the same article, is contrary to Hanafl teaching and reads 
as follows: ‘A contract may also contain a condition which is to the advantage of one
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 24.
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of the contracting parties or to a third party provided it is not prohibited by the 
legislator or is not contrary to Public Policy or morals, otherwise the condition is 
cancelled but the contract remains valid unless the cancelled condition was its 
motivation, in which case the contract is also cancelled.’29 
Investigating the Legality of the Contractual Cause (sabab)
In relation to contracts, cause {sabab) means the motive (ba’ith) which actually 
induces the parties to enter a given contract, but it also means the purpose of 
contracting (gharad). Both meanings relate to the intent of the contracting parties.30 
Broadly speaking, the various Islamic schools of law have approached the matter of 
legality of the cause in two different ways: the first approach relies on the opinion that 
respect due to legal acts leads to taking into account the ostensible intention and 
disregarding the inner or real intention, even if the latter contradicts the former.31 This 
means motives are not given a great value. The second approach is based on the belief 
that motive should be scrutinised in the light of moral and religious principles.
This means that a transaction is to be measured against the degree of purity of the 
contracting parties’ intention.
For the Hanafis and Shaft ’is, the ostensible meaning conveyed by the apparent terms 
of a contract is taken into account when the real inner intention is not easy to detect; 
the real intention, however, prevails when recognisable.
Malikis and Hanbalis take a different stand and give great significance to real motives 
behind the apparent legal act (and indeed all acts) provided they are known to both 
parties.
Consequently, motives for the Malikis and Hanbalis determine the validity or 
invalidity of a contract whether or not they are identified in such a contract. Two 
examples of void contracts (cannot be legally enforced and no longer of any effect) 
under Hanbali fiqh  as a consequences of this illegality are the sale of grapes intended 
to be transformed into wine and the sale of arms intended to stir up trouble.
The basic rule taught by the schools of law that puts emphasis on real motives even 
when unapparent, is that a contract which in itself fulfils all the criteria of validity and 
in all appearances contains no element of illegality, may yet be a nullity on the 
grounds that it is inspired by improper motives. On the other hand, the Hanafi and, to
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p.25.
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a lesser extent, the ShafCi school of law consider that it is not the function of the 
courts to investigate what stands behind apparently genuine transactions or to unveil 
their real inspiration. In addition, the law of contract is being increasingly affected by 
the resurgence of legal moralism based on the dicta of the Qur ’an and the Sunnah. 
That is to say, the real purposes of contracts will be increasingly investigated and 
taken into account especially in the Gulf area where flqh spurns legal stratagems 
(hiyal) and requires disclosure of the real (sabab)?2.
Here again the example of the 1980 Kuwaiti Civil Code and 1976 Jordanian Civil 
Code will help to show how they have dealt with the concept of cause (sabab). It is no 
accident that article 165 para. 1 of Jordan’s Civil Code defines {sabab) as being the 
immediate intended purpose (gharad) of the contract; whereas article 176 para.2 of 
Kuwait’s Civil Code defines (sabab) as being the motive (ba’ith) which induces a 
contracting party to conclude a contract provided that such a motive is known to the 
other contracting party.34
The explanation for this difference is simple: the Hanafl School prevails in Jordan 
whereas the Maliki School holds authority in Kuwait. However, both legal systems 
stress that (sabab) should be in existence as well as lawful (article 176 para. 1, 
Kuwait; article 165, para, 2, Jordan) and both legal systems make room for 
establishing the real cause (sabab) when there is doubt on the veracity of the apparent 
one (article 178, Kuwait; article 166 para. 2, Jordan).
6.2.4 Implications of Islamic Contract Law
6.2.4.1 Absence of Formalism 
The most fundamental difference between Western international contract principles 
and those in the Middle Eastern region is that, in the past, a written contract and a 
contract not committed to writing had exactly the same value with regard to legal 
enforceability. For both forms of contracts it was only the testimony of those who 
witnessed them which established their existence (Tyan 1945, 11 and 72).36 
Because writing was not convenient or possible during the first century of Islam 
(because many Muslims at that time were unable to read and write), contracts were 
often concluded by a witnessed exchange of words and that was deemed sufficient to
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p.26.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 15.
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tie the contracting parties together (‘aqda, the verbal root of ‘aqd - contract or 
transaction - means to tie up, to make a knot).37
For more complex contracts or more orderly contracting parties, when writing was 
resorted to, it had be witnessed as well. Contracts of trivial importance could even be 
concluded by mere conduct (mu ’ataf) with few words exchanged and with no need for
38witnesses.
Other contracts could only be perfected by the subject-matter passing from hands of 
one contracting party to the other such as the loan of a non-fungible article, pledge or 
gift. The point to be emphasised here is that, as a general rule, contracts under Islamic 
law grew without formalism if we accept the requisite for uttering explicit words, in 
the past or present tense,39 which are indicative of the contracting parties’ intentions.40 
Contracting parties might clap or shake hands in order to close the bargain, but these 
were local customs which, technically speaking, had no part in the conclusion of the 
transaction.41
This lack of formalism found in the Shari ’a Contract Law was remarkable compared 
to the existing formalistic laws of neighbouring Byzantian42 and Sassanian43 Empires. 
One likely reason for the Islamic informality in the contracting technique is the 
Qur ’an’s concern to spare the Islamic community from any undue hardship (Qur ’an 
XXII, 78), that concern being a distinctive feature of the teaching of Islam. A better 
guarantee for the respect of contracts and transactions was not deemed ceremonial but
37 Ibid.
38 Mu’atat is when the offer and acceptance are expressed by an act with no need for any formula. For 
example, when a shopper tenders five dirhams to a trader and takes two melons from the stall, and the 
trader takes the money and remains silent. See supra note 4. p. 15. op.cit.10.
39 A promise to contract is not, as a matter of principle, valid by Shari’a standards. Thus the contracting 
parties are urged to make use of the past tense or, less satisfactorily, the present tense, which indicates 
there is no separation in time between their intention to transact and the transaction they pass. See 
supra note 5. p. 16. op.cit 10
40 Expressing the intent means other than words, such as nodding, is not valid except for the mute. 
Contracts by mere conduct were first tolerated with respect to trivial subject-matters only. See supra 
note 6 p.16. op.cit. 10
41 Ibid., p. 16.
42Byzantine Empire is the term conventionally used since the 19th century to describe the Greek­
speaking Roman Empire during the Middle Ages, centred at its capital in Constantinople. In certain 
specific contexts, usually referring to the time before the fall of the Western Roman Empire, it is also 
often referred to as the Eastern Roman Empire. See Wikipedia
43 The Sassanid Empire or Sassanian Empire (in Persian: Sassanian) was the name given to the kings of 
Persia (Iran), during the era of the third Persian Empire, from 224 AD until 651 AD. The dynasty 
ended when the last Sassanid Shah, Yazdegerd III, lost a 14-year struggle to drive out the early 
Caliphate, the first o f the Islamic empires. The empire's terrority encompassed parts of today's Iran, 
Iraq, Armenia, Afghanistan, eastern parts o f Turkey, (during Khosrau II’s rule of Egypt, Jordan, Israel, 
Lebanon), eastern parts of Syria, north west India, Pakistan, Caucasia, Central Asia and Arabia. See 
Wikipedia.
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observation of the divine injunction ‘O ye who believe fulfil [your] contracts’ (Qur’an
v,i).44
Nowadays, written evidence is deemed essential with respect to a growing number of 
transactions and contracts, often as a requirement and a response to international trade 
and investments and not necessarily as the expressed wish of the contracting parties. 
Accordingly, international contracts are requested to be in writing and must be 
properly registered; otherwise they have no value. Thus, the advantage that the 
Shari’a offered to Muslims in their dealings has faded away. But, equally, the 
disadvantages that accompanied a strict interpretation and implementation of the 
Shari ’a law or contract have also considerably diminished as the constraining factors 
have lost ground.45
6.2.4.2 Freedom of Contract 
The second most important implication of Islamic contract principles for the 
harmonisation process of international commercial arbitration contracts is the freedom 
of contract concept.
Despite the general obligation to uphold contracts, not all contractual arrangements 
are condoned by the texts. The Hadiths raise a number of specific obstacles to 
freedom of contract. The most important hadith involves a transaction of the 
Prophet’s Muhammad wife ‘Aisha, who desired to buy and then free a certain slave, 
Barira.46 This hadith has highly troubling implications for freedom of contract. It 
suggests that the very terms of contracts, not to mention contracts themselves, must be 
prescribed by God’s writ. Unless a term is positively allowed by revelation (“in the 
Book of God”), it is nugatory (of no real value), the parties’ agreement
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 It is related that 'A'isha said, "Barira came and said, 'I have a freedom-contract with my owners for 
nine awqiyas, with one awqiya every year. Help me.' 'A'isha said, 'If your people like, I will give it to 
them all at once and then I will set you free, but your wala' will be with me ' a Barira went to her 
owners and they refused to let her do that. She said, 'I offered that to them and they refused until they 
kept the wala'.' The Prophet Muhammad heard about that and asked me about it and I told him. He 
said, "Take her and set her free and give them the condition of the wala'. The wala' is with the one who 
sets free.'" 'A'isha said, "The Prophet Muhammad stood up among the people and praised and glorified 
Allah. Then he said, 'Following on from that: why is it that some men among you make conditions 
which are not in the Book of Allah? Any condition which is not in the Book of Allah is invalid even if 
it is stipulated a hundred times. The decision of Allah is truer and firmer. What is wrong with some 
men among you who say, 'Set free, so-and-so, and I will have the wala'. The wala' is for the one who 
sets free."' Chapter 53. Chapter on the Mukatab Sahih Collection of Al-Bukhari.
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notwithstanding. Contractual terms are treated here as if they were part of 
fundamental morality, conclusively and exclusively fixed by revelation, like the 
Qur'an’s prescriptions as to the types and degrees of relationship within which 
persons may marry.47
Moreover, as with all legal systems prior to the nineteenth century, “Islamic contract 
law is expressed not as a general theory but as rules for various specific contracts - 
laws of sale, lease, pledge, and so forth.”48 The closest thing to a general law of 
contract is the contract of sale (bay ’), used by Muslim jurists as a prototype and 
analogy for all other contracts.49
From the perspective of modem contract law which honours virtually any genuine 
commercial contract having lawful purpose, this characteristic of Islamic contract law 
instantly raises questions. May one create new contracts? How exclusive and binding 
are the rules of the standard contracts? May one add to or vary from the terms 
prescribed by the Shari’a? In other words, to what extent does Islamic law admit 
freedom of contract?
The Qur’an emphasises fulfilling one’s pacts or undertakings. The Sunnah is more 
resistant to free contracting imposing narrow limits on “stipulations,” i.e. terms of 
contracts other than those dictated by flqh. Recall particularly the “Barrira” hadith 
which condemned any term “not in the Book of God”. What position does classical 
law take on the issue of freedom of contract?50 
New Contracts
In general, classical fiqh  rarely discuses the idea of contractual freedom outside the 
standard contract types. The most relevant controversy is whether, in the absence of a 
specifically applicable revealed divine ruling, contracts and stipulations are presumed 
to be lawful or unlawful. Ihn Taymiyya takes a strong position:
“The underlying principle in contracts and stipulations is permissibility 
(ibaha) and validity. Any [contract or stipulation] is prohibited and void only 
if there is an explicit text [from the Qur ’an, the Sunnah or the consensus or a
47 op.cit. 12. pp.67-68.
48 See Mohammad Daud Bakar. Contracts in Islamic Commercial Law And Their Application in 
Modem Islamic Financial Systems. Iqtisad A1 Islamy, Islamic Economics, p.36.
49 op.cit. 12. See Islamic Law of Contract, p.97.
50 Ibid., p.98.
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qiyas [analogy] (for those who accept qiyas) proving its prohibition and 
voiding.”51
At the other extreme from Ibn Taymiyya is the now-extinct “Literalist” or Zahiri 
school. This school argues that contracts, as private lawmaking, seek to alter the 
divine legal status of things, which can be done only with affirmative divine 
authority. The other Sunni Schools reject this narrow view, yet, as Ibn Taymiyya 
asserts, their position is not that different since, although they profess the principle of 
permissibility (ibaha) as he does, in practice they confine themselves to elaborating 
contract rules by analogy to revealed precedents.52 
Stipulations
In classical law, “debates concerning freedom of contract did not concern new 
contracts, but rather when standard contracts could be altered or combined. 
Stipulations were divided into three types: 1) condition (ta ’liq, literally “suspending”) 
- the conditioning of a contract on a future event; 2) extension (idafa) - delaying the 
beginning of the contract until a future time; and 3) concomitance (iqtiran) - varying 
the terms of the contract. In all cases, if the law finds the stipulation void, the contract 
may or may not be void also: the results vary casuistically.”53
6.3 Regional Perceptions of International Contract Principles 
Previous chapters showed how the principle of sanctity of contract was the most 
dominant contract principle in Western legal culture and how such legal thinking has 
been reflected in Modern Commercial Arbitration Law. This part of the chapter will 
critically examine Middle East regional perceptions of international contract 
principles. It will argue that such perceptions reflect regional legal thinking which has 
been influenced by a mixed understanding of regional traditions, Islamic contract law 
principles as well as Western contract principles when these principles match regional 
legal culture. Overall, it will argue that still under such mixed understanding, there are 
strong regional legal traditions and these are found in Islamic contract principles and 
affects commercial contract experiences. In general, a significant difference still exists 
between Modem international contract principles and those in the Middle East. In the 
following pages, such differences will be examined.
51 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatawa, 3:474. See also idem, Qawa’id, 112; idem, Nazariyyat, 226; etc. See supra 
note 3. p.98. op.cit. 12.
52 Ibn Taymiyya, al-Fatawa, 4:47 off.
53 Ibid., p. 100.
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6.3.1 Flexibility over Sanctity of International Contract Principle
As has been discussed in the previously, unlike in the West, in legal traditions as well 
as in Islamic contract principles, contracts do not have stability or sanctity 
characteristics. There has been no formality in contract theory either in tradition or in 
Islamic contract law. Referring to legal arguments used to deny the theory of contract 
stability and sanctity, the theory o f administrative contract has been one of several 
used. Thus, the adoption of administrative contract theory in most Middle East 
countries became justifiable.
The concept of droit administratif was adopted by many Middle East countries , 
whether they were under the influence of the French legal system such as Morocco, 
Tunisia, Lebanon and Algeria, or were never French colonies. In particular, Arab- 
Islamic legal traditions facilitated the reception of French public law characterisation 
in all of the 22 member countries of the Arab League, as well as non-Arab Islamic 
countries in both Asia and Africa. When many Arab Islamic countries gained 
independence after the Second World War, the Egyptian model, which was based on 
French traditions, was introduced and formally adopted by many Arab states such as 
Syria, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, as well as Iraq and Sudan.54 The 
question thus arises as to whether administrative law applies to international 
contracts?
Despite the fact that many have argued that administrative contract law does not apply 
to international contracts, this perception has been emphasised more frequently in 
Middle Eastern commercial arbitration cases.
It has been argued that Arab countries which adopted the French model recognise two 
categories of contracts. First, the categories of private contracts exclusively subject to 
the rules contained in the civil and commercial codes, and second, the category of 
public contracts, which are called administrative contracts, and which are, to a certain 
extent, governed by a special set of public law rules (administrative law). Only
54 Mansour Al-Saeed, 2002. Legal Protection of Economic Development Agreement. Arab Law 
Quarterly. Kluwer Law International, p. 155. See also his supra note 22. (... See Cattan Henry, The 
Law of Oil Concessions in The Middle East and North Africa, New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 
1967, p. 75; El-Kosheri A and Raid T, “The Law Governing a New Generation of Petroleum 
agreements: Changes in Arbitration Process”, 1 ICSID Review-Fore/gn Investment Law Journal, 1986,
p. 26.
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particular types of contracts which are concluded by the state or public authorities are 
regarded as administrative contracts.55
An answer to the question whether administrative law applies to international 
contracts will depend upon the nature of the contract itself. Contrats administratifs 
have been defined as:
“... Contracts which the administration [the government or its 
representative], concluded with private persons, corporations, or other 
departments to regulate and facilitate public utility, and which include 
provisions unparalleled in private law contracts. Where administrative 
contracts are concerned, the governmental has exclusive power to place 
restrictions on these contracts which the other party to the contract has to 
observe. Any disputes arising from such contracts have to be resolved 
within the legal system according to the administrative law.”56
Oil industrial contracts have considerable weight among other international contracts; 
thus how such contracts have been treated is very important for highlighting regional 
perceptions. According to Cattan: “an oil concession in the Middle East has always 
been treated as a contract between the State and the concessionaire which is governed 
by ordinary rules of contract”.57 It has been noted that some contracts administratifs 
provide provisions which regulate a multiplicity of legal relationships: e.g. the State, 
the contractor, and the users. The concessionaire assumes the duty to perform on 
behalf of the state or public authority a service for the public. Such service may, for 
example, be the supply of gas, water, electricity or transportation. In contrast, no such 
relationships arise in the case of an oil concession which is restricted to the 
contracting parties and does not undertake the performance or management of a 
public service.58
Also, it has been previously asserted by the French Consiel Etat that a mining 
concession is not a public service concession. For example, in its opinion of 19 
December 1907, it said:
55 Ibid., See also Al-Tammawi Soliman, General Basis of Administrative contracts: A Comparative 
Study, (5th edn), Dar Al-Fiker Al-Arabi, 1991, p. 53.
56 Al-Fayad Abraham, Administrative contract: The Public Theory and its application in Kuwait and 
Comparative Law, Kuwait: Al-Fallah Press, 1981, p. 9; Al-Tammawi Soliman, op.cit., p.59).op.cit. 
51.p.l56.
57 M A1 Saeed, (2002). Legal Protection of Economic Development Agreements. Arab Law Quarterly 
vol. 12 No. 2. Brill Academic Publisher, p. 163.
58 Ibid.
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“if the term concession is used in administrative law to designate numerous 
acts of a different nature, the identity in designation involves no necessary 
assimilation whatsoever between these various acts; in particular, no 
analogy can be established between the concession of public works by 
which an authority entrusts to a private corporation the management of a 
public service under conditions determined specially in each case and for a 
limited duration, and the concession of mines by which the public authority 
institutes a perpetual ownership under the regime fixed by the law of 21 
April 1810-27 July 1880.”59
In the Aramco case, the public service concession was distinguished from the oil 
concession in arbitration between the Arabian American Oil company (Aramco) and 
the Government of Saudi Arabia when the Government of Saudi Arabia argued for 
the application of droit administratif to the concession agreement. The Arbitration 
Tribunal ruled:
“Aramco’s concession could not be viewed as a public services concession, 
because it does not involve any users, nor any dues to be paid by the 
public, which does not have recourse to the concessionaire’s service. To 
turn a concession into a public service, it is not enough that the exploitation 
of some national resources is of extreme importance to the economy of the 
conceding State, or even that the State’s financial stability is dependent on 
such exploitation. The company has no duty to manage continuous and 
permanent services to the benefit of third parties (users). Its prosperity and 
its solvency depend on economic and political circumstances. This 
situation explains why no cahier des charges ’, containing the law of the 
service, has been annexed to the concession contract. The status governing 
the company does not involve, therefore, any “act-condition” in the sense 
of French law; the State cannot intervene in order to modify the clauses of
i t  • ) ) 6 0the concession.
The Tribunal also observed that:
“Mining and oil concessions are not public services concessions because 
they do not include any provision in favour of users. To use the words of 
Planiol: “The mine is not destined to public use and is exploited by the 
concessionaire in his own private interest”. The concessionaire enjoys a
59 Cattan Henry, p. 81. op.cit. 51 p. 157.
60 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Oil Company (Aramco), 27 International Law Report, p. 215. op.cit. 51 .p. 
158.
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nearly total freedom and is neither bound by clauses concerning maximum 
tariffs for sales nor by prohibitions of preferential tariffs which are the 
usual features of the cahiers des charges in public services concessions.
Mining concessions are not public works concessions either, because the 
mineral deposits become the property of the concessionaire who, at the end 
of his concession, will have to return them to the state with their 
exploitable substance and sometimes even exhausted.61
Finally, it should be said that the term “contract administratif’ is usually restricted to 
three classical types of contracts, i.e. concessions of public utilities, public works and 
public procurements, and case-law established by the French Conseil d ’Etat. Thus, 
international contracts concluded by a public authority, which are of prime 
importance, particularly in the modem world, are not classified within the enumerated 
categories of a contract administratif.62
Although it has been noted that an international contract does not constitute a contract 
administratif and thus cannot be subject to the application of administrative law, such 
arguments do not prevent the parties in the region which possess the concept of 
administrative law to subject their contracts to droit administratif 
According to droit administratif Middle Eastern states are required to compensate the 
contractor for both direct losses and lost profits, should the government unilaterally 
terminate the contract. Thus, the financial equilibrium of the contract is preserved 
upon payment of full compensation of any loss suffered as a direct consequence of 
government action64 taken upon justification of regional perception of the principle of 
flexibility of contract.
6.3.2 Public over Private International Contract Principles 
The public law character can be seen basically in the increasing role of government 
interference in economic life: e.g. unilateral drafting in advance of the conditions of a 
transaction by public authorities, the legislative approval of which is ordinarily 
prescribed for the grant of an oil concession, and state-owned resources whose 
alienation is regulated by statute.
61 Ibid., p. 161.
62 Ibid., p. 158.
63 Ibid., p. 159.
64 Curtis Christopher, p. 335. op.cit. 51. p. 159.
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Modem Arab writers are agreed on emphasising the predominant public character of 
the oil contract. As El wan noted:
“Do not forget that a country does not exist in oil contracts as a private law person, 
but in the capacity of a sovereign. Thus, the private characterisation of these contracts 
is reduced, at the same time their public characterisation is doubled, especially under 
the growing interference of the government. Although the parties to the contract 
freely negotiate in order to conclude agreements, the situation is changing at present, 
because of the increasing organising power of the government side. As a result of 
establishing investment legislations in these countries, the freedom of the parties has 
become restricted re this legislation. Even for the countries that do not adopt 
investment legislation and do not possess oil legislation, there are many legal 
restrictions on the freedom of contractual parties. This means that despite the existing 
relationship between the host country and the foreign contractor, the contract contents 
are not determined in free negotiation of the parties.”65
The public law character has received a constitutional basis in the various Arab 
countries which include in their constitutions a provision emphasising that natural 
resources are the property of the state whose task it is to ensure the proper 
exploitation thereof in the best interests of the national economy.
For example, in the case of Kuwait, Article 21 of the Kuwaiti Constitution provides 
that: “Natural resources and all revenues are the property of the state. It shall ensure 
their preservation and proper exploitation, due regard being given to the requirements 
of state security and the national economy”.66
6.3.3 Dualism Preferred over Monism International Contract Principles 
In international contracts it is important that the contracting parties choose a dispute 
settlement mechanism, (mainly international arbitration) whether institutionalised or 
ad hoc, without expressing the applicable law governing their contractual relationship. 
This issue is considered controversial in the area of international law. Different laws 
and principles have been suggested as being applicable to contracts between states 
and foreign investors. However, there is no general consensus. Some proclaim the 
application of the lex contractus, while others restrict the application of the law of the
65 Elwan Mohammed, p. 310; Rabah Khasan, op.cit., p. 188; Mughraby Muhamad, Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Oil Resources: A Study o f Middle Eastern Oil Concessions and Legal Changes, 
Lebanon: Catholic Press, 1966. op.cit. 51 p. 161.
66 op.cit. 51. p.161.
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contracting state or transnational law or general principle of law or international 
law.67
In other words, the arbitrator is not under any obligation to follow a national private 
international law system, whether one pertaining to the state in which the arbitration 
takes place, or of any other national system. This section will argue that Middle East 
countries adopt the Dualism principle over the Monism Principle, drawing upon the 
analysis of differences between these two approaches in chapter five.
6.3.3.1 The Application of the General Principles of Law 
The idea that economic development agreements can be governed by general 
principles of law was presented by Lord McNair (1961)68. He argued that “the system 
of law applied to these agreements cannot be public international law stricto sensu, 
because these agreements are not inter-state agreements and do not deal with inter­
state relations. He suggested that the legal system of law most likely suitable for the 
regulation of these agreements and the adjudication of disputes arising out of them is 
“the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations”.69 
A number of international contracts include provisions which stipulate the application 
of one of the general principles, such as “good will” and “good faith”, or the 
application of the principles of law common to the contracting parties and, in the 
absence of such common principles, then by and in accordance with the principles of 
law recognised by civilised nations in general.
A good illustration of this trend can be seen in Article 35(1) of the concession 
between the Government of Kuwait and the Kuwait Shell Petroleum Development 
Company Ltd of 1961 which states:
“The parties base their relation with regard to these agreements on the principle of 
goodwill and good faith. Taking account of their different nationalities this agreement 
shall be given effect and must be interrelated and applied in conformity with the 
principles of law common of Kuwait and England and, in the absence of such 
common principles, then in conformity with the principles of law normally recognised
67 Ibid., p. 163.
68 See Lord McNair, (1961). The Law of Treaties. Oxford University Press. Quoted by Khbar Rasulov, 
(2003). Revisiting State Succession to Humanitarian Treaties: Is There a Case for Automaticity. The 
European Journal o f International Law. vol. 14, No. l.p . 164.
69 Ibid.
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by civilised states in general, including those which have been applied by 
international tribunals.”70
Similarly, Article 39 of the Agreement concluded between the Sheik of Kuwait and 
the Arabian Oil Company of Japan of 1958 first refers to the “principles of goodwill 
and good faith”. Then it provides for the application of the “principles of law common 
to Kuwait and Japan and, in the absence of such common principles, then in 
conformity with the principles of law normally recognised by civilised states in 
general, including those which have been applied by international tribunals.71 
The general principle of law has been confirmed by international arbitration cases. 
Most of these cases deal with oil concessions. In the arbitration between the Arabian 
American Oil Company (Aramco) and the Government of Saudi Arabia, the 
Arbitration Tribunal held that:
“Matters pertaining to private law are, in principle, governed by the law of 
Saudi Arabia, but with one important reservation. That law must, in case of 
need, be interpreted or supplemented by the general principles of law, by 
the custom and practice in the oil business and by notions of pure
jurisprudence, in particular whenever certain private rights -  which must
inevitably be recognised to the concessionaire if the concession is not to be 
deprived of its substance - would not be secured in an unquestionable 
manner by the law in force in Saudi Arabia.”72
“In the arbitration between the ruler of Qatar and the International Marine Oil 
Company Ltd (1953), the arbitrator found that the parties intended the agreement to 
be governed by the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. In the Abu 
Dhabi case (1951), the arbitrator, Lord Asquith of Bishopstone, held that he had to 
resort to the general principles of law, as a form of the modem law of nature.”73 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that it is not for international legislations in different 
countries to agree on an applicable ruling in one specific matter. Thus, some jurists
hold the view that these principles are just general suggestions which consider the
70 See M. Saeed, (2002). Legal Protection of Economic Development Agreements. Arab Law 
Quarterly, vol. 17, No. 2. p. 159.
71 Ibid., p.l65.Basic Oil Concession Contracts (Middle East), Supplement No. 1.
72 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). Quoted by M. Saeed, (2002). Legal 
Protection of Economic Development Agreements. Arab Law Quarterly, vol. 17, No. 2. pp. 150-176.
73Ibid., p. 166. See International Marine Oil Company v. Ruler of Qatar, 20 International Law Report, 
1953.
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basis of different legal systems. If so, it will be difficult for the contracting parties to 
predict clearly their rights and duties if their agreement is subject to such principles.74
6.3.3.2 Denial of the Application of International Law 
Chapter Five critically examined how it had been suggested by Mann that contracts 
between states and aliens can be governed by international law if that law is chosen 
by the parties to be the proper law of the contract. He observed:
“it is possible, however, for contracts between parties, only one of whom is an 
international person, to be subject to public international law ... 9a) According to the 
theory referred to, a contract could be “internationalised” in the sense that it would be 
subject to public international law stricto sensu, therefore, its existence and fate would 
be immune from any encroachment by a system of municipal law in exactly that same 
manner as in the case of a treaty between two international persons; but that, on the 
other hand, it would be caught by such rules of jus cogens as are embodied in public
nr
international law.”
In the arbitration between Aramco and the Government of Saudi Arabia, the 
Arbitration Tribunal rejected the contention that an oil concession should be 
“assimilated to an international treaty governed by the Law of Nations” and held that 
as the agreement had not been concluded between two States, but between a State and
nr
a private American corporation, it was not governed by public international law.
For these reasons, a number of developing countries, including many in the Middle 
East, stipulate in their internal legislations and international contracts the application 
of their own municipal law to these agreements. This view was adopted by the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Resolution XVI.90,77 
regarding the declaratory statement of petroleum policy in member countries.
The Resolution recommended to member countries that “all disputes arising between 
the Government and operators shall fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the 
competent national courts or the specialised regional courts, as and when 
established”78
74Ibid.
75 Mann F A, “The Proper Law of Contracts concluded by International Persons”, op.cit., p. 43; and the 
same author, “The Law Governing State Contracts”, 21 The British Yearbook of International Law, 
1944, p. 20. op.cit. 51 p. 167.
76 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), op.cit., p. 165. op.cit. 51. p. 169.
77 OPEC Resolution XVI. 90 of the Sixteenth Conference held in Vienna from 24 Th. To 25 Th. June 
1968. See Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts (Middle East), Supplement No. XXXI, p. c-1. 
op.cit. 51 p. 169.
78 op. cit. p. 169.
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Hence, the local law of these contracting states is applied to disputes arising from 
these contracts. The Libyan Petroleum Law of 1995 as amended in 1965 provides that 
the contract “shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with, the principles 
of law in Libya which are consistent with principles of international law ...”.79 Thus, 
the Libyan legislation does not adopt the notion of internationalisation of the state’s 
contracts; however, it adopts the notion of subordination of the local law to 
international law. In other words, the Libyan law applies in all cases unless it differs 
from international law.
In the dispute between Petroleum Development Ltd and Abu Dhabi (1951), Lord 
Asquith decided that: “This is a contract made in Abu Dhabi and wholly to be 
performed in that country. If any municipal system of law were applicable, it would 
prima facie be that of Abu Dhabi.”80
Sir Alfred Bucknill, the arbitrator in the arbitration case between the Ruler o f Qatar 
and the International Marine Oil Company Ltd o f (1953) decided that:
“If one considers the subject matter of the contract, it is oil to be taken out of the 
ground within the jurisdiction of the ruler. That fact, together with the fact that the 
ruler is a party to the contract and had, in effect, the right to nominate Qatar as the 
place where any arbitration arising out of the contract should sit, and the fact that the 
agreement was written in Arabic as well as English, points to Islamic law, that being 
the law administered at Qatar, as the appropriate law.”81
This award was confirmed by the Aramco case in which the Arbitration Tribunal 
found; “the concession of 4 Safar 1352, corresponding to 29 May 1933, derives 
therefore its judicial force from the legal system of Saudi Arabia, the Shari ’a, the 
divine Law of Islam, supplemented by royal Decree No. 1135, of Rabie al Awal 1352, 
corresponding to 17 July 1933.”82
The Tribunal also found that: “matters of private law are, in principle, governed by 
the law of Saudi Arabia but with one important reservation. That law must, in case of 
need, be interpreted or supplemented by the general principles of law, by the custom 
and practice in the oil business and by notions of pure jurisprudence, in particular 
whenever certain private rights - which must investable by deprived of its substance -
79 Ibid., See also “Kronfol Zouhair, op. cit., p. 76”.
80 See Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, op.cit. p. 534. op.cit. 51p.l70.
81 See K.M. AL-Jumah, (2002). Arab State Contract Dispute: Lesson from the Past. Arab Law 
Quarterly, vol. 17. No.3 See also International Oil Company v. Ruler of Qatar.
82 Ibid., See also Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company, op. cit., p. 167.
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would not be secured in an unquestionable manner by the law in force in Saudi 
Arabia.”83
The application of municipal law has been adopted by a number of Middle Eastern 
governments contracts concluded with foreign investors. The choice of law clause 
was prescribed in the mining contract between the Democratic Republic o f  the Sudan 
and the Japanese Group of 1976, which explicitly states in Article 12: “This 
Agreement shall be governed by and constructed in all respects in accordance with the 
law of the Sudan. Sudanese courts shall have jurisdiction to determine any matter 
arising from the Agreement.”84
National legislation of some host countries also provides such provisions. For 
example, Article 3 of the Saudi Arabian Council of Ministers’ Resolution No. 58, 
dated 25 June 1963, provides that:
“The law applicable to disputes to which the state is a party shall be determined in 
accordance with the established general principles of private international law, the 
most important of which is the principle of the application of the law pertaining to the 
place of execution. Government agencies may not choose any foreign law to govern 
their relationship with such individuals, companies, or private organisations.”85 
In Kuwait, there is a systematic policy which, recently, has been adopted by the 
government, that in all contracts between foreign investors and government ministries 
or institutions, Kuwaiti law shall be the law of the contract.
A number of writers argue against application of the municipal law of the contracting 
host state in the contract in question. Most of their arguments are based on what has 
been stated in previous arbitration awards. For example, in the Aramco case, the 
Tribunal stated: “The regime of mining concessions, and consequently, also of oil 
concessions, has remained embryonic in Muslim law and is not the same in the 
different schools ... Hanbali law contains no precise rule about mining concessions
o r
and is silent a fortiori about oil concessions”.
In the Abu Dhabi case, Lord Asquith asserted: “But no such Law can reasonably be 
said to exist. The Sheikh administers a purely discretionary justice with the assistance
83 See Paul Streeten, (1994). Economic Progress and Prospects in the Third World: Lessons of 
Development Experience Since 1945. Journal o f Economic Literature. Vol. XXXII. p. 1938.
84 El-Sheikh Fathi El-Rahman, op. cit., p. 241. Also, see Article 21, 22 of the contract between 
Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (a national Argentinian oil company) and Pan American International 
Oil Company of 1957. See 3 International Law report, 1964, p. 359. p. 171.
85 See International Law Report, 1964, p. 45.
86 See Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Oil company (Aramco), op.cit., p. 163. op. cit. 51. p. 172.
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of the Qur’an; and it would be fanciful to suggest that in this very primitive region 
there is any settled body of legal principles applicable to the construction of modem 
commercial instruments...”87.
In the Qatar case, Sir Alfred Bucknill declared: “ ... I have no reason to suppose that 
Islamic Law is not administered there strictly, but I am satisfied that the law (sic) does 
not contain any principles which would be sufficient to interpret these particular
oo
contracts”. This argument has been invalidated in recent times since most of the 
developing countries, including Middle East countries, have developed advanced 
legal systems obtained from Western laws, which is no justification for not applying 
the national laws of these countries in these contracts.89
From the above discussion, it seems there are two clear regional perceptions of 
international contract principles, the first, the application of the municipal law of the 
contracting state, and the second, the flexibility of the international contract affording 
the right to modify the contract. Therefore, in practice, regional legal culture in 
respect of international contracts is always there and plays a significant role in any 
harmonisation process.
6.3.4 Contemporary Issues in the Adjudication of International Contracts 
in the Middle East
Previous sections of this chapter have focused upon the impact of regionalism in 
relation to Middle East perceptions of International Contract Principles; this section 
will focus on a very prominent aspect of international commercial contract principles, 
that is, the nature of the contract between the arbitral parties and arbitrators. What is 
vitally important to analyse here is the precise difference between Modem 
international contract law and the Middle East with regard to the arbitrator’s legal 
status according to international arbitration contracts.
Arbitrators are free to create their own express contract with the parties setting out 
their rights, responsibilities, and liabilities regarding the arbitration. Unfortunately, as 
arbitrators do not regularly enter into a separate contract with the parties for the 
provision of arbitral services, a different method is necessary to determine the terms 
and conditions of the receptum arbitri (This term is used in Roman law to express the
87 See Petroleum Development Ltd v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, op.cit., p. 534.
88 See International Marine Oil Company Ltd v. Ruler of Qatar, op.cit., p.534. op.cit. 51 p. 172.
89 Ibid., p. 173.
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agreement to submit to arbitration and to have an informal assumption of a guarantee 
for a specific effect or specific result).90
Immunity versus Liability 
Before discussing the immunity and liability of arbitrators under these two different 
legal cultures and the impact of regionalism in respect of this issue, it is worth 
discussing arbitrators’ relationship to the arbitration contract. In general, arbitrators 
must accept their appointment in writing, but it is unclear whether this “acceptance” 
creates a distinct contract between the parties and the arbitrators.
Under modem law, as well as in Middle East countries, arbitrators are part of the 
arbitration agreement with differences. In Norjarl v. Hyundai (1990), for example, the 
court explained that the “arbitration agreement is a bilateral contract between the 
parties to the main contract. On appointment, the arbitrator becomes a third party to 
the arbitration agreement which becomes a trilateral contract.”91 Another English 
court pointed out that arbitrators become parties to the arbitration agreement by 
accepting appointments under it.92
This perspective is also accepted in some Arab Middle Eastern countries. For 
example, in Lebanon and Yemen, an arbitrator becomes a party to the agreement to 
arbitrate and has a contractual relationship with the parties that may result in 
contractual liability. In these countries, arbitrators may also be bound by the terms of 
the parties’ arbitration agreement particularly because of the influence of the civil 
law tradition and Islamic law,94 it is likely that such liability can be based upon the 
contract. However, because of religious tradition it is also necessary to consider 
Islamic Law sources, mostly the Qur’an and Shar’ia to determine liability. As has 
been discussed in this chapter, the Qur’an emphasises ‘fulfilling one’s obligation’ as
90 See Susan D. Franck, 2000. The Liability of International Arbitrators: A Comparative analysis and 
Proposal for Qualified Immunity. New York Law Journal o f International & Comparative Law. p. 2-3.
91 Norjarl v. Hyundai, [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. at 536.
92 Susan D. Franck, p. 3.
93 Traditional Shari’a scholars suggest that an arbitrator should expressly accept his appointment. But 
modem jurists tend to assert that the agreement of the parties alone to execute an arbitration agreement 
is not sufficient, and instead, the consent of the arbitrator must be obtained. The Shari’a does not 
specifically indicate, however, whether this arbitration agreement must be in writing. See Saleh, supra 
note 22, at 39-40. op.cit. 84. supra note 47. p.27.
94 Various Islamic codes have imported the Western concept of an irrevocable mandate and can prevent 
an arbitrator from being removed, except through established court procedures. In contrast, under 
tradition established in the Shari’a, the parties’ appointment of an arbitrator is revocable at any time 
prior to the delivery of the award. See Saleh, supra note 22, at 24, 39-44. op.cit. 84. supra note 48. p. 
27.
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the fundamental principle that governs contracts95 and which can create a basis for 
arbitrator liability.96 At the same time, “service contracts [are] of a dubious nature, 
[and] are also outlawed on the basis of illegal Mahall [subject matter] and (sabab)
• • 07[motivating cause].” Ultimately, however, it is necessary to consult the Qur’an, the 
Shari ’a, and the Code of the relevant country before making a final determination.98 
Express Immunity of the Arbitrator
When originally proposed, the UNCITRAL Model Law did not contain an express 
provision making arbitrators liable or immune from their acts or omissions. The 
Model Law’s legislative history indicates that the issue of arbitrator liability was 
specifically ignored because “the liability problem is not widely regulated and 
remains highly controversial.”99 However, some countries addressed this issue when 
adopting the Law.
The United Kingdom’s Arbitration Act 1996 provides arbitrators with a statutory 
basis for immunity in tort, contract, or otherwise.100 Section 29 provides an arbitrator 
with general immunity for anything done or omitted in the discharge or purported 
discharge of his functions as arbitrator. There are only two specific situations 
justifying liability: (1) if an arbitral act or omission is done “in bad faith,”101 and (2) if
95 See Rayner, supra note 46, at 87. The Qur’an also states that, “O ye who believe, respect your 
contractual undertakings” and “He authorised what he did not forbid.” Peter Sanders, General 
Introduction on Arbitration in Arab Countries, in International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration 6 
(1998).
96 Under the Qur’an, arbitrators are required to judge according to the provisions of the Qur’an and 
arbitrate with observance of the rules of fairness and justice. See Saleh, supra note 22, at 15-16. op.cit. 
84. supra note 51. p.27.
97 See Rayner, supra note 46, at 156. op.cit. 84. supra note 52. p.27.
98 op. cit. 84. p.27.
99 Howard M. Holtzman & Joseph E. Neuhaus, A guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration: Legislative History and Commentary 1119 (1989) citing First 
Secretariat Note, A/CN.9/207, para. 70. See also id. at 1443, 1148-50 (providing the legislative history 
of the rejected provision regarding arbitrator liability), op.cit. 84. see pura note 213. p.42.
100 See Peter Sanders, National Report on England, in International Handbook on Commercial 
Arbitration 30 (1998). This broad statutory immunity, however, does not protect an arbitrator from 
liability incurred by reason of resigning. Sections 29 (3) and 25 do provide for the potential liability of 
an arbitrator for his withdrawal from the arbitration. The parties are free to agree with an arbitrator of 
the consequences of resignation regarding entitlement to fees or expenses and any liability. See 
arbitration Act 25 (1). Otherwise, a resigning arbitrator must apply to a court for: (1) relief from 
liability or (2) an order regarding fees and expenses. See Arbitration Act 25 (3). In making the 
determination about liability, the court will consider whether the resignation was reasonable. See 
arbitration Act 25 (4). This provision is unique because it allows an arbitrator to go to court 
prospectively to obtain a “grant [of] relief from liability” incurred by reason of resignation. See 
Arbitration Act 25 (3)(a). op. cit. 84. see supra note 220. p.42.
101 One important critique of the 1996 United Kingdom Arbitration Act is that it does not expressly 
define “bad faith,” but rather leaves the judiciary to interpret this term. Thomas Carbonneau, A 
Comment on the 1996 United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 22 Tul. Mar. L.J. 131, 143 (1997). Currently, 
under English law, “bad faith” means actual malice or actual knowledge of the absence of any power to
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a court determines withdrawal is unreasonable.102 Although immunity under the 
Arbitration Act is fairly broad, unlike the U.S. approach, it is qualified to give parties 
a remedy for an arbitrator’s international misconduct.103
The immunity of arbitrators from suit is partly based upon the doctrine of judicial 
immunity and often on whether an arbitrator’s responsibilities are functionally 
comparable to those of a judge. In essence, although some countries evaluate arbitral 
immunity on the basis of contractual obligation, others determine the scope of arbitral 
immunity by evaluating an arbitrator’s similarity in status to that of a judge.
Form of Liability of the Arbitrator
Unlike most Western countries, many Arab countries create express liability for 
improper resignation. In these countries there is a tendency to base liability on faults 
such as inappropriate withdrawal, failure to render an award, and general failure to 
abide by the terms of appointment. As there is no indication in these countries of 
immunity, however, liability probably extends to all negligent acts and breaches of 
duty.
Express Liability
In Qatar, an arbitrator is liable to the parties if he withdraws without serious grounds. 
Similarly, in Tunisia, the 1993 Arbitration Code does not provide any immunity for 
arbitrators and, instead, expressly subjects an arbitrator to damages if he “withdraws 
without good reason.”104 Libya also has a law that does not create immunity but 
instead provides for an arbitrator’s liability for withdrawal without good reason.105 
Under the Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure (1985), the law expressly provides that 
an arbitrator “will become liable” if he withdraws without sufficient reason.106
discharge the function at issue. See Sanders, National Report on England, supra note 220, at 31-32; see 
also Melton Medes v. Securities and Inv. Bd., [1995] 3 All. E.R. 880, 890 (defining “bad faith” in a 
narrow sense that “a moral element is an essential ingredient. Lack of good faith connotes either (a) 
malice in the sense of personal spite or desire to injure for improper reasons, or (b) knowledge of 
absence of power to make the decision in question.”
102 See English Arbitration Act of 1996, 25.
103 op.cit. supra note 84. p.l 1.
104 See Peter Sanders, National Report on Tunisia, in International Handbook on Commercial 
Arbitration (1998) (citing 1993 Tunisia Arbitration Code, art. 11). In Bahrain, under domestic 
arbitration law, if an arbitrator withdraws without good cause, he may be liable in damages. See El- 
Ahdab, supra note 13, at 108 (citing Bahrain code of Procedure, art. 234. Although there is a Bahraini 
International Arbitration Act, no provision within this statute expressly addresses the issue of arbitrator 
liability).
105 See Peter Sanders, National Report on Libya, in International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration 
5 (1998) (citing Libyan Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure of 1953, art. 748).
106 See Lebanon New Code of Civil Procedure, art. 769 in El-Ahdab, supra note 13, at 864.
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However, in international arbitration, parties may opt out of this provision through 
agreement.
Other Arab countries create liability for resignation but add additional bases of 
liability. In Syria, if arbitrators resign except for a serious reason they may be required 
to compensate the parties.107 Moreover, since arbitrators are not subject to the same 
procedure for judicial liability, arbitrators are liable for any negligence or fault 
committed during the arbitration.
Under the Kuwait: Arbitration Law of 1980, there is only one stated ground for an 
arbitrator’s liability. Specifically, “if the arbitrator, without serious grounds, refrains 
from acting after having accepted his mission, he may be liable in damages to the
1 OXparties.” But, because arbitrators are also required to accept their appointment in 
writing, failure to abide by duties enumerated in the arbitration law is likely to lead to 
liability. Morocco has a similar scope of arbitrator liability. Under the Arbitration Act 
of 1974, “arbitrators cannot refuse to act once they have started, else they shall have 
to pay compensation to the parties for the damage thus caused.” 109 
Saudi Arabia applies traditional Islamic law principles to the issue of arbitrator 
immunity. Although there is one primary basis for liability, its potential is quite broad. 
The Qur ’an contains the basic principle that, “he that mediates in a good cause shall 
gain by his mediation; but he that mediates in a bad cause shall be held accountable 
for its evil.”110 Under this general principle, an arbitrator can be liable for negligence 
in “failing to take note of important documents made by one of the [parties].”111 
Essentially, an arbitrator is liable for nearly any fault he commits which results in 
damage to any party. Although there was a regulation proposed to hold arbitrators 
liable for inappropriate withdrawal, this was never enacted. Instead, Article 11 of the 
1983 Arbitration Regulation of Saudi Arabia provides that if  the parties remove an 
arbitrator who was “not the cause of such removal,” the arbitrator may “claim 
compensation” against the parties.112 It is not clear, however, that the failure to enact a
107 See Syrian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 514 in El-Ahdab, supra note 13, at 928 and Saleh, supra 
note 22, at 100. op.cit. 84. see supra note 268. p.46.
108 Kuwait Law No. 38, art. 178 in El-Ahdab, supra 13, at 885.
109 Act of 28 September 1974, art. 313.
110 Sanders, supra note 276, at 17 (citing Koran, Al-Nisa (Women) 4:85).
111 Salah Hejailan, National Report on Saudi Arabia, in 4 Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 162, 
167 (1979). op.cit. 84. see supra note 289. p.47.
112 Ibid., See El-Ahdab, at 27-28 (citing Arbitration Regulation of Saudi Arabia, art. 11).
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legislative provision will provide immunisation against the otherwise broad potential 
for arbitrator liability in Saudi Arabia.
Implied Liability
In several Arab countries, the potential liability of an arbitrator is quite broad. In Iraq 
(no evidence of change post-Sadaam), after accepting appointment, “an arbitrator may 
not decline to act without a just cause.”113 Although this does not expressly create 
liability, at least one commentator asserts this becomes a part of the receptum arbitri 
and is an implied basis of liability. The potential scope of immunity, however, is 
never discussed.
Although the Egyptian Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure of 1968 provided for 
arbitrator liability for resignation without comprehensively adopting the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, there is no express provision for arbitrator liability or immunity.114 
Although some have asserted that the duties implied by the 1994 Act create the basis 
for liability, this is not necessarily certain.
Jordan’s Arbitration Act (1952) does not contain an express provision for liability, 
under the current law an arbitrator is generally not liable if he refuses to perform his 
mission; but if a party can prove a link between the damage and the refusal of an 
arbitrator to act, the general rules of liability apply.115
Yemen has a similar standard of liability. Although arbitrators are not required to 
accept in writing, the arbitrator is a party to the agreement to arbitrate and is 
contractually bound to perform according to the agreement and is potentially liable for 
any breaches.116 Overall, the potential for liability in these countries is quite extreme
117in comparison to that prevailing in common law countries.
Implications of Regional Variations
The application of different laws to the same contractual relationship between the 
parties and the arbitrators will contravene the idea of uniform treatment of these 
contracts. This can result in unjustifiable discrimination against arbitrators where they
1.3 Ibid., See also 1969 Iraq Code of Civil Procedure, art. 260, in El-Ahdab supra note 13, at 837.
1.4 Ibid., See El-Ahdab. Law Concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters, supra note 13, 
at 821-35.
115 However, in the new Jordanian Arbitration Act (2001), there are no express provisions for arbitrator 
liability, instead, there are uniform standards allowing for dismissal of an arbitrator and the setting 
aside of the award.
116 See Yemen Presidential Decree No. 22-1992 Issuing the Arbitration Act, art. 4 at 755.
117 See Susan D. Franck, (2000). The Liability of International Arbitrators: A Comparative Analysis 
and Proposal for Qualified Immunity. New York Law Journal o f International & Comparative Law.
p.16.
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live in countries with higher standards of liability. If the domicile is the applicable 
law, however, there is a greater probability that the arbitrator will be familiar with the 
proper standard of liability and act accordingly. Ultimately, this slight increase in 
certainty does not justify the significant variations in arbitrator liability. Particularly 
as it can result in variations among the behaviour of arbitrators, there can be 
unacceptable varying levels of arbitrator performance. For example, within the same 
panel, US arbitrators could covertly engage in fraud without fear of repercussions 
while Saudi Arabian arbitrators adhered to the strictest letter of the law. Although not 
all arbitrators behave in the same way, this startling inconsistency in behaviour
significantly undermines the respect for and integrity of the international arbitration
118process, or the prospect for evolution of a coherent, harmonised set of international 
rules.
In summary, i) in the West as well in the Middle East, arbitrators become a party to 
the agreement to arbitrate and have a contractual relationship with the parties; ii) 
Arbitrator personal liability varies between states mainly between Western and 
Middle Eastern countries; iii) occasionally, there is uncertainty as to whether 
municipal or international rules govern arbitral contracts; iv) while Western legal 
culture provides arbitrators with a basis for immunity, that of the Middle East 
provides liability of arbitrators; v) the UNCITRAL Model Law’s legislative history 
ignored the issue of arbitrator liability because it is highly controversial; and vi) The 
contractual status of arbitrators vis a vis the original contracting parties who are in 
dispute varies.
118 Ibid., p. 18.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Impact of the UNCITRAL Model Law on the Middle East Region
7.1 Background to Harmonisation
In order to address issues caused by global differences between national laws in 
different jurisdictions, such as the applicable law for dispute resolution, the 
unification of arbitration laws was attempted. The aim of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration, which was adopted in 1985, is to facilitate 
harmonisation of national laws between which considerable disparity exists.
Designed for use by states with different legal, social and economic systems and 
intended to develop “a unified legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement of 
disputes arising in international commercial relations.”1, the UNCITRAL Model Law 
was drafted with input from arbitration experts representing legal cultures from 
around the world (including civil, common, and Islamic law traditions), with the 
purpose of creating a "crucible for the evolution of international commercial 
arbitration.”2
The Model Law took a flexible approach which allowed states to modify articles 
adopted from it according to their demands and traditions or to use the law as an 
authoritative internationally accepted standard or benchmark for the reform or new 
enactment of laws3 more accessible and transparent to foreign lawyers.4 
The Model Law’s flexibility is an advantage in influencing national laws towards 
uniformity of law tempered to accommodate regional or local diversity; it provides 
commonly accepted basic standard. This basic standard has been derived from 
consensus achieved among different schools of legal thought, e.g., common, civil, 
Islamic. Although states adopted the Model Law can modify it to cover both domestic 
and international arbitration, the Model Law was specifically designed for
1 See Marshall J. Breger, Shelby R. Quast (2000), Article international commercial arbitration: a case 
study of the area under control of the Palestinian Authority. Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law. 185, p.9.
2 See Jan Paulsson, Third world participation in International Investment Arbitration, 2 ICSID Review. 
-Foreign Investment Law .Journal, vol. 19, No. 23 (1987). In Charles N. Brower; Jeremy K. Sharp, 
(2003), International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third Phase. The American Journal o f  
International Law, vol. 97, no. 3 (Jul., 2003), 643-656. p.650.
3 Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the Model Law on International commercial 
Arbitration, 3 says, “The form of a model law was chosen as the vehicle for harmonisation and 
improvement in view of the flexibility it gives to States in preparing new arbitration laws”.
4 See Gerold Herman, Does the World Need Additional Uniform Legislation on Arbitration? 15 
Arbitration International Journal, “11, 212-13 (1999).
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international commercial arbitration. It has proved popular internationally and has 
become a benchmark by which the quality of national arbitration laws is judged.
The structure of the Model Law covers all stages of the arbitral process, beginning 
with the arbitration agreement and ending with the recognition and enforcement of the 
arbitral award.5 Further, a system is established for sharing information between 
practitioners regarding court decisions and arbitral awards interpreting the Model 
Law. UNCITRAL Notes on Organising Arbitral Proceedings (“UNCITRAL Notes”) 
were also published to facilitate international commercial arbitration practice.6 
Consequently the Model Law has contributed to the development and harmonisation 
of national laws on arbitration and arbitration practice through its adoption or 
adaptation into each jurisdiction.7 The Model Law provides those countries without a 
modem arbitration law with a complete system of arbitration that is recognised by and 
acceptable to the international community. Now, there are “Model Law countries in 
all continents, of all sizes and all stages of economic development, covering 
altogether more than one-quarter of the world’s territory,”8 thus reflecting a 
worldwide consensus on the principles and important issues of the practice of 
international commercial arbitration.
7.2 Historical Background and the Process of Codification in the Middle East
Within the process of codification in the Middle East, emphasis will be placed on 
historical roots to reflect the differences rather than the similarities between the 
various jurisdictions in terms of their legal makeup.
Codification of commercial arbitration varies from one country to another due to 
historical reasons. Saudi Arabia for example, is the most vigorous adherent to 
traditional Islamic legal and constitutional norms. In contrast with other Arab States, 
the positive (Western inspired and secular) laws of the commercial field are 
subordinate and supplemental to classical Islamic law (fiqh), to the limited extent that 
company and commercial laws have been codified in the country.
In Contrast to Saudi Arabia the other Gulf States; for historical reasons they have 
been exposed to Western-British-legislation, but have maintained their Islamic law 
jurisprudence. In their codification of commercial law, they have been influenced by
5 See Model Law, supra note 112, reprinted in 24I.L.M. 1302.
6 See Roberto Ceccon, (1997), “UNCITRAL Notes on Organising Arbitral Proceedings and the 
Conduct of Evidence”. Journal o f International Arbitration. 67-68. in Commercial dispute Processing: 
The Japanese Experience and Future. Yasunobu Sato. Unpublished thesis 2000.
7 See Model Law, Supra note 112, Art. l(This law applies to international commercial arbitration).
8 See Herman, supra note 115, at 212.
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the civil French/Egyptian model as a basis for enacting commercial legislation around 
the time of their independence, the first among them being Kuwait (Law 15 of 1960) 
and the latest, the United Arab Emirates (Law 8 of 1984 put into effect by Law 13 of 
1988). Another example is Bahrain which departed from the hitherto dominant 
English common law (in Law 28 of 1975) tradition to follow the Egyptian system, 
itself inspired by French law.9
Egypt is another example of how historical factors influence the codification of 
commercial law. In 1949 Egypt adopted a civil code borrowed mostly from the 
French Civil Code, yet incorporated elements of Islamic law. Commercial law reform 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s was intended to play a major role in transforming 
Egypt from a relatively closed socialist economy into an open capitalist one.10 
Furthermore, Egypt was among the first to codify the commercial arbitration law 
according to the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Lebanon is the classic example in which its domestic law has long been displaced by 
a Western-oriented French legal system of commercial laws and regulations. A wide 
range of corporate, financial, commercial, investment and arbitration law reforms 
have been implemented as part of a programme of legislative modernisation which 
has taken place after the civil war (1975-1990).11
From a historical perspective, codification of commercial arbitration law in the 
Middle Eastern countries can be classified into four main categories: countries 
adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law, countries adopting an Islamic Law approach, 
countries adopting the French approach and finally countries adopting the mixed 
statutory approach as will be discussed in detail in the following section.
7.3 Implications of the UNCITRAL Model Law for the Middle East Region 
This part of the chapter will examine implications of the international harmonisation 
process, and the UNCITRAL Model Law in particular, on the development of 
arbitration laws in the Middle East.
It will be demonstrated that there is no consensus among countries in the region with 
regard to the incorporation of provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law in domestic 
arbitration legislation as a tool for global harmonisation of arbitration laws. Differing 
approaches towards adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law in the Middle East region
9 See Hilary Lewis Ruttley and Chibli Mallat, (1995). Commercial Law in the Middle East. Centre of 
Islamic & Middle Eastern Law. pp. 3-6.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
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will be identified. In addition, how and why various operative commercial arbitration 
laws have been enacted will be addressed. While in the West, the following countries 
have adopted the UNICITRAL Model Law; Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, 
Norway, Poland, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland: Scotland, 
USA: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Oregon and Texas.12
In regard to the Middle East, the main finding shows that only five of eighteen 
countries in the region (Bahrain, Tunisia, Egypt, Oman and Jordan) have promulgated 
commercial arbitration laws which adopt the principles of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law. Consequently, international commercial arbitration in the region can perhaps be 
described as a patchwork comprising local tradition, European laws, and terminology 
sometimes derived from classical Islamic law.13 Countries in the Middle East can be 
classified within four categories according to the development of arbitration laws and 
the harmonisation process.
Table 7.1 Showing the Different Approaches towards Harmonisation of Commercial 
Arbitration
1. Countries which have Adopted the 
UNCITRAL Model Law
Bahrain, Tunisia, Egypt, Oman and 
Jordan
2. Countries which have Adopted the 
Islamic Law Approach
Saudi Arabia and Yemen
3. Countries which have Adopted the 
French Approach
Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco and Syria,
4. Countries which have Adopted a 
Mixed Statutory Approach
Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, 
Palestine, Libya, Sudan, Iraq and Qatar
The analytical framework will show that, countries in the region can be organised into 
four main legislation categories mainly based historical reasons. Further, because 
multinationals advocate global trade and foreign direct investment with regional 
blocks rather than small domestic markets, such a policy is likely to have a negative 
impact upon the region. Moreover, international trade and investment within the
12 See www.uncitral.org
13 See Chibli Mallat, (2000) “An introduction to Middle East Law” and his supra note l.In 
“Commercial Law in the Middle East: Between Classical Transactions and Modem Business”. Am. J. 
Comp. L. 81(2000).
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Middle East region will be constrained by national commercial arbitration legislation 
boundaries. Traders will have to make deferent contract provisions in each country 
and foreign corporations will not be able to easily circumvent restrictions across 
boundaries. As a consequence, the Middle East region will have small-scale global 
trade and investment. Therefore, policy makers should care not only about their 
national legislation but also about divergences across the region in general and show a 
greater interest in regional integration of commercial arbitration law if they want the 
region to be open to the world economy.
7.3.1 Countries Adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law 
Main findings show only five countries out of eighteen in the Middle East region have 
adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law. These countries are: Bahrain (law No. 9 of 
1994), Tunisia (law No. 42 of 1993), Egypt (law No. 27 of 1994), Oman (Decree No. 
47 of 1997) and Jordan (law No. 31 of 2001). In the following section, why these 
countries have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law will be briefly discussed. How 
the Model Law has been adopted, introduced and its implications will be investigated 
in detail in the next chapter.
Bahrain
Despite a historical background similar to other Middle East countries, mainly in the 
Gulf region, Bahrain has been able to introduce international commercial arbitration 
law reform. Surprisingly, it has adopted the exact form and wording of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. Thus, it is worth discussing the historical factor in Bahrain’s 
legislative process that did not prevent it from following the harmonisation process. 
Before World War I, arbitration in its modem sense was unknown in Bahrain. There 
had been a traditional system for settling disputes through a council called the Majles 
Orfi}4 its members selected on the basis of custom.
Following World War II, Bahrain became the central location for the British army, 
navy and air forces in the region and, as a result, the country was exposed to the 
British legal system as were other Gulf States.15 The first order in council came into 
effect in 1925, and from then until 1959 Bahraini’s and other Muslim Arabs were 
subject to the jurisdiction of the local Sharia ’ courts which existed in parallel with the
14 op.cit. 11, p. 316.
15 See S.H. Amin, Middle East Legal System; supra note 20, See Ahmed A. Mohamed Al-Suwaidi. 
The finance of international trade in the Gulf Arab States: a comparative study between Conventional 
and Islamic Banking systems with special Emphasis on the United Arab Emirates. Unpublished thesis, 
university of Exeter 1991. p. 52.
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British courts. From 1959 until 1971, there was a gradual transfer of jurisdiction to the 
local Bahraini courts, either by Order in Council or Regulation.16 
After independence, in 1971 Bahrain issued its first Law of Procedures, including 
arbitration provisions which resembled the old French rules of arbitration embodied in 
the previous Egyptian Law of Civil and Commercial Procedures. The Law of Civil 
and Commercial Procedure was issued in 1972 and the Commercial law No. 107 of 
1987 was based on Egyptian and Kuwaiti Codes.17
In accordance with its role as a regional centre for offshore banking, financial, 
insurance and commercial activities, on 16 August 1994, Bahrain promulgated the 
International Commercial Arbitration Decree Law No. 9 of 1994 (ICAL).18 
According to Article (1) of the ICAL, the law is applicable to international 
commercial arbitration unless otherwise agreed by the parties.19 The term arbitration 
covers any arbitration whether or not administered by a permanent arbitral 
institution.20
Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made by an application to the 
High Civil Court of Appeal for setting aside only if the party making the application 
satisfies the conditions in the law.21 The Law consists of four articles only. Article 1 
provides that the UNCITRAL Model Law will be applicable to every international 
commercial arbitration contract unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Article 2 of 
the Law provides that the provisions of Bahrain’s Civil and Commercial Procedures 
Act 1971 shall not be applicable to any international commercial arbitration contract. 
Egypt
The last three decades have witnessed important steps in Egypt towards the 
modernisation of its laws in the field of international commercial arbitration. In 1959, 
Egypt acceded to the 1958 New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
16 Ibid., p.52.
17 Ibid., p.53.
18Anonymous, International arbitration law enacted (1995). Euromoney Publications Pic, Cardiff 
University Proquest databases, p. 1.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p.2.
21 These conditions are: a party to the arbitration agreement is under some incapacity; the arbitration 
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties subjected it; the party making the application 
has not been given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or is 
otherwise unable to present this case;
The award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to 
arbitration, or contains decision on matters beyond the scope of the submission, or the composition of 
the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure is not in accordance with the agreement of the parties; or 
the subject matter o f the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the State of 
Bahrain or the award is in conflict with the public policy of the State of Bahrain.
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Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 N.Y. Convention). Later, in 1974, Egypt acceded to 
the 1965 Washington Convention of the International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) which established the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID).22
In 1982, Egypt signed a bilateral investment treaty with the United States, which 
entered into force in 1992. This treaty defines the right of individual investors with 
respect to their investments in the other contracting country and protects their ability
*y\to secure arbitration in a neutral forum.
In 1994, Egypt promulgated the Law Concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (the Arbitration Law No. 27 of 1994), which adopted the principles of the 
UNICTRAL Model Law of Arbitration to bring its arbitration laws within 
international standards.24
The importance of the Egyptian Arbitration Law lies in the fact that it has primarily 
influenced Oman.
Original draft of the 1994 Law followed the Model Law in limiting its scope of 
application to international arbitration only. However, when referring the draft to the 
People's Assembly, it was decided that the Law should apply to all arbitrations, 
whether domestic or international, concurrently providing special rules for the latter. 
Jordan
During the Ottoman Empire, the rules of Al Majalla were the applicable law. After the 
establishment of Jordan as an independent political entity in 1922, steps were taken 
towards modernising its system of law. In 1933, a law was enacted which included 
provisions on arbitration. In 1953 a Law of Arbitration was enacted. The 1953 law 
reflected the influence of English law on arbitration. The Jordanian Law does not 
permit arbitrators to be authorised to act as amiable compositeurs. It adopts the 
English approach of giving an umpire jurisdiction to determine the dispute himself if 
two-party appointed arbitrators fail to agree on an award. Moreover, the law follows 
the English approach of giving the courts considerable powers of intervention in 
arbitrations.26
22 Ibid.,p.314.
23 See Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Sep. 29, 1982, 
US-Egypt, S. Treaty DOC. No. 99-24 (1986), 21 I.L.M. 927, 1982. op.cit. 1, see supra note 142, p.42.
24 op.cit. p.315.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p.320.
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Jordan has been recently engaged in international arbitration; it acceded to agreements 
on enforcing arbitral awards concluded within the Arab League (1952, 1985).27 In 
1972 it acceded to the IBRD Washington Convention. In 1979 it acceded to the New 
York Convention. Jordan has active relations with international arbitral institutions.28 
In 1989, Jordan began its economic reform programme, with a concentration on trade 
liberalisation. In an effort to create a friendly investment environment, Jordan 
continued the reform in 1995 with new and amended laws.29 On September 16, 1995, 
the Jordanian parliament approved the Law for the Protection of Investment. This law 
applies to investment by non-Jordanians in the Kingdom. Law No. 16, Article 33 
provides a settlement mechanism. In 2001, Jordan continued the process of reform, 
influenced by the UNCITRAL Model Law, and promulgated the Commercial 
Arbitration Law No. 31 of 2001.
Oman
Oman applied the Shari'a rules, Islamic law according to the Idadi doctrine, which 
resembles to a great extent Sunni doctrine. However, unlike other Arab Gulf 
countries, Omani legislators acknowledged the fact that economic development and 
the encouragement of investment required the enactment of new and modem Omani 
laws on arbitration. So it was decided to issue a new Law of Arbitration in Civil and 
Commercial Disputes based on the same lines and principles of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. On 28 July 1997, the law was enacted by the Sultani Decree No. 47 of 
1997. The Law is a replica of the Egyptian Arbitration Law. Such legislative attitude 
has very important implications for the harmonisation process of international 
commercial arbitration in the region as whole as will be discussed later in chapter 
nine.
Tunisia
Until the closing year of the Nineteenth Century, Tunisia applied the Shari'a rules, 
primarily the Maleki doctrine. In 1881, Tunisia became a French Protectorate. From
27 Jordan signed the Arab League Convention of Judicial Cooperation (Riyadh Convention).This 
Convention signed on 6 April 1983, repealed the previous 1952 Arab League Convention on the 
Enforcement of Judgement and Awards and came into force in October 1985. Also, it signed the 1983 
Amman Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 See Law for Promotion of Investment of 1995, Law No. 16(1995), reprinted in business laws of 
Jordan (Feb. 1998). op.cit. 1 see supra note 144, p. 42.
3‘op.cit. 3. p.316.
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that time and since its independence in 1956, its laws were codified and influenced by 
French law. In 1967 Tunisia acceded to the New York Convention.32 
In the 1980s and 1990s, active legislative steps were taken towards encouraging 
foreign investment. One of the main steps taken in this regard was the enactment of a 
new law on international commercial arbitration which diverged from the French 
influence and adopted the principles of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The Arbitration 
Code, Majallat Al Tahkim, was issued by Law No. 42 of 1993 on 26 April 1993.
The Tunisian Law takes a different approach in adopting the principle of the Model 
Law. The Law differentiates between international and domestic arbitration. The 
principle of the UNCITRAL Model Law is applicable mainly to international 
commercial arbitrations, while the rules applicable to domestic arbitration give the 
state courts more powers of supervision over decisions of arbitral tribunals. More 
details will be provided in the next chapter.
7.3.2 Countries Adopting Islamic Law 
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has a long history of applying Islamic law according to the Hanbali 
doctrine. Here it is essential to examine how Saudi arbitration rules have responded to 
the requirements of the international harmonisation process and why they remain 
faithful to the Kingdom’s own legal tradition.
From the early days of oil exploration until the 1950s arbitration was the primary 
means of resolving disputes between Saudi and foreign companies. Saudi Arabia 
adopted arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism in the Code of the Commercial 
Court of 1350 AH (1931).33 The Code entitled disputants to resolve their disputes by 
means of arbitration.
The defeat of the Saudi Arabian Government in the Aramco arbitration case34 of 
1958 was the direct reason for the unpopularity of international arbitration in Saudi 
Arabia. Further, Saudi Arabia was also influenced by cases such as Petroleum 
Development Ltd v. Sheikh o f  Abu Dhabi and Qatar v. International Marine Oil
32 Ibid.
33 Saudi Arabia Commercial Court Regulation, issued under Royal Decree M/32 of 1/15/1350 A.H. 
(1931 A.D.). These rules did not recognise the validity of an agreement to submit future disputes 
arising from a specific contract to arbitration.
34 The dispute concerned the right o f the state to transport oil produced by a national company. The 
arbitral tribunal decided that the producing company, Aramco, had an exclusive right to transport the 
oil any way it chose. The award ruled that the Saudi law which was that agreed upon by the parties as 
the law applicable to the dispute - was insufficient for the purpose and should be complemented by 
other sources of law.
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Company Ltd35, because the arbitrators paid no consideration to Islamic values. Saudi 
Arabia considered the arbitrators lacked basic knowledge about the Shari’a and its 
basic principles applicable to commercial transactions.
As a result of its dissatisfaction with the decisions in these cases, the Saudi 
government in 1963 forbade all government agencies from resorting to arbitration 
without prior approval from the Council of Ministers. This policy remains in effect 
today, despite the 1980 Saudi ratification of the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 
Convention), which provides for arbitration under the auspices of the World Bank. An 
ICSID arbitration clause has never been approved by the Council of Ministers, and 
commercial arbitration was not governed by a comprehensive set of rules until 1983.36 
The arbitration regulation of 1983 serves two important objectives of the Saudi 
government. First, it provides a comprehensive, uniform set of rules which are 
accessible to foreign businesspersons and their legal counsel. The Regulation is 
designed to allay their fears over the previous lack of judicial and legislative support 
for commercial arbitration. Second, it establishes governmental control not only over 
arbitration procedure in general, but over the actual arbitration proceedings by 
providing for supervision by governmental agencies, courts, or perhaps the Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry.
Thus, the extensive supervisory role played by the government is perhaps the most 
significant feature which emphasises the concept of statism in Saudi Arabia 
arbitration laws.
The Authority will presumably be the CSCD in most commercial disputes; the 
Grievance Board in disputes with a government agency that has received permission 
to arbitrate; or the competent Shar’ia court in a case involving real estate.
35 In the Qatar award, the Arbitral Tribunal contended that the Shari 'a does not contain any principles 
sufficient to interpret the concession agreement. It further said that the Shari ’a does not possess a body 
of legal principles applicable to a modem commercial contract.
36 The Saudi Arabia Commercial Court Regulation contained a few limited rules on arbitration, 
allowing the court to confirm the appointment o f arbitrators (but not to appoint arbitrators should a 
party fail to do so) and requiring the court to review the award prior to enforcement. The 1931 rules 
were formally repealed in 1983, but had been seldom utilised for some time prior.
37 Article (5) of 1983 Law provides “Parties to a dispute shall file the arbitration instrument with the 
authority originally competent to hear the dispute. The said instrument shall be signed by the parties or 
their officially delegated attorneys-in-fact and by the arbitrators, and it shall state the subject matter of 
the dispute, the names o f the parties, names of the arbitrators and their consent to have the dispute 
submitted to arbitration. Copies of the documents relevant to the dispute shall be attached.” Further, 
Article (6) provides “the authority originally competent to hear the dispute shall record applications of 
arbitration submitted to it and shall issue a decision approving the arbitration instrument.
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Representatives of Chambers of Commerce which promulgated their own arbitration 
rules in 1980, argue that their organisations also should be considered by the 
Authority in appropriate cases.
As a result of the lack of clear procedures and judicial support, arbitration between 
private parties has been sporadic. For example, arbitration rules agreed between the 
parties in advance have not been enforced and it is unclear how awards are to be 
enforced, especially if they are rendered outside Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government 
is dissatisfied also because arbitrations are frequently conducted under foreign rules 
both inside and outside Saudi Arabia.38
Three aspects of the procedure established by the 1983 regulation have caused 
particular concern among foreign commentators. First, while the regulation recognises 
the validity of a contractual clause calling for arbitration of future disputes, it is not 
clear how such a clause is to be enforced if one party refuses to cooperate when a 
dispute arises. Second, commentators are unsure about the extent to which Saudi law 
must be applied to the substance of the dispute. Third, the Regulation does not specify 
the grounds on which the competence or appropriate authority may set aside or refuse 
to execute an award.39
In general, due to historical reasons, the legal system has not kept pace with the 
modernisation process. As a result, foreign investors complain that Saudi international 
commercial law is inadequate.40 
Yemen
Yemen codified Islamic law while at the same time (contrary to Saudi Arabia) 
followed modem trends in different fields of international commercial arbitration law. 
One example of this was legislation on arbitration passed in 1981. On 29 March 1992 
Yemen replaced the 1981 legislation with a new law. This followed the unification of 
North and South Yemen. The 1992 law differentiated between domestic and 
international arbitrations. It adopted the principles embodied in the New York
38 Awards rendered outside Saudi Arabia are still notoriously difficult to enforce in Saudi Arabia. 
Foreign awards must be embodied in a foreign judgement and even then are subject to a de novo 
review procedure by the Saudi government and or a Saudi court of competent jurisdiction, which will 
apply Saudi law to the substance of the dispute and perhaps review factual determinations as well 
before enforcement is possible. Naturally, such procedures negate many of the advantages of 
international arbitration.
39 See George Sayen (2003). Arbitration, Conciliation and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia. 
U. PA. J. INTL. 211. p. 3. See also supra note 53.
40 Ibid., See also Saba, Saudi Arabia Investment Climate: Its Risks and Returns, Middle East 
Executive report., October 1986.
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Convention and the principle of part autonomy41. Parties to an international arbitration 
may agree on an applicable law other than Yemeni law. They may choose any foreign 
language, and a place of arbitration situated outside Yemen. The award will be final if 
the parties so agree, or if arbitrators have been authorised to act as amiable 
compositors (Ruling according to equity, rather than law to give the arbitral tribunal 
greater flexibility to reach fair results, which otherwise may not be possible through 
strict application of law). Apart from these two situations, an award may be appealed. 
The 1992 law embodies the competence de la competence principle (related to the 
respective power of arbitrators to determine their tribunal jurisdiction). The principle 
of the separatability of the arbitration agreement also applies if the agreement was 
concluded in the form of an arbitration clause. Thus, an allegation of nullity or 
termination of the contract will not affect the validity of the arbitration clause if it is 
valid in itself.42 In sum, Yemeni law in comparison to Saudi Arabia law is more 
advanced in the light of modem commercial arbitration principles.
7.3.3 Countries Adopting the French Approach 
The legal systems in Middle East countries, generally speaking, are based on the 
French legal system (Franco-German) that includes Civil Law. Other countries have 
based their legal systems on the ‘Anglo-Saxon legal system’, which includes 
Common law. This creates discrepancies when interpreting and applying clauses 
within the boundaries of local civil and commercial code.
Algeria
Algeria was hostile to international arbitration for some time after independence. 
However, in order to seek more advantageous international trade terms and to attract 
foreign investments, this attitude had to change. Some bilateral agreements with other 
states included recourse to arbitration in case of disputes. Decree No. 9/1993 was 
issued on 25 April 1993 to amend the Procedural Law (section 4), and included 
provisions on international commercial arbitration. The 1993 Decree was inspired by 
the French Law of Arbitration of 1981 and the Swiss Private International Law Act of 
1987.43
41 The principle of party autonomy is reflected in the consensual nature of the parties’ choice to have 
their claims arising out of their contractual relationship submitted to arbitration; in the selection of the 
arbitral tribunal; and the applicable law and the autonomy afforded to the parties in structuring the
. Aboul Enein (1999). The Development of International Commercial Arbitration Laws in 
the Arab World., p.318. British Library.
43 Ibid., p.316.
proceedings. 
42 See M.I.M
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The 1993 Decree introduced the principle of party autonomy in international 
commercial arbitration. Accordingly, the parties are free to choose the applicable law 
on the procedures and on the substance. The courts still have a considerable role in 
cases where proceedings are hindered, such as where a party is reluctant to appoint an 
arbitrator. However, two criteria must be fulfilled for an arbitration to be international 
and to be subject to the provisions of the 1993 Decree. First, like the French law of 
1981, the dispute must relate to the interests of international commerce. Second, it is 
required that at least one of the parties must have its place of business or domicile 
abroad.44 
Lebanon
In 1983, Lebanon issued Law No. 90/1983 on arbitration. Even though there are some 
slight differences, the Lebanese law on international arbitration is closely modelled on 
the French Law of 1981. The provisions on national arbitration are also copied from 
the French Law, with a few changes.45
For international arbitration provisions to apply, the dispute must relate to the 
interests of international commerce. This is a purely economic criterion which does 
not take into account such factors as the nationality or residence of the parties and 
arbitrators, the place of the arbitration or the place where the contact was concluded.46 
According to Article 814 of the Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure, arbitral awards, be 
they foreign awards or awards rendered in Lebanon in the context of an international 
arbitration process, are enforced after being vested of the exequatur (vested final 
recognition) provided that the concerned parties substantiate their existence and the 
absence of a manifest inconsistency with Lebanese private international law public 
policy.47
The existence of the arbitration is corroborated by exhibiting the minutes and an 
original copy of the arbitration agreement (or duly certified copies thereof). If these 
documents are in a foreign language, a certified translation thereof should be 
provided.48
44 Ibid., p.317.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 See Fadi Moghaizel, Chafic Nehme (1997). Setting business in Lebanon. International Company and 
commercial Law Review, p.6.
48 Ibid.
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In order to define the validity of international awards, articles 809 to 815 stipulate that 
internal arbitration awards are vested of the Res Judicata (Binding force) on their 
rendering.49
With respect to the enforcement of international awards, the Code of Civil Procedure 
lays down a more liberal treatment than the one reserved for the enforcement of 
foreign courts’ judgements. All that is required for an international arbitration award 
to be enforced in Lebanon is a writ of execution which is duly constituted by the 
award itself (or a duly certified copy thereof) vested with the enforcement title 
exequatur granted by the Beirut First Degree Court or the court of the place of the 
international arbitration taking place in Lebanon.50
When an award rendered abroad is denied recognition or enforcement, the concerned 
party is entitled to file an appeal against the decision of denial on the grounds that the 
arbitral award is not in breach of public policy. When a foreign award is
acknowledged to be valid or granted the exequatur by the Lebanese competent court, 
the interested party can file an appeal against the court decision on the following 
grounds:51
(i) The absence of an arbitration agreement, its invalidity or expiry:
(ii) the arbitral tribunal was not formed in accordance with the law;
(iii) the arbitral tribunal awarded more than was requested, ultra petite;
(iv) the basic rights of defence have not been observed;
(v) the ward infringed public policy.
No retrial or further examination of the merits of a case will be allowed in Lebanon 
outside the above mentioned grounds. Finally, it is worth pointing out that although 
Lebanon is not a party to the 1958 New York Convention on the Mutual Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Lebanese domestic law provides an 
equal protection to foreign arbitration awards.52 
Morocco
In 1912, Morocco became a French Protectorate. Before then, it had applied customs 
and rules derived from Islamic law according to the Malki doctrine.
From 1913, Morocco enacted legislation and codes influenced by French law. 
Morocco continues to be influenced by the old French law on arbitration, since it has
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., p.7.
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not changed its rules of arbitration following independence in 1956. Arbitration is 
governed by the provisions of the Mestera (Code of Civil and Commercial 
Procedure), which adopted the French law approach, with all its negative effects. 
However, several bilateral international agreements introduced some modem 
arbitration provisions, albeit limited in application to the scope of those agreements, 
and in the same vein as the French Arbitration Law of 1981.53
Under the Morocco Law of Arbitration (1994), persons having the legal capacity to do 
so can agree to arbitrate.54 Hence, the law allows arbitration on any commercial, civil 
or social matter. The most significant exclusion is the one concerning the state, 
particularly public entities, which do not have the right to settle their disputes by 
arbitration. This can be explained by the fact that arbitration does not permit the 
compulsory intervention of the public prosecutor and matters involving the interests 
of the state or public entities can be litigated before any court. This incapacity was 
reinforced in 1993 by the creation of administrative courts having exclusive 
jurisdiction over disputes involving administrative contracts and claims for damages 
caused by acts and activities of public entities.55 However, there are some exceptions 
to this principle, and the state may have recourse to arbitration in matters involving 
foreign loans and oil agreements with foreign companies. In addition, the state is 
required to submit to arbitration any dispute involving investment agreements entered 
into with foreign private investors under the Washington Convention (1965 ICSID 
Convention), and Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States. Moroccan case law has further contributed in 
easing the restriction on the state to submit its disputes to arbitration, and the 
restriction does not apply to public, industrial or commercial entities when the 
contract has an international scope.56 In addition, the law does not allow arbitration 
for matters involving acts or property governed by administrative law. This rule aims 
at prohibiting the state and public entities from resorting to arbitration, which runs 
counter to international practice.
53 op.cit. 19. p.317.
54 Article 306. Law of Arbitration 1994.
55 See Mohamed El MerNissi, (2002). Arbitration in Morocco: Realities and Perspectives. Journal of 
International Arbitration 19(2): 179-183. Kluwer Law International, p. 180.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., p. 183.
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Syria
After independence in 1941 and following the termination of the French Mandate in 
1944, Syria began modernising its legislation. In 1949, it enacted a Civil Code, a 
Commercial Law and Penal Code. In 1952, it enacted its Law of Civil Procedures, 
which includes provisions on arbitration. These provisions resemble the provisions of 
earlier Egyptian law. According to the Syrian system of arbitration there is voluntary 
arbitration based upon the agreement of the parties, and compulsory arbitration, 
influenced by the systems of Socialist countries, applies with regard to contracts of 
the Ministry of Defence, agricultural disputes, labour disputes, some property 
disputes, customs disputes and disputes between public sector parties. Compulsory 
arbitration is also used, according to Islamic law, in cases of family disputes between
58spouses.
7.3.4 Countries Adopting Mixed Statutory Arbitration Laws
This section will examine how the revised international commercial arbitration law 
within this category of countries governed by mixed statutory provisions basically 
influenced by Islamic Law principles, and Secular and Western-inspired statutory law. 
Such statutory laws were introduced in the Middle East countries during the colonial 
era and eventually given validation by Muslim jurists, such as the Sanhuri (the main 
architect of the Egyptian Civil Code of 1948 after which so many Arab civil codes are 
modelled.)59 
Kuwait
The new Kuwaiti Law of Judicial Arbitration No. 11 of 1955 aims to release the 
commercial sector from the complex and time-consuming procedures associated with 
the traditional state judiciary system.60
The Kuwaiti Law of Arbitration No. 11 of 1995 has a mixed arbitration, where certain 
provisions put parties into contradictory positions, allowing one party the liberty of 
resorting to arbitration, while depriving the other of this right. This is stipulated with 
to arbitration requested by individual, natural, and judicial persons of the private 
sector against any governmental bodies or state-owned companies, unless the dispute
58 op.cit 19, p. 318.
59 See Nabil A. Saleh, (1988) Financial Transactions and the Islamic Theory of Obligations and 
Contract. In Chibli Mallat (Islamic Law and Finance), p. 26.
60 See Mashael Abdulaziz Alhajeri, (2000) A Critical approach to the Kuwaiti law of Judicial 
arbitration No. 11 of 1995 with Reference to the UNCITRAL Model Law on international Commercial 
arbitration. Arab Law Quarterly, 48-62, Kluwer Law International, p. 51.
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has already been tried and brought before the courts. The latter parties cannot object 
to arbitration.61
Procedural problems which have been incorporated within the new law concern the 
unbalanced formation of the arbitral panel. The arbitral panel is now composed of five 
members, three judges and two arbitrators, whereas, it had only been three following
AOthe abolition of Article 177 of the Civil and Commercial Procedure Law No. 6 of 
1960 (CCP Law). Thus, the judiciary is the dominant element in this new formation. 
This change triggers the concern that this domination by the judiciary is in 
contradiction with the very concept of arbitration, which basically establishes the
AOlitigants’ free will to choose their arbitrators.
As the panel in the judicial arbitration is formed mostly of judges, and it practises a 
compulsory jurisdiction with regard to governmental bodies, an award rendered by the 
arbitral panel enjoys the force of an adjudicated order, and is fully enforceable in 
conformity with the proceedings prescribed in the Civil and Commercial Procedure 
Law (CCP law) No. 38 of 1980.64 
Limitation to the Parties’ Autonomy
The new arbitration law submits contracts containing arbitration provisions concluded 
after its enforcement to its jurisdiction without reference to a specific arbitration 
system. It has limited litigant’s free choice of the arbitration authority they can resort 
to, and restricts the parties’ ability to make a free decision, especially since they might 
prefer to resort to ordinary arbitration rather than the judicial arbitration system.65 For 
the aforementioned reasons, it has been argued that the parties’ freedom of choice is 
very much restricted in this respect, as the Law predetermines most of the arbitral 
issues, thus depriving the litigants of the true advantages of arbitration.
The Kuwaiti Law also has substantive problems with regard to the boundaries of the 
arbitral panel’s jurisdiction.66 Questions are raised with regard to the extent of the 
arbitral panel’s jurisdiction to disputes arising between individuals and governmental 
bodies, and whether it encompasses administrative decisions and administrative 
contracts, for example, public works contracts. The jurisdiction of the arbitral panel is 
restricted by that of the Administrative Court, which has sole jurisdiction over all
61 Ibid., p.52.
62 Article 177 of the CCP provides that the tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators.
63 Ibid.
64 Article 9 of the CCP Law No. 38 of 1980.
65 Ibid., p. 57.
66 Ibid, p. 59.
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administrative disputes. For all the above mentioned arguments, arbitral panels have 
no jurisdiction with respect to administrative disputes.67 
The position of the courts
It seems that the Kuwaiti legislature does not fully accept the concept of arbitration. 
This position leads to applying rigid judicial rules in the arbitration arena. A good 
example is the significant role that has been assigned to form in arbitral awards. With 
regard to the question of whether or not an arbitral award should be rendered in the 
name of His Highness the Amir of Kuwait, the Court of Cassation answered in the 
affirmative:
“... Article 53 of the constitution stipulates that the judicial power is carried out 
in the name of the Amir within the constitutional limits, and article 16 of the 
Amir Decree No. 19 of 1959 on the Regulation of judiciary stipulates that 
“awards are rendered in the name of the Amir of the State”, this means that 
with regards to all awards -  including those of arbitrators - failing to mention 
they are rendered in the name of the Amir as the said article has stated is an 
omission of a substantial declaration that is essential to its validity, which 
results in it being absolutely void with regard to public order.. .”68 
United Arab Emirates
Before the independence of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971, the applicable 
law on civil and commercial matters was Islamic law according to the Hanafl doctrine 
included in Al-Majalla. After independence, legislation reflected a mixture of Western 
and Islamic law.69 The legal framework of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is 
essentially made up of three parts: Federal and Local rules (including legislation); 
Codified law; and Islamic legal principles. At the statutory level, the position is 
simple. Under article 121 of the UAE constitution, the Union (as the UAE is 
sometimes known) has exclusive power when it comes to major legislation dealing
70with contract and civil obligation; company law; and procedural matters.
In 1993, the UAE issued the Commercial Transaction Law No. 18, "the Commercial 
Code". This code is the last of the basic Codes and has far reaching implications and
• • 7 1 *consequences for those engaged in commerce, industry, banking and finance. It is
67 Ibid., p. 60.
68 Ibid., p. 61.
69 op.cit. 19, p. 319.
70 See Shane Sayers Kennedys, (2000). Doing Business in the United Arab Emirates.
71 See Dawoud Sudqi El Alami (1994). The Law of Commercial Procedure o f the United Arab 
Emirates, p. 12. Graham & Trotman.
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one of the three major codes: the Civil Code, the Code of Commerce and the Code of 
Civil Procedure. In broad terms, the Civil Code sets out general contractual principles 
and covers certain types of business agreements (for example, construction contracts). 
The Code of Commerce, on the other hand, governs commercial transactions and 
relationships between merchants. All three codes are heavily influenced by Egyptian 
and European laws. Like other civil law countries codification, the UAE codes 
express general abstract concepts and rules drawn from Roman law. The writings of 
Al-Sanhoury, 1934 (Egyptian jurisconsult who endeavoured to combine in his writing 
principles of Islamic law and civil law, mainly the French civil code) are particularly 
significant when deciding how to apply such concepts and rules in individual cases.72 
Under Article (1) of the Civil Code, if the judge cannot find a relevant provision in 
the code, he must rely on Islamic Shari’a law. Article 1 then lists (in order of priority) 
the various juristic texts -or other legal authorities -the judge should use. In any 
event, when interpreting the provision of the Civil Code, the judge must act in 
accordance with general principles laid down by Islamic jurisconsults. A major 
influence here is the Majalla, especially its first 100 articles. These set out general 
principles, particularly regarding interpretation. Because the Majalla is a code, it 
easier to access and tends to have more weight in practice than the juristic authorities 
listed in Article 1 of the UAE Civil Code.73
In applying Shar ’ia law in civil and commercial matters, courts in the United Arab 
Emirates have in the past often had, and may well continue to have (though to a lesser 
extent), recourse to the Al-Majalla.14
Two issues in respect of the Code should be noted. First, for the purpose of this Code, 
“commercial activities” are defined as any transactions carried on by a businessman in 
connection with his business, and the legal presumption is that everything done by a 
businessman is deemed to relate to his trade unless proved otherwise. The UAE 
Civil Code broadly defines the commercial to include both the economic and financial 
criteria of the transaction.
Second, the distinction between a "civil” and a "commercial” transaction (a distinction 
peculiar to civil law jurisprudence) is not clarified, leaving considerable uncertainty as
72 op.cit. 47.
73 Ibid.
74 op.cit. 47.
75 Ibid., p. 18.
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to how to reconcile the law contained in the Civil Code with, for example, the existing 
Dubai contract Law based upon English Common Law.76
In regard to validation of the party autonomy principle of arbitration contracts in 
UAE, a recent Dubai Court of Cassation case (Petition No. 240/2001, dated 8/12/ 
2001), demonstrated that courts will recognise the parties’ choice to submit a dispute 
to arbitration. The case confirmed that Article 203 of the Civil Procedure Code 
provides that if parties have agreed upon arbitration, they have no right to resort to the 
court, unless the same parties at any stage amend the clause.77 The decision also 
confirms the Middle East perception that arbitration contract can be revocable based 
on parties’ decision.
In regard to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the UAE, a recent 
judgement delivered in the appeal of the Indian Overseas Bank v. Ibrahim al Shirawai 
(1996) and another Dubai Court decision have raised considerable doubt as to whether 
a foreign arbitration award will be enforceable in the UAE.78
UAE is not party to the New York Convention. Although the Civil Procedure Code 
provides the theoretical provision for courts to recognise a foreign arbitration award 
based on the grounds of Article 203, in practice, parties obtaining a foreign award will
70find its enforcement difficult.
This is evident in a decision of Dubai’s highest court, the Dubai Court of Cassation,
which rejected an application to enforce a foreign arbitration award for paid up
charter hire against a UAE-based charter. The application was issued by a sole
arbitrator in the UK. In rejecting the application, the Dubai Court of Cassation’s
judgement was consistent with previous court of appeal and court of first instance
80judgements, although somewhat different in its reasoning.
The reason for rejection was simply that the UAE has not signed the 1958 New York 
Convention. As a result, foreign arbitration awards, where there is no treaty between 
the UAE and the place of arbitration, cannot be enforced in the UAE courts.
76 Ibid., p. 13.
77 Arbitration can often be the best course in the GCC. (2003) Lloyd’s List International, p .l .
78 See Essam al-Temimi’s Comment on Indian Overseas Bank v. Ibrahim Mohammed al-Shirawi, cited 
in Chibli Mallat (2000) Commercial Law in the Middle East: Between Classical Transactions and 
Modem Business. The American Journal o f Comparative Law. vol. 48. p. 137.
79 op.cit. 54.
80 See Richard Briggs, AlTamimi &Company (2000). Foreign arbitration clauses in charter parties- a 
UAE perspective, p. 1.
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It had been previously decided in lower UAE courts that it would be possible to 
enforce a foreign arbitration award if there was genuine reciprocity between the two 
countries in accordance with the principles for enforcement of foreign arbitration 
awards set out in Articles 235 and 236 of the UAE Federal Law No. 11 of 1992 (the 
Civil Procedure Code 1992). This was to be evidenced by documents showing that the 
arbitration award was enforceable, and actually enforced, in the country where the
o 1
award was obtained first.
However, this argument was also rejected by the Dubai Court of Cassation, which 
stated that it was simply not possible to enforce a foreign arbitration award in 
accordance with Articles 235 and 236 due to the UAE not having signed the 1958 
Convention.
It has long been suspected that it is difficult to enforce foreign arbitration awards as 
the UAE is not signatory to the Convention, although cases heard in the lower courts 
have been inconsistent on this point. However, this country’s Court of Cassation 
judgement contradicts previously consistent judgements of the Dubai and Sharjah 
Court of First Instance, which rejected the jurisdiction of UAE courts on the basis that 
a foreign law and arbitration clause signed and accepted by both parties existed in the 
charter party.
Two different arguments have been used to reject charter party claims. The first due 
to the presence of a foreign law and arbitration clauses in the contract, and the second 
due to the UAE not acceding to the New York Convention. In such situations, a 
foreign claimant has no forum to bring a claim against a UAE-based defendant.
Dubai has been taking steps independently to update and implement new commercial 
arbitration rules. Commercial arbitration in Dubai was previously largely supervised 
by the Dubai Chamber of Commerce & Industry. The DCCI published rules of 
commercial conciliation and arbitration in 1994, but these are widely recognised as 
being in need of modernisation.
What is not clear is how the new Federal Arbitration Law, the UAE Civil Procedure 
Code (which contains provisions relating to commercial arbitration) and the new
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 See Terence Witzmann and James Abbott (2004). Ringing the changes: recent development in UAE 
law: Dubai is updating arbitration rules and reviewing the Maritime Code.
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Dubai International arbitration Centre (DIAC) rules will interact with each other when 
it comes to enforcement of arbitration awards.84
To date, the UAE courts have been quick to set aside arbitration awards and render 
their effect null and void. Before an arbitration award can be enforced it must be 
reviewed by a judge and “validated” by the UAE courts.85 This shows that UAE Law 
does not take the main principle (limitation of court intervention) of international 
commercial arbitration into consideration.
Palestine
Commercial arbitration law in Palestine has been derived from a variety of sources, 
mainly Ottoman, British and Jordanian law. Like other Middle East countries, Al- 
Majalla (the codified Islamic Law) is the applicable law in Palestine in civil and 
commercial matters.
During the British Mandate on Palestine, Britain began to revamp the Ottoman law in 
a variety of areas including the procedure and recognition of arbitrations.
“In Gaza, the Palestinian National (PNA) Authority administered the British 
Mandatory Arbitration Ordinance of 1926, “with pre-1967 legislation by the Egyptian 
governors and the Gaza Assembly, and PNA enactments” until 2000 Jordanian 
arbitration law No. 18 of 1953 governs the West Bank.”86
Arbitration law No. 3 of 2000 was promulgated in Palestine. The scope of this law 
covers both domestic and international arbitration, whether ad hoc or institutional 
commercial arbitration. Whilst Article 3 of the law considers the arbitration “internal” 
if the subject of the dispute is related to international commerce taking place in 
Palestine, it gives a very general definition for “international arbitration” to cover 
matters related to “Economic, Commercial and Civil matters” in the given conditions. 
This is similar to the position taken by the UAE in its broad definition of commercial 
activities and is consistent with the modem trends adopted in the UNCITRAL Model 
Law.
Another area showing similarities with modem trends is the law’s emphasis on the 
(separatability concept), where the arbitration clause remains valid even if the 
contract is null and void. Nevertheless, the law has been influenced by the concept of
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 See Marshall J. Breger, Shelby R. Quast (2000). International Commercial Arbitration: A Case Study 
of the Areas Under Control of The Palestinian Authority. Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law, pp. 8-9.
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statism. In certain cases defined in the law, the Ministry of Justice will appoint an 
arbitrator from its recognised arbitrators, list without mentioning the criteria or the 
qualifications for becoming an arbitrator.
The arbitral tribunal itself can ask the jurisdictional court for its interpretation 
regarding any issue raised during the arbitral process without a request from the 
parties. Also, the arbitral tribunal can act as (<amiable compsiture) and offer 
conciliation with or without a request from the parties. Such position reflects the 
collectivism concept of arbitration to maintain harmony of the society.
Despite the fact that the tribunal decision will be res judicata*1 the law does not 
determine the court of jurisdiction for submitting an application to set aside or for 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral decision, especially in case of international 
arbitration.
As regards the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, article 48 adds more 
difficulties on parties to enforce the arbitral award if the decision is not compatible 
with international conventions and agreements in force in Palestine. Such difficulties 
arise from the legal personality issue which prevents the Palestinian Authority from 
being a party in international conventions or treaties. Legislators could avoid such 
difficulties if the reciprocity principle was incorporated.
Libya
In 1970, a law was enacted which forbade the settlement by arbitration of disputes 
arising from administrative contracts. In 1972, the legislature realised that this had 
negative effects upon foreign investment, consequently, the law was repealed by law 
No. 49/1972. As a result, the arbitration of disputes arising only from administrative 
contracts concluded with foreign entities was permitted on an exceptional basis and 
following approval by the Popular Committees (which act as the Libyan Parliament). 
In 1973, legislation was enacted to authorise chambers of industry and commerce to 
conciliate and arbitrate between domestic or foreign parties who agree to submit their 
disputes to them. In 1975 legislation was enacted which conferred upon the Popular 
Committees a power to conciliate and arbitrate between citizens who agree to submit 
their disputes to them. However, according to articles 20 and 21 of the law on
87 It is a common law doctrine meant to bar re-litigation of cases between the same parties in court. In 
this respect it means the arbitral award is final.
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Petroleum Investments, which was promulgated by Law No. 25/1955, petroleum
disputes must be settled by arbitration, unless the parties agree otherwise.88
Sudan
Sudan has had an exceptional and different experience in formulating its legal system. 
It started by applying Ottoman law prior to becoming part of the British Empire in 
1898. In 1900, the British authorities enacted a procedural law which included a 
mixture of rules applied in some Indian provinces, some Ottoman rules, and rules 
applied in some British African colonies.
Since 1971 there has been a trend to distinguish Sudanese legislation from British 
influence. In that year, civil and procedural laws were enacted which were influenced 
by former Egyptian and French laws, replacing the previously applicable laws in these 
fields. However, in 1974 these laws were repealed and Sudan issued new laws that 
reflected the British laws.
Sudan’s law of arbitration is greatly influenced by English law. It permits arbitrators 
to seek the opinion of the courts in the disputes submitted to them; and they must 
abide by the court’s opinion. The courts are authorised to correct and amend the 
decisions of the arbitrators and to resubmit the cases to them for review. The courts 
may also set aside awards and adjudicate upon disputes themselves. The law does not 
permit arbitrators to settle the disputes as amiable compositors. It provides for 
compulsory conciliation before arbitration if the judge having jurisdiction so decides,
QQ
or if the agreement of the parties provides for it. International arbitration is not 
popular in Sudan mainly because of ineffective foreign direct investment activities. 
However, a strong feeling among members of the legal profession that it is necessary 
to enact a new and advanced law on arbitration to encourage foreign investments, 
especially in regard to oil exploration activities, has recently emerged.
Iraq
Iraq is typical of a mixed statutory approach. It applied the rules of the Majallah prior 
to British occupation. In 1915, the British authorities enacted a new system of law 
derived from laws applicable in India. In 1920, application of the Ottoman law was 
resumed and lasted until 1956. Since then, Iraq, in enacting new legislation, has 
drawn upon the following sources:
1. Islamic law according to the Hanafi doctrine;
88 op.cit. 19, p. 319.
89 Ibid., p. 320.
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2. English law;
3. Egyptian law;
4. Socialist laws providing for compulsory arbitration in disputes between public 
sector entities. In 1977, however, Iraq enacted a law requiring such disputes to 
be settled by administrative courts instead of by compulsory arbitration.
In 1965 Iraq enacted its Code of Civil and Commercial Procedures, which included in 
Articles 139-149 provisions on arbitration. In 1969, a new Code of Civil and 
Commercial Procedures was enacted. Chapter II deals with arbitration (Articles 251- 
276). The arbitration provisions resemble the old French-influenced Egyptian law. 
This situation has particular significance for international arbitration. Prevailing 
circumstances in Iraq during the last two decades have not encouraged reform of 
legislation in the relevant fields.90 
Qatar
For settlement of commercial disputes, Qatar is not a member of the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) known as the Washington 
Convention and is also not a signatory to the New York Convention of 1958 on the 
same subject. Qatar, however, accepts binding international arbitration of investment 
disputes between the Government of Qatar and foreign investors.91 Resorting to 
arbitration to solve disputes can be more binding if clearly stipulated in contracts. 
Effective Qatari laws -  Civil (Qatar Law of Procedure of 1990) and Shar’ia (Islamic 
law) - have provided mixed statutory means for arbitration. In Fujita Corporation vs.
Q 'J
The Qatar Ministry o f  Municipal Affairs and Agriculture (1995), the Court of
90 Ibid.
91 See Legal environment of Qatar, www.Armerican.edu/Qatar/legal environment.
92 Fujita Corporation of Japan entered into a contract with the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and 
Agriculture to build the University of Qatar. Article 67 of the contract between the two parties 
specified that any dispute arising between the parties should be referred to arbitration to be conducted 
according to the laws of the State of Qatar. Such dispute did arise and Fujita called on the Ministry to 
appoint its representative in the suggested arbitration tribunal to adjudge the dispute. When the 
Ministry replied negatively Fujita applied to the Higher Civil Court asking that the Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Agriculture be ordered to nominate its arbitrator. The Ministry responded by 
raising a number of objections to such action and the court decided after hearing both parties that 
Article 67 of the contract concluded between the two parties was null and void because at the time the 
contract was made there was no arbitration system in the State of Qatar, hence the Court’s decision that 
the only venue open to the parties was the Civil Court of Qatar. The court decided that it has the 
authority to look beyond the literal meaning of the text of Article 175 and refuse to end the proceeding 
if it appears that public interest demands such action. In this particular case it was apparent that the 
judgement of the Court of First Instance might have an adverse effect on the rights of persons who had 
entered into agreement to refer their dispute to arbitration before the passage of the 1990 law of 
Procedure. Further, the Court decided that as the aim of the legislature is to uphold the decision of the
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Appeal decided that the Civil Court was wrong and that the agreement to refer their 
dispute to arbitration was valid and lawful despite the argument raised that at the time 
of the contract there was no arbitration system in Qatar. To-date, Qatar does not have 
a special law of arbitration other than the Law of Procedure of 1990.
As consequences, Middle East countries rely on a vast and complex legal 
infrastructure for resolving disputes concerning their regional and international 
economic activities. Middle East counties cannot continue to abide by this 
inconsistent legal system, they have to consider the impact of their limited 
participation in the ever growing system of international arbitration. This situation has 
led such countries to challenge the existing legal framework, and crucial efforts to 
establish a coherent international commercial arbitration law in the region based on 
modem international commercial arbitration legislation become essential.
court of first instance and prevent the party who opts to abandon his appeal from starting new 
proceedings, the court shall have the authority to reject an application made under Article 175 of the 
law of Procedure if it can be proved that the aim was to serve a purpose other than that which was 
envisaged by the legislature. See Dr. Najeeb Bin Mohamad Ahmed El-Nauimi Law Office 
publications.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Adoption of UNCITRAL Model Law Principles
8.1 General Overview
As has been mentioned in the last chapter, five Middle Eastern countries (Bahrain, 
Egypt, Oman, Tunisia and Jordan) have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law in their 
jurisdictions. This chapter firstly will therefore examine why these five jurisdictions 
have introduced new arbitration rules based on UNCITRAL Model Law main 
principles, to what extent principles have been modified and implications for arbitral 
proceedings. As regards the first issue, economic and jurisprudence factors were 
behind the adoption of the Model Law in Bahrain, Egypt, Oman, Tunisia and Jordan. 
Bahrain adopted exactly the same provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law in the 
Appendix to its law No. 9 of 1994 to promote economic development.
Tunisian arbitration legislation was governed for a long time by the Code of Civil and 
Commercial Procedures 1959 Articles (258-284). The previous the 1910 Code has 
been silent on the subject of arbitration, probably because this was appropriate to the 
nature of the legal system in force at that time (before independence), which was the 
inquisitorial system.1
Under the French protectorate, scattered laws regulated arbitration in specific fields, 
such as the decree of 30 December 1935 relating to arbitration of disputes between 
tribes on collective lands.
After independence, and following promulgation of the Civil and Commercial 
Procedures Code in 1959 (CPCC), arbitration drew the attention of Tunisian 
legislators, and 25 articles were subsequently devoted to arbitration, its procedure and 
the enforcement of arbitral awards. At that time, the legal system regulating 
arbitration was inspired by French law.
Shortcomings of the CPCC included ambiguity of certain provisions, complexity of 
remedies at law, and numerous lacunae, particularly in the international context, 
which were dealt with by only one section, namely, section 277, which merely treated 
an award made abroad as a foreign judgement for the purpose of the authorisation of 
enforcement.
1 See Abedwahab El-Behi (2003). Analysis of the Tunisian Arbitration Code. International Business 
Lawyer. British library, p. 25. (An inquisitorial system is a legal system where the court or a part of the 
court is actively involved in determining the facts of the case, as opposed to an adversarial systems 
where the role of the court is solely that of an impartial referee between parties.).
2 Ibid.
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Due to increasing awareness of the importance of a procedure for settling disputes, 
particularly with regard to foreign parties, reform became necessary. The authorities 
set up a Reform Commission in 1977. Unanimously, legal theorists, decision-makers 
and practitioners called for the updating, simplification and clarification of the 
existing legislation. It was necessary to promote the independence, effectiveness and 
continuity of arbitration, while at the same time ensuring the protection of the parties.3 
In recent years, globalisation and the growing interdependence of economies and 
opening of markets encouraged Tunisian legislators to provide several guarantees to 
both foreign and national investors. The appearance of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
accelerated the decision to revise the texts of international arbitration laws.
The major initiative was in the form of the draft submitted to the Tunis Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, which favoured the setting-up of a Centre for Conciliation 
and Arbitration, which would be primarily concerned with domestic arbitration. The 
Tunis-French Chamber of Commerce and the Bar Association had on their side 
established think-tanks on the subject.4
Tunisian legislators then began to consider reform and update of both internal and 
international arbitration due to arbitrations’ increasing importance in the new 
economic policy of Tunisia, particularly with regard to international relations where 
recourse to arbitration is intended to be a fundamental legal safeguard granted by 
Tunisia, as the host country, to foreign investors.5
The modernisation of arbitration has been combined with prudence; the system is 
dualistic, consists of two fundamental sections, one for international arbitration and 
the other for domestic arbitration. With regard to international arbitration, and the 
adoption of the principles of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the legislature took to heart 
the statement of one writer who stated, ‘to accept rules proposed by a world body is to 
show conformism of the right kind’.6 As a result, 26 April 1993 marked a turning 
point for arbitration in Tunisia. Law No. 42 of 1993 created a Code related to
n
arbitration that entered into force six months after its promulgation.
Many other measures were also taken, such as signing of an association agreement 
with the European Union in 1995 and adoption of WTO agreements, revision of the
3 See Kalthoum Meziou (1995). The Tunisian Code of Arbitration. MECLR. British Library, p.55.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 See supra note 1, p. 25.
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Trade Code, and promulgation of laws on Competition and Intellectual Property. 
Being based on the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law, the legislators’ 
intention was to harmonise Tunisian arbitration law with that of the international 
community.8
Arbitration in Oman was not codified. It was governed by the Muslim Ibadite 
doctrine9 (Modem Khawarij10 are sometimes called Ibadites after Abu Allah Ibn Ibad 
(ca.660-ca.715)) whereby arbitration agreements are considered valid but not binding, 
contrary to arbitral awards which it held to be binding on the parties.11 
Jurisprudence filled this gap by incorporating precise provisions, which organised and 
governed arbitration, into the Sultanate Decree No. 32 of 1984. This laid down the 
statutes of the Board for Settlement of Commercial Disputes. An entire chapter 
(Articles 59-68) is devoted to arbitration.12 This was the first time arbitration law in 
Oman was codified.
When law-makers noted that the absence of a neutral body to settle disputes in 
international commercial contracts could be an obstacle to the development of 
investment in Oman, they endorsed arbitration, granting national and international 
guarantees to foreign investments, by providing for means to resort to arbitration. 
When Omani jurisprudence and law-makers conceived of a modem and advanced 
Arbitration Act, applied the fundamental rule of Muslim law that “It must be possible
1 'Xto make easy what is difficult”.
With particular relevance and importance to foreign companies conducting business 
in Egypt, the law-makers recognised that the arbitration provisions of the Code on 
Civil and Commercial Procedure were archaic and impractical,14 and there was 
therefore a need for reform and to modernise arbitration law and procedural. They
8 Ibid.
9 A full examination of the Ibadite fiqh would be of the highest interest, as the separation of its line of 
descent goes far the formation of any of the orthodox systems and it must have been codified to a 
greater or less extent by Abd Allah ibn Ibad himself. See the development of Muslim theology. 
www. sacred-text. com.
10Meaning “those that seceded” were members of the earliest sect in Islam that left the followers of Ali. 
Khawarij considered that Ali made a mistake in looking for a compromise with Mu’awiya. For this 
reason they are not considered as Shi’ite by some commentators. See Kharijite Islam, 
www.GlobalSecuritv.org
11 See Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab (1997). The New Omani Arbitration Act in Civil and Commercial 
Matters. Journal o f International Arbitration. British Library, p.59. See Article 14 of Sultanate Decree 
No. 32 of 1984.
12 Ibid.
13 See Alastair J. Hirst (1995). Court Decisions on Commercial Arbitration in the Sultanate of Oman. 
Middle East Commercial Law Review, vol. 1 No. 2. p.77.
14 See The New Egyptian arbitration law (1995). Middle East Fox & Gibbons. British Library, p. 62.
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aimed to provide a detailed and modem procedural framework for all arbitration 
conducted in Egypt or any international commercial arbitration conducted abroad 
where the parties agree to submit to the provisions of the 1994 Law, in order to bring 
Egypt in line with the various international conventions on arbitration to which it is a 
party.
To achieve these aims, the law-makers adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law with 
limited modifications. On 18 April 1994, the Egyptian People’s Assembly enacted 
Law No. 27 of 1994 on Civil and Commercial Arbitration. The new law came into 
force on 22 May 1994.15
Jordanian Law of 1953 was outdated and suffered from deficiencies. The same 
economic argument was used to reform Jordanian arbitration law as was used in the 
context of Egypt. Jordan’s law-makers promulgated Arbitration law No. 31 of 2001. 
This law does not distinguish between domestic and international arbitration. Notably, 
Jordan is party to two standard international arbitration conventions: the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other 
States, and the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards. Jordan also signed and ratified the Arab Convention on the 
Enforcement of Judgements. At this point in time, the general observation is that 
moving towards the international harmonisation process is achievable.
8.2 UNCITRAL Model Law Operative Standards: Main Features 
This section will examine how the four main principles and standards of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law (the scope of application, party autonomy, strengthening 
tribunal power, and restriction of court intervention) have been introduced into Egypt, 
Oman, Tunisia and Jordan, respectively. Bahrain will not be examined since it has 
adopted the exact version of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Comparison with the 
Model Law will be made to determine whether there have been areas of 
modifications, and if so, their implications.
15 See Tarek F. Riad (2000). Arbitration and Legal Business Environment in Egypt. Journal of 
International Arbitration 17(5): 169-191, p. 180.
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8.2.1 Scope of Application
8.2.1.1 Commercial
In defining the term “commercial”, the UNCITRAL Model Law provides, in a 
footnote to Article 1, that the term should be given broad interpretation in the context 
of arbitration.16
The definition of "commercial" under the Egyptian Arbitration Law 1994 is consistent 
with the UNCITRAL Model Law’s philosophy. However, some distinctions are 
discernible. Whilst the UNCITRAL Law's definition of "commercial" is in a footnote 
to Article 1, under the Egyptian Arbitration Law of 1994, the definition of 
"commercial" is a substantive provision.17
The UNCITRAL Model uses the word "commercial" to describe the nature of the 
legal relationship covered by it. The Egyptian Law has replaced this with more 
expansive wording, that arbitration is commercial if the dispute arises out of a legal
• • « i  o  ,relationship having an “economic nature”. What is "commercial" under the Egyptian 
Law is intended to be all-inclusive.
The economic nature of a legal relationship is the applicable criteria rather than the 
traditional one.19 The law renders or deems commercial many, if not most, activities 
which are strictly speaking civil under the Egyptian Commercial Law. It is also clear 
that activities provided for in Article (2)20 are not exclusive; these have been listed as
16 Model Law, Article 1, supra note 112:
The term “commercial” should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising from all 
relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not. Relationships of a commercial nature 
include, but are not limited to, the following transactions: any trade transactions for the supply or 
exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial representation or agency; factoring; 
leasing; construction of works; consulting; engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; 
insurance; exploitation agreement or concession; joint venture and other forms of industrial or business 
cooperation; carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail or road.
17 See Article 2 of the 1994 law.
18Under Article (2) of this law, an arbitration is commercial if the dispute concerns a legal relationship 
of an economic nature, contractual or non-contractual, such as the supply of commodities or services, 
commercial agency, construction works, engineering or technical expertise, industrial or tourist 
licensing, the transfer of technology, investment, development contracts, banking operations, insurance, 
carriage, the exploration and extraction of natural resources, the supply of energy, the laying of gas and 
oil pipelines, the construction of roads and tunnels, the reclamation of agricultural land, the protection 
of the environment and the construction of nuclear reactors.
19 See Mahmoud Samir El-Sharkawi, (1999). New Trends in Egyptian Law. Journal o f International 
Arbitration 16(l):5-24. British library, p.8.
20Article (2) provides, arbitration is commercial if the dispute concerns a legal relationship of an 
economic nature, contractual or non-contractual, such as the supply of commodities or services, 
commercial agency, construction works, engineering or technical expertise, industrial or tourist 
licensing, technology transfer, investment, development contracts, banking operations, insurance, 
carriage, the exploration and extraction of natural resources, the supply of energy, the laying of gas and 
oil pipelines, the construction of roads and tunnels, the reclamation of agricultural land, the protection 
of the environment and the construction of nuclear reactors.
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examples only. It can be concluded that Egyptian law has taken the UNCITRAL 
position that the term commercial should be given a wide interpretation. Accordingly, 
now most disputes concerning contractual and non-contractual relationships may also 
be submitted to arbitration with the exception of administrative contracts as will be 
discussed later.
The Tunisian law of 1993 makes no reference whatever to the commercial element: 
the validity of the arbitration agreement therefore comes down in essence to the 
question whether the dispute is capable of arbitration.21 The Tunisian law adopts the 
former standard principles of 1959 (Civil and Commercial Procedure Code) CPCC. 
Matters relating to public policy, disputes concerning nationality or personal status, 
and matters where compromise is impossible are excluded from arbitration. Under 
Article 7, the State, local authorities and public establishments of an administrative 
character are still prohibited from referring disputes to arbitration, but this prohibition 
is limited to internal relations. Consequently, Tunisian arbitration law confirms the 
Middle East tendency towards statism and has not adopted the UNCITRAL principle 
of wide interpretation of the term commercial.
The Omani Arbitration Act of 1997 presents a broad definition of commercial
• • 00arbitration and gives the concept “commercial” an economic meaning. The principle
adopted by the Act is that arbitration is not allowed in matters which cannot be subject
00to compromise. Omani law has adopted a general principle in this respect. However, 
some difficulties remain because there is no clear distinction between matters which 
can be subject to compromise and arbitral matters. In some matters, which cannot be 
subject to compromise, there is doubt as to the possibility to resort to arbitration, even 
within the framework of the 1997 Act.24
The Jordanian law of 2001 was inspired by Articles 1(1), 7(1) of the Model Law as 
well as articles (land 10) of Egyptian law. It provides that, “the provisions of this law 
shall apply to every conventional arbitration conducted in the Kingdom and to civil or 
commercial disputes between parties of public or private law persons whatever the 
legal relationship ( contractual or not).”
21 op.cit. 3, p. 56.
22 See (Article 2) of the Omani law of 1997.
23 op.cit. 10, p. 61.
24 Ibid., p.62.
25 Article (3) of Jordanian Law.
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The point to be emphasised here is that the law has followed the principles of 
UNCITRAL Model Law. In addition, the term commercial has been given wider 
interpretation than that by the other three countries as the law shall be applied to all 
commercial disputes with narrow interpretation of the civil term (taking into 
consideration that the law cannot be applied to all disputes in relation to personal 
matters) and wide interpretation of the commercial term. More importantly, it will be 
applied to commercial disputes raised in relation to administrative contract. Thus, 
Jordan is giving up the concept of statism in this regard, a significant step towards 
meeting the principles of the Model Law
8.2.1.2 International
Egypt’s and Oman’s laws have adopted exactly the same wording in defining 
“international” arbitration. In this respect, whatever will apply in Egypt will apply in 
Oman. To understand the position of both Egyptian and Omani law, it useful to 
compare the relevant provisions of the Model Law, with the corresponding provisions 
of Egypt’s and Oman’s arbitration laws. The Model Law deems arbitration to be 
“international”26 in three cases.27
The first is where the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of the 
conclusion of that agreement, their places of business in different states. The second is 
where one of the following places is situated outside the state in which the parties 
have their place of business: the place of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, 
the arbitration agreement; any place where a substantial part of the obligations of the 
commercial relationship is to be performed; or the place with which the subject-matter 
of the dispute is most closely connected. The third is where the parties have expressly 
agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration relates to more than one country. 
Egyptian and Omani arbitration laws have modified the criteria of “international” 
given in the Model Law by adding a fourth criterion which must always exist with the
? o
other three. In doing so, their laws, as in most of their provisions have been to a
26 Arbitration is “international” if the parties “have their places of business in different states,” the place 
of arbitration or substantive part of the relationship is outside the state in which the parties have their 
business, or “if the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement 
relates to more than one country.” Article 1 (3) of the Model Law.
27 See Mahmoud Samir El-Sharkawi, (1999). New Trends in Egyptian Arbitration Law. Journal of 
International Arbitration, vol. 16, No. 1. Kluwer Law International, p. 9.
28 An arbitration will thus be considered "international" whenever its subject-matter is a dispute related 
to "international commerce" in any of the following cases:
1. If the principal places of business of the two parties to the arbitration are situated in two 
different States at the time of the conclusion of the arbitration agreement.
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great extent influenced by the philosophy of the Model Law, while at the same time 
retaining many unique provisions. The definition of “international” in Article (3) of 
the Egyptian and Omani Laws is process-specific (regulated by a range of sectors).29 
Under these two laws, arbitration is deemed international if its subject-matter 
concerns a dispute related to “international trade”.30 The two laws have also provided 
for another case which does not exist under the Model Law; if the parties agree to 
submit their dispute to a permanent arbitral institution situated in [Egypt- Oman] or 
abroad. It should be emphasised that in order to deem arbitration as international, the 
subject-matter of the dispute must always and essentially be related to international 
trade according to the four cases stated in article (3). Three cases are taken from the 
Model law and a fourth has been added by the two countries’ arbitration law.32 
Accordingly, the Arbitration Law applies to arbitrations having their venue in Egypt/ 
Oman as well as to those arbitrations taking place abroad, and to which the parties 
have agreed to apply the provisions of the Law. It should be noted here that the Laws 
differ from the Model Law, which applies only to arbitrations taking place in the state 
adopting it. It should also be emphasised that the application of this Law to 
arbitrations taking place in Egypt and Oman is by no means mandatory. The Law is 
based on the principle of 'party autonomy'; thus, parties may agree to apply a foreign
• 'X'Xprocedural or substantive law to an arbitration taking place in Egypt or Oman.
The importance of determining whether arbitration is international or domestic can be 
seen in the following examples:
2. If the parties to the arbitration have agreed to resort to a permanent arbitral organisation or to
an arbitration centre having its headquarters in the Arab Republic of Egypt or abroad.
3. If the subject matter of the dispute falling within the scope of the arbitral agreement is linked 
to more than one State.
4. If the principal places of business of the two parties to the arbitration are situated in the same 
State [and, it may be noted, not necessarily in the Arab Republic of Egypt] at the time of the 
conclusion of the arbitration agreement, but one o f the following places is located outside the 
said State:
a) the place o f arbitration as determined in the arbitration agreement or pursuant to the 
methods provided therein for determining it;
b) the place where a substantial part of the obligations emerging from the commercial 
relationship between the parties shall be performed;
c) the place with which the subject matter of the dispute is most closely linked.
29 See Kamel Ben Salah (2000). An Overview of the Tunisian Arbitration Regulations. Journal of
International Arbitration, vol. 17, No. 3. Kluwer Law International. 19, p. 141.
30 See Article 3 of the Egyptian Law of 1994.
31 See Article 3 (ii) of the Egyptian Law of 1994.
32 op.cit. 26, p. 10.
33 See M.I.M. Aboul-Enein. (1999). The Development of International Commercial Arbitration Laws in
the Arab World. Arbitration. Vol. 65(4) British Library, p. 315.
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According to the first paragraph of Article 9 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law, in 
matters referred to the ordinary courts for arbitration, unless otherwise agreed upon, 
the competent court is, in the case of domestic arbitration, the one which possesses 
original jurisdiction and, in the case of international arbitration, the Cairo Court of 
Appeal. In the Omani case, for domestic arbitration, the commercial court is the court 
of jurisdiction, and in the case of international arbitration, the Appeal Division of the 
Commercial Court will have the jurisdiction.
According to the first paragraph of Article 54 of the Egyptian law, and according to 
the same Article in Omani law, a legal action for annulment of an arbitral award must 
be brought, in the case of an “international” arbitration, before the Cairo Court of 
Appeal or any other the parties select, and in the case of domestic arbitration, it must 
be brought before the Court of Appeal that would have had the original jurisdiction.34 
These two examples reflect the intention of legislatures in both countries to give 
international arbitration fast procedures to reduce time and cost consumption.
The Tunisian law of 1993 is formally divided into three parts: Chapter 1 (common 
provision), chapter 2 (domestic arbitration), and chapter 3 (international arbitration), 
but the chapters are not completely harmonised. The arbitration will be “international” 
according to the definition given in Article 48 of the law.
Similar articles are found between chapters 2 and 3, dealing with domestic and 
international arbitration. Such lack of harmony is explained by the aim of adopting as 
many provisions of the Model Law as possible without alteration and in the same 
sequence. In this respect, conformism may have been taken far. In other words, 
within the Tunisian law many UNCITRAL Model Law articles have been introduced 
although not in the same sequence as in the Model Law. Rather, they have been 
repeated more frequently for domestic as well as for international arbitration 
procedures.
The validity of an arbitration agreement concluded by the state depends on whether it 
is international. Here there is a problem of reconciliation between Articles 7 and 48. 
The latter begins by repeating in full the definition in the Model Law.36 Arbitration is 
international if the contract relates to international commerce or the flow of money 
and goods across borders; but international arbitration may also be contractual, that is,
34 op.cit. 26, p. 10.
35 op.cit. 3, p. 55.
36 See Article (3) of the Model Law.
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decided on by the parties merely by situating the place of arbitration abroad or 
stipulating the existence of connections with more than one country. After repeating 
the list found in the Model Law, the wording of the Tunisian law avoids excessive 
details and adds a general definition: arbitration is international if ‘generally, it 
concerns international commerce’, thus adopting the principle of Article 149237 of the 
French Code of Civil Procedure.
Article 7 proceeds differently; it recognises an arbitration agreement in a contract 
concluded by the state where international relations of an economic, commercial or 
financial nature are involved. Here, the international element does not concern the 
arbitration, but the relationship itself. This is an objective concept which excludes 
contractual stipulation for international arbitration.38 Thus, any agreement is valid for 
commercial arbitration if it involves international relations irrespective of its 
contractual stipulation.
However, Article 47 (1) excludes from the scope of Tunisian Law the application of 
international arbitration proceedings organised under multilateral or bilateral 
conventions, including specific provisions on international arbitration.
Accordingly, all disputes which are regulated by any bilateral or multilateral treaty 
which includes specific provisions on arbitration settlement are excluded from the 
scope of application of the Tunisian Law.
One of the important implications of making the distinction between domestic and 
international arbitration is that the rules relating to international arbitration differ from 
those applicable to domestic arbitration. In domestic arbitration, arbitrators are 
entitled to rule on their own jurisdiction, but appeal against their decision is only 
possible in conjunction with an appeal against their final award (Article 26).
Another difference is found in Article 46, which states that the provisions of the Civil 
and Commercial Procedure Code apply in domestic arbitration (as long as they are not 
contrary to the provisions of the law) whereas such provisions do not apply as such to 
international arbitration.40 This ensures the enforcement of a final arbitral award 
without the interference of other domestic legislations.
37 Article 1492 of the France-Code of Civil Procedure-Book IV. Arbitration in force in 14 May 1981. It 
states, “arbitration is international if it implicates international commercial interest.” See UN. 
www.lexmercatoria.org.
38 op.cit. 3, p. 56.
39 op.cit. 28, p. 141.
40 Ibid.
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Unlike the three other arbitration laws, the Jordanian arbitration law of 2001 does not 
distinguish between domestic and international arbitration. Furthermore, the law has 
restricted the applicability of the Civil Procedure Act for nullifying the arbitral award. 
According to Article (48), “arbitral awards rendered in accordance with the provisions 
of this law may not be challenged by any of the means provided for in the Law of 
Civil Procedures. However, an action for nullification of the arbitral award may be 
instituted in accordance with the provisions of Articles 49, 50 and 51 of this law”. 
This article significantly assure international party that the enforcement of a final 
arbitral award will not be subject to any other domestic legislations other than in cases 
mentioned in the 2001 Law.
8.2.1.3 Administrative Contract
A significant point of introducing the Model Law in the Middle East region is the 
position taken regarding arbitrability of administrative contracts41. The following 
section will show that arbitration is considered perfectly legal in administrative 
contracts in Egypt, Oman, Tunisia and Jordan, where the state or government is a 
party. The point to be emphasised here is that modification to the Model Law has 
been made to retain some state control over the arbitration process. Such 
modifications represent and reflect the legal culture concerning international contract 
principles in the Middle East.
As regards the nature of the parties to whom the Arbitration Law is addressed, Article 
1 of the Egyptian 1994 law indicates that the Law shall apply to all arbitrations in 
Egypt, between public or private law persons, notwithstanding the nature of the legal 
relationship giving rise to the dispute.42 Thus, the Law will be applicable if one or 
both parties are public sector bodies. As for the nature of the dispute, it is permissible 
for the parties to agree to refer disputes concerning civil, commercial or 
administrative contracts to arbitration.43
41 “Administrative contract” includes an agreement in which: at least one of the parties is an 
administrative agency or a person acting on behalf of the State, which exhibits the characteristics of 
a concession contract; or a public service contract; or a contract for the provision of public utilities; or a 
contract for the exploitation of natural resources.
42 See Amazu A. Asouzu, (1996). The Egyptian Law Concerning Arbitration in civil and Commercial 
Matters. African Journal o f International and Comparative Law. vol.8, No. 1, p. 140.
43 See Notes: Domestic Courts’ Obligation to Refer Parties to Arbitration. Arbitration International. 
vol. 17.No. 3, p. 315.
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Furthermore, Article 1 has wider implications, not only as it relates to a situation 
where the State of Egypt or its administrative organs and a private party are involved 
in an arbitration to be conducted in Egypt, whatever the legal relationship might be, 
but, also, where the commercial arbitration has an international dimension and is to be 
conducted abroad, on the agreement of the parties. In this situation, the Law will be 
applicable even if the State or its organ and a private party are involved.44 
Thus, the Law brings into the scope of its application disputes arising from 
administrative contracts between the government of Egypt or any public sector entity 
and private entity. This position reverses a decision rendered by Egypt’s 
Administrative Court on 20 February 1990, which stated that disputes arising from 
administrative contracts involving the government or any public entity could not be 
settled by arbitration 45
There should therefore be no doubt from the phrase “regardless of the nature of the 
legal relationship of the dispute” that the Arbitration Law is applicable to disputes 
arising from civil, commercial or even administrative contracts. However, some 
opinions doubt the application of this Law to administrative contracts, even with the 
express statement found in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Arbitration Law draft 
which states that disputes arising from contracts between private or public persons 
may be subject to this Arbitration Law.
This certainly should have eliminated any controversy, because, first, the conseil 
d ’state  (State Council) Law allows disputes arising from administrative contracts to be 
submitted to arbitration, and second, there have been several concurring legal 
opinions issued by the Legal Opinion Department of the State Council.
However, and in spite of these, there have been controversial judgements to the 
contrary by the administrative courts 46 An opinion of the Legal Opinion Department 
determined that disputes arising from administrative contracts may not be submitted 
to arbitration, thus altering the Department’s previous opinion 47 
As a result, the Arbitration Law was amended by Law No. 9 of 1997 enacted on 13 
May 1997 to confirm its original position, and to emphasise that disputes arising from 
administrative contracts may be referred to arbitration, subject to the approval of the
44 op.cit. 41, p. 140.
45 See Skalakany law office, Cairo. (1995). New Arbitration law in Egypt. Arbitration and Dispute 
Resolution Law Journal, vol. 1. British Library, p.74.
46 op.cit. 26, p.6.
47 op.cit. 42. p. 315.
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minister having jurisdiction. It is even permissible, according to Article 10(1), to refer 
non-contractual disputes to arbitration.48
The 1997 Law added another paragraph to Article 1 of the Arbitration Law, providing 
the following:
“Concerning disputes related to administrative contracts, the agreement 
to submit such dispute to arbitration must be by the consent of the 
competent minister, or whoever enjoys similar authorities with regard to 
public entities, and in this regard, delegation of power is not 
permissible.”49
It is clear from the above text that the amendment has not established a new rule, as 
the administrative contract is subject to arbitration. This was expressly determined 
and well settled by Article 1 of the Arbitration Law. The only new rule established by 
the amendment is the essential requirement for a competent minister’s consent or that 
of whomever enjoys similar authority as previously stated.
According to Article 1, it is also clear that both contractual and non-contractual 
disputes should be submitted to arbitration. This is confirmed where this law allows 
the conclusion of an arbitration agreement before a dispute arises and is valid whether 
it exists as a clause in a contract or it is a separate agreement. It is also possible to 
conclude an arbitration agreement after a dispute arises and even if a related action is 
pending before the courts (Article 10)50
The Cairo Court of Appeal's decision on 19 March 1997 in Commercial Case No. 64
tliof the 113 (1993) judicial year rendered an important judgement concerning the
legality of arbitration in disputes relating to Egyptian administrative contracts. The 
Court indicated that the agreement to refer disputes to administrative contracts to 
arbitration is perfectly legal.51
48 Ibid.
49 op.cit. 26, p. 6.
50 See Habib Malouche (1991). Recent Development in Arbitration law in Tunisia. Journal of 
International Arbitration, vol.8 (2) 23-31. British library, p. 26.
51 The Court of Appeal reiterated that the government authority’s claim that the arbitration clause in an 
administrative contract is null and void despite being signed by this same governmental authority, is 
not only illegal, but is equally contrary to the principle of the necessity to execute the obligation in 
good faith whether in civil or in administrative contracts.
Further, the Court added that such claim was also contrary to the agreed upon rules relating to 
international commercial arbitration, that the State or the governmental authority cannot refrain from 
applying an arbitration clause contained in its own contracts by relying on local legislative constraints 
and that adoption of the opposite view would also affect the confidence that must prevail in their 
dealings with other parties and also negatively affects foreign investments. See Tareq F. Raid (2000). 
Arbitration and the Legal Business Environment in Egypt. Journal o f International Arbitration, vol. 17, 
No. 5 Kluwer Law International, pp. 180-181.
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The Omani 1997 Law took the Egyptian position; it explicitly provides that juristic 
persons of public law may enter into an agreement to arbitrate. Under the Omani Law, 
State organisations may enter into agreements to arbitrate without any need for a later 
approval. It has been argued that a State - whatever its strength - is in a very strong 
position against a co-contracting party because it will generally draft the clause of the 
contract and the general conditions,52 which protects the State and juristic person53 of 
the public law. Under such conditions, the insertion of an arbitration clause will have 
no consequences for the interests of the state and will not prejudice its sovereignty. 
However, Omani law has not covered the question of the capacity of foreigners to 
enter into an agreement to arbitrate, nor the question of which law is to be applied in 
order for them to do so.54 Omani arbitration law does not mention the capacity 
required of private law persons to enter into a valid agreement to arbitrate and, 
consequently, the provisions of Shari ’a are applied. This means that the signature to 
such an agreement requires the capacity to dispose of one’s rights.55 Therefore, 
minors and persons under a disability, a person suffering from a terminal illness and 
bankrupts may not resort to arbitration.
According to Tunisia’s Arbitration Law of 1993, the legislature distinguished between 
domestic and international arbitration. The State, government agencies and other 
public entities are not entitled to submit to arbitration in domestic cases, but they are 
entitled to do so in international cases with respect to disputes arising from 
international relations of an economic or financial nature which are governed by 
Chapter Three of the Tunisian Arbitration law of 1993.
The law adds one condition that submission to international arbitration by the public 
entities is governed by the Prime Minister’s circular letter dated 20 June 1994, which 
recommends inter alia:
- to use Tunisian law and Tunisian arbitration regulations;
- to refer to arbitral institutions in Tunisia; and
- to avoid amiable composition clauses.
52 op.cit. 10, p. 62.
53 This relates to organisations of public law, which are gatherings of people, and foundations, which 
are gatherings of property, as entities that can be subjects of rights. This enables organisations, etc. to 
participate in transactions in the name of the organisation and to own immovable assets, and simplifies 
the processing of legal matters.
54 op.cit. 10, p. 63.
55 Ibid.
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The Jordanian Arbitration Law of 2001 also applies to arbitrations to which the 
government is party.56 Jordanian law provides that capacity is required for those who 
enter into a valid arbitration contract, and they cannot enter into arbitration in matters
C *7
that can be settled by conciliation.
8.2.1.4 Separatability Clause
A Separatability clause relates to the validity of the arbitration clause, where the 
arbitration contract is null and void. This principle is considered one of the main 
features of the UNCITRAL Model Law. In general, in the Middle East when the 
contract is considered null and void this covers all the terms and conditions of such 
contract, including the arbitration clause. It is important to examine the attitude of the 
four jurisdictions of Egypt, Oman, Tunisia and Jordan towards this principle.
The Egyptian Law of 1994, like the Model Law, recognises that an arbitration clause 
is independent of and separate from the other contractual obligations so that the 
nullity, rescission or termination of the contract shall not affect the arbitration clause, 
provided the latter is valid per se.59
The Court of Appeal's decision on 31 December 1997 in Case No. 62 of the 113th 
(1993) judicial year confirmed this principle. It rendered a judgement which indicated 
that Article 23 of the Arbitration Law of 1994 provided that, "the Arbitral Clause is 
deemed to be an agreement that is independent from the other conditions of the 
contracts and that nullity, rescission or termination of the contract shall not affect the 
arbitral clause therein, provided such clause is valid per se". The Court thus decided 
that nullity, rescission or termination of the contract does not have any effect on the 
arbitral clause under consideration.60
Article 10 (3) of the Omani Arbitration law of 1993 adopted the same position. The 
doctrine of autonomy or severability of the arbitration clause is based on the idea that
this clause is a contract within the contract; in other words, arbitration clauses are a
contract equivalent to the basic contract. Thus, the judge of the main issues is the 
judge of the ancillary issue and the judge of the contract is also the judge of the 
arbitration clause contract.61 According to the Omani law of 1993, where reference is 
made in a contract to another document containing an arbitration clause, this is
56 See Article (3) of the 2001 law.
57 See Article (9) of the 2001 law.
58 See Article (23) of the Arbitration law of 1994.
59 op.cit. 41. p. 148.
60 op.cit. 14, p. 181.
61 op.cit. 10, p. 63.
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considered a valid agreement to arbitrate, provided that such reference clearly makes 
such a clause an integral part of the contract.62
The Omani law also provides that the arbitration clause is an independent agreement, 
separate from the other clauses of the contract. The law authorises the arbitral tribunal 
to settle the question of its own jurisdiction whenever a defect in the arbitration clause 
is argued. One reason for this is that the law cuts short any dilatory tactics. As a result, 
it will ensure the arbitration goes smoothly, avoiding the situation where one of the 
parties refuses to participate in it. Consequently, the arbitral tribunal has no 
jurisdiction. The law provides that the fact that a party appoints its arbitrator or 
participates in his appointment does not deprive it from the right to raise such an 
argument.63
The Tunisian law of 1993 and Jordanian Law of 2001 took the same position 
regarding the independence of the arbitration clause from the contract. According to 
Article 22 of the Jordanian law, “an arbitration clause shall be treated as an agreement 
independent of the other terms of the contract. The nullity, revocation or termination 
of the contract shall not affect the arbitral clause therein, if such clause is valid by 
itself.”
Regarding this point, the Tunisian Law of 1993 once again distinguishes between 
“international arbitration” and “domestic arbitration”. Whilst Article 61 authorises 
arbitrators in “international arbitration” to decide their own jurisdiction in relation to 
the arbitration agreement, nullity and revocation of the contract will not affect the 
arbitration clause and will be treated independently from other terms of the contract. 
In Article 3 the legislator validates the arbitration clause based on the contractual 
agreement. Further, if the arbitration clause is contained in another contract relevant 
and equivalent to the basic contract, the latter must be mentioned without any 
ambiguity that the arbitration clause is valid per se.
8.2.2 Party Autonomy
The second main strand in the UNCITRAL Model Law places emphasis upon party 
autonomy by allowing parties the freedom to choose how their disputes should be 
determined. In this section, validity, scope and limitation of choice of law by the party 
will be examined in the four cited jurisdictions (Egypt, Oman, Tunisian and Jordan).
62 Ibid., p. 61.
63 Ibid., p. 63.
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Party autonomy in this context is defined as “the autonomy of the parties to decide on 
all aspects of an international arbitration procedure. These concepts are expressly 
provided in the articles of the Model Law which provide the parties with the 
autonomy to agree on: “the composition of the arbitral tribunal”, “the conduct of 
arbitral proceedings, and “the rules applicable to the substance of the dispute”. 64
8.2.2.1 Autonomy to Determine the Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal 
Nationality of Arbitrators
Under the Model Law, parties are given the autonomy to choose the arbitrator 
provided that “no person shall be precluded by reason of his nationality from acting as 
an arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.”65 While the Tunisian Law, 
Article 56 (1) confirms party autonomy without any modification in this respect, the 
Omani law, Article 16 (2), Egyptian law Article 16 (2) and Jordanian Law Article 15 
(B), have modified the provision in the Model law by omitting one of the classical 
restrictions found in Islamic Shari ’a law, that arbitrators have to have the same 
capacity as judges, i.e. they have to be “male, wise, free, Muslim and fair”. These 
three laws provide that it is not required that the arbitrator be of a “given gender” or 
“nationality” unless the parties agree otherwise.66 This clearly means that an arbitrator 
may be a male or female and may be a national or foreigner.
Number of Arbitrators
The Model Law provides in Article (10) that the parties can determine the number of 
arbitrators; however, if the parties do not provide for the number of arbitrators, the
r n
“number shall be three.” Under the Egyptian Arbitration Law Article 15(1), the 
parties are allowed to determine the composition of the arbitral tribunal and the 
appointment of a sole arbitrator or more than one arbitrator, and in the absence of 
such agreement their number must be three. Omani Law under Article 15(1) and 
Jordanian law under Article 14(a) have taken the same position. Under Egyptian 
Article 15 (2), Omani law Article 15 (2), and Jordanian law article 14(b), if the 
arbitrators are more than one their number must be uneven otherwise the arbitration
64 See Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, (1997).The Role of Party autonomy in International Arbitration. 
Dispute Resolution Journal (The Principle of party autonomy is fundamental to arbitration in general 
and to international arbitration in particular), pp. 28-29.
65 See Article (11) of the Model Law.
66 See Article 16 (2) of the Omani law of 1993, Egyptian law of 1994 and Article 15(B) of the 
Jordanian Law of 2001.
67 See Model Law Article 10. For the text of the Model Law, see UNCITRAL Model Law 40th Session. 
Supp. (No. 17), annex I, U.N. Doc A/40/17.
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will be null and void. Tunisian Law Article 55 provides that the arbitrator number 
must be uneven, and in the absence of agreement the number must be three. 
Accordingly, the laws in these countries adopt the principle of party autonomy and 
provide that the parties are free to agree upon the number of arbitrators. There is no 
requirement for an arbitrator to be of a particular gender or nationality, unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties or determined by these laws. These arbitration laws 
only intervene if the parties are unable to choose the arbitrators.
Majority Rule
£0
Majority rule is adopted in all four arbitration laws. However, the parties have the 
freedom to decide otherwise. Omani Law Article 40, Egyptian Law Article 40, 
Tunisian Law Article 74 and Jordanian Law Article 38 adopt the position of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. While Egyptian and Omani laws add that the rule of 
majority applies after deliberations conducted in the manner determined by the 
arbitral tribunal, Tunisian and Jordanian laws that the chairman of the tribunal has the 
power to order interim measures if the parties or other tribunal members authorise him 
to do so.
The three arbitrators may have three different opinions, resulting in a situation where 
there is no majority. One might also arrive at a situation where it is impossible to 
make an award.
8.2.2.2 Party Autonomy over Conducting Arbitral Proceedings
The Model Law is characterised by allowing the parties to choose the procedure to be 
followed by the tribunal. The scope of party autonomy in this respect covers areas 
like, equal treatment of parties, choice to determine the rule of procedure, place of 
arbitration, commencement of arbitral proceeding and language to be used in 
arbitration. The choice of party autonomy in these areas will be examined in the four 
given jurisdictions.
Equal Treatment of Parties
The most important aspect of the Model Law Article 18 is that it ensures that the 
parties will be treated with equality and each will be given a full and fair opportunity 
to present their case. Article 26 of Egyptian law, Article 63 of Tunisian law, Article 
26 of Omani law and Jordanian Law Article 25 take the same position. This basic rule
68 Is defined as the rule that requires more than half of arbitral tribunal members who cast a vote to 
agree in order to make an arbitral award decision.
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circumscribes most steps to be taken by the parties and the arbitral panel, before and 
during the proceedings.
Determination of Rules of Procedure
The Model Law allows the parties to determine the rules of procedure69. This rule is 
considered one of the fundamental principles of arbitration. In Egypt as well as Oman, 
under Article 28, parties may agree on the rules of procedure to be followed by the
70arbitral tribunal different from those laid out in their laws , including their right to 
adopt the rules of any arbitration institution or centre, in Egypt or abroad; and in the 
absence of such agreement the arbitral tribunal may select the procedures that it
71deems appropriate, provided that the provisions of this law are observed. Thus, 
parties are free to subject arbitration to the procedural rules of an international
77organisation such as the ICC or any other organisation. In the absence of such an 
agreement, the tribunal may, without prejudice to the provisions of the law, adopt 
procedures it deems suitable.73 The same concept is emphasised under Article 24 of 
Jordanian law.
Tunisian Law under Article 64 grants freedom to parties to agree on the procedure to 
be followed in the conduct of the arbitral proceedings. They may have recourse to 
institutional arbitration. The rules of the institution may also be applied in the 
framework of an ad hoc arbitration if the parties so decide.74 However, failure on 
agreement does not give rise to the application of mandatory state rules. It is for the 
arbitrators to determine freely the procedure to be followed. Their power is limited 
only by observance of the fundamental principles of civil and commercial procedure
n c
and, in particular, the right to a fair hearing.
The Place of Arbitration
Like Article 20 of the Model Law, Article 28 in both Egyptian and Omani arbitration 
law, allows the parties to choose the place of arbitration, to be conducted in Egypt, 
Oman or abroad. In the absence of agreement, the arbitral tribunal must determine the 
place with due regard to the circumstances of the case and convenience of the parties. 
If there is no agreement as to where the arbitration will take place, according to
69 See Article 19 of the Model Law.
70 See Article 28 of Egyptian as well as Omani Arbitration Laws.
71 See Article 25 of both Egyptian and Omani Laws.
72 op.cit. 10, p. 62.
73 Ibid., p. 75.
74 See Article 64 of the Tunisia Arbitration law.
75 Ibid.
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Article 39 in both laws, the tribunal decides, based on convenience and
7 f \appropriateness. As a result, there is nothing to prevent the arbitral tribunal from 
meeting at any other place it deems appropriate to hear the parties, witnesses or 
experts, to review the documents or inspect goods or property, to hold discussion 
among arbitrators, or for any other reason. The same is said according to Article 27 of 
Jordanian law. Parties have the same autonomy to decide the place of arbitration 
according to Articles 65 and 66 of Tunisian arbitration law.
Commencement of Arbitral Proceedings
The Model Law under Article 21 guarantees party autonomy in commencement of 
arbitral proceedings. Both Egyptian and Omani law under Article 27 of each one, 
provides that, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings start on 
the day when the respondent receives the claimant’s “Request for Arbitration”. This 
rule further demonstrates how the will of the parties can govern the procedures. 
Article 26 of Jordanian law provides that, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, 
arbitral proceedings will commence on the day arbitral tribunal formation is 
completed. The situation is different in Tunisian law; according to Article 68, parties 
may agree on the time limits of arbitral proceedings. Either party may amend or 
supplement his claim or defence during the proceedings unless the arbitral tribunal 
considers it inappropriate with regard to the time of the request for amendment. Thus, 
Tunisian law is silent on the party autonomy principle in regard to the commencement 
date of the dispute; it only refers to the time-limit of statement of claim and defence. 
This point is particularly important because parties cannot predetermine the duration 
of the arbitration procedure, which is one of the main characteristics of arbitration to 
avoid a long procedure. The circumstances described here, may lead to a situation 
where tribunal jurisdiction is closer to litigation than arbitration. In other words, the 
Tunisian law has not been inspired by the Model Law.
Language
The Model law provides that, “the parties are free to agree on the language to be used 
in the arbitral proceeding.”77 Failure to reach such agreement by the parties means, the 
arbitral tribunal shall determine the language to be used in the proceeding. Under 
Egyptian law Article 29, Omani law Article 29 and Jordanian law Article 28, unless 
the parties have agreed to another language, the arbitration shall be conducted in
76 op.cit. 10, p. 75.
77 See the UNCITRAL Model Law Article 22.
208
Arabic. Under Tunisian law Article 67 parties have to agree on the arbitration 
language(s); in the absence of such agreement the arbitral tribunal will decide the 
language(s).
Article 29 (1) of Egyptian and Omani laws applies this rule to the parties’ statement, 
written memoranda or oral pleading, in addition to any order or award made by the 
arbitral tribunal. Article 29 (2) of both laws states that the arbitral tribunal is entitled 
to order the enclosure of a translation of any submitted documents into the language 
used in the arbitral proceedings. Article 28 (b) of Jordanian law gives the same 
condition.
8.2.2.3 Rules Applicable to the Substance of the Dispute
The Model Law provides that parties can choose the rules of law applicable to the 
substance of the dispute.”79 Article 28 (1) of the Model Law provides that the arbitral 
tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of law as are chosen by 
the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Accordingly, in choosing the 
applicable law, the parties are not bound by the laws of any specific state.
But, in case there is no agreement as to the applicable law, according to the Model 
Law, when adjudicating the merits of the dispute the tribunal shall apply the 
substantive law it considers most closely connected with the dispute and take into
account the conditions of the contract and relevant usages of trade in similar
80transactions.
With regard to the merits of the dispute, once again, in Egypt as well as in Oman, 
under Article 39 (1) in both laws, the arbitral tribunal must apply the rules agreed by 
the parties. Where the parties agree upon the application of the law of a certain 
country, the substantive law will be the applicable law. In the absence of agreement 
on the applicable substantive law, the arbitral tribunal must apply the substantive law 
most closely connected with the dispute Article 39(2).
Jordanian law under Article 36(a) confirms the party autonomy principle to agree on 
the substantive law applicable to the issue in dispute. The parties are therefore given 
the freedom to choose the system of law of a given state, the substantive rules in that 
law shall be followed and not its rules relating to conflict of laws.
78 See Article 29 of the Egyptian law and the Omani law.
79 See Article 19(1), 28(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. See the text in UNCITRAL Model Law 40th 
Session, (No. 17), Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/40/17
80 See (Article 28) of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
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With regard to Tunisia, the Tunisian legislature has departed from the wording, if not 
the principles, of the UNITRAL Model.
Article 73 gives the parties absolute freedom to choose the applicable rule. Under sub­
section (1), the arbitral tribunal ‘shall decide disputes in accordance with the law 
designated by the parties’, and under sub-section (3), ‘the arbitral tribunal may decide 
in accordance with the rules of equity if it is expressly authorised to do so by the 
parties’. These provisions set out the principle that the arbitrator should apply the 
rules chosen by the parties. The arbitrator settles the dispute in accordance with the 
law chosen by the parties. He does not have to assess the justification for that choice, 
but is required to apply the chosen law. Thus, Article 73 confirms this rule found in 
the Model Law.81
Notably, the substantive rules in that law of the state chosen by the parties shall be 
followed and not its rules relating to conflict of laws. This principle, which is stated in 
the Model Law, is not expressly found in the Tunisian law, but refers to the principle
• • 89traditionally accepted in contractual matters in the Tunisian law.
Therefore, the doctrine of party autonomy as has been analysed in the scope and the 
validity of international commercial arbitration may be viewed as an express 
recognition of the rule of “freedom to contract” that had not previously been stated in 
any of the four given jurisdictions. This is a very significant step taken by these 
countries to meet the condition of the Model law in regard to validating party 
autonomy in areas always considered sensitive (choice of foreign arbitrators, foreign 
procedural and substantive rules).
8.2.3 Strengthening the Tribunal’s Power
8.2.3.1 Competence of the Arbitral Tribunal to Rule on its Own Jurisdiction
One important principle adopted by the Model Law under Article 16 is the doctrine of 
“competence de la competence”, by virtue of which the tribunal shall have jurisdiction 
to rule on its own jurisdiction. This continues to indicate, among other things, the
trend towards minimising the interference of courts over the arbitral process as will be
81discussed in the coming section.
Egyptian and Omani Laws under Article 22 of each one adopt this principle. 
Jordanian Law under Article 21 adopts the same principle using almost the same
81 See Article 37 of the Tunisian Law No. 42 of 1993.
82 op.cit. 3, p. 57.
83 See Article (16) of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
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wording as Egyptian and Omani laws. Tunisian law provides the arbitral tribunal with 
the power to decide on its own jurisdiction under Article 61.
The Model Law authorises the parties to start arbitral proceedings with 30 days. In 
this regard, the Egyptian, Omani, Jordanian and Tunisian laws defer84: They allow the 
parties to set the time limit agreed by them to start arbitral proceedings after they have 
been informed by the arbitral tribunal of the competence decision. Unlike the other 
three, the Tunisian law states that such arbitral procedure should be submitted with 
the defendant statement and the Tunisian tribunal should decide the case within 3 
months of the date of submission.
Most importantly, unlike the Model Law, the procedure will be suspended under the
o r  #
Tunisian law. On this point, Egyptian, Omani and Jordanian laws are inspired by the
o /
Model Law which does not suspend the arbitral proceedings .
However, Egyptian, Omani, Jordanian and Tunisian laws then go further than the 
Model Law, as they provide that arbitrators have jurisdiction on their own 
jurisdiction, including objections based on the non-existence, extinction or nullity of 
the agreement to arbitrate as well as those based on the question of whether the
on
agreement to arbitrate covers the subject in dispute. The Model Law provides in this 
respect that arbitrators have jurisdiction to settle all questions relating to the existence 
or validity of the agreement to arbitrate.
8.2.3.2 Challenges to the Arbitrator
The Model law provides that an arbitrator may not be challenged except where
QO
circumstances give rise to serious doubt of his impartiality or independence. The 
Egyptian, Omani, Jordanian and Tunisian arbitration laws provide that an arbitrator 
must accept his appointment in writing, and at the time of acceptance also, the 
arbitrator must point out and disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to doubts
o n
as to his independence or impartiality.
Thus, these countries adopt the rule foreseen in the Model Law where an arbitrator 
may not be challenged, except where circumstances give rise to serious doubt
84 See Article 21 (2) of the Egyptian and Omani Law, Article 21 (b) of the Jordanian law, and Article 
61 (3) of the Tunisian law.
85 See Article 61 (3) of the Tunisian law.
86 See Article 22 (3) of the Egyptian and Omani law, as well as Article 21© of the Jordanian law.
87 (Article 22 (1)) of the Egyptian and Omani laws, Article 21(a) of the Jordanian law and Article (61) 
of the Tunisian law define these bases.
88 See (Article 12 (2)) of the Model Law.
89 See Article 16 (3) of the Egyptian and Omani law, Article 15© of the Jordanian law, See also, 
Article 11 of the Tunisian law.
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concerning his impartiality or independence. The Cairo Court of Appeal's decision on 
25 November 1998 in Case No. 42 of the 115th (1995) judicial year, confirm this 
principle according to Article 16(3).90
Here, it must be emphasised that Omani91 and Tunisian92 laws go beyond Egyptian 
and Jordanian laws, specifying that, if such circumstances arise out of his appointment 
or during the proceedings, the arbitrator must take the initiative to inform the parties 
to the arbitration and the other arbitrators thereof.
According to these four arbitration laws, there has been substantial progress and 
development in this matter. An arbitrator may be dismissed only if there are serious 
doubts as to his impartiality or independence and (qualifications agreed upon by 
parties’ in case of the Tunisia Law according to Article 57(2)).
The application for dismissal may not be submitted by the party who has selected or 
participated in the selection of the challenged arbitrator, unless for a reason that
Q'y t t #
appears after the appointment was made. Tunisian law is silent on this point.
Egypt as well as Oman followed the Model Law whereby the dismissal application 
must be submitted to the arbitral tribunal which hears the arbitration and the challenge 
must take place before the arbitrators themselves. The application must contain 
reasons and must be submitted within 15 days of the date the applicant becomes 
aware of the composition of an arbitral tribunal or the reasons justifying the recusant. 
Unless the arbitrator withdraws, the arbitral tribunal must decide thereupon.94
90The court stated that: Article 16 (3) of the Arbitration Law provides that: "the arbitrator when 
accepting the mission entrusted to him", must disclose "any circumstances which cast doubt on his 
independence or neutrality", and Article 53 of the Law provides that: "an action for the nullity of an 
Arbitral Award is admissible" if the arbitral panel was constituted or the arbitrators were appointed 
contrary to the Law or the agreement between the two parties.
The judgment mentioned that, in this case, the arbitrator appointed by one of the parties accepted his 
mission without disclosing that he was a partner in the law firm defending this same party.
The Court added that this fact was only discovered after the arbitral award was pronounced, and the 
Court decided that the arbitral award was null and void for its contradiction of the Arbitration Law. See 
also, supra note, 15, p. 181.
91 Article 16 (3) of the Omani law provides that: “the arbitrator must accept his mission in writing. At 
the time of acceptance, the arbitrator must point out any circumstances likely to give rise to doubt as to 
his independence or impartiality. If such circumstances arise out of his appointment or during the 
proceedings, the arbitrator must take the initiative to inform the parties to the arbitration and the other 
arbitrators.” See also, supra note, 33. p. 315.
92Article 57 (1) of the Tunisian law provides that: “a person at the time of offering him the possibility 
of becoming an arbitrator, he must disclose all circumstances which may cast doubt on his 
independence and impartiality, and he must inform the parties if such circumstances rise during the
18 (2) of the Egyptian and Omani law, and Article 17(b) of the Jordanian law. See also, 
supra note, 20, p. 14.
94 See Article 19 (1) of the Egyptian and Omani law.
proceedings. 
See Article
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Where the dismissal application is denied, the applicant may challenge this decision 
within 30 days of being notified, before the Commercial Court (national arbitration) 
Appeals Division thereof in the case of Omani law95 and to the Court of Appeal in 
Egyptian law96. There is no recourse against the court’s decision in this respect and its 
decision is not subject to any type of appeal.
The challenge to the arbitrator was under the judicial control of the constitutionality of 
Egyptian arbitration law and exclusively entrusted in Egypt to its Supreme 
Constitution Court.97
The Court passed a judgement on 6 November 1999 in Case No. 84 of the 19th (1999) 
judicial year, which directly bears on the subject of the constitutionality of Article 19 
of the Egyptian arbitration law, which provides in its Sub-clause (1) that the arbitral
QO
panel decides on the request for its own challenge. The Court stated that this Article 
19 of the Egyptian Law is unconstitutional and in contravention of Articles 40, 65, 67, 
68 and 79 of the Constitution which guarantee equality before the law, subjection of 
the State to the law, the right of defence and the right of litigation.
Jordan and Tunisia contrary to the Model law, did not adopt this principle. In Jordan, 
the dismissal application must be submitted to the Court of Jurisdiction, whose 
decision will be final.99 In Tunisia, the arbitral tribunal does not resolve the matter
95 op.cit. 12, p. 66.
96 See Article (9) of the Egyptian law, and Article 18(a) of the Jordanian law.
97 op.cit. 14, p. 181.
98 The plaintiff in this case had previously requested the challenge a member of an arbitral panel which 
was determining a dispute in which the plaintiff was a party and the arbitral panel had rejected his 
request. The plaintiff then brought the case before the Supreme Constitutional Court, arguing that 
allowing the arbitral panel to decide upon the challenge of its own members contravenes the necessity 
of neutrality that is guaranteed by the Constitution for those engaged in judiciary activity. Therefore, it 
is contrary to the basic principle of equality before the law as provided in the Constitution.
The Supreme Constitutional Court mentioned the judicial nature of arbitration that is based upon a 
voluntary agreement between the parties and which results in negation of the right of the judiciary to 
review the disputes subject to arbitration.
The Supreme Constitutional Court pointed out that the right of recourse to the arbitrator is linked to the 
basic rights of litigation that are necessary for all judicial actions and is also closely linked to the right 
to litigate as provided in the Constitution that necessitates independence and impartiality in the 
authority that dispenses justice.
The Supreme Constitutional Court then stressed that Article 69 of the Constitution guarantees the right 
of defence as a cornerstone of the rule of law and that subjection of the State to the law means that its 
legislation may not encroach upon the rights and guarantees which are considered in democratic States 
as the basis for the existence of the rule of law.
The Supreme Constitutional Court finally stated that the Article which was the subject of the recourse 
allowed the arbitral panel the right to decide upon its own challenge, and that this is contrary to the 
values of justice and to the principle of impartiality of the judicial act in favour of one category of 
litigants to the detriment of another. The Court stated that it is therefore unconstitutional and in 
contravention of Articles 40, 65, 67, 68 and 79 of the Constitution which guarantee equality before the 
law, subjection of the State to the law, the right of defence and the right of litigation.
"See Article 18(a) of the Jordanian law.
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itself; the arbitrator who is challenged may withdraw, the other party may accept the 
challenge or, failing that, the matter may be brought before the Tunis Court of Appeal, 
with the consequence that the arbitral proceedings will be suspended.100 As 
aforementioned, like the decision of the Court of Jurisdiction in Jordan101, Tunisian
i cnCourt of Appeal decisions will not be subject to appeal in respect of the dismissal 
application.
In the Egyptian, Omani and Jordanian laws, neither the request to challenge the 
arbitrator nor recourse against the decision of the arbitral tribunal suspends the arbitral
• i mproceedings. In contrast, Tunisian law states that, Tunisia Court of Appeal must, 
within 45 days, decide on the application for challenge to the arbitrator, and during 
this time the proceedings will be suspended.104
Here, the following question could be raised: why should the arbitral proceedings 
continue after the application for the challenge has been made to the state court 
whereas such proceedings before the state courts are suspended until a decision is 
made on the challenge of arbitrator?
In this regard, it could be argued that suspension of the arbitral proceedings takes into 
account the fact that state courts are required to make a decision in a short time. This 
does not prejudice the arbitral proceedings because the court’s decision to granting or 
rejecting the challenge is not subject to any means of recourse.
One rationale behind the decision not to suspend the procedure is that the three laws 
attempt to assure and guarantee that the proceedings will continue. In this situation, 
there is an arbitration which continues, despite the fact that one of the parties is not 
satisfied with the arbitrator and despite the fact that the challenged arbitrator will feel 
hurt and probably not objective.
Also, these laws foresee another possibility which might threaten the proceedings, 
namely where an arbitrator is unable to perform his mission, fails to perform his task 
or interrupts the performance thereof in a manner which causes undue delay to the 
arbitral proceedings. Egyptian and Omani laws under Article 20 of each, provide that 
if the arbitrator does not withdraw in these cases and the parties have not agreed his 
removal, then the Commercial Court in Oman and the Cairo Court of Appeal may
100 See Article 58 (2) of the Tunisian law.
101 See Article 18 (a) of the Jordanian law.
102 See Article 58 (3) of the Tunisian law.
103 See Article 19 (4) of the Egyptian and Omani Laws, and Article 18© of the Jordanian law.
104 See Article 58 (3) of the Tunisian law.
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remove him upon the request of either party. The Court of Jurisdiction in Jordan under 
Article 19 and the Tunisian Court of Appeal under Article 59 may remove the 
arbitrator. It seems therefore that, the challenge to an arbitrator presented to the state 
court, does not lead to the suspension of arbitral proceedings. If the arbitral award is 
made before the court decides on his removal, the court’s decision will be rendered 
null and void because the award will have been made before the arbitrator is 
removed.105
8.2.3.3 Power to Order Interim Measures
The Model Law under Article 17 guarantees the arbitral tribunal power to order 
interim measures.106 Egyptian and Omani laws under Article 42 of each, allow the 
arbitral tribunal to issue interlocutory or partial awards and to order provisional or 
conservatory measures during the proceedings upon the request of either party prior to 
issuing its final award. Jordanian law under Article 41 also allows the arbitral tribunal 
to issue interim awards prior to final awards. Under Article 74 of Tunisian law, with 
the agreement of other arbitrators, the president of the tribunal may issue interim 
measures. He can issue these interim measures alone in a case where there is no 
majority among the arbitrators.
During the course of arbitration, parties may agree upon settlement; in this case does 
the arbitral tribunal have the authority to issue interim measures? Article 41 of the 
Egyptian and Omani laws, Article 39 of the Jordanian law and Article 76 of the 
Tunisian law accommodate the possibility that the parties to the dispute may reach a 
settlement among themselves before the arbitration proceedings have been concluded. 
In the first three cases, the condition of the settlement should be presented to the 
tribunal, which will then issue a decision equivalent to the arbitral award, which shall 
contain the provisions of the settlement. In the case of Tunisia, the tribunal will issue 
a decision to finalise the arbitral proceedings. In the case of ordering interim 
measures, the decision rendered by the arbitral tribunal which contains the conditions 
of the settlement will terminate the proceedings. In addition, such decision has the 
same force as an arbitral award as far as enforcement is concerned.
op.cit. 28, p. 146.
106 Article (17) says: “Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of 
a party, order any party to take such interim measure of protection as the arbitral tribunal may consider 
necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute. The arbitral tribunal may require any party to 
provide appropriate security in connection with such measure.”
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Egyptian and Omani laws under Article 45 (1) give the arbitral tribunal a period of 12 
months in which to conduct the arbitration proceedings and issue its award. The 
tribunal may extend the deadline by a maximum of six months at its discretion. If an 
award is not rendered by the deadline, either party may request the President of the 
Cairo Court of Appeal to set a new deadline or terminate the proceedings, and in the 
case of Oman, the Commercial Court to which the dispute may have been brought.107 
Article 37(1) of the Jordanian law authorises the arbitrators to extend the deadline of 
arbitral procedures if not finalised within the time limit of 12 months.
During the arbitral proceedings, if a matter falling outside the scope of the arbitral 
tribunal’s jurisdiction is raised, if, for example, a document submitted to it is 
challenged for forgery, or criminal proceedings are undertaken on the alleged forgery 
or for any other criminal act, the arbitral tribunal under Article 46 of Egyptian and 
Omani laws as well as Article 43 of the Jordanian law may decide to proceed with the 
subject-matter of the dispute without reliance on the incidental matter raised on the 
document alleged to be a forgery or on the other criminal act. The arbitral tribunal 
may also suspend the arbitral proceedings until a final decision is made in this respect. 
In this case, the period of time granted to the arbitral tribunal to make the award is 
suspended.
In the above two cases, Tunisian law does not provide a special article to treat these 
cases in the same way as the other three countries’ laws. Nevertheless, the arbitrator- 
in general- under Tunisian law may take any measure, within the scope of his 
competence, provided that the arbitral tribunal has not started the proceedings. When 
the arbitral tribunal starts the proceedings, it may adopt any provisional measures 
falling within it competence.
The president of the tribunal of the first instance, in the jurisdiction of the place of 
arbitration, provides an authorisation to enforce any provisional or preliminary 
decision made by the arbitral tribunal.
The solution for international arbitration is not specified. A decision has simply been 
made that the request for protective measures before state courts is not in itself 
incompatible with the arbitration law. Consequently, it is not forbidden to go to state
1 Oftcourts while the arbitration process is taking place.
107 See Article 45 (2) of the Egyptian and Omani Law as well as Article (9) in both laws in which the 
procedure to refer to the court of jurisdiction is determined.
108 op.cit. l,p . 28.
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The interim measures taken by the tribunal under Tunisian law are subject to appeal to 
the Tunisian Court of Appeal. Article 61 (3)109 provides that the Tunisian Court of 
Appeal is required to deliver its judgement within a period not exceeding three 
months. Further, and in order to avoid a hasty award by the arbitrator which might be 
set aside, the above-mentioned article bars the continuance of the arbitration 
procedure until a decision is made by the appeal judge.110
8.2.4 Restriction upon Court Intervention
If an agreement to arbitrate cannot be recognised and enforced by a court when there 
is non-compliance with it by a party who institutes a competing or parallel suit in 
relation to the matters agreed to be referred, arbitration will degenerate into ordinary 
court-room litigation and will lose much of its practical attractiveness and efficacy.111 
Therefore, limiting the courts' interventions in the arbitral process has been advocated 
by supporters of international commercial arbitration and, in fact, was one of the main 
objectives behind the Model Law.
119 •Article 8 of the Model Law helps limit court interference by requiring the parties to
113refer to arbitration. Ar tide 8 (1 ) of the Model Law is designed to keep the 
arbitration before the relevant tribunal and out of the national court and under Article 
8 (2) it may only refuse to refer the parties to arbitration in the event that the 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.114 
To determine the extent of the courts’ interference according to Article 8 of the 
Model, the following question may be raised: what is the effect of an arbitration 
agreement upon a party's right to raise the matter before the court?
This question has been addressed and it was answered most succinctly by Lord 
Dunedin in Sanderson v. Armour &Co (1922) 115: “If the parties have contracted to
109 See Article (61) of the Tunisian Law.
110 op.cit 49. pp. 26-27.
111 op.cit. 41. p.147.
112 Article (8) says: 1. A court before which an action is brought in a matter that is the subject of an 
arbitration agreement shall, if a party so requests not later than when submitting his first statement on 
the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
2. Where an action referred to in paragraph (1) of this article has been brought, 
arbitral proceedings may nevertheless be commenced or continued, and an award may be made, while 
the issue is pending before the court.
113 See Notes Domestic Courts’ Obligation to Refer Parties to Arbitration. Arbitration International, 
Vol. 17(3). LCIA, 2001. p.314.
114 op.cit. 42. p.315.
115 See Hew Dundas, (2006). Sisting of Legal Proceedings for ADR. In this case, he quoted Lord 
Dunedin who decided that “the court is obliged to sist (stay) legal proceedings where there exists an 
arbitration agreement between the parties covering the dispute. The court is wholly precluded from
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arbitrate, to arbitration they must go”. Article 8 (1) essentially creates the same 
consequences and as mentioned above the referral is generally considered to be an 
obligation not a possibility. This is due to the mandatory language of this Article: “A 
court... sh a ll .. .refer parties to arbitration”. This idea has been upheld by courts and 
by respected authors in the field of international commercial arbitration.116 
The trend in favour of limiting court involvement in international commercial 
arbitration, reflects the view that, “parties to an arbitration agreement... prefer
117 • 118expediency and finality to protracted court battles” , found under Article 5 of the 
Model Law, which states that, beyond the instances of possible court intervention 
according to this law (the Model Law), “no court shall intervene.” Accordin gly, 
Effects of the Arbitration Agreement, Setting Aside of the Award, and Recognition 
and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (Articles 35 and 36) will be examined as 
instances of court intervention in the four given jurisdictions (Egypt, Oman, Jordan 
and Tunisia).
8.2.4.1 Effects of the Arbitration Agreement
Egyptian arbitration law as well as Omani arbitration law under Articlel3, Jordanian
law under Article 12 and Tunisian law under Article 52 clearly state that where there
is a dispute before a court in respect of a contract containing an agreement to arbitrate,
it is open to the defendant to object to the continuation of the proceedings. In this
eventuality the court is obliged to reject the case119 and must rule fin  de non 
1
recevoir (no right to bring it before the court) if so pleaded by the defendant in the 
action and before submitting any demands or pleading any defences. While these laws 
repeat the provisions of the Model Law, Tunisian law provides that the court must 
decline jurisdiction if a party so requests when submitting his first statement on the
191substance of the dispute.
inquiring into the merits of the dispute, this being reserved to the Arbiter(s).” Introduction to Scottish 
Mediation Network Staff, p.2.
116op.cit. 113, p.315.
117 See Explanatory note by UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law International Commercial 
arbitration on www.uncitral.org/english/texts .
118 The article says that “In matters governed by this law, no court shall intervene except where so 
provided in this Law.
119 op.cit. 10, p. 62.
120 The French term means: “An exception or plea founded on law, which, without entering into the 
merits of the action, shows that the plaintiff has no right to bring it, either because the time during 
which it ought to have been brought has elapsed, which is called prescription, or that there has been a 
compromise, accord and satisfaction, or any other cause which has destroyed the right of action which 
once subsisted.” See www.datasegment.com online dictionary.
121 op.cit. 3, p. 55.
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The Egyptian, Omani and Jordanian laws use the following expression: “the 
court...shall hold the action inadmissible”: this expression gave rise to discussion 
because it means that the court must declare that it has no jurisdiction.
The approach adopted by the Egyptian law followed by Omani law(which uses the 
terms122 used by the Egyptian law) and the Jordanian law (which in the second 
paragraph in relation to starting or commencing to make award authorises the parties 
to agree otherwise)123 is based on the argument that an agreement to submit a dispute 
to arbitration is, in fact, a waiver of the right of litigation before the courts. Thus, as 
pleading non-acceptance of legal action is a procedural matter,124 it must be pleaded 
before the court, which is not entitled to make such a ruling on its own motion or 
initiative.
Further, the Egyptian Court of Cassation held that the contractual nature of arbitration 
means that the effect of the lack of jurisdiction is not peremptory and consequently 
the courts do not have to raise their own lack of jurisdiction on their own motion; it 
has to be raised before any discussion of the merits of the case, or the parties are 
deemed tacitly to have waived this provision. Omani and Jordanian arbitration laws
1 *yc
comply with this principle.
With regard to this point, the Tunisian law distinguishes between domestic and 
international arbitration. According to Article 19, which regulates domestic 
arbitration, state jurisdictions shall declare themselves incompetent on the request of 
the most diligent party126. This issue is not of a public nature; therefore the court
197cannot raise it automatically.
In international arbitration, Article 52 stipulates that the arbitral tribunal shall declare 
itself incompetent if one of the parties requests this in limine litis (in due time). It can 
declare itself competent only if the arbitration contract is null and void, inoperative or
i 9 o
unlikely to be executed.
122 The terms “...-the defendant must raise this plea before submitting any demand or defence on the 
merits of the case, -such a judicial action does not prevent the arbitral proceedings from being 
commenced or continued, nor does it prevent the making of the award.” The Jordanian law adds 
“unless agreed otherwise by the parties”.
123 op.cit. 10, p. 66.
124 op.cit. 26, p. 12.
125 op.cit. 10, p. 65.
126 This expression usually refers to a reasonable party who seeks to avoid harm to another contracting 
party. Failure to show due diligence (also known as due care) is viewed negligence. Often the 
arbitration contract will specify that a party is required to provide due diligence. www.Wikipedia.org.
127 op.cit. 1, p. 26.
128 Ibid.
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The defendant’s defence must be made before any demands or a pleading against the 
legal action have been served or he has taken no other action in the proceedings by 
way of the submission of another petition or pleading, which could be construed as 
acquiescence to the court action.129 If such an action is made before the court, arbitral 
proceedings can still be started or continued and the award can even be made. This 
shows the explicit intention of these laws to separate arbitral proceedings from any 
legal action, whatever its purpose. Thus, the legal proceedings do not paralyse the 
arbitration.130
8.2.4.2 Setting Aside the Award
In principle, awards are final and may not be challenged. This is to guarantee a quick 
settlement, which is needed in commercial disputes in particular.131 Article (34/2/b) of 
the Model Law provides two cases for application for setting aside the arbitral award: 
if the court finds that “(i) the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement 
by arbitration under the law of the State, or (ii) the award is in conflict with the public 
policy of the state.”132
Egyptian and Omani arbitration laws under Article 52(1) as well as Jordanian law 
under Article 48 and Tunisian law under Article 78 do not allow for appeal against an 
award. Nevertheless, under Egyptian and Omani law, the validity of an award may be 
challenged in some exclusive cases according to Article 53. Article 54(1) provides 
that the legal action shall be brought within 90 days of the date when the party against 
whom the award is to be enforced is notified. This is permissible even if such party 
had waived the right to challenge the award before it was made.134 The same principle 
regarding the setting of time limits is also found in Jordanian law under Article 50, 
that legal action must be brought within 30 days.
In Tunisian law, the recourse to annulment differs between domestic and international 
arbitration. In domestic arbitration, the arbitral award is, first, subject to setting aside 
only if the parties expressly decide to lodge an appeal against an arbitral tribunal. 
However, this possibility is not permitted when arbitrators have the power to settle the
129 op.cit. 10, p. 62.
130 Ibid, p.65.
131 op.cit. 26, p. 19.
132 See Article (34) of the Model Law regarding application for setting aside as exclusive recourse 
against an arbitral award.
1 In addition to the two cases mentioned in the Model Law, Article 53 provides 6 more cases. For 
more details see Article 53.
134op.cit. 26, p. 22.
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dispute in accordance with rules of equity. Moreover, if the award is confirmed, the 
competent jurisdiction orders the enforcement; if it is invalidated, it is decided on the 
merits.135
Concerning the time-limit as well as the court of jurisdiction, the Tunisian law 
according to Article 43 provides that, the recourse to annulment shall be brought 
within 30 days from the notification of the award. It should be submitted before the 
Court of Appeals.136 When the award is annulled, and on the request of the parties, the 
court shall decide on the merits, with the same powers vested in the arbitrator. When 
the recourse to annulment is not accepted, such rejection confers leave of enforcement
117to the award.
In international arbitration, according to Article 79 (3), recourse must be made to the
Tunisian Court of Appeals, which has exclusive competence, within three months (90
day as in Egypt and Oman) from the date when the claimant received the award.
When the annulment is declared, the court may decide on the merits, on the request of
all the parties, as an amiable compsiteur. Rejection of the recourse to annulment
118confers leave of enforcement to the award.
Contrary to the Model Law, the four countries’ laws have adopted a time-limit for
requesting setting aside of an arbitral award, which could lead to a situation where the
time-limit for requesting setting aside has expired. This situation could have been
avoided if these laws had adopted the principle of the Model Law, nevertheless, it is a
positive contribution to ensure res judicata (the matter cannot be raised again) of the
110arbitral award to avoid unnecessary delay.
Egyptian arbitration law, unlike Omani, Jordanian and Tunisian arbitration laws’ 
distinguishes between international and domestic arbitration with reference to the 
court of jurisdiction for nullification of the arbitral award. Concerning international 
commercial arbitration, the legal action must be raised before the Cairo Court of 
Appeal according to Article 54 (2). However, in cases other than international 
commercial arbitration, the parties are entitled to agree to raise the legal action before 
the Court of Appeal in any given Court of Jurisdiction. In the context of Oman, the 
Appeal Division of the Commercial Court will be the court of jurisdiction for all cases
135 op.cit 1, p. 28.
136 Ibid, p.29.
137 Ibid.
138 op.cit. 10, p. 81, see also supra note, 1, p. 28.
139 Ibid.
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according to Article 54(2). Under Article 49(b) of the Jordanian law, the court of 
jurisdiction has jurisdiction to decide such cases. The Tunisian Court of Appeal under 
Article 78(1) will decide the cases.
The implication of such difference between the two laws may be stated as follows: 
according to Omani arbitration law, in international commercial arbitration the 
Appeals Division of the Commercial Court will have jurisdiction over a request for 
setting aside, whether the arbitration takes place in Oman or abroad. Even if the 
arbitration is not international commercial arbitration, the Appeals Division has 
jurisdiction to decide on all requests for setting aside.
This is contrary to the rule that these requests should initially be submitted to the 
Court of the First Instance. This was done for two main reasons. First, the speed for 
settling the request for setting aside the award and, secondly, the fact that the purpose 
of the request is to settle a question of the validity or nullity of an award. This is why 
it was deemed useful to submit this right of recourse to the Court of Appeal instead of 
a court of the first instance.140 This argument could be stated regarding Tunisia, but 
will not stand for the Jordan where in international arbitration cases the need for 
speedy settling of the request cannot be overemphasised.
Although all four countries laws were greatly inspired by Article 34 of the Model Law 
as for cases where a legal action for nullity of an award may be raised, it should be 
noted that both Egyptian and Omani laws under Article (53/1 /iv) as well as Jordanian 
law under Article 49(4), (but not Tunisian law where reasons for annulment are based 
on the provisions of the Model Law), include a case not found in the Model Law, this 
being that an award may be declared void where the award has not applied the 
substantive law determined and agreed upon by the parties to the arbitration. The 
importance of such provision is quite clear and practical, especially where 
international arbitrations are concerned.
Finally, these laws explicitly provide that the request for setting aside does not result
in suspending the performance of the award.141
8.2.4.3 Recognition and Enforcement of the Arbitral Award
Court restriction on arbitral procedures is one of the main features of the Model Law,
where recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award by a court is obligatory
140 Ibid, p. 84.
141 Ibid.
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unless one of the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement referred to in 
Article 35142 of the Model Law applies.
Egyptian law as well as that of the other three countries have followed the Model 
Law, and thus the classic position of enforcement of an arbitral award has radically 
changed. All four countries laws provided that if all requirements as to form and 
procedure are met, an award will have the status of Res Judicata, will prima facie be 
enforceable, and will be subject to nullification on very limited grounds.
Significantly under Article 57 of Egyptian and Omani law, an action for a 
nullification of an award will not, in itself, give rise to a stay of enforcement. In order 
for a party to achieve this he is obliged, under Egyptian and Omani law, to present the 
court with persuasive reasons which would justify a stay. The court will therefore not 
be inclined to order a stay unless it is satisfied that there is a greater probability that 
the nullification action will succeed.
In order to prevent enforcement of awards being delayed, both Egyptian and Omani 
laws specify under the same Article 57 certain time limits within which action must 
be taken. In particular, if a court receives a petition for a stay, it must issue a ruling 
within 60 days of its submission. A court’s ruling can be submitted for appeal to the 
appropriate court within a further 30 days. If a court upholds a submission for a stay 
on the grounds of possible nullification of an award, the court has to issue its 
judgement on the nullification action within six months of its ruling on the stay.143 
Unlike Egyptian and Omani law, under Article 82 of Tunisian law, regarding an 
action for nullification or stay of enforcement, the Tunisian Court of Appeal may stay 
its decision for recognition and enforcement of the award. The Jordanian law is silent 
on this important point.
As a result, Egyptian and Omani laws have been inspired by the modem legal 
framework found in the Model law in respect of this point, which aims to promote
142 Article (35) of the Model Law uses the obligatory language to enforce the arbitral award. It says 
under item (1). that, “An arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, shall be 
recognised as binding and, upon application in writing to the competent court, shall be enforced subject 
to the provisions of this article and article 36.”
And under item (2). The Model Law provides that a party applying for enforcement of an award “shall 
supply the duly authenticated original award or ... certified copy thereof, the original arbitration 
agreement (,)” and (3) if the agreement is not in the official language of the state, “a certified 
translation.”
143 See Mike Reddy, (1995). Egypt Arbitration -  New Law. Middle East Commercial Law Review, vol. 
1(1) British library, pp. 3-4.
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arbitration as an efficient means of dispute resolution, more than Tunisian and 
Jordanian laws.
The Egyptian, Omani, Jordanian and Tunisian laws have radically altered the position 
for parties seeking to enforce an arbitral award. Under the previous and traditional 
provisions of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedures, like so many other 
countries, the unsuccessful party in arbitration could attempt to overturn the award in 
new court proceedings. As this would involve what would amount to a fresh 
evaluation of the entire case, and given that proceedings to enforce the award would 
in the meeting be stayed, the entire process could be delayed by a number of years.144 
However, under Article 58 of the Egyptian and Omani laws, Article 54 of the 
Jordanian Law and Article 81 of the Tunisian law, arbitral awards will have res 
judicata status, will be fully enforceable, and will be subject to nullification on only 
very limited grounds. These grounds145 are the same in both Egyptian and Omani 
laws.
With regard to Egypt and Oman, the order for enforcement of an award may not be 
granted unless the competent judge is satisfied that it does not violate public order, 
and that it has been duly notified to the person against whom enforcement is sought 
(Article 58(2)(b)and (c)). The Cairo Court of Appeal's decision on 2 October 1997 in
thCase No. 41 of the 114 (1994) judicial year issued a judgement in respect of the 
public order argument. The Court found that allowing interest over the maximum 
allowed by the law does not violate public order.146
144 Ibid.
145 The grounds are set out under (58) of both Egyptian and Omani law as:
the award contradicts an earlier judgement by an Egyptian court on the same dispute, 
the award contradicts Egyptian Policy,
the unsuccessful party did not receive valid notification of the award against them.
In the Omani case, The president of the Commercial court must sure that the award:
does not contradict a judgement previously rendered by the Omani courts on the subject-matter 
in dispute;
does not violate the public policy of the sultanate of Oman; 
was properly notified to the parties against whom it was rendered.
1460ne of the reasons for the appeal in this case was that the judgement which was the subject of the 
appeal was null and void because it allowed for an interest over the maximum allowed by law, which 
maximum is of public order in accordance with Egyptian law.
The Court of Appeal mentioned in this case that Article 39 (4) of the Arbitration Law provides that: 
"The Arbitral Panel may, if it has been expressly empowered to act as an 'amiable compositeur' by 
agreement between the two parties to the arbitration, adjudicate the merits of the dispute according to 
the Rules of Justice and Equity without being bound by the provisions of Law."
The Appeal added that in view of the above there is no contradiction to public order, in this case, if the 
arbitral panel decides that the interest rate mentioned in its judgement is consistent with the rules of 
justice and equity, even if this interest rate is over the maximum allowed for by law, because this
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Also, the order may not be granted unless the competent judge is satisfied that it does 
not contradict another judgement previously rendered by an Egyptian or Omani court 
concerning the same subject-matter of the dispute (Article 58(2) (a)).
In fact, determining such a matter is difficult (if not entirely impossible) from a 
practical point of view. This is simply because the enforcement application is 
submitted by the party in whose favour the award has been made to the president of 
the competent court. A further difficulty arises where an enforcement order is granted 
as it may not be appealed, whereas an order for refusal of enforcement may be 
appealed before the court (Cairo Court of Appeal in the Egypt case and the Appeal 
Division of the Commercial Court in Oman) as referred to in Article (9) in both laws, 
within 30 days (Article 58(3)).147
It is only possible to appreciate the facilities granted by the Jordanian, Egyptian and 
Omani arbitration laws by comparing them with the Model Law. Indeed, the Model 
Law foresees several reasons to suspend enforcement of the award, which largely 
exceed the cases foreseen by the aforementioned three laws. Comparison also shows 
that the Jordanian law ensures the enforcement of the award much better than the 
Egyptian, Omani and Tunisian laws. The control of the court of law is limited to two 
conditions in the case of Jordan, and three conditions in Egypt and Oman as
148previously mentioned. Here, Tunisian arbitration law adopts conditions almost 
identical to those laid down by the Model law while making some amendments 
concerning public policy.
Whereas the Model Law annuls the award or refuses authorisation for enforcement if 
the court finds that ‘the award is in conflict with the public policy of the state’, 
Tunisian arbitration law under Article 81(2) provides that the award must be contrary 
to ‘public policy within the meaning of private international law’, which may be 
described as a more liberal attitude towards restriction of court interference in the 
enforcement of an arbitral award.
With regard to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, other than the two conditions 
laid down in the Jordanian law, enforcement will cover awards rendered inside or 
outside Jordan. In Egypt, an award issued pursuant to an arbitration that has taken 
place outside Egypt may be enforced in Egypt if it is covered by or does not
judgement is based upon the agreement of the parties to apply the rules of justice and equity and not the 
provisions of the law.
147 op.cit. 26, p. 22.
148 op.cit. 10, p. 80.
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contradict any of the international conventions to which Egypt has adhered to 
according to Article (1), and if it satisfies the condition set out in Article (58). Egypt 
is a signatory state to: The New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards; the Washington Convention of 1965 on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States; and 
the Convention of 1974 on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between The Arab 
States and Nationals of Other States.
This is not the case under Omani law. The provisions of the Omani law are only 
applicable to awards made in Oman. Awards made abroad, where the parties have 
agreed to submit them to Omani law, are subject to the provisions of Sultanate Decree 
No. (13) of 1997.149 This modified the rules of the Board for Settlement of 
Commercial Disputes and replaced it with the Commercial Court. This decree added a 
new chapter VII, dealing with enforcement of foreign judgements and awards.150 
Tunisian law distinguishes between domestic and international arbitration. For 
international arbitration, the reasons for refusal of enforcement are similar to the 
reasons for annulment. The Tunisian Court of Appeals, before which a request of 
recognition or enforcement is laid, may stay its judgement if a request for annulment 
is presented, whether in the country where the award was rendered or in the country 
by virtue of which laws it was rendered.151
In the absence of a convention or a treaty, according to Article 79 foreign awards shall 
be recognised or enforced only in case of reciprocity, irrespective of the country
i  c'y
where rendered. In this respect, Tunisia has ratified certain multilateral treaties and 
conventions relating to arbitration and enforcement of awards (New York Convention 
1958, ratified in 1967, Washington Convention (ICSID), ratified in 1966; and the 
multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Convention, ratified by Tunisia in 1988) 
and bilateral treaties governing enforcement of arbitral awards with certain countries 
(Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco, Germany, Italy, France).
149 Sultanate Decree No. 13/97, published in the Omani Official Gazette No. 596.
150 Article (11 of Chapter VII of Sultanate Decree No. 13/97 relating to the enforcement of foreign 
judgements and awards provides that: “ 1. Judgements and awards made abroad may be enforced in the 
Sultanate of Oman under the same conditions of enforcement as those judgements of the Omani courts 
in the foreign country,” Article 121 provides that “the provisions of the preceding article apply to 
awards made abroad. The award must have been made in an arbitral matter according to Omani law 
and be enforceable in the country where it was made.” See also, supra note 12, p. 82.
151 op.cit l.p . 29.
152 op.cit 28. p. 150.
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For domestic arbitration under Article 33, the arbitral award can be subject to a 
spontaneous enforcement by parties or a forced enforcement by an order of the 
President of the court of First Instance or the district judge in the jurisdiction in which 
the award was rendered.
8.3 Evaluation
The above findings from a comparative analysis of arbitration laws in Egypt, Oman, 
Tunisia and Jordan suggest these countries have generally been open to the idea of 
adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law. However, in-depth comparison reveals that 
where modifications have been made with regard to the four main features of the 
Model Law, certain contradictions and negative consequences can be identified. First, 
it is obvious that in regard to the scope of application, Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan have 
restricted application of the law in cases where the state or one of its agencies is a 
party to the contract (certain measures are required before the law can be applied, 
mainly the government’s approval). Bearing in mind that most international contracts 
in the Middle East usually involve the state or one of its agencies, the applicability of 
the arbitration law will be restricted. Thus posing potential problems for foreign 
investors in the future and contradicts with premise on which the reform was based, 
namely to promote foreign direct investment.
Secondly, despite the advanced steps taken in adopting the principle of party 
autonomy, such advanced steps will be in conflict with the restriction required by 
certain countries, mainly Tunisia, to apply the domestic law in the case of state 
contracts. In other words, the first two features of the Model Law are in contradiction 
and reconciliation between them is required.
Thirdly, there are contradictions between elements of the third feature of the Model 
Law, that is, the strengthening of tribunal power. Although all four countries have 
adopted the principle of competence de la competence of the arbitral tribunal, two 
countries directly (Tunisia and Jordan) and two indirectly (Egypt and Oman) have 
referred the challenge to arbitrators to the state court to decide rather than to the 
arbitral tribunal it self. Further, the interim measures which can be issued by the 
tribunal are subject to appeal before the state court in the case of Tunisia. In other 
words, these contradictions practically restrict the adoption of the third principle of 
the Model Law (strengthening the arbitral tribunal’s power).
153 op.cit. 1, p. 29.
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Lastly, the fourth feature of the Model Law, which ensures restriction of court 
intervention, has been modified to give national courts more power to intervene. In 
addition to what have been mentioned in this regard, more grounds have been given 
for national courts to set aside arbitral awards. The court may decide on the merits of 
the dispute in the case of Tunisia which reflects the statist character of the Tunisian 
Code.
Despite the significant steps taken by Egypt, Oman, Tunisia and Jordan towards 
adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law, it cannot be asserted that these countries have 
fully adopted the main four features of the Model Law, since study findings point to 
the will of these countries to retain some of their traditional position in regard to 
commercial arbitration, reflecting their legal philosophies as has been discussed in 
Chapter Four and Chapter Six.
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A summary of the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law principles by Egypt, Oman, Tunisia and Jordan.
UNCITRAL 
Main Features
UNCITRAL Model Law Egypt Law No. 9 of 1994 Oman Law No. 47 of 
1997
Tunisia Law No. 42 of 
1993
Jordan Law No. 31 of 
2001
1 Scope of 
Application
♦Commercial
The Significance 
* International
Wide Interpretation of 
commercial Term
International in three cases: 
♦Business in different states. 
*If certain places situated 
outside the state in which 
parties have their business. 
♦Subject matter related to 
more than one country.
Economic criteria
More disputes can be 
submitted to arbitration. But 
still maintains the statism 
concept
If subject matter related to
international trade
All the three cases in the
Model Law and adds a fourth
one:
♦If parties agree to submit 
their dispute to a permanent 
arbitral institution situated in 
Egypt or abroad.
Distinguishes between
In cases not subject to 
compromise.
Difficult to determine
Same as Egypt
No Reference
Adoption of statism 
concept
Uses the words of the 
Model Law but not in the 
same sequence.
Adds general definition: 
arbitration is international 
if ‘generally, it concerns 
international commerce’ 
Influenced by the French 
Code of civil Procedure 
Article 1492 of 1981.
Very wide interpretation
Gives up the concept of 
statism
No distinction between 
international and domestic 
arbitration.
Restricted applicability of 
Civil Procedure Act.
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The Significance
♦Administrative
Contract
The significance
The Model Law ensures the 
validity of an arbitration 
contract when a state or its 
organs is a party.
international and domestic 
arbitration
Adopts the principle of party 
autonomy. Parties may agree 
to apply foreign procedural or 
substantive law.
Ensures a fast and economic 
international arbitration 
procedure by reference to the 
Cairo Court of appeal 
In the 1994 law, 
Administrative contract is 
valid, but, amendment to 
Article 1 that agreement to 
submit dispute to arbitration 
must be by the consent of the 
competent minister.
These four countries (Egypt, 
Oman, Tunisia and Jordan), 
did not fully adopt the Model 
Law principle by placing some 
restriction on validating a 
arbitration contract when the
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Appeal will be made to 
Appeal Division of 
Commercial Court.
State organisations may 
enter into agreement to 
arbitrate without any need 
for later approval.
Multilateral and bilateral 
agreements are not 
covered by this law. 
Validity of agreement is 
related to nature of 
international relation 
more than to contract 
stipulation.
State and its organs are 
restricted to use Tunisian 
regulation for
international arbitration.
Ensures enforcement of 
final arbitral award 
without interference from 
other domestic legislation. 
Provides more certainty to 
foreign parties.
Arbitration is valid with 
government party, but 
cannot enter into 
arbitration in a matter that 
can be settled by 
conciliation.
* Separability 
Clause
Arbitration clause is valid 
when the contract is null 
and void.
state or its organs are a party 
to that contract. This situation 
adds more difficulties to 
foreign contracting party. 
Adopts the UNCITRAL 
principle, the clause remains 
valid
Arbitration clause is 
independent from the 
agreement.
Adopts the principle that 
the clause will be treated 
independently.
The clause is valid based 
on the contractual 
agreement.
2 Party Autonomy
*Autonomy to 
compose the 
Tribunal
* Party Autonomy 
over Conducting 
Arbitral
Ensure parties autonomy to 
compose arbitral tribunal. 
No person shall be 
precluded by reason of his 
nationality.
Number of arbitrators are, 
according to parties 
decision, otherwise must be 
three.
Arbitrator decides according 
to majority rule.
Ensures parties’ autonomy 
to choose the arbitral 
procedure in regard to equal
Moved away from classic 
Shari’a law (arbitrator should 
be male, wise, free, Muslim 
and fair)
One or more, in absence of 
agreement must be three.
Same as the Model Law
Took the position of the 
Model Law without 
modifications.
Ensures autonomy, no 
restrictions of given gender 
or nationality.
If more than one, must be 
uneven.
Same as the Model Law
Took the position of the 
Model Law without 
modifications.
Same as Egypt and 
Jordan. No restriction.
Same as Oman
Modified to give the 
chairman the power to 
order interim measures. 
Took the position of the 
Model Law without 
modifications, except it is
Kept the Model Law 
without modifications.
Number must be uneven, 
in absence of agreement 
must be three.
Took the position of 
Tunisia.
Took the position of the 
Model Law without 
modifications.
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Proceedings
*Rule Applicable to 
Substance of 
dispute
treatment, determination of 
rules of procedure, place of 
arbitration, commencement 
of arbitral proceedings, and 
the language.
Provides that the tribunal 
will decide the dispute 
according to rules chosen by 
the parties.
Tribunal will apply rules 
agreed by the parties. Parties 
can agree to apply law of 
certain countries. In absence 
of agreement, tribunal can 
apply substantive law most 
closely connected with the 
dispute.
Same as Egypt.
silent about the date of 
commencement of arbitral 
proceedings and gave the 
tribunal power to decide 
on amendment by either 
party.
Absolute freedom to 
choose the applicable 
rule. Tribunal can decide 
in accordance with rule of 
equity if authorised by the 
parties.
Parties are free to decide 
the system of law of a 
given state, substantive 
rules, not its rules relating 
to conflict of laws to be 
followed.
3 Strengthening the 
Tribunal Power
* Competence de la 
competence
Tribunal shall have 
jurisdiction to rule on its 
own jurisdiction.
Principle has been adopted. 
The scope of the jurisdiction is 
wider than the Model Law.
Principle has been adopted 
similarly as the Egyptian 
law.
Principle has been 
adopted.
Principle has been 
adopted. Further 
procedure will be 
suspended while the 
tribunal decides its 
jurisdiction.
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♦Challenge to the 
Arbitrator
♦Power to order 
Interim Measures
Arbitrator may not be
challenged except where 
circumstances give rise to 
serious doubt of his
impartiality or
independence.
Arbitral tribunal has the 
power to order interim 
measures.
Inspired by the Model Law 
and application should be 
submitted to tribunal. A denial 
application will be brought to 
Court of Appeal.
Have the power to issue 
interim measures upon the 
request of either party.
In case of settlement before 
the final award, tribunal
should issue a decision 
equivalent to the award.
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Arbitrator takes the 
initiative to inform the 
parties and withdraw. 
Application to challenged 
arbitrators submitted to the 
tribunal. A denial 
application will be bought to 
Appeal division of 
Commercial Court.
Same as the Egyptian.
Arbitrator takes the 
initiative to inform the 
parties and withdraw. 
Contrary to the Model 
Law, application will be 
submitted to Court of 
Appeal.
Tribunal President alone 
may issue the measures in 
case there is no majority 
among arbitrators. In case 
of settlement, it must be 
presented to the tribunal 
to issue a final award 
according to conditions of 
settlement and finalise the 
procedure. Challenge to 
interim measures brought 
before the Court of 
Appeal.
Same as The Model Law, 
arbitrator will be 
challenged in case of 
serious doubts. Contrary 
to Model Law, application 
will be submitted to Court 
of Jurisdiction.
Tribunal has the power to 
issue interim measures 
before the final award. In 
case of settlement, it 
should be brought before 
the tribunal to issue a 
decision equivalent to the 
award.
Restriction on
Court Intervention
* Effect of Limits court interference by Court is obliged to reject the
Arbitration referring parties to case where the agreement
Agreement Arbitration. contains an arbitration clause.
Court should declare it has no
jurisdiction.
♦Setting Aside Two cases only: Award may be challenged in
Award If the subject matter of some (7) exclusive cases even
dispute is not capable of if the party had waived the
settlement by arbitration. right to challenge the award.
If the award is in conflict
with public policy.
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Same as Egypt.
Same as Egypt.
Distinguishes between 
domestic and international 
arbitration. In domestic, 
the court shall declare 
incompetence upon the 
request of the most 
diligent party. In 
international arbitration, 
the court shall declare 
incompetence only if the 
agreement is null and 
void.
Distinguishes between 
domestic and
International award. In 
domestic arbitration, only 
if parties expressly decide 
to lodge an appeal against 
an arbitral tribunal. In 
international arbitration, 
the Court of Appeal
Same as Egyptian and 
Omani laws.
Same as Egyptian and 
Omani Laws.
♦Recognition
Enforcement
Award
and Court is obliged to 
of recognise and enforce the 
award unless certain 
grounds for refusal apply.
Arbitral awards will have res 
judicata status, will be fully 
enforceable, and will be 
subject to nullification on only 
very limited grounds. These 
grounds are: contradicts
previous court decision, 
contradicts public policy, and 
the award has correctly been 
informed.
235
Same as the Egyptian law.
decides on the merits.
Adopts the exact Model 
Law clause.
Unlike the other three 
laws, Court intervention 
has been limited to two 
cases only.
CHAPTER NINE
Moving Toward Modernisation of Regional International 
Commercial Arbitration Law
9.1 Introduction
Previous chapters examined the legal aspects influencing the process of harmonisation 
of international commercial arbitration law in the Middle East and provided 
comparative proof that regionalism plays a significant role in creating a legislative 
environment which makes the Middle East countries to a large extent reluctant to 
participate in the global process of harmonising international commercial arbitration 
law by adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law. Previous chapters also showed that 
Middle Eastern commercial arbitration laws suffer from outdated, multilayered, and 
inconsistent legislations. Accordingly, the case for international commercial 
arbitration law reform has been established.
International commercial arbitration is no doubt a viable way to process cross-border 
commercial disputes, mainly because arbitration criteria and procedures have become 
standardised through the UNCITRAL Model Law. However, arbitration cannot yet 
bridge all the cultural gaps between the parties, most notably, between the conciliation 
culture as found in the Middle East region and the adversarial culture in the West.1 
This chapter will propose that in response to globalisation, regional legal culture 
values and norms should not act as barriers to the introduction of accepted 
international principles of international commercial arbitration into the Middle East 
region since regional norms can be accommodated.
9.2 Reflecting on Competing Claims
This section will consider arguments against arbitration law reform in Middle East 
countries. These arguments are founded upon Islamic law, the capacity of the state, 
and cultural estoppels.
9.2.1 Islamic Law and the Ground Rules 
Islamic law is a crucial dimension in the debate on legal reform in the Middle East 
region. In light of Islamic Shari’a methodology (Usui al-flqh) , this section will argue
1 See Bernardo M. Cremades, (1998). “Overcoming the clash of legal Culture: The Role of Interactive 
Arbitration” Arbitration International vol. 14 No. 2, p. 159, cites Ahmed Sedek El-Kosheri, “Is There a 
Growing International Arbitration Culture in the Arab-Islamic Culture?” 47-48 in Van Den Berg (ed.)
2 The Islamic science of methodology is mainly concerned with laying down procedural rules and 
principles in accordance with which the deduction and induction of details of substantive Islamic 
principles, rules and rulings are regularised, standardised and free from possible fallibilities. In Mahdi
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that under the ground rules of Islamic Law, reform is achievable and the basic 
principles of international commercial arbitration law can be introduced into the legal 
system of Middle East countries, where some3 argue that they cannot adopt and 
incorporate modem international commercial arbitration law because it might alter 
existing notions of the moral order.
Islamic Methodology (Manhaj)
Manhaj according to the Arabic dictionary means “clear way or pathway”. It 
originates in the word nahaja, which means “to follow a clear way or pathway”. 
Manhaj in research means a set of general rules that are followed by the researcher in 
collecting and organising the various ideas and information of the research in order to 
attain optimum results.4
By applying Islamic Law methodology, it will become clear that, the main features of 
international commercial arbitration are acceptable according to the primary as well 
as the secondary source of this methodology this methodology; thus, reform will not 
contradict the Islamic Law.
9.2.1.1 Reform in light of the Primary Source of Islamic Methodology (Manhaj) 
Validity of the Arbitration Concept
Arbitration is an integral part of the Islamic Law: both the term and the concept are 
mentioned in the Qur ’an, and it has been traditionally practised in the Middle East for 
more than 1,400 years.5
The validity of arbitration is recognised by the four primary sources of the Sharia; the 
Qur’an; Sunnah;6 Idjma’ (consensus of opinion) and Qiyas (reasoning by analogy). 
Further, not only is the concept recognised, but a debate exists between classical 
Muslim jurists concerning the character of arbitration.
According to one view, arbitration is a form of conciliation close to amiable 
composition which is not binding on the parties. Those favouring this view hold that
Zahraa, (2003). Unique Islamic Law Methodology and the Validity of Modem and social science 
research methods for Islamic research. Arab Law Quarterly, Koninklijke Brill, p. 216.
3 Saudi Arabia, and Sudan
4 op.cit. 2 p. 226.
5 See Yahya Al-Samaan, (2001). Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia, p. 71 in Yearbook of Islamic and 
Middle East Law. Volume 7, General Editor Eugene Cotran. Published for the Centre of Islamic and 
Middle East Law at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
6 The acts and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. He recognised and practised arbitration. He 
appointed arbitrators and accepted their decisions. He also acted as arbitrator on several occasions to 
resolve disputes arising between individuals and tribes. He acted as an arbitrator in the dispute between 
several Arab tribes regarding which of whom would have the honour of lifting and placing the Black 
Stone after rebuilding the Kaaba. He also chose arbitration to settle the dispute between himself and 
Bani Anbar.
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the arbitrator’s decision is neither binding nor final, unless it is accepted by the 
parties. Thus, arbitration does not have any jurisdictional nature, but is close to 
conciliation. Proponents of this view deploy the following verse from the Qur’an:
“If you fear a breach between them twain (the man and his wife), 
appoint (two) arbitrators, one from his family and the other from hers; 
if  they both wish for peace, Allah will cause their reconciliation.
Indeed Allah is Ever the All Knower, Well Acquainted with all 
things”.7
The second view is that the Shari ’a recognises arbitration in its binding modem sense. 
This view is based on the following verse from the Qur’an:
“Verily Allah commands that you should render back the trusts to those, 
to whom they are due, and that when you judge between men, you 
judge with justice”.8
If one is authorised to judge, one is authorised to make judgements with a binding 
decision.
Issue of Terminology
It should be noted that one of the elements that has caused confusion and 
misunderstanding as to the difference between arbitration and conciliation in Islam is 
that Islamic Law uses the word “Hakam”.9 The word refers in its strict sense to a 
person who is ‘authorised’ in a specific mission. Accordingly, the word can be used in 
its broad sense to refer to an authorised person with power to settle differences 
between disputants by suggesting settlement or helping them to reach it, or by issuing 
a binding decision to settle their dispute. The agreement of the parties determines the 
type of the authorisation in each case. As a result of differences between scholars, 
understanding of the meaning of the word in its terminological sense in Islamic Law, 
some think Islamic Law recognises only two types of arbitration: arbitration that leads 
to binding decisions, and arbitration that leads to non-binding decisions. Islamic law, 
in fact, recognises the differences between conciliation (that ends with a non-binding 
decision) and arbitration that leads to binding decisions. Conciliation is permitted
7 The Holy Qur’an 4: 35.
8 The Holy Qur’an 4: 58
9 See I. Abul-Enein, (2000). “Liberal Trends in Islamic Law (Shari’a) on Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes”. J. Arab Arbitration. Vol.2 p.2.
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under Islamic Law in civil, commercial, family and other matters as long as it does 
not permit acts against God’s commands or the matter settled by conciliation falls 
within the ambit of the rights of God, i.e. crimes and their sanctions.10 
Approaches taken by the Four Islamic Schools
Detailed arbitration rules are not expressed in the Qur’an: the Qur’an has laid down 
the general rule mentioned above and it is the duty of Qualified Muslim jurists to 
elaborate and develop it in accordance with the needs of the community within the 
general framework of Islam.11 Although arbitration is recognised by the four major 
Islamic schools, every school gives emphasis to certain unique themes.
The Hanafi School
The scholars of this school emphasise the contractual nature of arbitration and hold 
that arbitration is legally close to agencies and conciliation. They hold that an 
arbitrator acts as an agent on behalf of the disputant who has appointed him. The 
Hanafi School stresses the close connection between arbitration and conciliation. 
Thus, to them an arbitral award is closer to conciliation than to a court judgement, and 
is of lesser force than a court judgement. Nevertheless, under this School the 
disputing party cannot be relieved from being obligated to obey the award because the
19agreement to resort to arbitration binds the parties like any other contract.
The Shaft School
According to the Shall School, arbitration is a legal practice, whether or not there is a
IT •judge in the place where the dispute has arisen. However, according to this School, 
the position of arbitrators is inferior to that of judges, since arbitrators’ authority is 
liable to be revoked up to the time of issuance of the award.
The Hanbali School
Under the Hanbali School, a decision made by the arbitrator has the same binding 
nature as a court’s judgement. Thus the award made by an arbitrator (who must have 
the same qualifications as a judge) is imposed upon both of the parties who chose 
him.14
10 Conciliation according to Islamic law is a separate subject. The purpose of mentioning this issue is to 
show that Islam recognises the difference between conciliation and arbitration.
11 See Zeyad Alqurashi, (2003). Arbitration Under Islamic Shari’a. Oil, Gas & Energy Law 
Intelligence, p. 3.
12 Ibid.
13 See Samir Saleh (1984). Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East: A Study in Sharia and 
Statute Law. Graham & Tortman. London, p.22.
14 Ibid, cites, Abul Hamid El-Ahdab. Arbitration with Arab Countries (Kluwer Law International, 
1999). p. 16.
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The Maliki School
The Maliki School has great trust in arbitration, accepting that one of the parties can 
be chosen as an arbitrator by the other disputing party. This is explained by the fact 
that one party relies upon the conscience of the other party.15 Unlike the other three 
schools, this School stresses that an arbitrator cannot be dismissed after 
commencement of the arbitral proceedings.
Impact of Different madhahib on Reform of Commercial Arbitration Law
When Muslims began to codify Islamic law, such as when the Ottomans drafted the 
first Islamic code the Majalla, they had to decide which madhhab would take 
precedence: would they adopt a Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, or Shafi’i madhhab?
Despite the fact that a commercial arbitration agreement is valid according the 
primary source of Islamic fiqh (Qur’an and Sunnah), certain differences in the context 
of commercial arbitration procedure exist as a consequence of differences in 
madhahib (for example, Shafi’i and Hanafi permit the revocation of arbitrators at any 
time before rendering the award).
At the outset, it might seem that reform could create difficulties; for example, 
arbitration procedure in Kuwait according to Malikis madhhab differs from arbitration 
procedure in Egypt according to Hanafis madhhab. Nevertheless, taking into 
consideration the doctrine of takhayyur the process of selection between the different 
madhahib should allow reformers to operate effectively. Further, reform and 
modernisation are better achieved away from doctrinal fanaticism, and (ikhtilaf al- 
r ’ayj different madhahib should enhance the reform process.
Main Features of Arbitration under the Four Islamic Schools 
To comprehensively reflect on the aforementioned Islamic Law claim main features 
of modem international commercial arbitration law will be examined to show that this 
claim will not stand in light of in-depth research on the ground rules of the Islamic 
law. In other word, the examination in the following section of main principles of 
modem international commercial law will show that the Islamic law does not conflict 
with commercial law reform’s modem principles.
Arbitration Agreement
According to all schools of Islamic law, the arbitration agreement is the principal 
basis for conferring upon arbitrators the power to issue binding decisions. The use of
15 Ibid.
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arbitration as a method for the settlement of disputes under Islamic Law depends upon 
the full and valid consent of the parties.
Whether the arbitration agreement should be in writing or oral is not discussed by any 
school in the SharVa. However, in the leading case between Caliph “Ali Ben Abi 
Taleb” (the Fourth Caliph) and “Muawya Bin Abi Sufyan”16, the two parties agreed to 
appoint two arbitrators in written deed which stated the names of the arbitrators, the 
time limit for making the award, the applicable law, and the place of issue of the
1 7award.
As part of an international commercial contract, the arbitration clause usually deals 
with disputes that might potentially arise from the contract. A pertinent question is 
whether arbitration is valid under Islamic Shari ’a law for disputes which do not exist 
at the time of contracting but might be arise in the future?
The doctrinal writing of the four Shari ’a Schools deal with the use of arbitration in 
existing disputes, therefore are silent about arbitration for disputes which might arise 
in the future.
This issue has been and continues a subject of controversy among some classical 
scholars of Shari’a. Such silence in early times should not mean that arbitration is 
prohibited in such disputes. According to the principle of freedom of contract under 
Islamic Shari’a, parties are free to include any clause in their contract as long as it
10 #
does not permit acts against God’s commands, such as the incorporation of ‘interest’ 
(Riba) clauses.
A division of opinion between authorities on the Shari’a prevails over whether the 
consent of the parties to go to arbitration is required only at the time of the agreement
16 When the third Caliph, Othman, was killed by a mob, the other Companions encouraged Ali to take 
the Caliphate. Because Othman was violently killed, Ali proved cautious about receiving the office too 
readily, since this might link him with the murder of Othman. When he did accept, upon the urgings of 
the other Companions, Ali felt that the tragic situation was mainly due to inept governors. He therefore 
dismissed all the governors who had been appointed by Othman and appointed new ones. All the 
governors, excepting Muawiya, the governor of Syria, submitted to his orders. Muawiya declined to 
obey until Othman’s blood was avenged. The Prophet's widow Aisha also took the position that Ali 
should first bring the murderers to trial. Due to the chaotic conditions existing during the last days of 
Othman it was very difficult to establish the identity of the murderers, and Ali refused to punish anyone 
whose guilt was not lawfully proved. Ali had difficulties establishing his legitimacy, and by the time he 
requested Muawiya to give him the oath of allegiance, the Syrian population was generally of the 
opinion that Ali was responsible for Othman’s murder; thus, Muawiya refused to pay him allegiance. 
The two men confronted each other with their armies at Siffin in early 657, where Muawiya called for 
arbitration. The arbitration solved nothing, but it did serve to delegitimise Ali in the eyes of some of his 
supporters. The debate over this case caused a major split in Islam into Sunni and Shiite branches.
17 Walid, El-Malik, Mineral Investment Under The Sharia Law (London: Graham& Tortman 1993) p. 
127. In Zeyad Alqurashi see supra note 14.
18 op.cit. 13 p.10.
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or does the consent continue until the issuance of an award by the arbitrator(s). Some 
classical Muslim jurists question the binding nature of an arbitration agreement. To 
them, an arbitration agreement is a revocable option rather than a contractual 
undertaking. This idea was incorporated in Al-Majalla19 where some codifications 
included arbitration rule to be applied during the Othman Empire.
However, according to contemporary Muslim scholars, this view is obsolete, 
superficial and ill-founded.20 The modem trend in Islamic law is to consider the 
arbitration agreement binding upon the parties once it has been entered into. Parties 
are also be bound by the decision of the arbitrators.
This view is based on the direct application of the general principles of Islamic Law
91derived from the Qur’an when it states: “Oh you who believe fulfil your agreement.” 
This meaning was also stressed by the Prophet Muhammad in the famous Hadith, 
“Believers should honour their engagements”. It may be concluded that the view that 
receives most approval and application in the legal profession is that arbitration 
agreements are binding and no party is permitted to withdraw from any agreement 
freely concluded with others unless the agreement is not valid for some reason.
As to the formalities of arbitration procedures relating to the place of arbitration 
appointment of arbitrators the Qur’an is silent. Accordingly, they are within the 
discretionary powers of the parties.
Arbitral Tribunal
Once the disputing parties have agreed to resolve their dispute by arbitration, they 
should reach an agreement on the appointment of the arbitrator(s). The parties may 
specify the arbitrator(s) by name or they may define the arbitrator(s) by a certain 
position without specifying the name. If parties agree on arbitration but do not appoint 
the arbitrator(s), the arbitration may not take place.
The four schools of Islamic Shari’a are silent on the possibility of appointing 
arbitrators by a third party. However, there is nothing under the Shari’a that prohibits 
the appointment of the arbitrator(s) by a third party. Thus, it is left to the freedom of 
the contracting parties to decide whether they want such appointment made by a third 
party or not.22
19 Article 1848 of Al-Majalla (the Islamic Civil Law Code established during the Ottoman Empire)
20 Abdul Razak Al-Sanhuri, Masader Al-Haq, Vol. 1, (Cairo: Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabia, 1968) p .80.
21 Qur’an 5: 1.
22 op.cit. 13.
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According to the four Islamic Law Schools, there are no restrictions on the number of 
arbitrators. The matter is left to the parties to appoint one or more arbitrators and the 
number may be odd or even. However, if each party appoints an arbitrator, and the 
two arbitrators authorise a third one, the majority rule may be applied if the parties 
give their consent.
As to the revocability of arbitrators by one of the parties, the Maliki School prohibits 
revocation after the procedure has started. The Shafi and Hanafi Schools permit the 
revocation of arbitrators at any time before rendering the award. However, the view 
that receives most approval and application in the legal profession is the view of the 
Maliki School, which provides that the appointment of arbitrators is irrevocable after 
the procedure has commenced, except by mutual agreement of the disputing parties. 
This view seems to be most appropriate because it meets the requirements of the 
international business community.
The Applicable Law
In disputes where one party is non-Muslim, choosing of a non-Islamic legal system to 
settle such disputes is recognised by the Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali Schools as valid. 
However, recourse to a non- Islamic system is only valid24 as long as the rules to be 
applied to the contract do not expressly violate provisions of the Qur’an or Sunnah. 
Arbitrability According to Islamic Law
According to the four Schools of Shari’a arbitration is not authorised in matters 
relating to the “Rights of God”. The area of arbitrability is large, covering criminal 
law as well as patrimonial rights, and resembles the area of public policy in modem 
laws. The Qur’an nevertheless excludes certain subjects, such as guardianship of 
orphan, which must be referred to courts law. Apart from subjects excluded, any other 
dispute should be just as cable of being resolved by arbitration as by a national court. 
Accordingly, disputes arising out of commercial transactions are arbitral.
Enforcement of an Arbitral Award
According to the Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi and the majority of Shafi’i scholars, an 
arbitral award is as enforceable as a judge’s judgement. The schools of Islamic 
Shari’a differ somewhat on the binding nature of a judgement reached through
23 See George Sayen (2003). Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Tradition in Saudi Arabia. U. 
Pa. J. Int’l Economic Law. p. 10.
24 The Prophet Mohammad in a well known case in Islamic history called “Banu Quraydah” accepted 
the application of customary and Mosaic law instead of Islamic law.
25 op.cit.17. p.47.
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arbitration. A minority of Shafi’ scholars hold that the final award has to be 
acceptable by both parties before it becomes binding upon them, thus reducing 
arbitration to a purely conciliatory procedure from beginning to end. Hanafi scholars 
hold that a judge should not enforce an award unless he agrees with it. The majority
of Shafi’i scholars and the Maliki and Hanbali schools are of the opinion that the
26decision of an arbitrator has the same legal status as a qadi 's (judge’s) judgement.
The Hanbali School is particularly insistent on this point, stating that a qadi should 
not refuse enforcement merely because of a difference of opinion (ikhtilaf al-ray’). 
This doctrine sounds encouraging from a Western standpoint for the harmonisation 
process of modem international commercial law because it confirms the enforcement.
9.2.1.2 Reform in light of the Secondary Source of Islamic Methodology 
It has been emphasised above that arbitration as a concept and principle is valid under 
the primary source of Islamic law methodology. Accordingly, those using the moral 
order argument of Islamic law against introducing reform have no legal basis for such 
argument. It may therefore be asked why the reform process in countries adopting 
Islamic law argument facing difficulties?
Such difficulties may be associated with use of the secondary source of Islamic law 
methodology, mainly in Saudi Arabia, which takes the Islamic law claim position, and 
not because there is a contradiction between Islamic law and the main principles of 
international commercial arbitration as has been previously demonstrated.
As a result, the following part proposes that arbitration reform can be successfully 
introduced by using the secondary source of Islamic law methodology. It will also 
argue that arbitration reform is imperfect in countries adopting Islamic Law claim 
position, mainly Saudi Arabia, because the application of the secondary source of 
Islamic law methodology is vague and unsystematic.
The Eclectic Device (Pragmatic Attitude)
It seems that the methodological approach used in Saudi Arabia is pragmatic rather 
than theoretical. The main reason for this attitude is that the Wahhabis27 have different
26 op.cit.23.
27The term "Wahhab" (Wahhabiya) refers to the Sunni fundamentalist Islamic movement’s founder 
Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab (1703-1792). It is the dominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar. The Wahhabis claim to hold to the way of the "Salaf as-Salih", the 'pious predecessors' as earlier 
propagated mainly by Ibn Taymiyya, his students Ibn Al Qayyim and later Muhammad Ibn Abdul 
Wahab and his followers. Wahhabis do not follow any specific maddhab (method or school of 
jurisprudence), but claim to interpret the words of the prophet Muhammad directly, using the four
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legal methodology; they have adopted Ibn Taymiyya’s legal theory, including the 
rejection of taqlid28, but at the same time have retained, unaltered, the classical 
Hanbali positive law without worrying about the contradiction involved (methodology 
and no methodology at the same time). The Hanbali attitude towards the Islamic 
methodology (Usui al-fiqh) of systematic analogy (Qiyas) and the consensus (Ijma) of
90the fuqaha remains very weak.
The moralistic Hanbali School cannot provide answers to all the challenges of the 
modem era. In fact, the ruling circles show some tolerance with regard to other 
schools. This attitude is prompted by practical -  economic and political -  
considerations. Therefore, one can find as early as the era of King Abdul Al Aziz in 
the 1920s surprising tolerance towards the other Sunni schools. The King denounced 
doctrinal fanaticism (ta’assub madhhabi) and suggested judging each case on its 
merits. He instmcted qadis to give their decisions according to the school whose 
doctrine was, in their view, the most effective with regard to the matter in hand. If 
that was the case at that time, obviously it is more essential in this era.
Contractual Stipulations
The doctrine of contractual stipulation, which is peculiar to the Hanbali School, has 
been utilised as a means to introduce reforms. All the Sunni schools except the 
Hanbali School, hold that contractual relations are exactly defined by law in terms of 
rights and duties which cannot be stipulated against, even by the consent of the 
parties. The Hanbali school, relying on the Qur’anic precept that Muslims shall fulfil 
their contracts (awfu bil-uqud) (5:1), maintains that the parties are free to determine 
relations between them. Hence the Hanbali mle is that every stipulation agreed upon
between the parties as part of the contract is valid and must be fulfilled, unless it is
*11
specifically forbidden by the Shari’a or is contrary to the nature of the contract.
maddhab for reference. However, they are often associated with the Hanbali maddhab. Wahhabists see 
their role as a movement to restore Islam from what they perceive to be innovations, superstitions, 
deviances, heresies and idolatries.
28 Taqlid is a term sometimes used in a derogatory sense to denote blind following, and is allegedly 
what inspired the Wahhabi movement to eradicate forms of Sufism that in their view had departed 
significantly from both the spirit and practice of Islam. Perhaps because of the pervasiveness of the 
Wahhabi influence, the connotative values of taqlid are decidedly negative
29 See Aharon Layish, (2004). Saudi Arabian Legal Reform as a Mechanism to Moderate Wahhabi. 
Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 107, No. 2 p. 283.
30 See J. Goldberg (1981), “Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud and the Wahhabi Ideology; Reflections on a 
Paradox.” Hamizrah Hehadash. vol. 30, p.285.
31 Ibid.
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In Saudi Arabia, if stipulations are applied to introduce reforms in contractual 
relationships of various kinds, mainly in petroleum concessions granted to American 
companies, then, the intentional reform process in commercial arbitration law can be 
appealed under the same doctrine.
Al-Masalih Al-Mursalah (public interest)
According to the traditional doctrine of Siyasa Shariyya {Shari ’a oriented policy), the 
ruler may make administrative regulations in the public interest, provided that no 
substantive infringement of the Shari’a is involved. This doctrine is recognised also 
by the Hanbali School, which links it with the Masalha (public interest) condition. It 
has been used in Saudi Arabia when the ruler defines the powers of Shari’a Courts 
restrictively whilst setting up an extra-Shar ’z'a judicial system by establishing 
administrative courts.32 If this doctrine is used as aforementioned, then the public 
interest argument can be used for legal reforms mainly in the area international 
commercial arbitration law can be introduced to promote foreign direct investment. 
Ijtihad
The reopening of ijtihad was, in the opinion of the Modernist School of Muhammad 
Abduh, a highroad to reforms by the authorised exponents of the Shari’a. In 1976, a 
conference of religious functionaries and intellectuals from all over the Arab world 
met in Riyadh. It resolved, inter alia, to establish an academy of Islamic law in which 
senior fuqaha (jurists) and ‘ulama (scholars) were to participate in order to revive the 
collective (jama'i) ijtihad and thereby to contend with the challenges presented by the 
modem era. In a declaration marking the opening of the fourth meeting of that 
academy, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia suggested that it was better to solve problems 
by way of ijtihad than by statutory legislation (nizam wadi).33 
So far, we cannot point to any ijtihad based legal reform affected by legislation. On 
the other hand, there are those who find instances of ijtihad, in the classical sense of 
this term, in the decisions of the (qadis) Judges.
9.2.1.3 Fatwa and Reform 
Theoretically, there is no temporal legislative authority in Saudi Arabia. Such an 
authority is contrary to the conception of a theocracy in which law is given by 
revelation as interpreted and identified by the competent fuqaha. Sensitivity to the
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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theocratic image is so great that it is not permitted to use terms connoting statutory 
legislation in a Western sense with all the attendant negative associations.34 
The Fatwa as an Instrument for Reforms
The muftis, the authors of religious-legal opinion, play an important role in Arab 
countries and it is in Saudi Arabia that they are given a position of strength 
unparalleled in any other Muslim country. The theocratic character of the state, which 
does not, in theory, recognise any legislative authority, causes the government to rely 
on the fuqaha (jurists), competent exponents of the Shari’a, to provide religious 
legitimation to the reformist policy by finding support for it in religious-legal sources, 
thereby preserving internal stability and legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of 
society.35
The Attitude of Muftis toward Reforms
The attitude of the muftis towards the legal reforms is divided. There are many 
instances of opposition, such as the defeat of the attempt to codify Shari ’a law on the 
initiative of the King of Saudi Arabia, Abdul Al-Aziz, and resistance to legislation on 
labour relations, social insurance and penal matters. There has been opposition to the
36application of ijtihad and maslaha as mechanisms for introducing reforms; this is 
related to the problem associated with the use of secondary source of Islamic law 
methodology as has been examined.
Strong criticism has been voiced against reformist legal opinions which, in the view 
of critics, give a distorted interpretation of the Qur’an in order to adapt it to the 
demands of modem life, in disregard of the Sunnah.
Most fatwas in modem areas, such as worship, personal status, science and medicine, 
technological inventions, reaffirm the Orthodox, conservative position.
The main reason for opposition of the muftis to reforms is the puritan character of the 
Wahhabiyya, which rejects every adjustment to changing conditions as bid ’a 
(innovation in a pejorative sense).
The main obstacle to the introduction of reform is associated with methodological 
issues rather than substantial issues of international commercial law and, for this 
reason, the need for the development of maslaha, the public interest doctrine, is 
essential.
34 Muhammad ‘Abd al-Jawad Muhammad, Al-Tatawwur al-Tashri’ fi il-Mamlaka al Arabiyya al 
Sa’udiyya. see supra note 29.
35Ibid., p. 288.
36 Ibid., p.298.
247
This argument is consistent with that of some other Muslim ‘ulama (jurists) who 
stress the importance of maslaha for adjusting Islamic law, which, in their opinion, is 
based on a rationalist approach to the conditions of a modem society. They seek 
support from Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya37 (1292- 1350 CE), who, according to them, 
placed maslaha on an equal footing with the Shari’a: “Wherever maslaha is, there is
38the divine law” (aynama kanat al-maslaha fa-thamma shar Allah).
They distinguish, within the Shari’a, between immutable general principles (qawaid 
a ’mma) and the positive law (ahkam tafsiliyya ) based on those principles. In their 
opinion, the Qur’an based positive law cannot be understood without reference to 
maslaha, and since the latter changes in the course of time, there is nothing to prevent 
corresponding changes in the positive law.
9.2.1.4 Islamic Public Policy and Reform 
Given the fact that Islamic law is considered to be the prevailing law in the Middle 
East, public policy acquires a distinct Islamic character. Unsurprisingly, Islamic law is 
prominently integrated into the framework of public policy, thus, has an impact on 
any international commercial arbitration law reform.
Islamic public policy does not represent a set of fundamental principles on which the 
legal order is based, but rather a number of specific mles. It appears that the common 
denominator of these rules is their mention in the Qur’an, which renders them
on
directives ordained by God and hence essential mles of Islamic law. These God- 
given mles are by their very nature considered to be immutable.
When considering the main features of international commercial arbitration law, 
evidence above shows that they do not conflict with Islamic public policy. Therefore,
37Sham Al-Din Muhammad Ibn Abi Bakr, Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya. He was bom in a small farming 
village near Damascus, Syria in 691 A.H/.1292 C.E, and he studied under his father who was the local 
attendant (qayyim) of al-Jawziyya school. Later on, he pursued his quest for knowledge at the hands of 
renowned masters and scholars of his epoch, as well as he studied the works and teachings of sufi 
masters known in his time. His schooling centred around Islamic jurisprudence, theology, and the 
science of prophetic traditions. In the year 712/1312 at the age of 21 he joined the study circle of Imam 
Ibn Taimiyyah who kept him in his company as his closest student and disciple, who later on became 
his successor. Most scholars of the time have acknowledged his profound knowledge of Qur’anic 
interpretation, commentaries on the prophetic traditions, and theology. His extensive knowledge and 
understanding of Qur’anic commentaries surpassed even some renowned theologians in Islamic 
history. See Dr. Salah al-Sawi (1994), al-Thawabit wa al-Mutaghayyirat, Cairo, al-Muntada al-Islami.,
p.66.
38 Ibid., p.290.
39 See Maurits S. Berger (2002). Conflict Law and Public Policy in Egyptian Family Law: Islamic Law 
Through the Backdoor. Am. J. Comp. L. pp. 587-588.
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Islamic public policy is not the often quoted “safety valve” to prevent unwanted 
consequences from foreign laws but rather a mechanism for upholding Islamic law 
principles.40
9.2.1.5 Reform Experience 
Commercial law reforms have been introduced into Middle East countries. Such 
reforms are generally in agreement with the Shari’a and fall within the scope of 
Siyasa Shariyya, they do not conflict with any religious legal permission or 
prohibition.
The first of these reforms was in 1860; the Ottomans adopted as their own, without 
changes or adaptation, the French Commercial Code of 1807. In 1863 and 1880, the 
Ottomans also freely borrowed the French Maritime Law and the Law of Civil 
Procedure, respectively. This borrowing extended to other European sources, 
including the Swiss, German, English, and Italian codes of law.41 
Later, with the emergence of nation-states after World War I, there were attempts at 
synthesising Islamic and European laws, and in this process it was Egypt that led the 
way.
Even in Saudi Arabia, important reforms in commercial law were inspired by 
Ottoman, Arab and Western legislation where courts of the chambers of commerce 
applied regulations based on the Ottoman Commercial Code of 1850, which in turn 
was based on a French model and has no trace of the Shari’a in it.42 
These regulations did not conflict with the Shari’a law of transactions and did not 
permit anything prohibited or prohibit anything permitted or in conflict with any 
[Qur’anic] text or any tradition or consensus (wa-du’n an tuhallil haraman aw 
tuharrim halalan aw tu ’arid nassan aw sunnatan aw ijma ’an).43 It may be concluded 
that reform of arbitration law is recognised as valid under Islamic law since it does 
not permit what is prohibited by the Islamic Shari’a.
40 Ibid., p.593.
41 See Wael B. Hallaq, (2003). “Muslim Rage” and Islamic Law”. Hastings L.J. p. 1713. See supra note; 
on these and other “reforms,” see Norman Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World (1976); N.J. 
Coulson, a History of Islamic Law (1964).
42 op.cit. 29. p.281.
43 Ibid., p.288.
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9.2.2 Statism: A Barrier to Reform
This part will reflect on statism, which dominates Middle East countries, constituting 
an obstacle and barrier to reform. If reform is to achieve its aims, national 
governments should be willing to adjust to the expanding need to regulate 
international arbitration by giving up the state’s monopoly over legislations of an 
economic character, for example, international commercial arbitration law, and 
facilitating other interest groups’ involvement in the legislative process.
In order to reflect on this claim and to assess the success of statism, it is important 
firstly to highlight the arguments used to justify statism, and, secondly, to argue that 
these have led to lack of an effective dispute resolution mechanism, which, in turn, 
has proved to be an obstacle for promoting efficient foreign direct investment in the 
Middle East.
9.2.2.1 Arguments Used to Justify Statism 
As has been discussed in chapter three, statism is one of the main paradigms of 
development of international commercial arbitration law and the most important 
institutional framework in the Middle East region.
After independence, many developing countries in the Middle East adopted statism. 
Several reasons have been advanced to explain the choice of statism in post­
independence in these countries as a development path, and the abandonment of the 
institutional frameworks imposed on them by colonial governments. The hope was 
that greater government participation in the economy would provide the state with the 
resources needed to alleviate mass poverty and significantly increase the national 
welfare. As Krueger has remarked,44
“[t]he role of the government was widely perceived to include not only the 
infrastructure and social overhead activities which had been carried out by 
governments in industrialised countries during their development, but also 
the direct responsibility for economic activities traditionally regarded as 
being in the private sector, including agricultural marketing, establishment 
and management of hotels and other tourist services” (Krueger 1992, 7-8).
These countries opted for statism, as a development model that emphasised 
government control of resource allocation, minimised the function of the market, and 
granted the state significant power to intervene in private exchange, as well as to own
44See John Mukun Mbaku, (1994). The Political Economy of development: an empirical analysis of the 
effects of the institutional framework on Economic development. Studies in comparative International 
development, p.5.
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and control productive resources.45 Eventually, the state came to dominate the 
economies of most Middle East countries.
Many considered the state as the most important actor in the war against mass poverty 
and deprivation,46 and were willing to grant it significant power to intervene in private 
exchange so that it could aggressively confront poverty.
Many indigenous elites of the time believed that the state was the only institution 
capable of reconstructing and rehabilitating societies and communities that had been 
devastated by colonial exploitation.47
Development economists of the time argued that the state was the only institution 
capable of successfully organising the large, highly expensive, risky and complex 
development projects needed to meet rising public obligations and deal with poverty, 
as well as provide employment opportunities for a restless population and enhance the 
ability of emerging economies to participate competitively and gainfully in the global
48economy.
The general ethos of the period favoured expansion of the welfare state and public 
management of the economy.49 Therefore, in such countries the state came to 
dominate the legislative process, becoming the sole player in setting the economic 
regulations in order to meet such goals.
9.2.2.2 Effects of Statism 
Many scholars believe that increased state regulation of economic activities 
contributes to poor economic performance and usually leads to a misallocation of 
resources. In addition, it is believed that government regulation of the economy also 
imposes significant costs on entrepreneurs and the economic system, distorts 
economic incentives, and destroys the signalling ability of prices, resulting in lower 
levels of economic output.50
As the evidence from more than three decades of statism and massive control of 
economic activities with excessive emphasis on the state sector has shown, the Middle 
East legal system, dominated by a statism philosophy, is currently unable to give 
efficient and quick responses to international commercial disputes. The multilayered,
45See John Mukum Mbaku (2003). Entrenching Economic Freedom in Africa. Cato Journal, vol. 23, 
No. 2 p. 218.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 op.cit. 43 .p. 4.
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outdated, inconsistent arbitration laws have led to bureaucracy, delays, high cost, and 
the attendant frustration involved in arbitral proceedings, contributing to a lack of 
confidence in the efficiency of commercial arbitration laws.
Statism has promoted and facilitated nepotism, bureaucratic corruption, and has 
constrained the effective development of viable economic infrastructures.51 
In some countries, excessive government regulation has encouraged rent seeking, 
most of which has exhibited itself through high levels of bureaucratic and political 
corruption, nepotism, political violence, and perverse economic policies (Mbaku and 
Paul 1989; Kimenyi 1989; Mbaku 1992a).52
9.2.2.3 Need for an Open Regulatory Institutions 
A situation where the state has the exclusive right and there is no rule of law without 
state monopoly, stands in sharp contrast with the philosophy of arbitration, which is a 
consensual process by nature, at all levels of the process.
Investors typically worry about whether local laws and institutions will discriminate 
against foreign interests or whether local regimes are capable of adequately 
responding to claims by foreign investors. Effective investment legislation, mainly 
international commercial arbitration law, should strike a balance between the 
recognised need for sovereign states to regulate economic activity within their 
territorial boundaries, and the need to create a stable environment within which
C 'J
international investment, trade and commerce can operate. In this regard, freedom to 
contract, which allows individuals engaged in domestic and foreign trade the right to 
enter into mutually beneficial exchanges, is a fundamental right that should be 
guaranteed.
Not surprising, this point had been emphasised by the major international 
organisations in order to promote an efficient global economy as well as reiterate the 
importance of discretionary legislation (non-mandatory legislation)54 in economic 
regulations.
51 Ibid.. p. 6.
52 Ibid.
53 See Why Asia needs a regional insolvency pact; International financial Law Review. London 2004. 
Section 3. p. 2
54 For the majority of discretionary legislation, the legislature in absent of any prejudge direction only 
sets out certain criteria for other interest groups to participate and to develop new legislation prima 
facie consistent with their interests. For more details see Xinji Wang, (2001). A New Paradigm for 
Understanding Mandatory and Discretionary Legislation Under WTO Agreement. Perspectives, vol. 3, 
No. 3. p. 4.
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The United Nations Development Programme has remarked that, “freedom is a 
necessary condition to liberate the creative energies of the people to pursue a path of 
rapid economic development”55 (UNDP 1992, 27).
As stated by the World Bank (2002:6), the active participation of different powers in 
society in open institutional regulation will enhance economic development: 
“effective institutions are those that are incentive-compatible.” Formal, as well as 
informal rules should function together to advance the interest of society. The most 
effective formal institutions are those that complement informal structures and 
provide the people with a well-integrated system of incentives for trade and 
investment.
The World Bank report adds that institutions serve three very important functions. 
First, they provide traders with information about other traders, significantly 
enhancing their ability to anticipate the behaviour of others engaged in similar 
activities. Second, institutions define and enforce property rights as well as contracts. 
Unless property rights within an economy are well defined and enforced, 
entrepreneurs are not likely to invest in productive activities. Third, institutions can 
raise the level of competition in markets and significantly improve resource 
allocation. In competitive markets, resources flow to those uses deemed most valuable 
by consumers, not politicians. The fact that underdeveloped countries must recognise 
is that ffee-market competition enhances innovation, development of new knowledge, 
and economic growth.56
Further, the IMF, in its 2003 report entitled “Effects of Financial Globalisation on 
Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence,” observed: “Preliminary evidence 
also supports the view that in addition to sound macroeconomic policies, improved 
governance and institutions have an important impact upon a country’s ability to 
attract less volatile capital inflows and its vulnerability to crisis.”57 Policymakers 
might be reluctant to encourage active participation of interest groups in order to 
retain state monopoly of legislation, but different approaches should be taken if 
reform is to be achieved.
Accordingly, the first step to introducing international commercial arbitration law 
reform in Middle East countries will be their willingness to accommodate the interests
55 op.cit. 43. p.6.
56 0P.cit.44. p.222.
57 op.cit. 43. p. 2.
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of companies, non-governmental arbitration institutions and other interest groups. The 
significance of this step will be reflected by the development of the dispute resolution 
process and constant changes and new solutions in arbitration, creating a more 
favourable environment for commercial arbitration.
As a result of the development of international commercial arbitration laws through a 
bottom-up, people-driven, inclusive, and participatory process, people’s ability to 
claim ownership of the laws and commitment to ensure their survival will be greatly 
increased.
9.2.3 Cultural Estoppel 
Cultural estoppel58 raises the question of cultural deviation and its influence on 
Middle East international commercial arbitration law reform. A further question, in 
turn, arises. What do Middle East countries in general think about cultural aspects in 
relation to international commercial arbitration law reform and do they have common 
attitudes towards this law?
To answer these questions, the need to reflect on the “cultural estoppel claim” 
becomes essential because this issue will affect the reform process. This section will 
propose that any reform should take the cultural element into consideration, and 
cultural deviations should be dealt with through cultural tolerance not cultural 
estoppel.
9.2.3.1 Arguments Used To Justify the Cultural Estoppel Claim
The question should be asked why and how the cultural estoppel claim has been 
justified. It has been argue that, cultural deviation as it relates to international 
arbitration is particularly significant because legal practitioners are often strongly 
devoted to the procedures of their own legal systems (out of habit alone or 
otherwise).59 Further, the extent of the differences are so substantial that they are 
always keen on the application of the rules of their own system, rather than of 
international harmonised codes.
Some commentators identify a Western “intellectual assault” (ghazw flkri) and 
“cultural assault {ghazw hadari) on the Middle East world,60 when discussing reform,
58 The term estoppel is derived from the old French world “estouper” meaning “to stop up”. It refers to 
the argument that culture prevents Middle East countries from committing to commercial arbitration 
law reform because the latter contradicts what already exists.
59 See Julian D M Lew, Laurence Shore, (1999). International Commercial Arbitration: Harmonising 
cultural Differences. Dispute Resolution Journal. Vol. 54, No. 3 p.6.
60 See William E. Shepard, (1996). Muhammad Said al-Ashmawi and the Application of the Shari’a in 
Egypt. International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 28, No. 1, p. 51.
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and argue that the way to deal with these assaults is by cultural estoppel. As a result, 
no effective and adequate reform has been introduced in the region.
For Middle East counties, the basic philosophy of dispute resolution is different; here 
it is based on Sulh (settlement), Musalaha (reconciliation), Musafaha (‘partaking of 
salt and bread’ i.e. hand-shaking), and Mumalaha (breaking bread together). 
Arbitration and Sulha, a form of community mediation, are the two forms of 
alternative dispute resolution currently used outside the (court system).
“The purpose of Sulha is to end conflict and hostility among people so that 
they may conduct their relationships in peace and amity. The communal 
Arab ritual of Sulha is a non-Westem indigenous application of the process 
of acknowledgement, apology, compensation, forgiveness, and 
reconciliation.”61
Because of the influence of the Middle East social environment, it advocates the 
amicable resolution of disputes. Going to court in open confrontation or litigation is 
considered by many to be an aggressive act, unlike Western culture that considers it a 
way to resolve disputes. Going to court is thus likened to an insult rather than a means 
of settlement.62
This means the decision to go to court may not only affect the contract in hand but 
also jeopardis e future contracts.63 Therefore, it is likely that, when out-of-court 
settlement fails, it is going to be difficult, if not impossible, to reach an equitable 
decision. In such a social environment, foreigners have to learn non-confrontation and 
less visible ways to resolve disputes.
Because of the role of the customary law, habits ( ‘adat, plural of a ’da) and customs 
(ia ’ r ’af, plural of ‘urf) have become embedded, including the domestic legal 
profession and judiciary, and become part of their being and culture.64 
It is well known that ‘urf, or local customary law practice, plays an important 
contributory role to the distinctiveness of Middle East dispute resolution mechanisms. 
‘Urf has been accepted as a basis for rulings and judgements, provided it does not
61 See Marshall J. Breger, Shelby R. Quast, (2000). Article International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Case Study of the Areas under Control of the Palestinian Authority. Case W. Res. J. Int’l 185. p. 12.
62 See Osama E.K. Daoud and Omarm. Azzam (1999). Sources of disputes in construction contracts in 
the Middle East. Technology, Law and Insurance, p.92.
63 Ibid.
64 See Besim S. Hakim, (1993). The Role of ‘Urf in shaping the Traditional Islamic City. Islam and 
Public Law Classical and Contemporary Studies. Edited by Chibli Mallat. p. 142.
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contravene or contradict local values and principles, resulting in the legitimisation of 
local dispute resolution as part of 4urf which, in turn, contributes to the formal legal 
system.
Some acknowledge that the role of 4urf within the legal system is complex and, as a 
result, has to require people to abandon their customs is a very difficult process.65 
Further, because of the role of 'u rf in the legal system, in sharp contrast, in the larger 
Middle East, individuals involved in conflicts are more likely to resort to the official 
legal system to settle their disputes. At the initial hearing, the judge asks the parties if 
they wish to arbitrate or mediate. With the consent of parties, judges may enquire 
whether the parties want conciliation. Thus, in the Middle East, formal arbitration 
judgements are (often) enforceable on the basis of honour and social pressure.
Finally, individuals are expected to fulfil obligations appropriate to their social 
position and in respect of the social hierarchy. Harmony is built on loyalty, social 
identity and preservation of the community. All these features require the 
submergence of individualism in favour of harmony in a community.66
9.2.3.2 Challenging the Cultural Estoppel Claim 
The point to be emphasised here is that, taking into consideration the above 
arguments, it is crucial that reform should find a way to resolve the cultural 
relativism67 versus cultural imperialism68 issue. What is needed is defence of a 
universal standard of international commercial arbitration in such a way as to allow 
for different cultural interpretations and, at the same time, avoids the pitfalls of 
cultural essentialism.69
It should perhaps be noted that in defending this view, one must simply avoid taking 
the idea that international commercial arbitration is a dominant Western-derived 
product for granted. Indeed, historic analysis shows that international commercial
65 op.cit. 60, p. 12.
66 See Edwin H. W. Chan (1997). Amicable dispute resolution in the People’s Republic of China and 
its implications for foreign-related construction disputes. Construction Management and Economic 
Journal, vol. 15. p.540.
67 Cultural relativism is the idea in cultural anthropology that standards of good and evil vary from 
culture to culture. For example what is considered to be good in certain societies might be considered 
bad in others. For more details See Wikkipedia.
68 Cultural imperialism is the idea that promoting the culture of one nation over that of another. In the 
Middle East, Western legal culture is often associated with large economically powerful states that 
want to promote their legal thought in the Middle East countries. For more details See Wikkipedia
69 Cultural essentialism is the concept and theory social order has to be maintained through the 
prevailing cultural framework derived from the socio-historical context. See Heiner Bielefeldt (2000). 
“Western” versus “Islamic” Human Rights Conceptions? : a Critique of Cultural Essentialism in the 
Discussion on Human Rights. Political Theory J. vol. 28, No. 1. p.92.
256
arbitration has not been the natural result of any “organic” development based on a 
particular culture.70
The rejection of cultural essentialism, however, does not imply that cultural aspects 
become altogether meaningless. On the contrary, culture can be a powerful motive 
towards practical commitment to commercial arbitration. Hence the question remains 
as to how to maintain the connection between international commercial arbitration 
and cultural tradition without getting trapped in the culturalist fallacy (the
71conservative argument which assumes everything boils down to culture) . The 
Culturalist fallacy binds citizens and elites together and fosters their identity in 
making and implementing common decisions in legal reform and bearing the
77consequences that derive from them.
The Middle East can learn to accept a different culture without submerging those 
differences that need to remain. Japan for example, has retained its basic values while
77modernising its commercial arbitration law. Middle Easterners should be able to 
make similar efforts.
China is another example of a country having its own culture and responding to the 
growing importance of foreign trade and market economy. Pursuant to the ‘Open 
Door’ policy in the 1980s, a legal framework for resolving foreign-related disputes 
was gradually established. The basic approach is to retain the informal system widely 
used for resolving domestic disputes and to apply the same principles to foreign- 
related disputes.74
At the same time it has been observed that the culture underlying private adjudication 
in the West, is likely to be gradually neutralised by a conciliatory culture, which is 
identified as supporting East Asian tradition, which emphasises harmony and 
conciliation in a community. Sanders comments:
“The wisdom of the Far East is gradually being introduced into our world as well”75 
A final example comes from the Middle East region where two different approaches 
have been adopted as discussed in the previous chapter. In the first, countries prefer to 
keep international arbitration laws separate from domestic arbitration laws as in the
70 op.cit. 59. p. 51.
71 See Stein Ringer (2005). With Good Reason, Rational Choice and Relativism. Cyberpoles, p. 6.
72 See Furio Cerutti, (2005). Constitution and Political Identity in Europe. Nomos Baden, p. 5.
73 See Yasunobu Sato (2000). Commercial Dispute Processing: the Japanese Experience and Future. 
Unpublished thesis, University of London, p. 300.
74 op.cit. 65. p. 541.
75 op.cit.72. pp. 221-223.
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case of Tunisia and Bahrain law reform. The other prefers to apply international 
commercial arbitration principles to domestic laws, as in the case of Egypt, Oman and 
Jordan. The aforementioned examples show that no society can claim to comply with 
commercial arbitration law reform unless it is willing to undertake political and 
cultural reforms.
In short, harmonisation of cultural differences in international arbitration practice 
should proceed with relative ease. However, if flexibility, tolerance, and persuasive 
arguments are lacking, procedural harmonisation will be a lost cause.
9.3 Theoretical Paradigm: Comprehensive Dispute Resolution 
The previous section has examined and reflected on the main competing claims in 
relation to the reform process and concluded that reform is not only necessary and 
achievable, but key areas of concern which should be identified and taken into 
account to ensure that the reform process will meet its objectives. This section will 
propose a theoretical paradigm for reform and emphasise the need to introduce with it 
an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanism in an attempt to achieve a 
comprehensive model of reform. Before examining the theoretical paradigm for 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, it is necessary to assess the equity of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.
9.3.1 Equity of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
As time passes, more jurisdictions are influenced by the Model; at the same time, due 
to the very nature of the Model Law itself, it is inevitably a paradigm in its treatment 
of the arbitration process. It is not a complete code and needs in any event to be 
supplemented. The Model Law does not prevent states from adopting its provisions 
with modification.76 Moreover, it should be updated in the light of the diversity of the 
new legislations based on it and its actual practice.77
The main reason to include the theoretical paradigm for reform with ADR is the 
influence of cultural aspects as has been discussed in the previous section of this 
chapter. Taking the skeletal nature of UNCITRAL Model Law into consideration, the 
question remains: is it flexible enough for such modification?
76 op.cit. 72. p. 196.
77 Ibid., pp. 203-204.
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A number of recent international arbitration statutes, based upon the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, envisage a separate process of conciliation prior to or at least apart from 
the arbitration proceeding.78
For instance, whilst the Netherlands and some common law countries, such as 
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong and some states of the USA, have inserted provisions 
regarding mandatory consolidation, the English Arbitration Act 1996 only provides a 
voluntary provision along the line of party autonomy. The English approach would be 
wise if arbitration institutions could articulate it in their standard terms. The 
Arbitration Act 1996, like the Model Law, does not contain any provision regarding 
conciliation.79
Sanders (2004) suggests that the adoption of the Model Law inspired the insertion of
rules on conciliation in many countries and that the appearance of provisions
regarding conciliation in modem arbitration laws is a new phenomenon. Not only in
the Far East, but also in several European countries, notably Germany, it is not
uncommon for arbitrators also to act as conciliators. Even in the United Kingdom,
80conciliatory elements do not seem to be traditionally unknown in arbitration.
Indeed, for effective reform and if the international business community seeks a set of 
rules better suited to the parties’ needs, then parties should not stop half-way at 
arbitration, but should move to the ADR (mediation and conciliation) context to 
ensure a focus on their own sense of justice rather than on that of the arbitrator.
This restriction is necessary for two reasons: first, equitable principles arguably 
“cannot be interpreted in the abstract; [they] refer back to the principles and rules 
which may be appropriate in order to achieve an equitable result; second, the 
achievement of tme justice cannot be accomplished through a method by which the 
arbitrator is allowed to impose a personal sense of equity, for the security of legal
Q 1
relations would thereby be reduced, and arbitrary decisions would abound”.
To globally harmonise the arbitration regime and other dispute processing 
mechanisms as well as day-to-day arbitration practice, cross-cultural communication
78 See Alan Scott Rau and Edward F. Sherman (1995). Symposium on International Commercial 
Arbitration: Article: Tradition Innovation in International Arbitration Procedure. University of Texas 
International Law Journal, vol. 89. p. 9.
79 op.cit. 72 pp. 204-205.
80 Peter Sanders (2004). The Work of UNCITRAL on Arbitration. Second and Expanded Edition. 
Kluwer Law International.
81 See Karyn S. Weinberg, (1994). Equity in International Arbitration: How Fair is “Fair”? A Study of 
Lex Mercatoria and Amiable Composition. B.U. Int’l L.J. pp. 252-253.
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and a multi-cultures approach are required to promote globalisation of the commercial
• 82community where various cultures coexist and conflict with each other. Thus, 
together with developing other ADR techniques, the combination of conciliation with 
arbitration should now be sought to complement one other for a more efficient,
O'}
comprehensive mechanism.
9.3.2 Introducing Alternative Dispute Resolution
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is a process of dispute resolution falling 
between simple negotiation between the parties, to conciliation, mediation, 
consolidation and adversarial determination by arbitration. Mediation is by far the 
most frequently used option.84 It comes from the Latin root “m e d ia r e to halve. In 
Chinese it means to step between two parties and solve their problem, and in Arabic it 
indicates manipulation. For Westerners, “mediation” is a procedure that is used 
increasingly for conflict resolution.85 This section will examine why ADR should be 
considered an area of concern in any reform of international commercial arbitration in 
the Middle East and in what form.
9.3.2.1 Reasons for Introducing ADR
OiT
In the West, the influence of liberalism and rational -  choice theory view resolution 
primarily through an individualistic perspective. That is, conflict is seen as something 
residing with individuals and individual ‘rational’ choices, and thus resolution needs
on
to focus at this level.
This differs markedly from the Arab-Islamic conception that focuses on the
importance of community cohesion, with individual rights often subsumed by the
perceived interests of the greater community. Most notably, at the initial hearing the
judge asks the parties if they wish to arbitrate (tahkim) or mediate and seek 
*
82 op.cit 72, pp. 204-205.
83 Ibid.
84 See Michael Robinson (2001). Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution. Law Notes: Legal 
information from the Law Firm of Michael Robinson, p. 24.
85 See James A. Wall, Jr.; Ann Lynn (1993). Mediation: A Current Review. J. of Conflict Resolution, 
vol. 37, No. 1. p. 160.
86These sociologists and political scientists have tried to build theories around the idea that all action is 
fundamentally 'rational' in character and that people calculate the likely costs and benefits of any action 
before deciding what to do. This approach to theory is known as rational choice theory. See John Scott, 
(2000). Rational Choice Theory, From Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present. 
Edited By G. Browning, A. Halcli, and F. Webster. Sage Publications, p.l.
87See Benjamin MacQueen, (2004). Civil War, Islamic Politics, and conflict Resolution in the Arab 
Islamic World. Deakin University. Paper was presented to the 15th Biennial conference of the Asian 
studies Association of Australia Camberra 29 June -  2 July 2004. pp. 11-14
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conciliation (sulh). These methods of conflict resolution are well established in the 
Middle Eastern societies and manifested as locally -  grounded approaches to conflict 
resolution.
The legal anthropologist Lawrence Rosen has discussed the philosophical 
underpinning of the Islamic court system and jurisprudence as follows:
“Within the cultural context the purpose of law is not to impose an abstract 
norm but to put people back in the position of being able to negotiate their 
permissible relationships. The courts are the agencies not of the state but of 
the community and aim to enforce its prevailing values and practices, to 
stabilise relation between contending parties and to increase their capacity 
to manage their social relations. The courts are concerned with cultural not 
logical consistency, with the coherence of the community’s way of life 
rather than with the abstract formal consistency of legal norms and 
precedents”88
While it may make sense for Middle Eastern society to follow the customary law or 
sulha (conciliation) for resolution of local disputes where the qudat (Judges) operate 
as mediators at the local level, most international investors require a more familiar 
and standard form of arbitration which is consistent and with characteristics which are 
recognisable from a Western secular perspective.
As shown in Chapter Four, Middle East countries share a conciliation culture in 
which mediation/conciliation is in principle understood as the primary method for 
dispute processing, not as an alternative to litigation. For commercial dispute 
processing, non-confrontational dispute processing has recently become more 
accepted as the principal method for processing a dispute while maintaining the 
business relationship, which, is in most cases, a prime concern to the parties. Thus, it 
should be considered as one of the main drivers of the reform process.
But does the Model Law allow such introduction and modification? Sanders points 
out that conciliation which is associated in particular with the Far East, where it is 
still preferred to arbitration or litigation, is now being adopted in legislation by a
88 As quoted by Merry, Sally Engle, (1990). The Culture of judging -  The anthropology of Justice: Law 
as Culture in Islamic Society by Lawrence Rosen. Columbia Law Review. December 1990. vol. 90, 
Issue 8, p. 2311.
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number of countries - ironically when adopting the Model Law into which 
UNCITRAL refused to incorporate conciliation provisions. This is because 
conciliation is considered useful in implementing arbitral proceedings in practice. 
Further, businessmen choose arbitration because it offers the possibility of 
reconciliation in order to maintain the business relationship.89 Thus, the relationship 
between the parties should be duly articulated, in particular, to achieve a consistent 
and efficient solution in harmony with party autonomy between the parties.
If the cultural arguments for taking ADR into account for any reform in the Middle 
East remain, the question arises as to how far the introduction of ADR in the said 
region will be acceptable to parties from other jurisdictions? In short, despite the 
different rationales, the development of alternative dispute resolution systems and 
techniques is now widespread in many jurisdictions.
The past decade has seen significant expansion in the acceptance and use of 
mediation as a process for handling disputes. That expansion has been particularly 
marked in the legal and business sectors. Indeed, practitioners in the ADR field 
observe that mediation has begun to replace arbitration as the ‘process of choice” in 
the ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution) “market,” including institutional users like 
courts and major private consumers of ADR like businesses.
Arguments to explain the increased use of ADR in other jurisdictions may be 
expressed as follows.
First, ADR will maintain parties’ relationships. Alternative dispute resolution has 
been the most popular option in solving commercial disputes between major 
corporations to-date and it has been effective in commercial disputes.90
According to Heiden (1999),91 a trial can have negative outcomes. A victory in court 
does not mean a company wins a moral or a public relations victory. “Winning in 
court can give you money,” he says. “It does not give you ideas or customers.”
89 op.cit. 72. p. 205.
90See Amy I. Stickel (1999). ADR will become a growing factor in commercial disputes. Corporate 
legal times. August 1999. p. 38.
91 See Thomas J. Heiden reasoning for the growing use of ADR quoted by Amy I. Stickel (1999) in her 
article; ADR Will Become a Growing Factor in Commercial Disputes. Business Litigation. Corporate 
Legal Times.
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The advent of ADR has led to many disputes being ultimately resolved through 
mediation or negotiation. It involves a cooperative process with the intent to restore 
relationships rather than declare a winner and loser. Such a dispute resolution method 
may help repair parties’ relationships and be beneficial.
Secondly, the “market demand” argument; whatever may be said of the early growth 
of the “modem mediation movement,” there is consensus that the current “expansion” 
is due to a marked increase in the use of what is commonly referred to as “evaluative 
mediation” in the commercial domain as well as in other conflicts.
The market referred to here includes both private and institutional consumers, and 
lawyers, and cases comprising commercial and business matters. In these areas, 
mediation has increasingly become an evaluative and directive process - “directive” 
meaning the mediator not only offers judgements but exerts substantial pressure on 
the parties to accept them.94
This is justified, however, as a necessary and desirable response to a strong demand 
from mediation consumers for just this kind of process.95
Further, some commentators see the growth in evaluative mediation as a positive 
development, brought about by better understanding among clients of what they want 
from mediators. This suggests that, as mediation has become more widely used and 
more familiar, consumers of the process have come to realise the value of, and 
therefore demand, more substantive involvement from the mediator.
Especially in cases that are headed for, or are already in the legal system (where the 
parties generally, but not always, have lawyers), mediation clients have become 
frustrated and dissatisfied with mediators who refuse to offer substantive information 
and outcome predictions, on the grounds of “preserving party self-determination.”96 
Thus, the current expansion in mediation represents a growth in demand for mediation 
as a “low-risk” evaluation/settlement conference process, taking place mostly “in the 
shadow of the law” in court-related venues, with the demand fuelled primarily by
92 See Matt Arbaugh, (2002). Making Peace the Old Fashioned Way: Infusing Traditional Tribal 
Practice into Modem ADR. Pepperdine. Dispute Resolution L. J. p.319.
93 See Robert A. Baruch Bush (2002). Substituting Mediation for Arbitration: The Growing Market for 
Evaluation Mediation, and What it Means for ADR Field. Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal. 
vol. 3 p.113.
94 Ibid, see supra note 9, “In light of what she perceives as the increasingly coercive character of 
evaluative mediation, Professor Welsh has analogised its practice to that of a judicial settlement 
conference.”
95 Ibid., pp.l 13-114.
96 Ibid., p. 116.
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courts, other public agencies, and lawyers (or parties who expect to be engaged with 
them).
This growth is the result of a more educated consumer who better understands what 
mediation has to offer, after decades of exposure to the process, and is prepared to 
take advantage of it when presented with a form of practice that is genuinely 
helpful97
Thirdly, as a response to judicialised arbitration, perhaps ironically the move towards 
a more protective process may have accomplished precisely what it was intended to 
avoid. Making the arbitration process more protective automatically inevitably makes 
it more formal, cumbersome, expensive, and contingent. In other words, it makes 
arbitration more like the judicial process itself. Nor are the effects of these “reforms” 
limited to certain kinds of cases; the reformist impulse, coupled with the increasing 
involvement of lawyers as advocates in arbitration, have begun to change the shape of 
arbitration practice generally. The result has been a movement towards a 
“judicialised” form of arbitration, resembling adjudication itself more than the
no
original arbitration process.
In response, it has been said: “consumers are not stupid”. If the product no longer 
meets the need for which it was originally sought, it loses its appeal. The reform of 
arbitration began to a decline in popularity, beginning in the late 1980s. This is where 
the new set of facts, concerning developments in mediation practice and use emerged. 
Finally, ADR is a collection of ideas for encouraging disputants to play a greater role 
in settling their own differences, for providing greater flexibility in processing their 
own claims, and for doing so," no one argues that any given alternative method 
would be universally applicable to all cases. If there is value in the ADR, it is because 
it often provides flexibility and a greater sense of satisfaction to the parties involved 
in the dispute.100
According to Fleming, (1986): “the dispute settlement is a dynamic process. The 
parties who participate in it will make adjustments designed to improve their 
respective positions. When they do, the “new” may become the “old” and a new life 
cycle, demanding change, will begin. For that reason, the success of ADR will depend
97 Ibid., p. 117.
98 Ibid., pp. 120-121.
99 See Robben W. Fleming, (1986). Reflections on the ADR Movement. Cleveland State. Law Review. 
p.528.
100 Ibid., p.524.
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heavily on its ability to continually evaluate its own work, and to change its outlook in 
order to adapt to new conditions.”101
9.3.2.2 ADR in What form?
In order to determine what form of ADR could be introduced into Middle East 
international commercial law reform, it is necessary to learn from the UNCITRAL 
Model Law and the arbitration legislation of other countries. It is important to 
examine how the ADR mechanism has been introduced into other jurisdictions. The 
most common procedures are mediation or a combination of mediation and 
arbitration. The latter procedure is a unique resolution mechanism to resolve foreign- 
related disputes in China. This method should be recognised and supported in any 
future arbitration law reform in the Middle East. The following part will examine this 
procedure in comparison to other common methods of ADR, namely, negotiation and 
mediation.
Negotiation
Negotiation means that parties in dispute negotiate or talk among themselves to 
resolve the conflict or to work out a compromise between themselves. This is the 
simplest and very often the quickest way of settling commercial disputes, because the 
parties themselves are in the best position to know the strengths and weaknesses of 
their own cases. Therefore, they are in the best position to discuss and work out 
compromise amongst them. Further, there is no legal formality involved, so they are 
able to save a great deal of time in reaching a common solution.
This is the ‘soft approach’, preferred in Asian including Middle East countries’ 
culture because of its ability to maintain harmony and good relationships between 
people. More importantly, it is able to ‘save the face’ of the disputants, thereby 
maintaining the business relationship between them.102 
Mediation
Different notions come to mind when talking about mediation. Consequently, when 
the question arises as to what exactly the mediator should do when working towards 
achievement of agreement, the answer differs substantially among mediators. The
101 Ibid., pp. 528-529.
102 See Margaret Wang (2000). Are Alternative Dispute Resolution Methods Superior to Litigation in 
Resolving Disputes in International Commerce? Arbitration International vol. 16. No. 2. p. 191.
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problems and concerns depend to some extent on how the mediator tries to achieve 
his goal.103
Here, two main factors can affect the effectiveness of the role of mediator. First is the 
mediator’s ideology. According to (Stein 1985), “In addition to culture, training, and 
context, the mediator’s ideology serves as a strong influence for tactic selection. To 
this end, mediators’ reading of the conflict, mediators’ culture, their training, as well 
as the context and mediators’ ideology, determine the techniques employed in 
mediation.”104
The second factor affecting the effectiveness of mediation efforts is the parties’ 
motivation to negotiate and reach an agreement. “Like the motivation to agree, the 
parties’ commitment to the mediation process increases the effectiveness of the 
mediators’ techniques. Hiltrop (1989) reports, for instance, that settlement is highest 
when mediation is sought by both sides. Similarly, Camevale, Lim, and McLaughlin 
(1989) report that settlement is positively correlated with receptivity to mediation. 
Consistent with the effects of motivation to reach agreement and commitment to the 
mediation process is the effect upon the parties’ relationship.”105 
Combination of Mediation and Arbitration
In developing a model for harmonised international commercial arbitration as a 
dispute resolution mechanism, it is important to recognise the existence of two 
methodological parameters within the Middle East region. First is commercial 
arbitration according to the Islamic law context, and second is social justice in terms 
of culture, ethics and tradition. This distinction is vital because it is neither sufficient 
nor acceptable to generate reform in the Middle East without careful review of 
validation processes and limitations in light of these two parameters. Islamic Law and 
customary practice are two important sources of legislation. These two sources are 
themselves quite capable of accommodating harmonisation within the wider cultural 
context in which they are found. Therefore, any reform of commercial arbitration 
processes in the Middle East has to achieve validation from the perspective of Islamic 
law principles (fiqh) as well as from the cultural dimension.
Accordingly, the suggested theoretical paradigm has equated arbitration as a valid 
concept according to Islamic fiqh, and mediation as a valid concept in terms of
103 See James A. Wall, Jr.; Ann Lynn, (1993), Mediation: a Current Review. The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, vol. 37, No. 1 p. 170.
104 Ibid., pp. 170-174.
105 TU '. A
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culture, ethics and tradition. Accordingly, reform does not lead to the demise of 
Middle Eastern basic principles and fundamental concepts.
Mediation-arbitration is a combination of mediation and arbitration. The process is 
intended to allow the parties to profit from the advantages of both dispute settlement 
procedures. As mentioned before, this method is China’s unique innovation in that 
arbitration is combined with mediation, a method known as the “med/arb”.
It should be further noted that a mediator may act as an arbitrator in the arbitral 
proceedings and the legitimacy of meeting by arbitrators during the process of 
mediation should be accommodated, so as to provide a basis for a combination 
between arbitration and mediation.106
The question is: why should this form be taken into account. What about different 
practices and expectations of the parties from different cultural, economic and legal 
backgrounds? To answer these questions, it is important to analyse the main legal 
aspects of this method.
The Characteristics of Mediation/Arbitration
The benefit of this method comes from its characteristics as follows:
The “Mediator and arbitrator is the same person (which is not the case in ‘stand­
alone’ mediation); the mediation is an integral part of the arbitration, in the same 
tribunal; a mediated settlement will be handed down as an enforceable arbitration 
award. If such settlement is reached, the same tribunal automatically will revert to 
arbitration proceedings; mediation will be carried out only at the request of both 
parties, without obligation and the mediation process will be extremely informal and 
flexible. There is no set rule to be followed; a tribunal may conduct mediation in any
1 0 7way it deems appropriate”.
The Mediator’s Role
It is essential to examine the role of the mediator in order to assess its uniqueness. It 
has been indicated that the main role of a mediator is to investigate the facts and set 
out clearly to the parties the weaknesses and strengths of their claims. Then, the 
parties are encouraged to reassess each other’s underlying problems and compromise 
wherever possible.
The mediator’s role can be summarised as follows:
106 See Song Lianbin, Zhao Jian and Li Hong (2003). Approaches to Revision of the 1994 Arbitration 
Act of the People’s Republic of China. Journal of International Arbitration, vol. 20 No. 2. p. 188.
107 op.cit. 65. p. 543.
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“To suspend the arbitration proceedings and commerce mediation at any time during 
arbitration if both parties agree to settle their dispute by mediation; to facilitate 
communication between the parties, including holding ‘caucus sessions’; to 
investigate actively and understand the parties’ underlying problems and intentions. 
Without being under any obligation to give reasons, the mediator may suggest 
solutions to the parties, whether possible; information obtained during the mediation 
process must not be disclosed or re-used by the mediator or the parties on other 
occasions; to assist in drafting a settlement agreement and had it down as an 
enforceable arbitration award if settlement is agreed between the parties and if 
settlement is unlikely, or if the parties do not want to continue further, the mediator 
will conclude the mediation stage and revert to an arbitration process, with the same 
tribunal.”108
Impact of the Combined Mediation/Arbitration Mechanism
In advocacy of this form of ADR in international commercial arbitration law reform 
in the Middle East, the argument can be based that the combined mediation/arbitration 
mechanism has been producing successful results in similar conciliation legal culture 
like China. It is not surprising therefore, that this method has attracted much attention 
in the international dispute resolution community. It has been argued that, this 
procedure offers important advantages:
“Time and resources are saved by avoiding the need to proceed through a 
different tribunal if  mediation fails; the success rate is higher than in 
‘stand-alone mediation; the mediation settlement will be handed down as 
an enforceable arbitration award, in contrast to ‘stand alone’ mediation 
awards which constitute only a contractual obligation and after the 
mediation process, whether settlement is achieved or not, the parties will 
understand each other better. This tends to preserve good relationships 
after the final award.”109
108Ibid.
109 Ibid., p.544.
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9.3.2.3 Evaluation of the ADR Mechanism
Since ADR is collateral, informal, relationship-based model of conflict resolution, it 
usually fit better within a collectivist culture.110 This method is no longer only applied 
in traditional conciliation culture. It is often used in Europe, and in USA.
In Europe, the 2002 European Commission’s Green Paper on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in civil and commercial law has raised for formal consideration by 
Members States whether there should be EU legislation governing a wide spectrum of 
ADR mechanisms with civil litigation procedure. In the context of current EU 
momentum towards harmonisation of certain aspects of the civil litigation procedure 
of Member States in relation to commercial disputes, the desirability of the United 
Kingdom at least exploring the feasibility of an ADR Act would seem to be strongly 
demonstrated.111
The English rules which are based on the Woolf Report place considerable emphasis 
on efforts to reach a settlement. Whether this will also lead to a change in arbitration 
attitudes cannot yet be predicted with any certainty. However, the 1996 English 
Arbitration Act requires arbitrators to adopt suitable procedures to avoid unnecessary 
delay.112
In the United States, the courts can appoint a special master and require parties to first
i  i n
try resolving their dispute through ADR. Further, in a research report on alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) services in the United States (Brett et al., 1996) found that 
about 78% of cases referred to mediation were resolved, and mediation had a number 
of other advantages over arbitration: mediation participants are more satisfied than 
arbitration participants with the process, its implementation and outcome, as well as 
with its effects on the parties’ relationship.
Fellows and Hancock (1994), indicated that, culture has a significant impact on 
domestic issues and disputes. The success in resolving domestic disputes in China 
with the combined mediation/arbitration practice has much to do with Chinese culture 
and with a lack of alternative for locals.114
110 See David Pitts and Yuseok Moon (2002). Individualism, Collectivism & Transformative 
Mediation. Paper prepared for submission to the 15th annual conference of the International Association 
for Conflict Management, Utah. p. 5.
11 ^ ee Sir Anthony Colman, (2003). ADR: An Irreversible Tide? Arbitration International, vol. 19, 
No.3 LCIA, p.304.
112 See Norbert Horn (2000). The Development of Arbitration in International Financial Transactions. 
Arbitration International, vol. 16, no. 3. LCIA , p. 295.
113 Ibid.
114 op.cit. 65, p. 544.
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Major international arbitration institutions have been developing their ADR facilities 
and capabilities with understandable urgency, because these mechanisms are market- 
driven. The AAA, the ICC, ICSID, the LCIA and WIPO all promote their own sets of 
conciliation or mediation rules; and there are now also many domestic organisations 
around the world offering mediation services, particularly in the USA and other parts 
of the common law world.115 A mediated agreement in “pure” mediation is generally 
enforceable as a contract. But such a settlement is not covered by the New York 
Convention. Thus, a court will not give a mediated agreement the same deference it 
gives an arbitral award. The question thus arises as to whether a mediated settlement 
in the med/arb process is enforceable like an arbitral award.116
After a through examination of all the relevant factors as above, if ADR is searching 
for new directions in an increasingly globalised world where the role of ethics is given 
more primacy, and if leading jurists in the world are calling for the teaching of 
comparative law and legal pluralism as an acknowledgement of the fact that human 
societies are not discrete objects of their own, like flotsams and jetsam in the rivers of 
time, but are closely interconnected, and if ADR is enshrined in Muslim juridical 
thought and if Muslims in the Diaspora come from legal pluralistic backgrounds and 
are practising legal pluralism, then, might the time have arrived for all these issues to
117be looked at in an integrated fashion?
9.4 Mechanism for Reform: Practical Implication
This part will suggest a practical mechanism for introducing international commercial 
arbitration law reform in the Middle East region. First, it will suggest the institutional 
mechanism for harmonising process, and second, reflect on the role of existing 
regional conventions as well as regional dispute resolution centres in the reform 
process.
9.4.1 Instituting an Intraregional Harmonisation Process
Because of the similarity of concept, circumstances and purpose, a practical example 
suggestion is to establish an institution for international commercial arbitration law 
reform in the Middle East within the Arab League, similar to the African OHADA.
115 See Martine Hunter (2000). International Commercial Dispute Resolution: The Challenge of the 
Twenty-first Century. Arbitration International, vol. 16, No. 4. LCIA. p. 383.
116 See James T. Peter (1997). Note & Comments: MED-ARB In International Arbitration. The 
American Review of International Arbitration. Juris Publishing, p.3.
117 See Mohammad M. Keshavjee (2002). “Alternative Dispute Resolution: Its Resonance in Muslim 
Thought and future Directions”. The Institute of Ismaili Studies, p. 207.
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OHADA is the French name translated as the Organisation for Harmonisation in 
African Business Law.118
Like Middle East laws, most African laws were unreformed laws from the colonial 
era that had often become grossly out-of-date. In addition, acknowledgement of 
existing commercial legal instruments in member countries was not widespread 
among their citizens or even among their legal professionals.119 
As a collaborative effort to enhance access to international trade law information for 
the joint benefit of African countries, OHADA exists under the treaty on the 
Harmonisation of business law in African signed in Port Louis, Mauritius, on October 
17, 1993.
As October 1, 2001, sixteen African states were members of OHADA. Following the 
African model, the institution suggested for the Middle East region will be able to 
restore the legal and judicial security of economic activities in order to promote 
investors’ confidence and to facilitate international trade. The institution should have 
the following objectives: (a) make available to each country common commercial 
rules that are both simple and adapted to their current economic conditions; (b) 
promote arbitration as a speedy and confidential means of settling commercial 
disputes; (c) improve the training of judges and auxiliary officers of justice; and (d) 
encourage the setting up of a Middle East Economic Community.
Similar to the African structure of OHADA, the new institute suggested for the 
Middle East could be formed from the four institutions responsible for formulation 
and implementation of its new international commercial arbitration law.
The Council of Arab Ministers of Justice meets regularly to adopt by unanimous vote 
the proposed uniform international commercial arbitration law. The Permanent 
Secretariat is attached to the Council of Ministers and is responsible for the 
preparation of uniform law in consultation with the governments of Middle East 
countries. The advanced regional School of Magistracy is attached to the Permanent 
Secretariat. It is responsible for the training of judges and auxiliary officers of justice 
of their countries. The Common Court of Justice and Arbitration has the following 
attribution: it is consulted for its advisory opinion on draft uniform law before its
118 See OHADA- a Source of Harmonised African Commercial Law, (2002). International Contract 
Adviser, vol. 3 No. 13. p. 3. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
119 Ibid.
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submission and final adoption by the Council of Ministers, and also on the 
interpretation and application of uniform law.
The OHADA experience shows it is possible to establish a uniform arbitration law 
based on the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law. The OHADA model has been 
applied to all member states, whether the arbitration involves parties from an 
OHADA country or from a foreign state. The law is modem and flexible; its purpose 
is to promote arbitration as an efficient means to settle disputes. Further, the Rules of
Arbitration of the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration set out the functions of
120the Court with regard to arbitration and other jurisdictional matters.
If that is the case, and remembering what Thomas Jefferson wrote to a friend in 1816, 
“I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and 
institutions, but I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the 
progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as 
new discoveries are made, new truth disclosed, and manner and opinions change with 
the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the 
times.”121, as well as what Gabriel Wilner said, “...the effort must go beyond merely 
educating the governments and business and legal circles in developing countries of 
the advantages of the process...”122 for the same result to be expected in the Middle 
East region.
9.4.2 Unification of Regional Dispute Resolution Centres’ Rules
The second practical suggestion to introduce international commercial law reform is 
unification of existing regional dispute resolution centres’ rules. In 1983, the 
establishment of the Arab Amman Convention on Commercial Arbitration was 
agreed. In 1987, fourteen Arab states convened the Amman Arab Convention on 
Commercial Arbitration, which was modelled on the Washington Convention. The 
Amman Arab Convention was intended to establish the Arab Centre for Commercial 
Arbitration in Rabat, Morocco. The requirement is that all proceedings shall be
120 Ibid., p. 13.
121 The writing of Thomas Jefferson 40 (Lipscomb ed.), as quoted in Stein and Hay, Cases and 
Materials on the Law and Institutions of Atlantic Area iii (1963); and in the work of Philip C. Jessup 
(1964). “Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of Nations.” The American Journal o f International Law. 
vol. 58. p. 343.
122 op.cit 65.
123 This Convention was convened to establish the Arab Centre for Commercial Arbitration and rules 
therefore. The centre was to be seated in Rabat, Morocco. In fact, it has not been established.
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conducted in Arabic; this, however, has limited the Centre's appeal outside the Arab 
states.124
Despite twelve125 countries signing the convention, the Centre has never been 
established and to-date, no commercial dispute has been settled or even referred to 
arbitration under the Amman Convention. One reason could be the difficulties 
associated with having different commercial arbitration laws among the members 
state. In other words, the inconsistency of legal framework in Middle East region have 
negatively impacted on the establishment and the function of the Amman Convention. 
On the other side, Egypt agreed to establish the Cairo Regional Centre for 
International Commercial Arbitration (AALCC). The Centre was apparently 
responsible for Egypt's 1994 Arbitration Act, which is said to have influenced, in turn, 
other Arab states, attempts to modernise their arbitration laws. Following the 
enactment of Egypt's Arbitration Act, the Centre began to receive significant numbers 
of cases. To-date, 320 international matters have come before the centre - in recent
19 f%years at the rate of approximately 50 per year.
In contrast to the Amman Convention, the enactment of the Egyptian 1994 Law based 
on the UNCITRAL Model Law has helped the Cairo Regional Centre for 
International Commercial Arbitration become a stronger presence for arbitration in 
the Middle East, as well as have a positive impact on trade in Egypt. The main lesson 
to be learnt from these two examples is the strong relationship between establishing 
harmonised international commercial law reform based on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law and the effectiveness of regional dispute resolution centres.
Further, numerous national arbitration centres have sprung up in the Middle East, 
including the Arbitration Centre at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Beirut, 
Lebanon; the Conciliation and Arbitration Centre of Tunis, Tunisia; the Bahrain 
Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (which applies the 1976 UNCITRAL
124 See Charles N. Brower and Jeremy K. Sharpe (2003). International Arbitration and the Islamic 
World: The Third Phase. The American Journal Of International Law, vol. 97, No. 3 p. 654. See Also 
Mahir Jalili (1990). Amman Arab Convention on Commercial Arbitration, Journal of international 
Arbitration.
125 These twelve countries are: “Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, 
Syria, Tunisia, UAE and Yemen.” Countries not signing the convention: “Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.”
126 See Charles N. Brower, Jeremy K. Sharpe (2003) International arbitration and the Islamic World: 
The Third Phase. The American Journal of International Law, vol. 97, No. 3. p.654. See also Fathi 
Kemicha, The Emergence of New Arbitration Centres in the Arab World, in Law of International 
Business and Dispute Settlement in The 21st Century: Libera Amicorum Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel 371, 
373 (Robert Briner, L. Yves Fortier, Klaus Peter Berger, & Jens Bredow eds., 2001).
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Arbitration Rules); the Kuwait Centre for Commercial Arbitration; and, in the United 
Arab Emirates, the Abu Dhabi Centre for Conciliation and Arbitration, and the Dubai 
Centre for Arbitration and Conciliation.
In order to further encourage the use of arbitration, the Arab Association for 
International Arbitration (AAAI, according to its French acronym) was created in 
1991. Its goals are to establish arbitration in the curriculum of legal studies in the 
Arab world; promote arbitration in the Arab Chamber of Commerce “so that 
arbitration becomes the rule for the settlement of disputes relating to national and 
international commerce and that resort to national courts becomes the exception”; and
• • • 127stimulate the development of modem, progressive arbitration legislation.
The proliferation of mles and protocols of arbitration centres all vying for a place in
the sun, if not supremacy, in the Arab world, may be more a sign of weakness than of
strength. The absence of any serious reported arbitration in Rabat, despite a genuine
attempt in the Amman Convention of 1987 to set it up as a major and supreme centre
128for commercial arbitration is one example of such weakness.
More generally, arbitration centres, in the existing multilayered outdated arbitration
legislations to which several jurisdictions have adhered, have apparently tried to
circumvent this weakness, but the problem has became more complex because of the
existing situation. This complexity has become more obvious with a long string of
statutes setting aside arbitration awards granted, by freezing them, subjecting them to
1
various appeals, or simply ignoring them. Therefore, the necessity of reform to 
focus on the impact of regional centres to adopt or to elaborate a coherent, modem 
legal framework to guide international commercial practices has become somewhat 
obvious.
It can be observed that international commercial arbitration systems in the region 
supported by numerous domestic substantive and procedural legislations have proven 
inappropriate or unsuitable for the processing of disputes involving cross-border 
commerce or business. As commercial activities become more global, the greater 
becomes the need for global processing.
127 Ibid., p. 655. See also, Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab (1992). Why Create the Arab Association for 
International Arbitration? INT’L ARB., vol. 29 No. 31 (“The role of the AAAI is indeed to help the 
ICC in this task by communicating the case law, academic writing and legislation of Arab countries in 
a regular manner and by co-operating with it in the ... performance of awards in these countries.”).
128 See Mohamed El Memissi (2002). Arbitration in Morocco. Realities and Perspectives. Journal of 
International Arbitration, vol. 19 No. 2. Kluwer Law International, p. 136.
129 Ibid.
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Any reform of international commercial arbitration in the Middle East region should 
be compatible with global standards based on the Model Law. Given the unique 
features of the Model Law, certain cultural and ethical norms make it particularly 
unsuitable if it has been simply transplanted without adjustment to take account of 
local customary and cultural values and norms.130 Thus, reform becomes more than 
simply organising a draft of law; it has to go far beyond simple articles of dispute 
resolution mechanisms to reflect on main factors which can facilitate the 
modernisation of regional laws so that regionalism assists and enhance the 
harmonisation process of the Model Law.
Several questions have been examined to show how the core social values and 
harmony can be preserved and maintained since where “reason is silent; conflict 
between rival values cannot be rationally settled.”131 Other areas still pose challenges 
and it has been argued they should be open to change if international commercial 
arbitration law reform is to be effective.
130 See Catherine A. Rogers (2001). Between Cultural Boundaries and Legal Traditions: Ethics in 
International Commercial Arbitration. Social Science Research Network, pp. 86-87.
131 Ibid., p. 77.
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CHAPTER TEN 
General Conclusion
As a result of the global process of harmonisation of international commercial
arbitration law, this thesis has reviewed and analysed the impact of the doctrine of 
regionalism in terms of the cultural, legal, social and historical factors which exist in 
the Middle East region. An understanding of these factors is vital in determining 
whether regionalism as a concept in the context of the Middle East can sustain or 
facilitate the harmonisation process in international commercial arbitration law.
10.1 Main Findings
Regionalism in the context of the Middle East has different values and cultural norms 
regarding dispute resolution mechanisms and, in particular, international commercial 
arbitration, from those found in the West, which have significantly influenced the 
development of the legal framework of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The hypothesis 
proposed in Chapter One has been supported, in that the regionalism doctrine in the 
Middle East region negatively affects the successful establishment of a framework for 
harmonisation of international commercial arbitration law. In respect of the first 
research question, the findings identified areas of differences between Middle Eastern 
and Western legal culture with regard to international commercial arbitration, and 
explained how such differences exist in terms of socio-legal and cross-cultural 
comparative social values. As regards the second research question, the Middle East 
region can comply with international commercial arbitration concepts and its values 
can be accommodated and maintained within the framework of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. Any further misgiving of the Middle East region to the global process of 
harmonisation is unjustified.
The main chapter findings are as follows: Chapter Two showed that the harmonisation 
process is not a new phenomenon; it is a continuous process, and the development of 
the lex mercatoria and evolution of the UNCITRAL Model Law should be understood 
in this way. Despite the fact that the UNCITRAL Model Law is a standard framework 
for universal harmonisation, evidence from other regions, shows that cultural 
deviation exists within Europe “differences between civil and common law”. Further, 
other regions like NAFTA, MERCOSUR, Latin America, Asia and Africa have 
regulated their laws differently, emphasising the impact of regionalism on the 
legislative framework of international commercial arbitration. This chapter has 
provided the bases for pursuing discussion.
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By applying John Austin’s theory of legal positivism to the Western region, Chapter 
Three explained how commercial arbitration has been developed within Western 
culture. Firstly, normative concept was analysed to clarify the behaviour in the West 
towards the development of modem international commercial arbitration. Tracing 
commercial arbitration history in this region, evidence shows interjurisdictional 
competition in the UK as well as the USA, and market competition for hosting 
commercial arbitration cases for economic reasons played a significant role in the 
development of modem international commercial arbitration law. The normative 
concept explains how the Model Law was developed spontaneously from the basic 
desire to see trade disputes settled, and harmonisation can be best explained in terms 
of the need to produce goods and services.
Further, the normative concept showed how the Western concept of individualism 
played a significant role in its development since the concept of party autonomy, 
considered a fundamental characteristic of commercial arbitration, is fully respected 
and acknowledged in the said culture in terms of recognising the arbitral contract 
developed by the parties. Thirdly, it showed how merchants played a major role in 
establishing their own courts, which applied the lex mercatoria developed by them 
whereas commercial arbitration was developed as a private mechanism for dispute 
settlement.
The second concept of positivism legal theory - the institutional concept - explained 
how modem commercial arbitration law has developed as Western societies have 
adopted anti-statism in the legislative process. Evidence from Europe and USA 
showed how the positions of states have changed over time in favouring development 
of the law by giving up the traditional position taken by legal systems and allowing 
other lobbying and interest groups to have their role in the legislative process. The 
coercive concept of John Austin’s positivism legal philosophy explained how 
commercial law has been obeyed and fulfilled. The contract’s nature in terms of the 
intentions of the parties as well as the binding authority is fully respected under the 
judicial character of law and this character has been introduced into the UNCITRAL 
Model Law.
Using the same legal philosophy Chapter Four showed how the Middle East region 
has different social and legal values. Contrary to Western competition values, the 
Middle East has the concept of “given law”. This concept has its base within the 
religious values of Islamic law which is derived from the Qur’an and Sunnah, thus,
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there is no need to compete with others for establishing law. Further, this chapter 
showed how the concept of collectivism dominates the Middle East region’s culture. 
According to this concept, and contrary to the West, harmony of the community not 
the interest of individual is the core concern. In other words, individuals cannot agree 
on matters contrary to group values or which could negatively affect the community, 
and if they do, the agreement will be null and void. Considering the second concept of 
John Austin’s positivism legal philosophy, the state in the Middle East has a position 
contrary to that in the West. The state’s monopoly in terms of statism is the general 
attitude in the legislation process.
Interest groups’ activity to advocate their interests does not exist; the state is 
considered the only legitimate power to protect the interests of the society as a whole. 
Regarding the coercive aspect, contrary to the West, an arbitration agreement is 
revocable if the final tribunal’s decision has not been issued. In other words, to 
promote the harmony of society, the most important concern is not to “judge” but 
rather to settle the dispute. Therefore, judging the dispute in terms of winner or loser 
should be the last choice, thus, unsurprisingly an agreement is revocable, favouring 
mutual resolution of the dispute.
Chapter Five showed how the Western region is very keen to harmonise international 
commercial contracts and showed some of the major steps taken to accomplish this. 
Further, it showed competing theories governing international contracts in relation to 
the state contract in general, and how Western cultural theories favoured some over 
others. It showed western values favour sanctity of the contract over flexibility. 
Contract conditions must be fully detailed in clauses and each clause is expected to be 
fully executed by contract parties. It also showed western legal culture favoured 
monism over dualism, that one set of legal rules are applied to international contract. 
Despite the public law argument, western values favour arbitrability of the contract 
with public law elements. These perceptions can be seen incorporated in the 
framework and clauses of international commercial arbitration law.
In order to seek and give meaning to Middle East perceptions of international contract 
principles, Chapter Six examined and showed that the Middle East has perceptions 
about contract principles that differ from those adopted in western culture. Many 
factors were identified as influences the formation of this different perception and 
understanding. Tradition and ethics favour the conciliation character of the contract. 
Islamic Law also plays a significant role in Middle East perceptions of the contract.
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Fundamental validation of the contract is not referred to the intention of the parties, 
rather, to the principles of Islamic Law. Both the motive and reason should be valid 
according to Islamic Law to validate the contract. Reference to certain contract 
conditions in Islamic Law, i.e. “to contract on future thing”, and “choice of special 
condition” are similar to international commercial contract principles’ reference to 
potential contractual issues not actual ones. Contracting on a future issue is a unique 
condition in Islamic Law which requires in general that the contract’s subject should 
exist at the time of contracting. Accordingly, the Middle East’s contrary position to 
the West has different concepts of international commercial contract that favour 
flexibility over sanctity, public over private and dualism over monism. Finally, while 
arbitrators are immune under the Western principle of the contract, they are liable for 
their acts according to the Middle East principle of contract.
In examining the impact of the UNCITRAL Model Law in Middle East region, 
Chapter Seven provided evidence of misgivings as to the Middle East’s participation 
in the global harmonisation process of international commercial arbitration law. The 
chapter indicated that the Middle East region has a complex, outdated, and 
multilayered legislation framework. Further, countries can be categorised into four 
different categories in respect of their approach to international commercial 
arbitration. Five countries, Bahrain, Tunisia, Egypt, Oman and Jordan, of eighteen 
countries in the Middle East have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law. The second 
category (Saudi Arabia and Yemen) has adopted the principle of the Islamic Law 
concept to govern commercial disputes and their settlement. The third category 
(Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco and Syria) uses the French approach mainly for 
historical reasons. The fourth category (Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Palestine, 
Libya, Sudan, Iraq and Qatar) has adopted a mixed statutory approach to arbitration 
laws (Islamic Law and secular Western-inspired statutory during the colonial era.) 
Analysis of how the UNCITRAL Model Law has been introduced in these five 
countries was undertaken in Chapter Eight, and showed that some Middle East 
perceptions of the contract principle have been adopted. The Dualism principle has 
been adopted in the case of Bahrain and Tunisia. Egypt has issued a supplementary 
article favouring public over private contract principles. In other words, the state 
contract in Egypt is subject to administrative law and is not allowed to be arbitrated 
spontaneously before certain procedures have been obtained first. All five countries 
share the flexibility principle of the contract in that in cases where parties have
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reached agreement before the arbitral tribunal decides the dispute, the arbitral tribunal 
issues its decision according to the conditions of such agreement. Most importantly, 
almost all main features of the UNCITRAL Model Law are maintained in their 
legislation.
Chapter Nine showed that the UNCITRAL Model Law can be introduced to the 
Middle East region provided it accommodates local values. This chapter reflected on 
the competing arguments used to deny the reform and participation in the global 
process of harmonising international commercial arbitration based on the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. It showed that such arguments can be appealed, and will not withstand 
insightful critical analyses and evaluation. On the one hand, it is argued by Saudi 
Arabia and other countries that Islamic law should govern and be applied to 
international commercial contracts. This argument directly or indirectly suggests that 
modem international law cannot be introduced in these jurisdictions. Reference to 
Islamic methodological showed the principles, concepts and framework of 
international commercial arbitration law are valid according to primary and secondary 
sources of Islamic methodology. The chapter also, defined why reform is problematic 
and showed how it could be introduced. Other social forces such as cultural estoppel 
should not work as a barrier to reform. An open regulatory system, rather than, 
statism and state monopoly of the legislation process, should be seriously considered 
to ensure efficient law reform. The second part of this chapter suggested a theoretical 
paradigm of comprehensive dispute resolution based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
This paradigm suggested introducing the ADR mechanism of mediation/arbitration as 
a tool for dispute resolution since it could take the region’s conciliation social values 
into account, is an accepted tool within the framework of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, and other regions, for example, China, have introduced the mechanism in their 
arbitration law. Further, this chapter suggested a mechanism for introducing law 
reform by instituting the reform process among the eighteen countries in the region 
under the umbrella of the Arab League based on the experience of African countries 
that have used the OHADA reform mechanism.
The chapter also suggested unification of regional dispute resolution centres’ rules to 
promote a comprehensive reform framework. Thus, the UNCITRAL Model Law 
could be incorporated into Middle East regional legislations despite differences in 
cultural values; regionalism could promote and add to the harmonisation process of 
international commercial arbitration law, and not act as a barriers.
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10.2 Contribution
The Middle East should face the reality that its commercial activities will inevitably 
include cross-border commercial disputes. Harmonisation requires a new system that 
reflects global standards of the UNCITRAL Model Law. This thesis makes a valuable 
contribution to the discussion on the way in which harmonisation of commercial 
arbitration can be pursued in the Middle East. This issue has not been previously 
researched in such a comprehensive manner.
By applying theories accepted in the West, the thesis adopted Western positivism 
legal theory to undertake a thorough analysis of the legal culture displayed in 
commercial arbitration legal system in the Middle East. It examined pre-existing 
Middle East national laws and prevailing cultural values, and legal environment 
according to the scope of this Western philosophical legal framework in order to 
explain regional legal values within a structure of this legal theory. Further, it has 
identified the cultural deviation issue within a cross-cultural and comparative law 
analysis.
It identified areas where important cultural differences exist between the Middle East 
Region and Modem International Commercial Arbitration law, including differences 
between arbitration legal systems which exist within the region. Thus, applying 
western positivism legal theory to analyse Middle Eastern legal culture values makes 
the research arguments more convincing and persuasive.
The thesis provides broad knowledge of the historical source of Middle East 
commercial arbitration legal culture. Starting from the historical legal concepts and 
thoughts of Arab society, it undertook a systematic analysis on the evolution and 
development of international commercial arbitration legal systems in major historical 
periods in the Middle East. In this sense, it has provided a summary of Middle East 
legal culture regarding dispute resolution mechanisms.
Moreover, the thesis has merged theoretical and practical aspects within the context of 
international commercial arbitration awards to offer mechanisms to handle multi - 
valued international commercial disputes. It suggests a comprehensive theoretical 
paradigm.
It generates a proposition that reforms are more likely to succeed if their designers 
adjust them to the cultural environment, thus supporting the argument that regional 
values can add to the global activities of the harmonisation process of international 
commercial arbitration law. In addition, a clear understanding of the guidelines for the
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reform and development of Middle East international commercial arbitration legal 
systems has been achieved. Towards this end, this thesis can be used to assess the 
stability of transplanting legal aspects of the UNCITRAL Model Law to the Middle 
East region.
It also provides dual awareness of the harmonisation process. On the one hand, it 
assures Middle East countries that they will have access to an efficient mechanism to 
solve potential disputes which might arise from an international contract by offering 
decision-makers certainty that their regional values will be accommodated within the 
accepted international legal standards of the UNCITRAL Model Law for commercial 
dispute resolution legislations.
On the other hand, it offers the Western comparative law literature detailed analyses 
of differences and similarities existing with Middle East commercial arbitration 
culture displayed in their legal norms. Thus, it shows the legal science how Middle 
East cultural deviations should not be viewed as barriers to the global harmonisation 
process but rather as crucial elements to ensure successful reform of international 
commercial arbitration.
10.3 Further Research
It seems appropriate to include in this thesis the consideration of other areas requiring 
further research, which, although necessary in international commercial arbitration, 
are beyond the remit of this study:
1. Assessing the effects of current legislation of international commercial arbitration 
on Middle East national economies.
2. Explanatory studies on the role of legal professionals, mainly lawyers, judges and 
academics as well as other interest groups like corporations, multinationals and non­
governmental organisation (NGOs) promoting the reform process.
3. Explanatory studies to formulate a code of conduct in relation to international 
commercial arbitration reflecting common legal values accepted by all countries 
within the Middle East region.
It is hoped that with comprehensive and extensive studies being carried out in the 
suggested areas of further research, comprehensive measures can be adopted to 
establish a model law of reform incorporating a regional code of conduct within the 
framework of the UNCITRAL Model Law of international commercial arbitration.
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10.4 Practical Implications of the Research
According to World Bank data, the Middle East suffers from insufficient foreign 
direct investment. The data1 indicates:
Data Profile 2000 2003 2004
Merchandise trade (%of GDP) 50.0 52.1 55.1
Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows US $ 4.1 billion 5.6 billion 5.3 billion.
Long-term debt US $ 121.2 billion 137.9 billion 141.0 billion.
This work has suggested the establishment of an institution which has the mandate for 
the harmonisation process, overseen by the Arab League. This suggested institution 
will facilitate research and propose practical measures. This new institution will assist 
other agencies involved in the legislation process, and decrease the level of state 
monopoly. As a consequence of this practical mechanism, expected outputs will 
enable countries to overcome the inconsistency of intraregional commercial 
arbitration law, and enable national economies to engage more effectively in the 
global context.
10.5 Limitations
Necessarily, a thesis on international commercial arbitration will focus on this aspect 
of law and practice; however, cases materials from the region are limited in 
availability. Due to the confidential nature of commercial arbitration procedure, 
detailed arbitral cases are not accessible in the region. Moreover, there have been a 
limited numbers of arbitral cases over the last two decades because of outdated 
legislation which exists in the Middle East. Another limitation is the limited number 
of countries that have introduced reform into their commercial arbitration legislations. 
Baring in mind the aforementioned limitations and the existing negative impact of the 
state’s monopoly over legislation, this research suggests that unless fundamental 
reform to existing arbitration law is implemented, the Middle East region will find 
itself lagging behind the global harmonisation process of international commercial 
arbitration which may, in turn, have detrimental trade and investment consequences. 
The research has provided a legal framework for policy-makers to introduce coherent 
international commercial arbitration law reform in the Middle East region.
1 See www.devdata.worldbank.org/extemal/cpprofile.asp7SelectedCountrv
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